Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratisation: mapping interactions and their impact

Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War, post-conflict democratisation has rarely occurred without a significant international involvement. This contribution argues that an explanation of the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation requires more than an examination of external actors, their mission mandates or their capabilities and deficiencies. In addition, there is a need to study domestic elites, their preferences and motivations, as well as their perceptions of and their reactions to external interference. Moreover, the patterns of external–internal interactions may explain the trajectory of state-building and democracy promotion efforts. These issues deserve more attention from both scholars and practitioners in the fields of peace- and state-building, democracy promotion, regime transition and elite research. Analyses of external actors and domestic elites in post-conflict democratisation should therefore address three principal issues: (1) the identification of relevant domestic elites in externally induced or monitored state-building and democratisation processes, (2) the dynamics of external–domestic interactions and (3) the impact of these interactions on the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation.

Keywords:

• Domestic elites
• external actors
• interaction
• peace-building
• post-conflict democratisation
• state-building

Introduction

Despite intensive international efforts, only very few post-conflict societies make a transition to electoral democracy, and even fewer to liberal democracy.¹ Standard explanations suggest that post-conflict societies lack the capacity to implement and sustain the complex and costly institutions required for democracy,² that bad neighbourhoods and a lack of linkages to the West negatively influence post-conflict democratisation,³ and that the legacies of war and violent conflict (such as ethnic fragmentation, political tensions and the emergence of a war economy) hinder successful transition to democracy.⁴ Modern peace- and state-building missions are designed to address these deficits through an expanded mandate including security-building, socio-economic development, societal reconciliation and democracy promotion.⁵ However, scholars argue that due to a lack of context sensitivity, coordination problems among peace-builders, their inability to learn from past mistakes and the intra-organisational constraints that peace-builders face, peace- and state-building missions are largely incapable of compensating for the aforementioned deficits.⁶

These arguments are plausible, as they explain in part why democracy is so difficult to achieve in a post-conflict context. However, taking into consideration theoretical and empirical work not only on post-conflict state-building and democracy promotion but also on the role of agency in transition, we suggest that a key explanatory factor has not yet been sufficiently studied: the role of domestic elites and their interactions with external actors. Experts on state-building and democracy promotion predominantly analyse post-conflict democratisation through the lenses of external actors, overlooking the contributions of domestic actors. In turn, democratic transition studies do not systematically factor in the influence of external actors on post-conflict transitions. We believe that it is important to connect these approaches, as post-conflict democratisation is driven both by external actors (such as peace-builders, democracy promoters and foreign aid providers) and domestic actors.

We argue that post-conflict democratisation cannot be understood without accounting for domestic elites. The nature of the interactions between these elites and external state-building and democracy-promoting actors is not yet well understood, as complex interaction dynamics must be taken into account. In our perspective, the idea of a two-level game should be applied to post-conflict democratisation contexts to adequately capture those interactions. In addition to this descriptive perspective, and in line with the findings of recent studies,⁷ we suggest that those interaction dynamics substantially influence the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation. Thus, this special issue advances the study of agency in externally induced or monitored transitions to democracy in conflict-riven societies.

Our subject of inquiry is located at the intersection of research on post-conflict state-building, democracy promotion, regime transition and elites. One of our central aims therefore is to bridge and connect these different strands of research, demonstrating how and to what extent they are all relevant for the study of post-conflict democratisation. In the remainder of this article, we delineate the topic of this special issue. In the first section, we examine the role of external actors in democracy promotion and in post-conflict state-building. The second section explores the role of domestic elites in democratic transition and state-building. It is a crucial but complex task to determine which types of elites and which types of elite conflicts are relevant in the post-conflict setting. The third section analyses the interaction dynamics among domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratisation. We argue that external influence is not a constant and that it is important to study how external actors adjust their demands in the course of the interaction process with domestic actors. The fourth section summarises the research agenda of this special issue of Conflict, Security & Development and points out the specific contributions made by the individual articles. They provide theoretical as well as empirical insights, ranging from an overview of the universe of cases to in-depth case studies from South-East Europe, sub-Sahara Africa and Central America. In addition, this introduction intends to set the stage for future research on the interactions between external and domestic actors in democratisation processes.

The role of external actors in democracy promotion and post-conflict state-building

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become increasingly active in promoting democracy,⁸ following either a political (direct) or a developmental (indirect) approach.⁹ External actors pursuing a political approach directly foster the establishment of core democratic institutions such as free and fair elections, a multi-party system, free media, civil society and a catalogue of political rights and civil liberties.¹⁰ They support democratic capacity-building among domestic actors by investing in the democratic socialisation and professionalisation of members of parliaments and state administrations, journalists, business elites and civil society leaders.¹¹ In turn, actors pursuing a developmental approach support socio-economic development and the technical dimensions of state-building. Thus, the developmental approach has an indirect impact by promoting favourable conditions for democratisation.¹²

The international community’s turn towards democracy promotion has also left its mark on conflict-riven societies and international efforts to establish peaceful functioning states.¹³ The general expectation is that democratisation will provide a solid basis from which to address the challenges of state-building after violent conflict.¹⁴ Under the leadership of the United Nations (UN), international actors have relied on formal democratisation to guide processes of reconstituting post-conflict states, and elections have served as the starting point for democratisation and state-building efforts. With the publication of the ‘Agenda for Democratization’ in 1996,¹⁵ the UN defined its role in the global move towards democracy, including post-conflict societies. On this basis, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has supported and directed peace operations on all continents, with the explicit aim of promoting democratisation.¹⁶ Over the last two decades, UN missions with democracy-promoting mandates have been sent to Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Sierra Leone and Sudan/South Sudan.¹⁷ Furthermore, regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and various ad hoc coalitions of states have been engaging in post-conflict missions that include efforts to develop democratic governance.¹⁸ Cases include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq. In the period from 2000 to 2010, the members of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) paid approximately US$ 389 billion as official development assistance (ODA) to fragile and post-conflict countries.¹⁹ Additionally, many post-conflict scenarios are characterised by a significant involvement of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in state-building and democracy assistance. The number of missions and actors and the amount of money invested provide an idea of the extent of international involvement in post-conflict transitions towards democracy.

