De-mystifying Buddhist religious extremism in Myanmar: confrontation and contestation around religion, development and state-building

ABSTRACT

Myanmar’s path to democracy, freedom and development has been marred by emerging Buddhist religious extremism targeted against the Rohingya Muslims. This article examines the rise of Buddhist religious extremism in Myanmar. Its core focus is on the political economy of state-building and development, and the structural and social conditions that have produced violence. We argue that contested state-society relations, negotiated by the discourse of state-building and development rather than religion and religious ideologies alone, can better explain the current dynamics of extremist violence in Myanmar. We show that hegemonic state-building processes (that have been ongoing since Myanmar became independent in 1948) and exploitative development serve as a site for inequalities and discriminatory policies. These policies and their manipulation for political and developmental gains have had multiple social effects: they have radicalised a section of Buddhists, resulting in the rise of violent religious extremism, and marginalisation and double victimisation of the Rohingya Muslims, targeted by the State security forces as well as Buddhist extremist groups.

KEYWORDS:

• Buddhist extremism
• violence
• conflict
• security
• state-building
• Myanmar

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Myanmar was formerly known as Burma. In 1989, the Burmese military authority passed the Adaptation of Expression Law, which changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar. Notwithstanding political sensitivity of both terms, which have caused public backlash inside the country, this article uses the term Myanmar, which also refers to the country and its administrative units in both colonial and post-colonial periods. In March 2011, the Burmese military regime dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – the official name of the military government – and handed over the power to the newly elected quasi-civilian government of President Thein Sein. This marks the beginning of the political transition in Myanmar.

2. The term ‘extremism’ is used in this paper to refer to the state of deviating from the norm and adopting political and religious ideologies and actions that oppose society’s core values and principles. In the literature, the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ are often used interchangeably. We maintain that when extremism produces violence and security threats, it manifests to be ‘violent extremism’ and if violent extremism is driven by religious ideologies, we call it ‘violent religious extremism’. While all forms of radicalisation – the process through with an individual or group acquires extreme views and ideologies – involve extremism, not all forms of extremism are a product of radicalisation. For more on debates and discussion of these terminologies, see Borum, Radicalisation into Violent Extremism; and Richards, From Terrorism to ‘Radicalisation’ to ‘Extremism’.

3. Van Klinken and Aung. The contentious politics of anti-Muslim scapegoating; Schonthal and Walton. The (New) Buddhist Nationalisms?.

4. See Simpson, Identity, ethnicity and natural resources in Myanmar. Somewhat similar to the concept of ‘double victimisation’, Simpson argues that the Rohingya Muslims are doubly disadvantaged as being targeted not only by the State but also by the Bamar majority, Rakhine Buddhists and other ethnic minorities. In his analysis, Simpson presents an ethnic hierarchy placing the Rohingya Muslims at the bottom to examine what the hierarchy means for access to and distribution of natural resources in Myanmar. In our study, we use the concept of ‘double victimisation’ to explore the dynamics of violence. Our focus is primarily on how the denial of the Rohingya ethnic identity by the state in the state-building has led them being marginalised politically and economically and targeted by the State/military as well as extremist Buddhist groups.

5. See Karim, The Rohingyas. For more discussion on how the terms race and ethnicity are interpreted differently in the local Burmese language and how such interpretation has affected the way Rohingya identity has been viewed within Myanmar, see Cheeseman, How Myanmar’s ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya.

6. Human Rights Watch, The Government could have stopped this.

7. Wade, Myanmar’s Enemy Within; Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya Conflict.

8. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya ’conflict.

9. Subedi, Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ issue is a regional refugee crisis.

10. See Amnesty International, Myanmar; ICG, Myanmar. Approximately 400 Rohingya Muslims participated in the attacks; they killed nine policemen and captured 62 firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition. Amnesty International has further revealed that the ARSA also killed many Hindus in the norther Rakhine state.

11. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s’ Rohingya’ Conflict, 66.

