Political networks and the 2014 Afghan presidential election: power restructuring, ethnicity and state stability

Abstract

This article examines power dynamics in political groupings during the 2014 Afghanistan presidential election and assesses the impact on political stability and order. The focus is the power dynamics of local political-economic and identity networks that have come to underpin and constitute the state in post-2001 international state-building. The article first seeks to understand how the complex relationships between the two leading presidential candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, and key powerbrokers were negotiated and subsequently influenced electoral outcomes. Second, focusing on negotiations over the appointment of the Cabinet ministers, advisers and staff, and governors, the study maps the restructuring of political networks within the Afghan state. The analysis reveals the impact of the election on the redistribution of power and resources, and the consequences for political order and state stability in the post-2014 period.

Keywords:

• Political networks
• power restructuring
• ethnicity
• state stability
• political order
• National Unity Government (NUG)

Notes

1. Goodhand and Sedra, ‘Who Owns the Peace’, 82.

2. See Brahimi, ‘State Building’, 16–17.

3. Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Elite Networks’, 6.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. As Noah Coburn points out in his paper in this volume, political parties that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century boasted strong ideological positions that were unpopular with most of the Afghan population. Moreover, the transformation of these parties into ethnic-based militias during the jihad against the Soviets further undermined their credibility, and the 1990s civil war saw these groups turning against each other and later the Taliban, causing widespread the destruction throughout the country.

7. Larson, ‘Political Parties in Afghanistan’.

8. See Ruttig, ‘Political Parties at the Fringes Again’; Reynolds and Carey, ‘Fixing Afghanistan’s Electoral System’; Larson, ‘Political Parties in Afghanistan’.

9. See Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Elite Networks’ for extensive details of the Western-educated technocrats.

10. See Lake and Wong, ‘Politics of Networks’, 129, for a further discussion of ‘nodes’.

11. Atmar had served in various capacities in the Karzai Administration including as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Minister of Education, and most recently Interior Minister.

12. Popal had served in various capacities in the Karzai Administration including as Deputy Minister for Customs and Revenue, Governance Advisor to Karzai, and most recently the Director-General for the Independent Directorate of Local Governance.

13. Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Elite Networks’.

14. Ibid.

15. Sharan and Heathershaw, ‘Identity Politics and Statebuilding’.

16. Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Elite Networks’, 6; Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Informal Political Networks’.

17. In the 2014 election, for example, both candidates and their network clients for the first time seriously competed to win the women’s vote in the main cities. They tried to articulate slogans that reflected women’s needs; Ghani, for instance, even promised four ministerial positions and a female high court nominee in the second round of election.

18. For a detailed discourse analysis of ethnicisation of elections see Sharan and Heathershaw, ‘Identity Politics and Statebuilding’.

19. Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Weak State’. A patron–client practice is an exchange relationship of some private and personal nature where players have reciprocal needs and expectations, but unequal power and status.

20. Noelle, State and Tribe.

21. See Giustozzi, ‘Good State vs Bad Warlords?’.

22. Bijlert, ‘How to Win an Afghan Election’; Wilder, ‘A House Divided?’, 6.

23. Independent Election Commission, ‘Afghanistan Presidential Election Results—2004’.

24. Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Elite Networks’.

25. Giustozzi, ‘Good State vs. Bad Warlords?’.

26. Coburn, ‘Political Economy in the Wolesi Jirga’; Sharan, ‘Power Dynamics of Informal Political Networks’.

27. Sharan and Heathershaw, ‘Identity Politics and Statebuilding’.

28. Killid Group, ‘Governor Recruitment in Afghanistan’.

29. Figure 2 highlights 12 powerful individual networks (comprising patrons and provincial governors). Provinces of rule are indicated in parentheses.

30. Independent Election Commission, ‘Presidential and Provincial Councils Elections’.

31. BBC Persian, ‘BBC Exclusive Interview with Hamid Karzai’, January 2016.

32. For a detailed analysis of the ethnicisation of the 2009 election see Sharan and Heathershaw, ‘Identity Politics and Statebuilding’; Sahar, ‘Ethnicizing Masses’.

33. Abdullah Abdullah has a Tajik mother and Pashtun father.

34. The list of MPs who supported Ashraf Ghani was obtained from the Ashraf Ghani campaign.

35. Several election observers, scholars and reporters have commented on vote-rigging during the 2014 election. See Bose, ‘An Election Observer’s View’; Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmad, ‘Afghan Candidate Alleges Voting Fraud by Karzai Aides’, New York Times, 16 June 2014; The Economist, ‘Stuffed Sheep’; Bijlert and Clark, ‘Elections 2014(35)’; also see Maley and Maley’s contribution in this volume.

36. Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Afghan Election Crisis: Stuffed Sheep’, The Guardian, 22 June 2014; The Economist, ‘Stuffed Sheep’.

37. Independent Election Commission, ‘Presidential and Provincial Councils Elections’.

38. Bijlert, ‘Elections 2014’.

39. Author interview with Sardar Rahimi, Kabul, 11 February 2015.

40. Ibid.

41. Bose and Ibrahimi, ‘Why Afghanistan’s National Unity Government’.

42. Clark, ‘Elections 2014(39)’.

43. Ibid.

44. The Asia Foundation, ‘Afghanistan in 2015’, 169.

45. Author interview with two senior OAA staff, Kabul, 22–23 August 2015.

46. See for example Matta, ‘Failed Pilot Test’.

47. ‘Agreement between the Two Campaign Teams’, 1.

48. Author interview with Abdul Salam Rahimi, Chief of Staff to the President, Office of Administrative Affairs, Kabul, 12 May 2015.

49. Matta, ‘Failed Pilot Test’.

50. For a detailed analysis of Kunduz’s fragmented security architecture see Goodhand and Hakimi, ‘Counterinsurgency, Local Militias and Statebuilding’, 32–37.

51. Author interview with Abdul Salam Rahimi, Chief of Staff to the President, Office of Administrative Affairs, Kabul, 12 May 2015.