However, promoting democracy in post-conflict societies is not an easy task.²⁰ The challenges and dilemmas of international democracy promotion in post-conflict contexts seem to be more difficult to resolve than in developing contexts.²¹ Large-n empirical evidence is thus far inconclusive. While some studies have shown that the presence of international peace- and state-building missions increases the likelihood of post-conflict democratisation,²² others are less optimistic and find a negative effect²³ or no effect at all.²⁴

The overwhelming majority of qualitative studies on post-conflict democratisation focus on the contribution of external actors in peace-building missions.²⁵ They have assessed the structure of such missions, their mandates and the implemented programmes and strategies, as well as the legitimacy of externally led democratisation and state-building.²⁶ Some seek to discover the impact of such missions on peace-building, arriving at tentative conclusions about the potential negative consequences of democracy promotion for peace.²⁷ They make strong arguments about the organisational shortcomings of donor governments (such as the United States), international organisations (such as the UN or the EU) and NGOs, and point to co-operation problems among the multiple external actors working in post-conflict societies as an impediment for successful peace missions.²⁸

When referring to post-conflict democratisation, we highlight in particular democratic institution-building and democratic capacity-building, i.e. the empowerment of domestic actors to comply with democratic rules. Whether, to what extent, and how external actors can influence the formation of democratic institutions in post-conflict environments is an intriguing question. Case studies have revealed the specific circumstances under which external actors are (in-)capable of inducing or imposing formally democratic institutions.²⁹ A frequently employed approach is political power-sharing, which is based on the idea that two or more ethno-national groups can jointly govern and take decisions by consensus. Power-sharing involves institutional arrangements such as proportional representation, the creation of grand coalitions including representatives from all relevant groups, federalism, or the granting of group autonomy rights.³⁰ A paradigmatic case of power-sharing is the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), which includes in Annex 4 a textbook-like constitution for a ‘consociational democracy’.³¹ However, scholars have become increasingly sceptical about power-sharing’s effectiveness, given the blockade in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system that has persisted for more than 20 years since the signing of the Dayton agreement.³²

No less intriguing is the question of how and to what extent external actors can influence democratic capacity-building among domestic actors. A durable establishment and consolidation of democracy is possible only if domestic actors are willing to play according to democratic rules of the game.³³ However, the acceptance of democratic rules is difficult to achieve immediately after a violent conflict, as it obliges warring factions to quickly transform into political parties that use words instead of weapons to promote their interests. External actors seek, but have not yet found, a blueprint to support the post-conflict capacity-building of political actors.³⁴ The legitimacy, local acceptance and effectiveness of such endeavours are contested. International interference suffers from a legitimacy deficit, given that external actors use undemocratic means to promote or even impose democratic institutions.³⁵ Both highly intrusive ‘heavy footprint’ missions (e.g. UN interim administrations as in Kosovo and supervision missions by an ad hoc coalition as in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and less intrusive ‘light footprint’ monitoring missions (e.g. Afghanistan) struggle with local ‘resistance’ against external interference ³⁶ and ‘resilience of the local political culture in the face of foreign norms’.³⁷ Even the experiences of democracy assistance channelled via NGOs are ambiguous: while some researchers have argued that non-state actors often do a better job in tailoring democracy aid to local needs and that it may be advantageous for aid to bypass the governments in recipient countries³⁸ , others have pointed to difficulties of selecting the right counterparts on the ground and the problem of ‘grant eaters’ that are more accountable to external donors than to the local community.³⁹ Ultimately, the rather unsatisfactory outcomes raise questions about the effectiveness of democratic capacity-building.⁴⁰

In light of these challenges, there is increasing acknowledgement among researchers and practitioners that there are no quick fixes or blueprint solutions, that the international community must be more sensitive to the specific context in which it is intervening, and that there is a need to gather more profound knowledge about the history of targeted countries and to engage domestic actors in the peace- and state-building process. However, despite their emphasis on actors, none of the abovementioned studies takes into account agency-oriented approaches to the study of democratic transition.

The role of domestic elites

The majority of studies on democracy promotion and post-conflict democratisation focus on external actors to explain the effectiveness (or the lack thereof) of democracy promotion and state-building, thereby reducing the agency of domestic actors to ‘compliance’, ‘partial compliance’, or ‘non-compliance’ with external demands.⁴¹ In turn, the role of domestic elites and in particular the power struggles between domestic elites and international actors (as well as power struggles among domestic elites) have largely been neglected.

Elites as contested concept

One reason for the neglect of the influence of domestic elites is the lack of consensus on the concept of elites among researchers from different disciplinary and epistemological backgrounds.⁴² The most basic contestation is whether the elite should be considered a unitary group or instead be analysed as several entities. For the sake of reducing complexity, researchers have sometimes treated elites as unitary, potentially masking ‘important cleavages, which frequently derive from different conceptions of interests and alternative rank orderings of these preferences’.⁴³ In fact, due to the division of modern societies into multiple spheres with distinct and potentially independent bases of social power, as well as the division of labour, ‘the elite’ are in fact pluralistic ‘elites’.⁴⁴

In addition, there is contention between scholars following a Marxist perspective that conceives of elites as individuals who occupy a dominant position within social relations⁴⁵ and those preferring a Weberian definition of ‘class’ based on the possession of power and resources. For example, Khan defines elites as those ‘who have vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource’⁴⁶ (such as decision-making power, knowledge, legitimacy, money, time, or human capital), which offers this group distinct advantages. Supporters of the former approach focus on a highly exclusive, small group of individuals defined as relevant in politics. However, exclusive emphasis on these individuals risks ignoring intermediary groups such as civil society organisations and the majority of the non-represented, disadvantaged, or underprivileged.⁴⁷ Supporters of the latter approach are foremost interested in the structure of relationships that empower or enrich particular position-holders. As a result, they simplify the complex dynamics between position-holders and groups in a society to a dichotomy of (organised) elites versus (unorganised) masses.⁴⁸

Finally, elites have been identified as engines of inequality, which gives the term a rather negative connotation.⁴⁹ Scholars tend to ‘code ‘elites’ as the mark of a social problem’ and associate the term with illegitimacy, clientelism, rent-seeking and corruption.⁵⁰ Consequently, some researchers avoid to use the concept of ‘elites’ and prefer alternative labels such as ‘actors’ or ‘players’.

These debates notwithstanding, we find the term ‘elites’ valuable to conceptualise those domestic actors that substantially influence post-conflict transition. We borrow from Higley and Burton’s pioneering studies in transition research, who define elites as ‘persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. […] [N]ational elites can be defined as top position-holders in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a society’.⁵¹ While studies on the role of elites in democratic transitions have mostly focused on political elites, Higley and Burton’s definition broadens the view and suggests that other types of elites might be influential in processes of social and political change.

In post-conflict scenarios, a multitude of domestic state and non-state actors contribute to the (re)building of the state. It is not solely the ‘victorious elites of a post-war society’⁵² or the ‘gatekeeper elites’⁵³ who impact democratisation on the domestic side. Studies of post-conflict democratisation should therefore take into account relevant domestic actors from different spheres of society. By ‘relevant’, we mean actors who substantially influence the shape of democratic institutions, dispose of decision-making authority in planning and implementing reforms, or have the potential to veto such processes and constrain post-conflict governments in their interactions with external actors, as well as those who are allowed to compete for political office.

