Legitimacy and post-conflict state-building: the undervalued role of performance legitimacy

Abstract

Legitimacy is essential to state-building after conflict. Yet, the prescribed path to gaining legitimacy is often a narrow one that borrows heavily from the experiences of Western states. Elections are prescribed as an essential first step on the logic that this means gaining process legitimacy can rebuild a social contract between citizens and the state, a social contract that is rooted in democratic norms and values. This article proposes an alternative path, one that emphasises the critical role of performance legitimacy and its non-exclusive nature. Performance legitimacy is granted when citizens perceive that some or all of their basic needs are being met. The article offers a new analytical framework for understanding a state’s potential source of performance legitimacy, how non-state actors may vie with the state to seize this form of legitimacy, and what consequences this has for processes of state institution-building after conflict. In this respect, this article seeks to reorient theory and practice to a broader view of legitimacy and its critical role in post-conflict state-building.

Keywords:

• Process legitimacy
• performance legitimacy
• post-conflict development
• state institution-building
• democracy

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my colleagues at the School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University and the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa for their useful feedback and support. I also wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

Notes

1. Within the framework of the analysis herein, I define the state as a set of formal institutions that forms a collectivity with established functions and structures. In an attempt to assess the real owners of performance legitimacy, understand the actions of the leaders and identify who citizens associate the benefits with, the political chambers or the government – the President, Prime Minister, House of Commons or the Parliament – and the politicians who work in these chambers are not included in my working definition of the state. Overall, this definition is inspired by the work of Grzymala-Busse who defines a state as a ‘set of formal institutions that administers citizen obligations (e.g. taxes, military service), enforces legal sanctions and regulates public provisions (e.g. infrastructure, rule of law, welfare, defense, etc.). It comprises both public finances and the channels of their distribution’ (‘Beyond Clientelism’, 640). It also includes the public and non-political apparatus that are the backbone of the country’s governance.

2. For the purposes of the analysis herein, I use the term post-conflict to describe situations where institution-building activities are being implemented in an attempt to rebuild a state and its legitimacy and where severe violence has not overwhelmed the state. Moreover, it represents cases where an agreement exists amongst the majority of the leaders to lay down arms, become involved in the government and the state structure and attempt to build a future through the political system. Conflict in turn includes civil wars, genocides and the decimation of state institutions following the violent expression of grievances. Therefore, this definition includes states that still experience some type and level of conflict (e.g. Afghanistan).

3. States of countries where conflict is isolated to specific areas and where the rest of the country continues to function normally (e.g. Sri Lanka) will likely continue enjoying process legitimacy in non-conflict-affected areas. However, performance legitimacy will likely be the main source in areas of conflict where restrictions on processes necessary for gaining process legitimacy are numerous and impactful.

4. Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy.

5. Shapiro, ‘Problems, Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics’.

6. Van der Vossen, ‘The Asymmetry of Legitimacy’.

7. Khadiagala, ‘State Collapse and Reconstruction’.

8. Rotberg, ‘When States Fail’.

9. Skocpol, States & Social Revolutions.

10. Beetham and Lord, Legitimacy and the EU; Fraser, ‘Validating a Measure’; Gilley, ‘Determinants of State Legitimacy’; Gilley, ‘Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy’; Kanol, ‘Assessing Legitimacy of the EU’; Levi and Sacks, ‘Legitimating Beliefs’; Lipset, Political Man; Treier and Jackman, ‘Democracy as a Latent Variable’; Weil, ‘Sources and Structures of Legitimation’.

11. It is important to note that this diagram refrains from weighting these four sources.

12. Tsai, Accountability without Democracy.

13. Kaplan, ‘The Remarkable Story of Somaliland’.

14. This analysis does not ignore the role of predominant state-sponsored violence and oppression. However, violence and control are a means to an unstable end and de-legitimisation; they thus do not represent long-lasting true sources of legitimacy.

