(Re)thinking homegrown peace mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts in Northern Ghana

ABSTRACT

The protracted chieftaincy conflict in Dagbon in the Northern Region of Ghana was recently resolved through an interplay of formal and informal resolution mechanisms, where the latter dominated the peace-making process with home-grown peace mechanisms. In the past, the state through formal liberal peace mechanisms like the law courts, committees and commissions of inquiry, interventions by NGOs/CSOs and peacekeeping operations failed to resolve the conflict. However, through the state support in the use of indigenous peace mechanisms by a Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC), a resolution of the conflict was made possible by the adoption of this hybrid dispute resolution mechanism. This article examines how the Dagbon conflict was resolved using a home-grown peace mechanism, the eminent peace approach. Drawing on related secondary data, we argue that empowering traditional leaders and strengthening home-grown conflict resolution mechanisms can play a pivotal role in resolving non-state conflicts. This article contributes to the hybrid peace literature that centres around the call for local-state collaboration in conflict resolution.

KEYWORDS:

• ‘Homegrown hybrid peace mechanism’
• conflict resolution
• Dagbon
• eminent chiefs approach
• hybrid peace

Introduction

In Africa, Ghana is among the few countries with no record of intra-state conflict since its independence in 1957. The December 2016 election shows that for the third time a democratically elected incumbent government handed over political power to the opposition party. The 2020 general election again shows yet another step towards consolidating democratic gains and peace in Ghana. In the global arena, Ghana is known for its strong commitments towards international peacekeeping in war-torn countries recovering from conflict. The Ghana Armed Forces has been at the forefront of international peacekeeping operations in many countries including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Rwanda, Lebanon, Israel, and Cambodia. Ghana is thus described as a beacon of democracy and stability in a continent with a history of violent conflicts.¹ However, there are internecine localised conflicts emanating from competition over land resources, chieftaincy succession, ethnicity and election related-violence over power struggles between political actors, which have devastating outcomes for local communities. For instance, the Ghanaian government is reported to have spent about 6.5 million Cedis in Dagbon, following the murder of the Ya Na (Dagbon King) in 2002.²

In a bid to prevent conflict escalation and ensuring relative peace, the Ghanaian government through the state security apparatus often deploys joint police-military forces in conflict zones for internal peacekeeping operations and appoints formal committees or commissions to investigate the conflict and recommend mechanisms for conflict resolution. Though these state’s dominated efforts, grounded in liberal peace mechanisms, have seen the de-escalation of violence, many of the conflicts have remained unresolved. In most cases, the conflicts have ended up being prolonged due to the perceptions of some factions that government officials and political elites are bias and intrusive because of their interests in these conflicts.³ This interference, whether real or imagined, impede resolution efforts making many of these conflicts intractable.⁴ The state having realised the intractability of many conflicts and the inability to resolve them has adopted non-state traditional authority actors and mechanisms in many resolution efforts. The African state is often represented by a government which presides over weak formal institutions; law courts, institutionalised commissions and committees of inquiry and a weak presence at the local level. More so, the state is known for sanctioning peacekeeping missions and appointing actors to oversee weak resolution efforts. The centralised nature of the state, without actually involving local non-state actors in peace-building efforts often leads to recurrence of violence. Importantly, what the state is perceived as good at includes an obliged disciple of global liberal norms (e.g. the state adheres to and adapt or adopt international criminal law in their national legal systems) and promotes elites’ governance and national security (wherein conflict resolution is supported via western liberal peace mechanisms).⁵

The resort to liberal peace mechanisms (i.e. peacekeeping operations, use of the law courts, use of commissions of inquiry and involvement of INGOs/NGOs/CSOs) in attempting to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict since its inception in 1948 led to re-escalation and protraction of the conflict (such as the 2002 deadly one). The Dagbon conflict, involving the Abudu and Andani gates over chieftaincy succession right is thus noted to have defied all these state-led liberal approaches for a peaceful resolution. In response to the protracted Dagbon conflict, following the murder of the sitting King, Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and 40 others in March 2002, the state, except for the peacekeeping mission, disengaged from all forms of liberal attempts to terminate the conflict, and appointed a Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) in 2003.⁶Ya Na is a traditional title name for the King of Dagbon Kingdom. The CEC, made up of three highly respected Ghanaian traditional leaders, was tasked to lead and dominate the process of finding a home-grown solution to the conflict.