Among the relevant domestic elites, political elites are position-holders who build institutions and are entitled to take authoritative political decisions and implement these decisions. Political elites thereby construct and implement new political orders and become key players in (post-conflict) transition.⁵⁴ They shape the institutional order and, in turn, the institutional order shapes their behaviour; in the course of institutional change, the people adapt to the new practices.⁵⁵ Domestic political elites can be further differentiated into ruling and oppositional political elites. Ruling political elites are similar to Linz and Stepan’s ‘state elites’, who are ‘the core group that is in day-by-day control of the state apparatus’.⁵⁶ Oppositional elites, in turn, are ‘those groups that openly struggle to win office’.⁵⁷ Barnett and Zürcher make a different distinction according to geographic location, identifying two sets of elites that can be found in any country: ‘state elites’, that are located in the capital, and ‘sub-national elites’, who want autonomy from the central government to preserve their power in the countryside.⁵⁸ Whereas state elites want to maintain power, ‘those outside the capital city often have independent powers that enable them to either block or frustrate any dreams of centralization by state elites’.⁵⁹

However, domestic elites relevant to (post-conflict) democratisation are not found exclusively in the political arena and may not necessarily be state actors only. Economic elites play an enormous role in transition, generating and providing the financial resources necessary for (post-conflict) democratisation,⁶⁰ while security elites control the security forces (both regular forces, such as the military and the police, and irregular forces, such as criminal networks and rebel groups) and can therefore easily return a post-conflict country to a state of turmoil.⁶¹ Another important role of elites is to interpret and define social reality and thereby influence public opinion and the preference-formation of large parts of the society. Accordingly, civil society elites (that is, leaders of civil society organisations, popular writers, artists and intellectuals, but also religious elites and elders) can also play such a role, challenging incumbent political elites through their activities.⁶²

The boundaries between these different types of elites quickly become blurred in modern post-conflict situations.⁶³ ‘State’ and ‘non-state’ are highly contested concepts in post-war contexts, since the state as a fixed frame (for the most part) does not exist. Often, relevant individuals are leading politicians and economic or security entrepreneurs at the same time. To account for this overlap, we propose to take into account economic, security, media, religious and civil society elites in the analysis of post-conflict democratisation and the associated domestic–external interaction processes once they become politically relevant actors that ‘start interfering directly in the political game, either by participating in the day-by-day control of the state apparatus or by trying to win office’.⁶⁴

Domestic elites and democratic transition

Agency-centred approaches to the study of democratic transition have long pointed to the crucial influence of domestic actors. Democratic transitions have thus been interpreted as an outcome of the iterated strategic decision-making of politically relevant actors, keeping in mind the fact that actors are constrained by structural conditions such as economic growth and the level of socio-economic development.⁶⁵

Drawing on a broad range of historical examples of regime change, empirical-descriptive transition studies highlight actor strength and actor strategy as the most important factors shaping the transition to democracy.⁶⁶ Elite-oriented approaches consider pacts to be an auspicious transition mode for future democratic consolidation. According to Higley and Burton, a consensus between outgoing and incoming elites on decision-making procedures, basic values and institutional reform is necessary to achieve democratisation.⁶⁷ In the long run, this consensus allows for nonviolent conflict management and facilitates co-operation, trust-building and the willingness to compromise, which in turn guarantee the survival of democracy. Elite consensus is an expression of commitment to the democratic rules of the game. Once the political elites abide by those rules, the electorate is likely to accept democracy as a legitimate political system.⁶⁸

Deductive-analytical variants of transition studies have resorted to game theory to model the sequences of choices that ruling and oppositional elites might make in the face of uncertainty over their future political influence.⁶⁹ In his seminal study ‘Democracy and the Market’, Przeworski conceptualises democratisation as a result of strategic situations in which authoritarian incumbents and their political opponents enter into alliances in an effort to promote their interests.⁷⁰ In this perspective, democratisation is an outcome of bargaining by rational actors who either are in favour of democracy or hesitantly acquiesce to democratic reforms. More recent contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson, Boix and Dunning factor in the role of the masses and the threat of revolution when showing that actors interact strategically in transitions and that their choices are determined by the expected redistributive consequences of reform policies.⁷¹

Although both the democracy promotion and the state-building literature on the one hand and the elite-centred transition literature on the other examine the role of actors in democratisation, there has been an evident lack of dialogue between these different strands of research. The literature on elites acknowledges that profound political crises, such as the attainment of national independence, defeat in warfare, outbreak of a revolution, or civil war, are pivotal events that often produce changes in elites and regimes. Many crises, in turn, derive from confrontations between old ruling elites and new oppositional elites.⁷² However, with their focus on domestic actors, elite-oriented approaches neglect what recent analyses of democracy promotion and post-conflict state-building have hinted at, namely the influence of external actors on democratisation processes.⁷³ At the same time, few recent studies on state-building have adopted the perspective of domestic elites in post-conflict countries whose transition processes are externally monitored, supervised, or administered. There is clearly a need to systematically investigate the importance of domestic elites, how domestic elites interact with external actors, and how these interactions influence the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation.

Domestic elites and state-building

When speaking about domestic actors in post-conflict societies, numerous groups and individuals come to mind: members of the executive, legislature and judiciary, business people and journalists, leaders of political parties and unions, commanders of security forces and warlords, representatives of religious groups, traditional authorities and elders, as well as civil society organisations and the population in general. Which of those actors belong to the politically relevant elite, and which of them have a chance to become part of the state elite – that is, who is allowed to compete for office and who has the right to decide upon institutions, to carry out reforms, and to implement decisions? This issue is highly contested in post-conflict societies, especially when there is debate over whether various political, economic, social, cultural, or ethnic groups truly belong to the society.⁷⁴

Additionally, elites are not always fixed when external actors arrive; in fact, they may appear to be a ‘network of complex, shifting relations, often among personalities rather than groups’.⁷⁵ This makes it difficult for state-builders and democracy promoters to determine their counterparts for purposes of negotiation, and also for scholars to identify the relevant actors to analyse. Although domestic elites play a central role in post-conflict state-building and democratisation, and external actors increasingly influence this process, ‘not very much is known about the process of elite formation in highly internationalized settings, such as post-war societies, or about the interaction of national elites and external actors in particular’, as Hensell and Gerdes cogently argue.⁷⁶ Exceptions include single-case studies on elites in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and several comparative studies on interim governments and international peace missions.⁷⁷

Studies focusing on highly intrusive settings of UN-led interim administrations indicate that these administrations influence the ‘construction’⁷⁸ or ‘formation’⁷⁹ of political elites – i.e. the recruitment and socialisation of politicians – through their impact on interim governing rules, on national elites’ ‘opportunity structures’ and on the creation of a domestic multi-party system.⁸⁰ They choose ‘who rules by select[ing] or exclud[ing] individuals and organizations for political leadership roles’; they create ‘incentives that shape tactics and strategies which elites and aspiring elites will use to gain or retain power’; and they shape ‘beliefs about the scope and purpose of government and about the limits of acceptable behaviour within the political system’.⁸¹

Thereby, interim governments affect which groups acquire access to political power and influence the expectations and strategies of these elites to remain in power once the interim government is converted into permanent institutional arrangements.⁸² It is highly likely that those who obtain early access to power (or in fact, remain in power, as Manning shows)⁸³ are more likely to shape the constitution-drafting process and consequently the new rules of the game. Furthermore, these elites are more likely to have access to information about external actors’ preferences as well as their strengths and weaknesses; they are more likely to gain access to resources, to quickly create political parties and thus to campaign more successfully for democratic elections; and they are more likely to enjoy some sort of legitimacy in the eyes of the voters, since they have already served in office.⁸⁴ Whether external actors contribute to elite formation to the same extent in less intrusive surroundings (such as monitoring missions and development co-operation settings) remains to be investigated.

