Politics, exit strategy and political settlement in Sierra Leone: a critical analysis of a laboratory experiment (1991–2015)

Abstract

A glance at key indicators—in terms of growth forecast and stable elections—will project Sierra Leone as a political settlement model for a post-conflict state. Sierra Leone has been an important laboratory for UN and international donors’ interventions and thinking. However, efforts by the international donor community to decentralise power to the margins, both geographically and demographically, have failed. Instead, this focus on the institutions of governance has allowed the same elite to maintain power. Sierra Leone today shares similar socio-economic and political conditions with the Sierra Leone before the outbreak of the civil war. A detailed analysis of the country’s socio-economic trends, its political institutions and the logic and dynamics of violence show a disturbing picture. While the international community considered that an exit strategy was feasible, the political settlement remains an experiment in that it is detached from everyday life and livelihood concerns of Sierra Leoneans and reveals the structural violence behind this process.

Keywords:

• Politics
• exit strategy
• political settlement
• Sierra Leone
• experiment
• youth marginalisation
• donors
• international community
• violence
• peace-building

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by UK aid from the UK Government, however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies. The author would like to thank Cassandra Biggs, Paul Jackson, Ngolo Katta, Jeremy Lind, Markus Shultze-Kraft, Mariz Tadros and James Vincent.

Notes

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2. DFID, Building Peaceful States and Societies.

3. RFI, ‘Sierra Leone a Success Story’.

4. Fritz and Menocal, Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective.

5. Wagner, ‘The Causes of Peace’; and Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements’, 681–690.

6. Jones et al., Pathways Out of Fragility.

7. See for example Fritz and Menocal Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective, who see political settlements as a peace deal.

8. Laws, Political Settlements, Elite Pacts.

9. Tadros and Allouche ‘Political Settlements as a Violent Process’.

10. Gurr, Why Men Rebel; and Goldstone et al., ‘A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability’, 190–208.

11. Goldstone et al., ‘A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability’, 190–208.

12. Laws, Political Settlements, Elite Pacts.

13. Ingram, ‘Building the Wrong Peace’, 3–20.

14. Tadros and Allouche ‘Political Settlements as a Violent Process’.

15. Zaum, ‘Peace Operations and Exit’.

16. Caplan, Exit Strategies and State Building.

17. Hirschmann, ‘Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies’, 170–185.

18. Ibid.; Caplan, Exit Strategies and State Building; and Zaum, ‘Peace Operations and Exit’.

19. Hirschmann, ‘Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies’, 170–185.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Caplan, Exit Strategies and State Building.

24. Harris, Sierra Leone: A Political History.

25. Fanthorpe et al., Decentralisation in Sierra Leone.

26. Richards, ‘The Sierra Leone-Liberia Boundary Wilderness’, 205–221; Keen, ‘Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths’, 67–94; Reno, ‘Political Networks in a Failing Stage’, 44–66; and Mokuwa et al., ‘Peasant Grievance, and Insurgency in Sierra Leone’, 339–366.

27. Peters, War and the Crisis of Youth.

28. Gershoni, ‘War Without End and an End to a War’, 55–76.

29. Richards, ‘The Sierra Leone-Liberia Boundary Wilderness’, 205–221. .

30. Peters, War and the Crisis of Youth.

31. Gershoni, ‘War Without End and an End to a War’, 55–76.

32. The RUF is not just a Liberian creation, the origins of the RUF can be traced back to training camps in the Libyan Desert in the late 1980s that included Sierra Leoneans, Liberians, Ghanaians and Gambians.

33. Allouche et al., Beyond Borders.

34. Rashid, ‘The Lomé Peace Negotiations’; and Bright, ‘Implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement’.

35. Accord, Paying the Price.

36. Meyer, Sierra Leone: Reconstructing a Patrimonial State; and Clapham, ‘Sierra Leone: The Global-Local Politics’.

37. Clapham, ‘Sierra Leone: The Global-Local Politics’.

38. Cubitt, ‘Political Youth: Finding Alternatives to Violence’.

39. Ginifer, ‘Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’.

40. Malan et al., Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone.

41. Hirschmann, ‘Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies’, 170–185.

42. Caplan, Exit Strategies and State Building.

43. Hirschmann,. ‘Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies’, 170–185.

44. Gbla, ‘Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage’, 78–93.

45. Interview with Prof.. O. Gbla, Freetown, 21 September 2011.

46. Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?’, 95–111.