12. In his opening statement to the 36^th Session of the Human Rights Council on 11 September 2017, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar could be a typical example of ethnic cleansing, although the Myanmar authorities have denied this allegation. See https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22041&LangID=E.

13. Authors’ personal communication, December 2019.

14. Coclanis, Terror in Burma for more on anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya violence by ultra-nationalist and Buddhist extremist groups.

15. Cheeseman, ‘How Myanmar’s “National Races”’.

16. Walton, ‘The ‘Wages of Burman-ness’; Walton and Hayward, Contesting Buddhist Narratives.

17. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya Conflict.

18. Callahan, Making Enemies.

19. David and Holliday, Liberalism and Democracy in Myanmar.

20. Jones, ‘Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition’.

21. Mann, The Dark-Side of Democracy, 4, 8.

22. Liow, Religion and Nationalism in South-East Asia. In making this argument, we agree with Liow who has analysed religious conflicts in South-East Asia shifting his analysis beyond religion and taking conflict and nationalism into consideration. However, our view also differs in that we extend the focus from religion to state-building and economic development as a variable for analysis.

23. Blamires, World Fascism, 2. In this article, we borrow the term ‘ultra-nationalism’ from Cyprian Blamers who distinguishes ultra-nationalism from nationalism. He argues that ultra-nationalism is ‘absolutely fundamental [and, therefore], must be understood totally different from nationalism’ …it ‘promotes an “ethnic”, “organic” or “integral” concept of nationality that stress the primacy of identity, of belonging to a supposedly homogeneous culture, shared history or race that it sees as undermined by such forces as individualism, consumerism, cosmopolitanism, globalisation and multi-culturalism’.

24. One of the authors lived and worked with Rakhine Buddhists (as well as members of other national races) in a village in Yangon District for five months in 2013–14 and has travelled throughout Myanmar over the past 5 years visiting towns and villages conducting research into violence, sustainability, alternative development models, education and gender issues.

25. Noted in repeated personal communications 2013–2019 and personal observations. These actors often work with and alongside those from other states and ethnic groups facing similar issues.

26. The authors have, however, had contacts with Rohingya, in Australia. These were middle class Rohingya who had fled the suburbs of Yangon for fear of persecution in the anti-Muslim sentiment sweeping across the country and did not have knowledge or understanding of the conflict in northern Rakhine between the villagers and military.

27. Coclanis, ‘Terror in Burma’.

28. ‘9ʹ refers to nine attributes of the Buddha, ‘6ʹ relates to the six attributes of his teachings, and another ‘9ʹ concerns with the nine attributes of the Sangha, or the monastic order. See Schonthal and Walton, ‘The (New) Buddhist Nationalism’; Walton, ‘Monks in Politics, Monks in the World’; and Kyaw, ‘Islamophobia in Buddhist Myanmar’, who have elaborated on the use of these symbols and its controversies.

29. Schober, Modern Buddhist Conjectures, 77.

30. Smith, ‘Ethnic Politics and Regional Development’. Under the socialist regime imposed by the military and by mid-1980 s Myanmar became one of the worlds’ ten poorest countries.

31. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar.

32. The URC was the supreme governing body of Burma established following the overthrow of the civilian government by the military junta, see Callahan, ‘The Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity’; Holliday, ‘Burma Redux’.

33. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar.

34. The abolished Acts directly concerned about governing Buddhist religious activities. They included the Vinicchaya Tribunal Act, the Pali Education Board Act and the Pali University Act. Also see Charney, A history of Modern Burma.

35. Yutthaworakool, The politics of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar.

36. Chowdhury, The Role of the Internet.

37. Ibid.

38. Schober, Modern Buddhist Conjectures in Myanmar.

39. Ibid.

40. Coclanis, ‘Terror in Burma’. It is useful to note here that Kyaw Lwin was an ex-Buddhist monk but he wrote and published most of his work as a lay man.

41. Moe, ‘A Radically Different Dhamma’.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Simpson, ‘Identity, ethnicity and natural resources’, as also noted earlier, for more on ethnic hierarchy and power.