15. See Krampe, ‘Empowering Peace’.

16. Brinkerhoff, ‘Introduction’; Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition; Eaton and Schroeder, ‘Measuring Decentralization’; Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development; Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; Gilley, ‘Determinants of State Legitimacy’; Gilley, ‘Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy’; Goldsmith, ‘Does Nation-Building Work?’; Lipset, Political Man; Sisk, Statebuilding; Weil, ‘Sources and Structures of Legitimation’; World Bank; Political Risk Services Group; Transparency International; Freedom House. While some non-or weakly-democratic systems can have some of these features, the idea, however, is that the higher the state ranks regarding the measurement of these indicators, the higher its process legitimacy is expected to be.

17. Barbara, ‘Antipodean Statebuilding’; Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Development and Peacebuilding’; Diamond and Plattner, Electoral Systems and Democracy; Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads; Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics. It is important to note that these characteristics actually make up the post-conflict international development programming agenda, which itself is based on the international community’s experience with the twentieth-century reconstruction and democratic re-legitimisation of West Germany and Japan. However, it is often forgotten that both of these countries had a pre-existing history either with strong state institutions or democratic institutional cultures prior to the conflict (Dinnen, ‘A Comment on State-Building’).

18. Coburn, ‘Elections and the Failure of Democratisation’; Goodhand et al., ‘Flooding the Lake?’.

19. Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics, 269.

20. Two of the most relevant examples are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

21. Given that elections represent the desire or choice of the people, there is an assumption that free and fair elections processes will inherently lead to a more stable government and thus a decreased risk for donors.

22. Sisk and Chandler, ‘Introduction’.

23. Sisk, ‘Elections and Statebuilding after Civil War’, 259.

24. This becomes exceptionally clear when one assesses the indicators that are used to measure legitimacy.

25. OECD, ‘The State’s Legitimacy’, 7. It is important to note that this assessment by the OECD is unique and does not seem to have influenced the current agenda or policies of the OECD. Subsequent documents that have been analysed make no reference to this report and do not present similar ideas or points.

26. As noted earlier, the analysis presented herein does not negate the merits or benefits of democratic systems. It does however question the tendency to ignore the pre-existing conditions on the ground and the other factors that play a significant role in the state-society relationship, relationships that might cause significant damage to the democratic agenda.

27. Inbal and Lerner, ‘Constitutional Design, Identity and Legitimacy’.

28. Diamond and Plattner, Electoral Systems and Democracy; Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics.

29. The evidence presented demonstrates that this transfer does not often occur. It is more likely that the legitimacy remains attached to the person and thus transfer with him or her once s/he leaves the government. For further information, one can draw on the work of Dinnen, ‘A Comment on State-Building’; Hameiri, ‘Capacity and its Fallacies’; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, ‘Citizen-Politician Linkages’; Mayall, ‘The Legacy of Colonialism’; Zanotti, ‘Imagining Democracy’, amongst others. Moreover, for more specific experiences, one can read up on the situation in South Sudan (Cook, A Place To Call Their Own), Lebanon (Hajjar, ‘The Convoluted and Diminished’) and other post-conflict countries.

30. Paris, ‘Wilson’s Ghost’.

31. OECD, ‘The State’s Legitimacy’, 7–8.

32. Gilley, ‘Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy’.

33. Dinnen, ‘A Comment on State-Building’; Mac Ginty, ‘Warlords and the Liberal Peace’.

34. Hutchison and Johnson, ‘Capacity to Trust?’.

35. One can refer to the work done by Maslow and other researchers whose work has been used to develop the basic principles related to food security, the Millennium Development Goals and humanitarian assistance.