External actors and domestic elites: mapping their interactions

Although external actors and domestic elites have been separately researched, their interactions in post-conflict environments have thus far not received due attention. A growing body of research explores the ‘hybridity’ of peace operations, reflecting the fact that they increasingly comprise domestic and international actors, norms and institutions and produce post-conflict orders that are a mixture of liberal and illiberal elements.⁸⁵ Studies of ‘peace-building from below’ focus on local (i.e. sub-state) actors and how they attempt to exploit peace-building missions for ulterior purposes.⁸⁶ Several case studies point to strategic interactions between external and domestic actors as possible explanation for state-builders’ inability to engineer liberal democracies in post-conflict countries.⁸⁷ Yet, very few studies on post-conflict democratisation have attempted a systematic theorisation of external–domestic interactions.

Similarly, the larger literature on democratisation still struggles to bridge structural and agency-centred approaches, and only selectively includes external factors (structures and actors). For example, structural approaches explore how the level of globalisation, geographical proximity and dependency relationships between target states and external actors determine the success of external interference;⁸⁸ agency-centred approaches emphasise how domestic political elites, on the basis of their principal values and calculations of the internal and external costs and benefits of political change, decide whether or not to give in to external demands.⁸⁹

The most influential attempt to theorise the interwovenness of external and domestic factors has been made by Levitsky and Way, who study the degree to which Western external actors and structures influence democratisation.⁹⁰ They argue that the impact of the international environment on democracy in a particular country operates along two dimensions: leverage (the vulnerability of the target state to external pressure) and linkage (the density of ties between the external actor and the target state).⁹¹ While leverage reflects the strength and credibility of Western pressure for democratisation, it is not enough to bring about democratic change; otherwise, the West would have been equally effective across the world in promoting democracy. Rather, linkages to the West also affect the motivation of domestic actors to democratise. When political, social, economic, organisational, or cultural ties and cross-border flows of trade and investment, people and communication between a particular country and the West are dense, the international awareness of authoritarian abuse rises and the costs of non-compliance with democratisation demands increase. In sum, external actors are only able to strongly influence a target state if there is an asymmetrical power relationship and a high degree of interdependence – in other words, if leverage is high and linkages are dense.⁹²

Although Levitsky and Way provide a more ‘detailed, elegant and far-reaching explanation of Western democracy promotion’ than many other theorists,⁹³ Tolstrup challenges their model for two reasons. First, he argues that a theory of external leverage and linkage should not only identify the positive (Western) influences conducive to democracy, but also negative, counterproductive influences, which are neglected by Levitsky and Way.⁹⁴ Second, Levitsky and Way’s model does not account for intra-regional variance. According to them, the density of linkages should be similar for all countries within the same region, as geographic proximity to the West is kept constant. Tolstrup criticises the determinism of this claim as it erroneously portrays domestic elites as mere objects of external influence, and argues that in reality, external influence in the same region varies.⁹⁵

To overcome those shortcomings, Tolstrup introduces the concept of ‘gatekeeper elites’ who ‘actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors’.⁹⁶ In his view, these elites are most exposed to the influence of external actors, but rather than being mere objects of external influence, they possess the capacity to shape external linkages and leverage. They may decide to intensify or reduce relationships with external actors and a country’s linkages to the outside. Gatekeeper elites can thus increase or decrease certain external actors’ leverage, and they can develop new linkages on their own.⁹⁷ According to Tolstrup, political elites may have good reasons to restrain or facilitate the influence of external actors by either cutting or building linkages, depending on how they believe such choices will influence their chances of wielding political power.⁹⁸

Tolstrup is correct to factor the role of domestic agency into the structure-oriented model of linkage and leverage, and in his efforts to account for both positive and negative influences on democratisation. However, in our view, the applicability of the linkage/leverage model to post-conflict contexts is limited. The basic tenet of the model is that the strength of leverage is conditioned by the linkages: external actors are able to exert influence on state-building and the formation of elites only when their power is backed by dense linkages. The denser the linkages, the more easily leverage is converted into influence. Thus, leverage cannot be exploited to its full potential without the ‘glue’ of linkages.

In post-conflict contexts, the dynamics of linkage and leverage function in a different way. First, the model assumes that it is the government or political elites in general who are subject to leverage and (in Tolstrup’s model) able to condition linkages. However, in a post-conflict setting, a functioning government is often inexistent. This creates opportunities for other powerful actors to influence external linkages, to interact with external actors and to exploit these linkages for their personal gain (e.g. to perpetuate war economies or influence the distribution of rents). From the perspective of the external actors, it is hence not so much their leverage over a post-conflict country as such that makes them capable of exerting influence; rather it is the leverage they hold over distinct groups within the country. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of external–domestic interactions in post-conflict settings presupposes the identification of politically relevant domestic elites that influence the building of democratic institutions and the planning and implementation of reforms, or have the potential to veto those processes.

Second, the model conceptualises external leverage as a structural factor. In Levitsky and Way’s and also Tolstrup’s understanding, leverage represents the general vulnerability of a state to the interests of Western powers, primarily due to economic factors. This implies that external actors influence democratic transition from a rather remote position. But in post-conflict situations, external actors are present on the ground and directly interfere in everyday state-building and democratisation: they participate in agenda-setting, the drafting of reform proposals and their implementation. Thus, leverage in post-conflict settings refers to a specific situational leverage that state-builders hold over domestic elites.⁹⁹ It is generally stronger when domestic elites depend on external resources and security guarantees and when they rely on external support to obtain their political objectives.

Accounting for the special features of post-conflict settings calls into question another assumption of the model, namely that leverage is unidirectional, with the direction of influence going from external actors to domestic elites. In fact, external influence is no one-way street: external actors influence national elites’ opportunity structures and impose institutions from the outside, but domestic actors react to these attempts and influence external actors’ interests and behaviour in turn. Domestic elites may choose to adopt external actors’ reform proposals, but they may also resist or try to modify them.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, we argue that domestic elites alter external actors’ preferences and calculations of how costly democracy promotion will be in the specific post-conflict context. Thus, both groups of actors engage in a dynamic and dense interaction process over norms and institutions.¹⁰¹ Approaches such as those proposed by Levitsky and Way and Tolstrup fail to model these processes of interaction and their effects on democratisation outcomes.