47. Dougherty, ‘Searching for Answers’, 40–56.

48. Denney, ‘Liberal Chiefs or Illiberal Development?’, 5–25.

49. Christensen and Utas, ‘Mercenaries of Democracy’, 515–539.

50. Krogstad, ‘Security, Development, and Force’, 261–280.

51. Interview with Prof.. O. Gbla, Freetown, 21 September 2011.

52. Krogstad, ‘Security, Development, and Force’, 261–280.

53. Interview with Papay Kabba-Sesay (UNIDO/MRU), Freetown, 19 December 2011.

54. Fanthorpe, ‘On the Limits of Liberal Peace’, 27–49; Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone; and Richards, ‘Green Book Millenarians?’, 119–146.

55. Under the Act there were 14 district councils and five city councils in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Koidu, New Sembehun and Makeni. The local council was designated ‘the highest political authority’ in the jurisdiction, and elections to these posts were held in 2004 and 2008. Under the Act, chiefdoms were recognised as the lowest political unit, and paramount chiefs were provided representation in councils and membership of ward committees.

56. Srivastava and Larizza, ‘Decentralization in Post-conflict Sierra Leone’.

57. Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?’, 95–111; Thomson, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse; Hanlon, ‘Is the International Community Helping’; and Richards, ‘Green Book Millenarians?’, 119–146.

58. Fanthorpe, ‘On the Limits of Liberal Peace’, 27–49; and Denney, ‘Liberal Chiefs or Illiberal Development?’, 5–25.

59. Srivastava and Larizza, ‘Decentralization in Post-conflict Sierra Leone’.

60. CDF (the Kamajors) were paramilitary organisations who fought in the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991–2002). They supported the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah against the rebel groups RUF and AFRC.

61. The women’s society, known as Sande in the south and Bondo in the north and Freetown, is general to Sierra Leone. There are several leading men’s societies (Poro, Wunde, Gbangbani, etc.).

62. Vincent, A Village-Up View of Sierra Leone’s Civil War.

63. Srivastava and Larizza, ‘Decentralization in Post-conflict Sierra Leone’.

64. Interview with Local councillor, Freetown, 20 September 2011.

65. Srivastava and Larizza, ‘Decentralization in Post-conflict Sierra Leone’; and Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?’, 95–111.

66. In the pre-war situation, paramount chiefs were the power-holders in their communities and could influence support for a candidate.

67. Labonte, ‘From Patronage to Peacebuilding?’, 90–115.

68. Wright, ‘Tackling Conflict Diamonds’, 697–708.

69. Koroma, ‘Decentralisation and Peacebulding in Sierra Leone’.

70. London Mining is a multinational company founded in 2005 to acquire, finance and develop mines for the global steel industry. In Sierra Leone, its activities are focusing on the expansion of the Marampa mine.

71. Fanthorpe and Maconachie, ‘Beyond the “Crisis of Youth”?’, 251–272.

72. Maconachie, Diamond Mining, Governance Initiatives.

73. Kawamoto, ‘Diamonds in War, Diamonds for Peace’.

74. Zulu and Wilson, ‘Whose Minerals, Whose Development?’, 1103–1131.

75. Ibid.

76. Interview with village headman and landowners, Lunsar and Makeni, February 2013.

77. Zulu and Wilson, ‘Whose Minerals, Whose Development?’, 1103–1131.

78. Maconachie, Diamond Mining, Governance Initiatives.

79. Fanthorpe and Maconachie, ‘Beyond the “Crisis of Youth”?’, 251–272.

80. Maconachie, ‘Diamond Mining, Urbanisation and Social Transformation’, 705–723; and SIPRI, Resource–Conflict Links.

81. Fanthorpe, ‘On the Limits of Liberal Peace’, 27–49; Fanthorpe et al., Decentralisation in Sierra Leone; Hanlon, ‘Is the International Community Helping’; Jackson, ‘Chiefs, Money and Politicians’, 49–58; and Meyer, Sierra Leone: Reconstructing a Patrimonial State.

82. ICG. ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone’.

83. The 2009 Mo Ibrahim Index ranked Sierra Leone as one of five rising countries that have made progress in democratic governance.

84. These include the Women’s Situation Room (WSR), the Carter Centre, the ECOWAS election monitoring group and the National Election Watch (NEW).