36. See Beetham and Lord, Legitimacy and the EU.

37. Brinkerhoff et al., ‘Service Delivery and Legitimacy’.

38. Scharpf, Problem Solving Effectiveness.

39. Von Kaltenborn-Stachau, The Missing Link.

40. Menocal, ‘Aid and Fragility’.

41. This argument is further elaborated in the next two sections.

42. Mayall, ‘The Legacy of Colonialism’.

43. Armstrong and Rubin, ‘The Great Lakes and South Central Asia’.

44. Refer to Krampe’s paper on Nepal for a more concrete example. Krampe, ‘Empowering Peace’.

45. Examples include USAID, World Bank, OECD, European Commission.

46. Examples include Angeles and Magno, ‘The Philippines’; Brinkerhoff, ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States’; Dodge, ‘Domestic Politics and State-Building’; Eaton and Schroeder, ‘Measuring Decentralization’; Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; Hartzell, ‘Structuring the Peace’; Keefer et al., ‘Decentralization in Pakistan’; Mukhopadhyay, ‘Disguised Warlordism and Combatanthood’.

47. Bardhan and Mookherjee, ‘The Rise of Local Governments’; Blair, ‘Rebuilding and Reforming’; Dinnen, ‘A Comment on State-Building’.

48. Ducci, ‘Local Governance and Democracy’; Oxhorn, ‘Unraveling the Puzzle of Decentralization’; Selee and Tulchin, ‘Decentralization and Democratic Governance’.

49. Beetham and Lord, Legitimacy and the EU; Beetham, The Legitimation of Power; Levi and Sacks, ‘Legitimating Beliefs’; and Mcloughlin, ‘When Does Service Delivery’.

50. Levi and Sacks, ‘Legitimating Beliefs’; Mcloughlin, ‘When Does Service Delivery’.

51. The experience of Hizballah, Hamas and other groups who have been able to transcend religious lines has demonstrated that the desire for meeting one’s basic human needs is common in most societies and often transcends other values (Harik, ‘Between Islam and the System’).

52. Gilley, ‘Determinants of State Legitimacy’; Gilley, ‘Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy’.

53. Mcloughlin, ‘When Does Service Delivery’.

54. This argument or method of deconstructing the legitimacy of the state is heavily influenced by case studies that attempt to understand the support that militia groups, warlords and other ‘unlawful’ groups have received from supporters, even when such support seems illogical or counterproductive. This point will be expanded upon further below.

55. It is important to note that low voting rates could be a result of apathy rather than a crisis of legitimacy. However, this is much more likely to happen in cases with mature democracies than in developing or post-conflict countries.

56. Levi and Sacks, ‘Legitimating Beliefs’. These reciprocal actions include trusting the state in its decision-making process, becoming involved in the electoral process (if applicable), being faithful to the state and its processes, and abiding by the rules and laws that are issued by the state even without threats of repercussion (e.g. payment of quasi-voluntary tax).

57. OECD, ‘State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations’, 7.

58. Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development.

59. Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Development and Peacebuilding’.

60. Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development.

61. The term ‘support’ groups entails groups that catered to the needs of the population during the conflict. As such, the term makes reference to militias, para-military groups, NGOs and civil society groups.

62. Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Development and Peacebuilding’; Siegle and O’Mahony, ‘Decentralization and Internal Conflict’.

63. Posner, ‘Civil Society and Reconstruction’.

64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, ‘A Joint Evaluation’, 25.

65. Starr, ‘Sovereignty and Legitimacy’, 110.

66. Coburn, Bazaar Politics; Lister and Wilder, ‘Strengthening Subnational Administration’; Paris, ‘NATO’s Choice in Afghanistan’.

67. Mac Ginty, ‘Warlords and the Liberal Peace’.

68. Lister and Wilder, ‘Strengthening Subnational Administration’.

69. Paris, ‘NATO’s Choice in Afghanistan’.

70. Undoubtedly, no one can completely rule out reluctance resulting from threats of violence. However, Starr’s research has identified such reluctance even in areas where there is no overt threat of violence, thus allowing for such a general statement (‘Sovereignty and Legitimacy’).