Grounded in traditional African peace practice and diplomacy, the CEC after over a decade of managing incompatible interests and fragile relationships between the warring factions finally announced a ‘successful’ resolution plan. This resulted in the enskinment of a substantive King, in the person of Ya Na Abukari Mahama II, following the performance of his predecessor’s funeral on 18 January 2019. The involvement of the government through the deployment of internal peacekeepers and financial support to the CEC provided the space to mediate for a home-grown win-win solution to the Dagbon conflict.⁷ Through the CEC, the state has recognised the important role of traditional actors in conflict resolution, peace-building, and transformation beyond their customary role as custodians of land and traditions.⁸ The state-traditional authority collaboration, leading to a peaceful resolution of the Dagbon conflict shows the potency of traditional African conflict resolution approaches and peace-making. This collaboration has been found to enhance local ownership and legitimacy in the Dagbon peace process and brought a win-win outcome.⁹

Contributing to the hybrid peace literature that centres around the call for local-state combination in conflict resolution, this article examines how the CEC was used as a home-grown peace mechanism to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. Following the review of related secondary data, including journal articles, newspapers, theses, books, and internet sources, we argue that empowering traditional leaders and strengthening home-grown conflict resolution mechanisms can play a pivotal role in decreasing and resolving non-state protracted conflicts. As part of this objective, the authors seek to reiterate that the Dagbon conflict resolution process depicts a scenario of a domesticated home-grown hybrid peace approach, where non-state traditional actors (CEC) consciously were permitted by the state to dominate the process of finding a home-grown solution to a protracted conflict.¹⁰ In this study, we conceptualise conflict resolution as mechanisms, whether traditional or western, to end a conflict by ensuring the cessation of violence and building of relationships. Peace-making here means efforts to ensure peaceful co-existence and end a conflict among conflicting parties through agreements between the warring factions. We at times use the two terms interchangeably.

The rest of the article is organised as follows. The first section which is the introduction is followed by a theoretical treatise on hybrid peace. We then discuss the historical overview of the Dagbon Conflict. This is followed by an examination of previous resolution mechanisms and then a thorough discussion of the Eminent Chiefs Approach (ECA) as a home-grown hybrid peace approach in the resolution of the Dagbon conflict. This is followed by an assessment of this home-grown approach in which we discuss the inherent challenges in the use of such an approach in resolving other conflicts. We finally draw a conclusion.

Theoretical arguments on hybrid peace

Liberal peace is often the dominant form of peace-making and peace-building favoured by leading states, international organisations and international financial institutions to provide institutional stability, world order, welfare, democracy, and peace.¹¹ However, large-scale peace operations founded on these thinking and recipes, were not able to accomplish these promises.¹² In Burundi, Angola, and Mozambique, for instance, liberal peace orders failed to solidify the peace.¹³ In some cases, short-term stability was provided by liberal orders, such as in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique or Central America, while in other cases, liberal peace failed to bring peace to war-torn countries.¹⁴ Failures of liberal peace prompted the need for the ‘local turn’ in peace-building to ensure ownership and legitimacy, which in turn, is expected to lead to a lasting peace.¹⁵ However, the ‘local turn’ in peace-building has been criticised for some deficiencies including marginalisation and gender inequality/exclusion;¹⁶ (non)poor protection of victims and witnesses in peace-making processes¹⁷; and a lack of the requisite resources to address large-scale conflicts.¹⁸ Scholars have described the deficiencies as the “romanticisation dilemma of the ‘local turn’.¹⁹

Criticisms of the ‘local turn’ in peace-building calls for hybrid peace as an alternative to building peace and resolving conflicts. Hybrid systems/methods of peace arouse from the failures of both local and Western approaches to conflict resolution and management.²⁰ Often, liberal peace approaches alienate traditional norms and institutions in conflict resolution processes. As a result of the weaknesses and often inability of liberal approaches to effectively deal with conflicts, especially those at the local level and those conflicts involving traditional norms such as chieftaincy conflicts, a hybrid of non-state traditional actors and methods (indigenous) – and their combination with some formal and modern forms of conflict transformation, be they state-based or civil-society-based, have become effective in conflict resolution.²¹ We categorised liberal peace approaches in Ghana to include the use of adjudication through the law courts, police-military peacekeeping, involvement of national and international CSOs, and the use of national commissions and committees of inquiry.