Finally, both Levitsky and Way and Tolstrup focus exclusively on the objective of democratisation and the ways how external and domestic actors may influence it. However, recent scholarship has shown that in complex undertakings like state-building processes, different actors may prioritise different objectives. Such conflicts of objectives can be extrinsic or intrinsic: extrinsic conflicts of objectives emerge when the goal of achieving democratisation interferes with other objectives such as security, stabilisation, or socio-economic development; intrinsic conflicts of objectives arise when different dimensions or sub-goals of democratisation come into conflict with one another (e.g. free elections with power-sharing, ownership with donor control).¹⁰² Such conflicts occur frequently, and if they are not managed well, democratisation gets impaired.¹⁰³

In investigating the problem of conflicting interests in a post-war context, Barnett and Zürcher model the interaction process between state-builders and state and sub-national elites and argue that state-builders’ democratisation efforts may collide with the egoistic calculations of domestic elites, leading to conflicts of preference.¹⁰⁴ Zürcher et al. demonstrate that ‘domestic elites in post-war societies are keen to benefit from the resources – both material and symbolic – that state-builders can bring, but they are less eager to adopt democracy because they believe democratic reforms may endanger some or all of their substantive interests’.¹⁰⁵ Whereas state-builders prioritise the implementation of democratic reforms, elites want to preserve their political power. As a consequence of democratisation, victorious elites risk losing elections or empowering a strong domestic opposition. Hence, state elites need to ensure that the reform process enhances or at least does not harm their political and economic interests, and that it does not become a source of new security threats. Sub-national elites aim to maximise their autonomy from the central government. At the same time, however, both state and sub-national elites fear that lack of co-operation could lead to the loss of the resources that state-builders supply.¹⁰⁶

To account for these countervailing arguments, Zürcher et al. hypothesise that the external demand for democratisation creates domestic adoption costs (such as the potential loss of executive power).¹⁰⁷ If these costs are too high, domestic elites do not embrace democracy. However, dependence on external actors’ resources (such as security guarantees or foreign aid) strengthens external leverage, which in turn increases the costs of not engaging in democratisation. As a consequence, the likelihood of implementing democratising reforms increases. The most likely outcome is ‘compromised peace-building’, a mix of reforms and preservation of the status quo, which reflects both the desire of peace-builders for democratisation and the desire of domestic elites to ensure that reforms do not threaten their power base.¹⁰⁸

Exploring in more detail the encounters between external actors and domestic elites in the everyday practice of post-conflict democracy promotion, Groß and Grimm identify patterns of external–domestic interaction.¹⁰⁹ Based on an empirical study of Croatia’s public administration reform, they argue that policy reforms in democratising countries exposed to external leverage are the result of negotiations between all stakeholders – external actors, domestic governments and domestic third parties (here, trade unions). These negotiations take place at various stages of the policy-cycle, including agenda-setting, policy-formulation, policy-adoption, policy-implementation and evaluation.¹¹⁰ Each side disposes of a set of instruments to influence the negotiations. External actors resort to diplomacy, democracy assistance, conditionality and supervision. These instruments reflect the general level of external leverage, with diplomacy having the least leverage and supervision the most. Domestic actors respond by making use of diplomacy, take-over, slowdown, modification, resistance and emancipation. A ranking of these domestic instruments is more difficult, as they describe different variants of reform-supportive or reform-critical behaviour.¹¹¹

For the purpose of this special issue, three relevant conclusions emerge. First, reform-making in a post-conflict context requires constant diplomatic exchange. External and domestic actors continuously meet, talk and negotiate over the scope and scale of reforms. Second, interactions change in character over time. In the early phase of policy-formulation, interactions are mostly not antagonistic, and proposals for democracy assistance on the external side are usually well-received on the domestic side. However, once it comes to policy-adoption, interactions become more conflictive: external actors employ instruments of higher leverage, whereas domestic actors might resort to slowdown, modification, or resistance (i.e. reform-critical behaviour). As a result, the reform proposal may be significantly altered, diverging substantially from the external actors’ original demands. Third, although donors emphasise the importance of ‘local ownership’ in transition, an asymmetric relationship persists, with external actors generally in the driver’s seat for the initiation of state-building and democratisation reforms and with leverage due to financial and personal resources they can supply.¹¹²

External–domestic interactions and their impact on post-conflict democratisation

Since the end of the Cold War, post-conflict democratisation has rarely occurred without significant international involvement. Scholars have therefore first and foremost examined the nature and relevance of external actors to determine whether and how they can alter domestic actors’ interests and preferences in favour of democratisation and support the development of democratic institutions. Yet, we have argued that confronting the challenges of post-conflict democratisation requires more than that. In addition, we need to take into account the domestic actors involved, their preferences and motivations, and their perceptions of and their reactions to external interference. When investigating external contributions to post-conflict democratisation (as has been done extensively over the last two decades), one must also analyse domestic actors’ preferences and behaviour (an aspect that has largely been overlooked) and the interaction dynamics between domestic elites and external state-building and democracy-promoting actors (which scholars are currently starting to explore). Moreover, the patterns of external–internal interactions are a potential explanatory factor for the fate of state-building and democracy promotion efforts.

Thus, we suggest that studies on external actors and domestic elites in post-conflict democratisation need to grapple with three principal issues: (1) the identification of relevant domestic elites in externally induced or monitored state-building and democratisation processes, (2) the dynamics of external–domestic interactions and (3) the impact of these interactions on the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation. Although some studies have begun to address these issues, they deserve further attention from both scholars and practitioners in the fields of peace- and state-building, democracy promotion, regime transition and elite research. These topics are addressed in the articles assembled in this special issue. Its contributions provide theoretical as well as empirical insights. Complementing our introduction, Christoph Zürcher presents a theory of post-conflict peace-building and democratisation based on the assumption that peace-building is a dynamic, interactive process between external peace-builders and domestic elites. Empirically, Zürcher explores the universe of cases of peace-building missions that aimed at inducing political change toward democracy, while the remaining three articles study cases from different world regions. They present findings regarding the role of domestic elites and their interaction with external actors in post-conflict democratisation in Guatemala (Zimmermann), Mozambique (Bunk) and Kosovo (Groß). However, the principal issues identified here are also intended to serve as building blocks for future research.

Identification of relevant domestic elites

Domestic elites play an important role in post-conflict state-building and democracy promotion. The majority of studies in these fields have focused on external contributions, investigating the mandates and internal functioning of democracy-promoting organisations and their field missions, but rarely systematically including the domestic side of post-conflict democratisation in targeted countries. When peace- and state-building studies mention domestic elites, they seldom offer clear conceptualisations of ‘the elites’, their formation and their ‘bargains’.¹¹³ Thus, questions such as who the domestic elites are in post-conflict societies, how they are formed (with or without external interference) and how they influence democratisation should be prioritised.