85. Report of the Visit of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone, 15–20 February 2013. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/doc_sierraleone.shtml#pbcvisits

86. Conteh and Harris, ‘Swings and Roundabouts’, 57–70.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Christensen and Utas, ‘Mercenaries of Democracy’, 515–539; and Dowd and Raleigh, ‘Mapping Conflict across Liberia and Sierra Leone’.

90. Africa Research Institute, ‘Old Tricks, Young Guns’.

91. Drew and Ramsbotham, ‘Conclusion, Consolidating Peace Liberia and Sierra Leone’; Africa Research Institute, ‘Old Tricks, Young Guns’; and Srivastava and Larizza, ‘Decentralization in Post-conflict Sierra Leone’.

92. Interview with Michael von der Schulenberg, Executive Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, Freetown, 22 September 2011.

93. Denney, ‘Reducing Poverty with Teargas and Batons’, 275.

94. Interview with the National Youth Commissioner, Anthony Koroma, Freetown, 20 December 2011. Ibrahim Samura, head of police community relations department, estimated that there are now 250 gangs in Freetown alone (personal communication, workshop, 1 February 2013).

95. NAN, ‘Peace: Sierra Leone Restates Commitment’.

96. Violence mitigation strategies since the end of the 11-year conflict in 2002 have been widely hailed as a success. The capital, Freetown, for example, is now considered one of the safest cities in Africa, and the number of armed violent incidents across the country is also very low (Dowd and Raleigh, ‘Mapping Conflict across Liberia and Sierra Leone’).

97. Action on Armed Violence, Sierra Leone Baseline Report.

98. These figures need to be taken with caution as these have been calculated on the basis of the extrapolation of victimisation rates to the general population.

99. ONS, Security Sector Reform.

100. Sierra Express Media, ‘Violence in the Sierra Leone Music Industry’.

101. Utas, ‘Trapped in the Game’.

102. Fanthorpe and Maconachie, ‘Beyond the “Crisis of Youth”?’, 251–272; and Sawyer, ‘Remove or Reform?’, 387–403.

103. Carmody, The New Scramble for Africa.

104. Two people were killed after workers at the Koidu diamond mining protested in December 2012 over bonus payments (Reuters, ‘Violent Strike Halts Work’). One person was killed when police fired on workers protesting about low wages and unfair treatment at African Minerals’ (AML) Bumbuna mine on April 18 2012 (Amnesty International, Sierra Leone). In 2010, at another AML site on the outskirts of Bumbuna, villagers were beaten and harassed after they protested the sale of their land by the paramount chief (Peters and Richards, ‘Rebellion and Agrarian Tensions in Sierra Leone’).

105. Africa Minerals which owned the Tonkolili mine faced huge financial losses, as well as corruption allegations, sold the mine to the Shandong Iron and Steel Group in December 2015.

106. Millar, ‘Investing in Peace?’, 1700–1716.

107. Interview with custom officer (wishes to remain anonymous), 20 February 2012.

108. Schultze-Kraft, Getting Real About an Illicit ‘External Stressor’.

109. World Bank, ‘West Africa: Facts and Figures’.

110. West Africa Commission on Drugs, International and Regional Responses to Drug Trafficking.

111. Stearns Lawson and Dininio, The Development Response.

112. Sierra Leonean Vice President Sam Sumana, who has been linked to a variety of illicit activities including a corruption affair known as Timbergate, was briefly named, but not arrested, in the 2009 cocaine scandal. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the Aviation Minister’s brother was one of the masterminds behind a shipment of 700 kilograms of cocaine at Lungi airport and convicted of drug trafficking.

113. ICG, Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?

114. Mokuwa et al., ‘Peasant Grievance and Insurgency in Sierra Leone’, 339–366.

115. Brown et al., Sierra Leone Drivers of Change.

116. In fact, youth organisations themselves have been criticised for representing the interests of political parties and individuals rather than youth’s interest (Interview with the National Youth Commissioner, Anthony Koroma, Freetown, 20 December 2011). See also Jackson, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards?’, 95–111.

117. Cubitt, ‘Political Youth: Finding Alternatives to Violence’.

118. Mitton, ‘Where is the War?’, 321–337.

119. Galtung, ‘What is Peace Research?’.

120. Richmond, Peace in International Relations.