71. François and Sud, ‘Promoting Stability and Development’.

72. Kingston and Zahar, ‘Rebuilding A House of Many Mansions’, 82.

73. Hajjar, ‘The Convoluted and Diminished’, 272.

74. Kingston and Zahar, ‘Rebuilding A House of Many Mansions’, 94.

75. Harb and Leenders, ‘Know Thy Enemy’, 179.

76. Norton, ‘Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal’, 35.

77. Sajan, ‘Rising from the Belt of Misery’.

78. Rabil, Syria, the United States.

79. Harik, ‘Between Islam and the System’.

80. Cammett, Compassionate Communalism.

81. Ibid.

82. LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan.

83. Jok, ‘Information Exchange in the Disaster Zone’; Radon and Logan, ‘South Sudan’.

84. Cook, A Place To Call Their Own.

85. Marut, Le Conflit de Casamance.

86. Gellar, Democracy in Senegal.

87. Ibid.; Marut, Le Conflit de Casamance.

88. Brinkerhoff, ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States’.

89. Goodhand, Aiding Peace, 111.

90. Widner, ‘Building Effective Trust’, 227.

91. Ibid.

92. Starr, ‘Sovereignty and Legitimacy’, 112.

93. International recognition should be understood only as the actual recognition of rightful leadership and statehood by the United Nations and other multilateral bodies that represent states and their leaders at the international stage. While there is an implicit international recognition when a post-conflict state abides by the process-centric development trajectory, it is not a necessary requirement (e.g. China, Somaliland, West Bank and Gaza).

94. It is important to note that not all citizens classify these four types as they have been classified herein. There are citizens who perceive process legitimacy to be more important than perhaps performance legitimacy. The point is that there is a general trend where people in conflict and post-conflict countries value performance legitimacy more than process legitimacy in the early post-conflict stage.

95. State-centred legitimacy implies the legitimacy of a state that can be gathered by working on the state to improve its institutions.

96. Caplan, ‘Partner or Patron?’; Dodge, ‘Domestic Politics and State-Building’.

97. Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Development and Peacebuilding’; Meierhenrich, ‘Forming States After Failure’; Paris, ‘Wilson’s Ghost’; Paris, ‘NATO’s Choice in Afghanistan’; Rotberg, ‘When States Fail’; Widner, ‘Building Effective Trust’.

98. Barbara, ‘Antipodean Statebuilding’; Dinnen, ‘The Solomon Islands’; Dodge, ‘Domestic Politics and State-Building’; Goodhand, Aiding Peace; Hameiri, ‘Capacity and Its Fallacies’; Hess, ‘Coming to Terms with Neopatrimonialism’; Mukhopadhyay, ‘Disguised Warlordism and Combatanthood’; Ottaway, ‘Democratization in Collapsed States’; Sharan, ‘The Dynamics of Elite Networks’.

99. Dinnen, ‘A Comment on State-Building’; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State’; Hameiri, ‘Capacity and its Fallacies’; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, ‘Citizen-Politician Linkages’; Marquette and Beswick, ‘State Building, Security and Development’; Mayall, ‘The Legacy of Colonialism’; Zanotti, ‘Imagining Democracy’.

100. Hameiri, ‘Capacity and its Fallacies’.

101. Dinnen, ‘The Solomon Islands’.

102. Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State’.

103. Ibid., 534.

104. Dinnen, ‘The Solomon Islands’; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State’; Hameiri, ‘Capacity and its Fallacies’; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, ‘Citizen-Politician Linkages’; Marquette and Beswick, ‘State Building, Security and Development’; Mayall, ‘The Legacy of Colonialism’; Zanotti, ‘Imagining Democracy’.

105. Dinnen, ‘The Solomon Islands’; Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State’; Hameiri, ‘Capacity and its Fallacies’.

106. Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State’; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, ‘Citizen-Politician Linkages’. While many authors have invested much time and energy in making a distinction between these terms, they all have a negative impact on the performance legitimacy of the state. As such and for the sake of simplicity, the analysis herein will refer to all these events or situations as clientelism.

107. The use of the term significant implies the size and/or the level of importance of segments of the population. The existence of an alienated section of the population is significant in the sense that it signifies a potential threat to the legitimacy of the state, and perhaps long-term stability and control, when combined with leaders who are actively competing to undermine the state and its legitimacy.