The special issue deepens the elite-theoretical component of our inquiry from the perspective of post-conflict studies by showing ways how to identify relevant domestic elites. When conceptualising the actor variable, simple dichotomies like ‘elites versus masses’ that pervade democratisation research should be avoided by always clearly identifying and naming the actors who are relevant in post-conflict democratisation. The articles in this special issue employ the frequently-made differentiation into national, state, or central elites, on the one hand, and sub-national, local or secondary elites, on the other. Zürcher distinguishes central elites and secondary elites, the former referring to the ruling government, the latter to ‘other relevant influential groups, such as entrenched provincial elites, militias, regional power-brokers, conservative religious groups, etc.’.¹¹⁴ The case studies operate on different levels of analysis: the contribution by Groß on municipal reforms in Kosovo concentrates on local level actors; Bunk’s analysis of the decentralisation process in Mozambique covers the interaction of external donors and domestic elites at the national as well as the local level; and Zimmermann’s study on international rule of law promotion in Guatemala focuses on domestic elites at the national level.

Contributions also study the divisions and shifting alliances among elites, seeking to identify important cleavages and diverging preferences that could explain specific outcomes of interaction processes between domestic elites and external actors. One example is the cleavage between state elites and sub-national elites, which Bunk addresses in her contribution on conflicting preferences in decentralisation.¹¹⁵ Cleavages and divisions might also be conducive to the rise of new elites that challenge old incumbents or well-established oppositional leaders. Such elite shifts may especially, but not exclusively occur in post-conflict environments, potentially bringing new political elites to power (which would challenge Manning’s findings of high elite continuity in post-conflict settings).¹¹⁶ For example, in her study of Guatemala, Zimmermann points out that the old oligarchy became increasingly worried about the emergence of new economic elites (both business elites and organised crime) in the post-conflict phase. By supporting a proposal for a rule of law commission, the old guard hoped to limit the influence of these new elites.¹¹⁷

Dynamics of external–domestic interactions

Domestic elites interact with external actors in post-conflict democratisation. External-domestic interactions go beyond the dichotomous conceptualisation of local ownership by domestic elites and monitoring by external actors. Instead, post-conflict democratisation is a dynamic process of bargaining between external actors and domestic elites over the shape of democracy and the prioritisation of democratic institution-building in relation to other objectives. During this process, ideas for post-conflict democratisation are exchanged, norms are discussed, interests are revealed, institutions are created and reform proposals are drafted. External actors may adjust their demands in the course of the interaction process with domestic elites. On the domestic side, it is possible to observe local appropriation, conditional endorsement and reservation about or rejection of democratic norms and institutions, as well as domestic elites’ efforts to either co-operate with or exploit external actors for their political purposes.

In this vein, Zürcher highlights the relevance of the interests of domestic elites, their bargaining power and their potential obstructive power in their interactions with external actors to explain stalled processes of post-conflict state-building and democratisation.¹¹⁸ Whether a post-war state emerges as democratic or not depends to a large extent on the bargaining process between domestic elites and peace-builders. This process is constrained by a conflict of preferences: whereas peace-builders typically intend to achieve a more democratic outcome, domestic elites very seldom fully embrace the peace-builders’ democratisation agenda.

The problem of diverging goals is highly relevant for the case of Kosovo.¹¹⁹ While peace-builders emphasised stability and respect for the norms of democracy and minority rights, local elites’ priorities centred on socio-economic development, political power and the question of Kosovo’s status. During the external–domestic negotiations, domestic elites consistently managed to capture democratic reforms. They succeeded in modifying reform proposals in a way to satisfy their interests regarding socio-economic development, political power and the status question.¹²⁰

Another interesting question is how domestic elites perceive external interference in post-conflict democratisation and how they respond to it. In contrast to conventional wisdom on international efforts to support state-building and democratisation, external–domestic exchange is not a one-way street. Rather, it takes place in two directions, from external actors to domestic elites and from domestic elites to external actors. External actors propose norms and institutions to domestic actors and negotiate the contents with them. Domestic actors challenge these norms and institutions and, in turn, propose revisions that force external actors to rethink the meaning of the contested norms as well as the manner of their implementation.

How domestic actors shape the external–domestic interaction becomes visible in the case of international promotion of the rule of law in Guatemala. ¹²¹ In 2004, the establishment of an UN-sponsored international rule of law commission was rejected by Guatemalan political elites, but in 2007, the establishment of the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) was approved by the Guatemalan Congress with a two-thirds majority. Neither external pressure nor changes in the ruling elites due to electoral defeat can sufficiently explain this outcome. Instead, the eventual approval of the CICIG can be explained through the dynamics of the external–domestic interplay in negotiations over the content and shape of the commission and in the reframing of its objectives. In an interactive process, external rule of law promoters, ruling elites and a domestic pro-commission coalition modified the institutional set-up and the mandate of the commission to make it fit elite interests and to adapt it to the local Guatemalan rule of law discourse.¹²²

Going beyond the nature and contents of external–domestic interactions, one should not neglect the structural conditions such as neo-patrimonialism or clientelism in which such interactions take place, as they are highly likely to shape their dynamics. In Mozambique’s post-conflict transition, interactions between domestic political elites with external donors took place at the state and the sub-state level in the context of the country’s decentralisation process.¹²³ Empirical research at national and local levels supports the hypothesis that informal power structures constitute a decisive factor shaping the processes of external–domestic interaction and consequently post-conflict democratisation. Patterns of (political) clientelism and preference formation at the national level are likewise reproduced at the local level. In light of the blurred boundaries between the state, the government, the ruling party and actors from the private sector and civil society, external and domestic actors act at national and local levels outside the formal democratic realm.

Impact of external–domestic interactions

How and to what extent external–domestic interactions influence the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation is the third principal issue to be addressed. Knowing more about actors’ strategies and the patterns of interaction might also contribute to the study of the intended and unintended consequences of external–domestic interactions. Authors including Barnett and Zürcher (and their co-authors) and Groß and Grimm have already pointed to the fact that certain interaction dynamics can hinder the implementation of specific policy reforms.¹²⁴ Zürcher argues that both external and domestic actors influence post-conflict democratisation, although their preferences on what should be achieved do not necessarily coincide. As a consequence of negotiations between external actors and domestic elites, reform proposals are changed and adapted to local contexts. Whether externally demanded democratic norms and institutions are appropriated, conditionally endorsed, challenged or rejected by domestic elites has an impact on democratisation trajectories.

All contributions to this special issue suggest that interaction dynamics might compromise state-building and democratisation. As a result, international peace-building missions rarely lead to prosperous democracy, as Zürcher shows in his study of 19 recent peace-building missions.¹²⁵ Even worse, external actors might (albeit unintendedly) increase peace-building complexities at the local level, as in the case of Kosovo, or contribute to the consolidation of neo-patrimonial behaviour on the part of domestic actors at the state and sub-state levels, as is demonstrated in the case of Mozambique. In turn, when external actors take domestic actors’ preferences and concerns seriously, they are more effective in promoting democracy and the rule of law. Once implemented, the Guatemalan CICIG fought impunity and fostered capacity-building in a way that challenged Guatemalan elites; subsequently, elites were compelled to strengthen the rule of law beyond their original intent.¹²⁶

A new research agenda

Together, the theoretical considerations and empirical studies included in this special issue point to the dynamics of external–domestic interactions as a new explanation for the outcomes of post-conflict state-building and democratisation. Obviously, our endeavour represents a first attempt and findings must be refined and substantiated by further empirical studies. We need to know more about which are the politically relevant domestic elites in individual cases of post-conflict democratisation, how domestic elites and external actors interact with one another, what strategies and instruments they use and what factors constrain external–domestic interactions. We are convinced that in this way, scholars will develop a deeper understanding of post-conflict state-building and democratisation processes. This will allow them to explain more comprehensively the trajectory of post-conflict democratisation and make more appropriate context-sensitive policy recommendations to improve the record of international state-building and democracy promotion efforts in post-conflict societies.