The theory of hybrid peace is a form of local agency, which partly operates to break the control of the liberal peace paradigms,²² to find solution to intractable conflicts. According to Oliver Richard, ‘hybrid forms of peace represent a juxtaposition between international norms and interests and local forms of agency and identity.’ ²³ Thus, hybrid peace is fusion peace of indigenous and liberal approaches, mainly with the dominance of the local/indigenous approach.²⁴ Also, hybrid peace is a blend of liberal and traditional African peace approaches which go beyond security-focused strategies and emphasises on relationship building, inclusivity and participation, which are imperative for sustainable peace-building in war-torn countries in Africa.²⁵ In congruence, Oliver Richmond argues that hybrid peace is manifested in a form of ‘local-liberal’ hybrid order. ²⁶ He notes that hybrid peace is the result of resistance towards the liberal peace and is the result of a contamination, transgression, and modification of the international and the local which has created a form of ‘local-liberal peace’.²⁷ In this article, we conceptualise hybrid peace as home-grown peace-making approaches, involving the use of approaches that comprise the customs, precepts, and traditions of Dagbon and aspects of state intervention such as the provision of peacekeeping and government/state support (financial and material). By home-grown peace, we mean approaches that are indigenous and context-specific to a particular area; in this case, Dagbon.

Hybrid peace is designed to achieve sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, deep-seated divided societies and diverse ethno-linguistic societies that deviate from the predominant Western model of peace-building.²⁸ The hybrid peace approach has the advantage of gaining more legitimacy from various actors in post-conflict societies and is more inclusive than the liberal approach.²⁹ Hybrid peace signals a willingness to accept and work with traditional institutions and values based on religious, ethnic and kinship connections, and to explore how they can be combined with modern approaches to bring lasting peace.³⁰ In hybrid political orders, the state have to share authority, capacity and legitimacy with non-state actors and institutions where significant legitimacy and agency emerge from the local scale.³¹ This is how the CEC approach was applied: fusion of Dagbon customs with the Ghanaian state provision of security in the resolution process.

The existing literature on hybrid peace generates two critical knowledge gaps. First, the discussions concentrate on the international-local co-existence, with little emphases on domestic state-traditional authority collaboration.³² Here, the international actors dominate local state with liberal orders grounded in win-lose outcome.³³ Second, in the case of Ghana, the debates treat state peace-building (often seen as a promoter of global liberal norms) and non-state traditional authority peace-making distinctively, which limits our knowledge of the interaction between the two practices within a domestic state.³⁴ Here also, domestic state peace-building dominates non-state traditional peace actors while subscribing to win-lose outcomes in the peace process. While a plethora of existing literature have centred on international-local or western-traditional hybrid peace, this article takes a different pathway. We look at the potency of the CEC as anchored in home-grown hybrid peace, in terms of the interplay between domestic state and non-state traditional authority, which is not broadly explained in the literature. In so doing, we contribute to the hybrid peace literature that centres around the call for local-state interplay in peace-making, and how this relationship relates to international-local collaboration and peace-building or conflict resolution.

As we shall be arguing, the Eminent Chiefs Approach (ECA) used in resolving the Dagbon conflict is anchored on home-grown hybrid peace approach, involving the Ghanaian state-traditional authority collaboration. We argue that although the state was involved in the resolution of the conflict through the appointment of the CEC, financial and peacekeeping support, the dominance of traditional institutions and norms through the ECA eventually led to the resolution of the conflict.

History of the Dagbon conflict

Dagbon is a notable kingdom in the Northern Region of Ghana with a very strong traditional authority. The Abudu and Andani royal families/gates are the only people with the legitimate right to the Dagbon throne.³⁵ The two gates practice a rotational system of chieftaincy where the title alternates between them. According to Ladouceur (1972), only the sons of a late Ya Na can ascend through one of three sub-gates (Mion, Savulugu and Karaga Skins) to become a King in Dagbon. The customarily accepted rotation succession rule, which has been in practice since 1824 was finally breached when the Abudu family tried to relegate the Andani family from the contest of the throne.³⁶ Thus, the Abudu gate introduced a ‘primogeniture’ system allowing them the exclusive right to the throne.³⁷ This, according to Kenneth Aikins, is the underlying source of the vicious violence involving members of the two royal gates in Dagbon. ³⁸