45. It is also worth noting here that in September 2013, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee or the Sangha Council responsible for regulating the monkhood issued a directive to ban the usage of 969 symbol for monastic organisations that have political purpose. While the Sangha Council’s decision is a welcome one, the scope of the directive could not prevent racial and anti-Muslim violence.

46. Schonthal and Walton, ‘The (New) Buddhist Nationalisms?’, 81–115.

47. ICG, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar.

48. Paing, Buddhist Committee’s 969 Prohibition; Ferrie & Oo,’ Myanmar Buddhist Committee Bans’.

49. Human Rights Watch, Burma. Some agencies also rightly predicted that the Laws could escalate communal tensions and violence.

50. Than, Religion and Violence, 12–24.

51. Ma Ba Tha organised 14 days victory celebrations in September 2015 to mark the success in pushing for the laws and the celebration was attended by an overwhelming majority of Buddhists who seemed to support the laws.

52. Ma Ha Na is a group of high-ranking monks serving as Myanmar’s government appointed body of the Buddhist religious authority. Ma Ha Na also declared that Ma Ba Tha is not an ‘offshoot’ of the 2013 conference of Buddhist clerics as claimed by the Ma Ba Tha Monks, and therefore, it cannot be recognised as a legitimate association of monks. For more on Ma Ha Na’s action against Ma Ba Tha, see Tha and Aung, State-Backed Monks’ Council Decries Ma Ba Tha as ‘Unlawful’.

53. Department of Population, ‘The 2014 Myanmar population and housing census’.

54. See Cheesman, ‘How in Myanmar’. Likewise, Walton, 2008, 890 also notes ‘ethnic identity and national identity are not necessarily one and the same’.

55. See Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict.

56. Charney, A history of Modern Burma.

57. Haque, ‘Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority’, 454–469.

58. Leider, ‘Rohingya’.

59. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya conflict, 79; Schissler et al., ‘Reconciling Contradictions’,387, 390.

60. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya conflict, 14.

61. Ibid, 18.

62. Schissler et al., ‘Reconciling Contradictions’, 389.

63. Author interview with a Rakhine Buddhist1, 15 September 2017.

64. Callahan, Making Enemies.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Cheeseman, How Myanmar’s ‘National Races’.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid, 10.

70. Ibid.

71. Ferguson, ‘Who’s Counting?’, 1–28.

72. See http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/bangladesh-plight-rohingya.

73. Elahi, The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh.

74. Here we borrow the term ‘social engineering’ in the context of peacebuilding and state-building from Oliver P. Richmond; see Richmond, Between Peacebuilding and State-building.

75. Skutsch, Encyclopaedia of the World’s Minorities, 128.

76. Smith, ‘Ethnic Politics and Regional Development’, 241.

77. Cheesman, How Myanmar’s ‘National Races’…; Haque, ‘Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority’.

78. Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘MSF survey…’.

79. See Cline, ‘Insurgency in amber’; Woods, ‘Ceasefire Capitalism’.

80. Jones, Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition; Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya Conflict, 114–170; Smith, 2019, 67.

81. Smith, Arakan (Rakhine).

82. Personal communication with a Rakhine Buddhist4, 23 February 2014.

83. Personal communication with Rakhine Buddhist4, 12 November 2019.

84. Cited in Simpson, ‘Identity, Ethnicity and Natural Resources’, 8.

85. The Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) is an armed wing of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) which has been waging armed insurgency since 1960 s. The strength of the ALA force is estimated less than 100 armed members. The ALA signed the Ceasefire Agreement with the Government in 2012 while the ALP has signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015.

86. See a report by the Frontier Myanmar https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/myanmar-military-fights-arakan-army-among-ancient-rakhine-temples.

87. At one point during an interview, 18 November 2019, the interviewee stopped to take a phone call from his uncle in his village near Buthedang in northern Rakhine. His uncle was ringing to advise that his (the interviewee’s) wife and 10-month-old son, were running to the monastery to seek refuge from a military strike which was in response to recent Arakan Army activity in the area. His family was safe but he was (obviously) very concerned and demonstrably angry at the upscaling of the violence emanating from the Tatmadaw towards Rakhine Buddhists.

88. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya Conflict, 158; Also see, The 2018 FAO/WFP Agriculture and Food Security Mission, 3.

89. Department of Population, The 2014 Myanmar Census.

90. The 2018 FAO/WFP Agriculture and Food Security Mission to Rakhine State, Myanmar, 12 July 2019, 3, 25.

91. LIFT & CARE International, ‘Tat Lan Sustainable Food Security and Livelihoods Program’.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. The 2018 FAO/WFP Agriculture and Food Security Mission.

95. Personal communication with a Rakhine Buddhist4, 23 February 2014.

96. Department of Population, The 2014 Myanmar Census.

97. Rakhine Buddhist2, personal communication, 16 September 2017.

98. Mann, Dark Side of Democracy, 8.

99. See ICG, Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency.

100. Ware and Laoutides, Myanmar’s Rohingya conflict, 49.

101. Personal communication by author with an ethnic youth, Yangon, May 2015.

102. Rakhine Buddhist2, personal communication, 16 September 2017.

103. This is noted by Simpson, 8, who suggests that ‘much of the antipathy towards the Rohingya is based on fear of reduced access to scare resources due to overpopulation’.

104. Rakhine Buddhist 5, personal communication, 14 November 2013.

105. Author interview with a Buddhist follower, Yangon, May 2015).

106. Tin Maung Maung Than, ‘Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar’.

107. See Simpson, ‘Identity, Ethnicity and Natural Resources’, and ERI, there is no benefit… for a discussion on the exploitation of natural resources in Myanmar.

108. Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State), 67.

109. Crouch, Islam and the State in Myanmar. Crouch suggests that this conflict has broader – geo-political ramifications – ie tensions between Muslims (and others) regionally and internationally.

110. Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State) 67.

111. Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State) 46.

112. ERI, ‘There is No Benefit, they Destroyed our Farmland’.

113. See Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State), 16, 67.

114. Boss, ‘India awards Road Contract’.

115. Nyein Nyein, ‘Arakan State Govt. Backs Mining Projects’.

116. Personal communications with respondents in Rakhine state, November 2019.

117. See Woods, ‘Ceasefire Capitalism’, 748.

118. Fuertes, ‘Karen Refugees Describe Peace’.

119. See Sadan’s edited volume on the Kachin ceasefire period.

120. See South, ‘Conflict and Displacement in Burma/Myanmar’.

121. See Simpson, 2014 for a discussion on ethnicity and natural resource rights in Myanmar.

122. Amnesty International, Remaking Rakhine State.

123. Woods, ‘Ceasefire Capitalism’, 751.

124. Rakhine Buddhist 2, personal communication, 15 September 2017.

125. Tin Maung Maung Than, ‘Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar’, 397.

126. See Mann, The Dark-Side of Democracy, 3.

127. Ibid, 5.

128. See Walton and Hayward, Contesting Buddhist Narratives.

129. Cited in Smith, Arakan (Rakhine State), 119.

130. See Walton and Hayward, Contesting Buddhist Narratives.

131. Collinson, ‘Power, Livelihoods and Conflict’.

132. Rakhine Buddhist2, personal communication, 15 September 2017.

133. Rakhine Buddhist3, personal communication, 21 September 2017.

134. Rakhine Buddhist2, personal communication, 16 September 2017.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

D. B. Subedi

D. B. Subedi is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at the University of New England, Australia. His research interest rests at the intersection of conflict, security and development in Asia, especially Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh. [email protected]; [email protected]

Johanna Garnett

Johanna Garnett is a Lecturer in the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at the University of New England, Australia. Johanna is a critical social theorist analysing the impacts of globalisation and mainstream development on agrarian populations, primarily in Myanmar. Key research foci are youth, civil society, social movements and possibilities for alternative development, and their roles in peace-building and democratisation. Johanna’s work is informed by extensive fieldwork and networking in Myanmar.[email protected].