Notes on contributors

Sonja Grimm is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Germany. She holds a PhD from Humboldt University Berlin and has recently completed her postdoctoral qualification (Habilitation) at the University of Konstanz. She specialises in the field of democratisation, democracy promotion and development co-operation in developing, transitioning, fragile and post-conflict contexts. More about her can be found at [http://sonja-grimm.eu].

Brigitte Weiffen holds the Martius Chair for German and European Studies, a visiting professorship sponsored by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), at the University of São Paulo. Her research focuses on comparative democratisation, transitional justice, conflict management, regional organisations and regional security.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of the contributions to this special issue were presented at the international conference ‘Domestic elites and public opinion: the neglected dimensions of externally induced democratization’ at the University of Konstanz in 2012. We thank all conference participants and especially the authors of this special issue for their fruitful contributions and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We wish to especially thank the journal editors for kind support during the publication process. We gratefully acknowledge financial support of the various stages of this project from the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Center of Excellence ‘Cultural Foundations of Integration’ at the University of Konstanz and the German research network ‘External Democracy Promotion’ funded by the Leibniz Association.

Notes

1. Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie [Enforced Democracy]; Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 2.

2. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject; Grimm, ‘External Democratization after War’.

3. Lake and Rothchild, International Spread; Levitsky and Way, ‘Linkage versus Leverage’; Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Diffusion’.

4. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Hartzell et al., ‘Stabilizing the Peace’; Fortna, ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?’; Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie [Enforced Democracy]; Paris, At War’s End; Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding.

5. Caplan, International Governance; Diehl, Peace Operations; Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie [Enforced Democracy]; Steinert and Grimm, ‘Too Good to Be True?’.

6. Grimm and Leininger, ‘Not All Good Things’; Jawad, ‘Conflict Resolution’.

7. Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy; Barnett et al., ‘Compromised Peacebuilding’; Groß, Peacebuilding and Post-war Transitions; Groß and Grimm, ‘External-Domestic Interplay’; Groß and Grimm, ‘Conflicts of Preferences’.

8. Burnell, ‘Democracy Assistance’; Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad; Schraeder, ‘State of the Art’, 25–26.

9. Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance’; Grimm and Leininger, ‘Not All Good Things’.

10. Reilly, ‘Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios’; Reilly, ‘Political Engineering’; Manning, ‘Party-building’; Manning, Making of Democrats.

11. Zeeuw and Kumar, Promoting Democracy.

12. Finkel et al., ‘Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance’.

13. Caplan, International Governance; Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, 338; Pouligny, Peace Operations, 3–6; Paris, At War’s End.

14. Chesterman, You, the People; Paris, At War’s End.

15. Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Democratization.

16. UNDKPO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. For further information, see Chandler, International Statebuilding, 6–12; Pouligny, Peace Operations, 3–6; Paris, At War’s End.

17. Steinert and Grimm, ‘Too Good to Be True?’, annex.

18. Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie [Enforced Democracy]; Zürcher, ‘Building Democracy’; Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy.

19. OECD, Fragile States, 46.

20. Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy; Zulueta-Fülscher, ‘Democracy-Support Effectiveness’; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.

21. Grimm and Leininger, ‘Not All Good Things’; Jarstad, ‘Dilemmas of War-to-Democracy Transitions’; Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding.

22. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; Doyle and Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding’; Heldt, ‘Peacekeeping and Transitions’; Pickering and Peceny, ‘Forging Democracy at Gunpoint’; Steinert and Grimm, ‘Too Good to Be True?’.

23. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, ‘Intervention and Democracy’; Marten, Enforcing the Peace; Weinstein, Democracy Advantage; Downes and Monten, ‘Forced to Be Free?’.

24. Fortna and Huang, ‘Democratization after Civil War’; Fortna, ‘Peacekeeping and Democratization’.

25. Paris, At War’s End; Chandler, Empire in Denial; Gromes, ‘A Case Study’; Chesterman, You, the People; Stahn, Law and Practice; Tansey, Regime-building.

26. Feldman, What We Owe Iraq; Fukuyama, State-building; Merkel and Grimm, War and Democratization; Newman and Rich, UN Role in Promoting Democracy.

27. Reiber, Demokratieförderung [Democracy Promotion]; Richter, Partner.

28. Chandler, Empire in Denial; Diamond, Squandered Victory; Zulueta-Fülscher, ‘Democracy-Support Effectiveness’.

29. Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie [Enforced Democracy]; Zeeuw and Kumar, Promoting Democracy; Tansey, Regime-Building; Enterline and Greig, ‘Against All Odds?’.

30. For an overview, see Schneckener, ‘Making Power-Sharing Work’; Binningsbø, ‘Power Sharing’; Pospieszna and Schneider, ‘Illusion of’.

31. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy; Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’.

32. Džihić and Segert, ‘Lessons from’; Berg and Solvak, ‘Muted Differences’; Chandler, Bosnia; Tansey, Regime-building; McMahon and Western, ‘Death of Dayton’; Keil and Perry, State-building.

33. O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule’, 59; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 10; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 5; Grimm, Erzwungene Demokratie [Enforced Democracy].

34. Hensell and Gerdes, ‘Elites and International Actors’, 158; Manning, ‘Interim Governments’, 54–56; Tansey, Regime-building, 37–42; Manning, Making of Democrats.

35. Caplan, ‘Who Guards the Guardians?’; Gilbert, ‘Legitimacy Matters’; Turner, ‘Delivering Lasting Peace’.

36. Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’; Newman and Richmond, Challenges to Peacebuilding. For a more critical stance on ‘resistance’, see Groß and Grimm, ‘Conflicts of Preferences’.

37. Nenadovic, ‘An Uneasy Symbiosis’, 1168.

38. Dietrich, ‘Bypass or Engage?’; Pospieszna, Democracy Assistance; Bush, Taming of Democracy Assistance.

39. Mendelson and Glenn, Power and Limits; Henderson, Building Democracy.

40. Grimm, ‘Democratization and Conflict Resolution’; Enterline and Greig, ‘Against All Odds?’; Downes and Monten, ‘Forced to Be Free?’.

41. Groß and Grimm, ‘Conflicts of Preferences’.

42. Sterbling, ‘Eliten in Südosteuropa’ [Elites in Sout East Europe], 11.

43. Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’, 29.