The influence of the British Colonial Government as well as other interferences from post-independence government also affected the Dagbon conflict. In the colonial times the British prevented succession wars by imposing resolutions the British deemed ‘fair’, even if these did not always accord with Dagbon/Dagomba indigenous norms.³⁹ Post-independent governments through the enactments of decrees and laws affected the Dagbon conflict. For instance, the Chieftaincy Amendment Act (Act 81) in 1961 gave power to the Minister of Local Government to recognise persons as chiefs before they were gazzetted as well as the chieftaincy Amendment Decree, NLCD 112 (1966) indirectly affected the Dagbon conflict and entrenched positions of the parties.⁴⁰

The actual manifestation of the conflict started in 1953, following the death of Ya Na Mahama Bla III (1948–1953) of the Abudu royal gate. In 1954, the Abudu royal gate managed to impose Ya Na Abudulai III as the successor to his late father (Ya Na Mahama Bla III), instead of a regent of the Andani royal gate per the traditional rotation rule. Yet, after 15 years of ruling, Ya Na Abudulai III died, and again Mahamadu Abudulai IV of the Abudu royal gate was enskinned as Ya Na by imposition at the expense of the Andani royal gate, triggering a succession dispute between members of the two royal gates.⁴¹

After about five years of ruling as the Ya Na of Dagbon, impartial king makers from the Dagbon Traditional Council based on the recommendations of the Ollenu Committee set up by the Ghanaian government in 1974 had Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV deskinned. The Committee found Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV illegitimately enskinned, per the traditional rotation succession rule. Consequently, the regent of Mion Lana Andani from the Andani royal gate was enskinned as Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, King of Dagbon on 31 May 1974 after the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV from the Abudu gate. According to Kenneth Aikins ‘if the regent, Mahamadu Abudulai had been installed, this would have been the third time since 1948 that the Abudu gate would have occupied the throne to the exclusion of the Andani gate.’ ⁴² Members of the Abudu royal gate felt cheated by the outcome of the political solution to the conflict and sort judicial redress.⁴³ It was anticipated that a Supreme Court ruling in 1986 would settle the conflict and bring durable peace in Dagbon. However, the court’s judgement reinforced a zero-sum outcome by ruling for a continuation of the rotational system and legitimised the enskinment of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II (Tonah 2012). Following the death of Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV (the deskinned king) in 1988, the Abudu royal gate requested permission to perform his traditional burial rites (according to Dagbon tradition for all dead Ya Nas) in the royal palace, but their request was rejected. This is because according to Dagbon custom, there cannot be a late Ya Na’s funeral when there is a reigning Ya Na.⁴⁴

Consequently, the Abudu royal gate continued to feel distressed about their inability to have access to the royal palace to perform the funeral rituals of the late Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV. This failure to perform the funeral led to occasional flaring up of tensions between the two gates from 1988 to its peak in 2002. The contention over the performance of the late Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV’s funeral itself represents a clash of tradition/customs and as will be seen in the subsequent discussions was one of the cardinal barriers the CEC had to deal with. The tensions finally resulted in the regicide of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II’s in 2002.⁴⁵Ya Na Yakubu Andani’s murder happened following the Abudu’s private information to perform certain rituals in relation to the celebration of the fire (Bugum) and Eid-ul-Adha festivals set aside only for a siting Ya Na. The denial of the Abudu gate in accessing the sacred royal palace and the disagreement about who is legitimate to sanction the rituals of the festivals are seen as the onset of the conflict. However, an attack on an emissary of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II by a group of Abudu youth ignited the conflict between the two sides,⁴⁶ which eventually resulted in the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and 40 others on 27 March 2002 by Abudu fighters.⁴⁷

The murder of the King generated a series of tensions and resulted in violence in many areas across the Northern Region, including Tamale, Yendi and Bimbila. In some of the areas, it reawakens old ‘rivalries’ which resulted in fighting and destruction of properties valued at billions of Ghanaian Cedis. The Government of Ghana spent over seven billion Cedis (US $9 million) in 2002 to maintain the fragile peace in Dagbon, where the money was used to feed security forces deployed in the area as well as for the provision of logistics and equipment to the security troops to help keep peace in the area.⁴⁸ After the murder of the king, the Dagbon conflict became an enigma to the Ghanaian state and discussions arose as to how to find a lasting solution to the intractable impasse. As a solution to the conflict, the government of Ghana adopted an approach that blended state-traditional authority arrangement (CEC) to resolve the conflict. In the next section, we want to examine previous conflict resolution mechanisms at attempting to resolve the conflict. We term these previous mechanisms as mainly imbedded in liberal peace thinking.