44. Khan, ‘Elite Identities’, 479.

45. Khan, ‘Sociology of Elites’, 362.

46. Ibid.

47. Held, Models of Democracy, 199; Khan, ‘Elite Identities’, 482.

48. Haggard and Kaufman, ‘Inequality and Regime Change’, 497; Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins.

49. Jencks, ‘Does Inequality Matter?’; Khan, ‘Sociology of Elites’; Bourdieu, State Nobility.

50. Khan, ‘Sociology of Elites’, 364. For an argument on illegitimacy, see Winters, Oligarchy; for clientelism see Fukuoka, ‘Indonesia’s ‘Democratic Transition’ Revisited’; Helmke and Levitsky, ‘Informal Institutions’; for rent-seeking see North et al., Limited Access Orders; Moore, ‘Revenues, State Formation’; and for corruption see Adebanwi and Obadare, ‘When Corruption Fights Back’; Wright, ‘Aid Effectiveness’; Divjak and Pugh, ‘Political Economy of Corruption’.

51. Higley and Burton, ‘Elite Variable’, 18; also see Higley and Burton, Elite Foundations.

52. Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 5.

53. Tolstrup, ‘When Can External Actors Influence’.

54. Sterbling, ‘Eliten in Südosteuropa’ [Elites in Sout East Europe], 11.

55. Stone and Stone, An Open Elite?

56. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 66.

57. Tolstrup, ‘When Can External Actors’, 720.

58. Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’, 24.

59. Ibid.

60. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Pugh, ‘Local Agency’.

61. Winters, Oligarchy, 42–50.

62. Sterbling, ‘Eliten in Südosteuropa’ [Elites in Sout East Europe], 11; Eyal et al., Making Capitalism.

63. Pouligny, Peace Operations, 45.

64. Tolstrup, ‘When Can External Actors’, 720.

65. Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy. Surprisingly, even though the role of mass mobilisation in democratic transitions might seem obvious, it has only more recently received the sustained attention it deserves (for an overview, see Haggard and Kaufman, ‘Democracy During the Third Wave’, 135; Weiffen, Entstehungsbedingungen [Determinants], 172–174).

66. Karl, ‘Dilemmas of Democratization’; Karl and Schmitter, ‘Modes of Transition’; Munck and Leff, ‘Modes of Transition’; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Higley and Burton, ‘Elite Variable’; Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship; Collier, Paths toward Democracy; Leff, ‘Democratization and Disintegration’.

67. Higley and Burton, ‘Elite Variable’.

68. Ibid.; Higley and Burton, Elite Foundations, 3; Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’.

69. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Colomer, ‘Strategic Transitions’; Colomer, ‘Transitions by Agreement’.

70. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 61–64.

71. Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins; Dunning, Crude Democracy.

72. Dogan and Higley, Elites.

73. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad; Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad; Carothers and Gramont, Development Aid.

74. Linz and Stepan, ‘Stateness’; Simonsen, ‘Addressing Ethnic Divisions’; Snyder, From Voting to Violence.

75. Pouligny, Peace Operations, 50–51.

76. Hensell and Gerdes, ‘Elites and International Actors’, 154.

77. Grandits, ‘The Power of ‘Armchair Politicians’’; Manning, ‘Interim Governments’; Manning, ‘Political Elites and Democratic State-Building’; Nenadovic, ‘Uneasy Symbiosis’; Pouligny, Peace Operations; Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’; Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy; Kappler, ‘Divergent Transformation’.

78. Manning, ‘Interim Governments’.

79. Hensell and Gerdes, ‘Elites and International Actors’.

80. Manning, ‘Interim Governments’, 56–57; Hensell and Gerdes, ‘Elites and International Actors’, 155–156; Manning, Making of Democrats; Nenadovic, ‘Uneasy Symbiosis’.

81. Manning, ‘Interim Governments’, 54.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace’; Mac Ginty, ‘International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance’; Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’.

86. Boyce, Investing in Peace; Pouligny, Peace Operations; Talentino, ‘Perceptions of Peacebuilding’.

87. Pouligny, Peace Operations; Englebert and Tull, ‘Postconflict Reconstruction’; Fortna, ‘Peacekeeping and Democratization’; Manning, Making of Democrats; Autesserre, Trouble with the Congo.

88. Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Diffusion’; Muller, ‘Dependent Economic Development’; Weiffen, Entstehungsbedingungen [Determinants]; Weijnert, Diffusion of Democracy.

89. Risse et al., ‘Socialization of International Human Rights’; Schimmelfennig et al., International Socialization; Yilmaz, ‘External-Internal Linkages’; Thiel, Nested Games.

90. Levitsky and Way, ‘International Linkage and Democratization’; Levitsky and Way, ‘Linkage versus Leverage’; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.

91. Levitsky and Way, ‘Linkage versus Leverage’, 382–383.

92. Ibid.

93. Tolstrup, ‘When Can External Actors’, 719.

94. Ibid., 717.

95. Ibid., 720.

96. Ibid., 718.

97. Ibid., 721–725.

98. Ibid., 726–728.

99. Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 116.

100. Kappler and Richmond, ‘Peacebuilding and Culture’; Pugh, ‘Local Agency’; Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’.

101. Groß and Grimm, ‘External-domestic Interplay’; Groß, Peacebuilding and Post-war Transitions.

102. Grimm and Leininger, ‘Not All Good Things’, 397–398; Spanger and Wolff, ‘Universales Ziel – Partikulare Wege?’ [Universal Objective – Particular Ways?], 267.

103. Grimm and Leininger, ‘Not All Good Things’, 398–399.

104. Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’; Barnett et al., ‘Compromised Peacebuilding’; Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy. See also Groß and Grimm, ‘Conflicts of Preferences and Domestic Constraints’.

105. Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 133.

106. Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’; Barnett et al., ‘Compromised Peacebuilding’.

107. Zürcher et al. Costly Democracy.

108. Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’; Barnett et al., ‘Compromised Peacebuilding’; Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy, 132; see also Zürcher’s contribution to this special issue.

109. Groß and Grimm, ‘External-Domestic Interplay’; Groß and Grimm, ‘Conflicts of Preferences’.

110. Ibid.

111. Groß and Grimm, ‘External-Domestic Interplay’, 919–922.

112. Ibid.

113. See, for example, Salmon, ‘Elites and Statebuilding’.

114. Zürcher, in this issue.

115. Bunk, in this issue.

116. Manning, ‘Interim Governments’.

117. Zimmermann, in this issue.

118. Zürcher, in this issue.

119. Groß, in this issue.

120. Ibid.; also see Groß, Peacebuilding and Post-war Transitions.

121. Zimmermann, in this issue.

122. Ibid.; also see Zimmermann, Global Norms with a Local Face.

123. Bunk, in this issue.

124. Groß and Grimm, ‘External-Domestic Interplay’; Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy; Barnett and Zürcher, ‘Peacebuilder’s Contract’; Barnett et al., ‘Compromised Peacebuilding’; see also Zürcher’s contribution to this issue.

125. Zürcher, in this issue; also see Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy.

126. Zimmermann, in this issue.