Previous conflict resolution mechanisms: state-led and civil society attempts

In the attempt to resolving the conflict and ensuring lasting peace in Dagbon, different conflict resolution mechanisms grounded in liberal peace approaches, including peacekeeping, commissions and committees of inquiry and judicial system dominated by successive governments on the one hand, and civil society led peace dialogue and advocacy (discussion below) on the other hand have all been used. These attempts subscribe to the liberal peace ideology/thinking because they have been inspired by western conflict resolution mechanisms. Besides, these approaches are in tune with western democratic principles⁴⁹ and therefore foreign to the Dagbon context, setting and situation. The thinking that they could resolve the conflict since 1954 again reiterates the inherent challenges of liberal peace approaches, especially the fact that it is not bottom-up peace-building and context-specific.

Peacekeeping: police-military intervention and the imposition of curfews

The concept of peacekeeping as a conflict resolution mechanism is said to have emerged in the context of World War II and gained widespread application in the post-Cold War conflict escalations in the global South.⁵⁰ Peacekeeping is embedded in the liberal peace paradigm. It is the deployment of international personnel to help keep peace and security or to prevent the recurrence of war(s) once a ceasefire is in place.⁵¹ Peacekeepers are usually tasked to help terminate open conflict and create a platform for dialogue between or among incompatible combatants towards peace agreements. Often, international peacekeepers are deployed to deal with the ethos of conflict by creating a platform between or among the combatants to embrace the ethos of peace. Peacekeeping is not only done at the international level in war torn settings and countries recovering from conflict devastations, but also peacekeepers may be deployed to keep warring factions within a country apart while preparing the grounds for a resolution.

In the case of Ghana, the government acting on early warning signals deployed a joint police-military force for internal peacekeeping mission in Dagbon. Following the exchange of gunfire in Yendi that lasted for three days (25–27 March 2002) leading to the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, a significant number of military and police contingent was deployed to protect lives and properties. In accordance with the Emergence Powers Act (Act 472), 1994, the government sanctioned a State of Emergency in Dagbon. Re-enforced security personnel were added to the existing deployment to monitor and enforce the curfews imposed on Yendi, Tamale and other parts of Dagbon following the declaration of a State of Emergency. Although, the peacekeeping mission succeeded in keeping the Abudu-Andani feuding factions apart and helped to create an atmosphere of fragile peace and temporary cessation of hostilities, there was no sustainable peace in Dagbon. In particular, the people lived-in fear, relationships and social cohesion were broken while economic activities were disrupted. It is imperative to add that the fragile peace created through the presence of the peacekeepers in Dagbon contributed to making the CEC able to function efficiently, albeit its setbacks. Even after the resolution of the conflict by the CEC, there is still a joint police-military force in the area helping to maintain the peace and supporting post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building initiatives.

Commissions and committees of inquiry

The appointment of commissions and committees of inquiry is another conflict resolution mechanism that the Ghanaian government adopted to deal with the Dagbon conflict. These include the establishments of the Mate Kole Committee of 1968 and the Ollenu Committee of 1972. Following the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, both Abudus and Andanis as well as other individuals, institutions, and groups, including opposition political parties called on the government to institute an impartial and independent commission to investigate the conflict.⁵² The acceptance by the feuding factions to have an independent body to investigate the conflict and propose resolution efforts suggest that the conflict was ‘ripe’ for a resolution.⁵³ According to Zartman, when ‘… parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory, and this deadlock is painful to both of them … they seek an alternative policy or a way out.’ ⁵⁴

In effect, the government, acting on the Constitutional Instrument (CI 36), on 25 April 2002 appointed a three-member commission of inquiry known as the Wuaku Commission of Inquiry (WC). The commission was chaired by Justice I. N. K. Wuaku, a retired supreme court judge. The WC was tasked to establish the causes of the dispute, the fatalities involved, the culprits, and make recommendations for justice delivery and permanent resolution to the conflict.⁵⁵ The WC’s final report submitted to the then President, John Agyekum Kufour on 6 November 2002 confirmed that the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and all the 40 were killed by Abudu fighters.⁵⁶ Further, the report recommended the arrest and prosecution of some individuals for their alleged involvement in offences such as conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, causing unlawful damage, assault, illegal possession of weapons, and unlawful military training. This led to the arrest of dozens of Abudus on the orders of the President. The suspects were later released by a court order for lack of evidence. These statutory committees and commissions of inquiry could help to unpack key nuances in search for peace, but they were not able to find lasting solutions to the conflict, mainly because factions often see these commissions and committees as biased and unfair and therefore are unwilling to cooperate or accept their suggestions for resolution of the conflict.

The use of the adjudication through the law courts

Parties to the conflict have resorted to the law courts to adjudicate and decide which gate has the legitimate right to rule. The most prominent of this is the 1986 Supreme Court decision on the ‘Yendi Skin Affairs’ which aimed at giving finality to the Dagbon conflict. This particular trial of the Supreme Court recognised the performance of the funeral of the deposed Ya Na Mahamadu Abdullai which become the bone of contention that subsequently resulted in the crisis of 2002.⁵⁷ Besides, previously, in 1974, the Abudu gate resorted to the Supreme Court to challenge the political outcome of the Ollenu Committee. The court ruled against, which led to further tensions between the two conflicting parties.⁵⁸ It is important to emphasise that the court processes have always reignited tensions and exacerbated the conflict. In particular, the 1986 Supreme Court ruling led to a deadlock about the performance of the funeral of Ya Na Mahamadu Abdullai. Also, the release of Abudu suspects – who were initially arrested on the orders of the president following the WC recommendations – by a higher court of appeal due to lack of evidence caused bitterness among the Andani group, hence sustaining fear, insecurity, and covert tensions in Dagbon. As Ahorsu and Gebe (2011) noted, the Dagbon crisis was unlikely to be resolved amicably through judicial processes.

Civil society peace-building efforts

Civil society organisations (e.g. non-governmental and faith-based organisations) participation in modern politics and development remains an integral for peace-making – conflict resolution and peace-building, especially in the global South. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have shown over the years that modern states and multi-state organisations are not the only players in societal order, and indeed, the former is pivotal part for conflict resolution and peace-building.⁵⁹ In particular, NGOs’ activities and interventions have reduced state-sponsored human rights abuses, advocated for and protected the rights of minorities and the vulnerable as well as dominated the terrains of humanitarian relief in situations of armed conflicts and natural disasters.⁶⁰ In Africa, while international NGOs in the peace-building sector often introduce liberal peace approaches and ideas in local settings, local NGOs that are funded by external donors and/or in collaboration with international organisations are tempted to fuse liberal and local peace-making approaches. For instance, peace-building activities by the state, local and international NGOs in war-torn and post-war countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Libya, and Central African Republic, have been dominated by the liberal peace characterised by no or minimal engagement of existing local structures.⁶¹

In Ghana, civil society, including specialised United Nations Agencies on their own initiatives and in collaboration with the state have played diverse role in attempting to resolve the Dagbon conflict.⁶² Their approaches are also roles rooted in liberal peace. One key contribution of the NGOs in conflict resolution and peace-building efforts in Dagbon is sourcing funds from donor agencies and development partners for peace programmes which were expected to end the conflict in Dagbon, including the West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP), Catholic Bishop of Yendi Diocese and Catholic Centre for Peace and Justice have served as negotiators and facilitators of peace talks between the Abudus and Andanis in the attempt to resolve the stalemate.

While relief service was provided by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to displaced people during the crisis, other NGOs organised sensitisation programmes to educate the people on the need for peaceful co-existence in Dagbon.⁶³ A series of peace education and advocacy campaigns and alternative disputes resolution training programmes were initiated by several NGOs to develop the capacities of some indigenous people to peacefully resolve conflict at the grassroots level before it manifests into violence.⁶⁴ Despite these efforts that contributed to maintaining relative peace at the micro level, the conflict was not resolved because Dagbon was still fragile with overt insecurity and mistrust. In fact, western-conventional approaches of conflict resolution in Northern Ghana have failed in terminating conflicts.⁶⁵ In lieu of the failure of previous approaches, which were mainly state- and civil society–led, were not able to terminate the conflict to ensure a sustainable peace in Dagbon, a home-grown hybrid conflict resolution mechanism, anchored mainly on traditions and customs of Dagbon was finally explored and adopted.

The introduction of home-grown hybrid mechanism in conflict resolution in Dagbon: the eminent chiefs approach

The Eminent Chiefs Approach (ECA) represents the first attempt in Ghana at fusing indigenous peace mechanisms with state-based western mechanisms at resolving a conflict. The Eminent Chiefs Approach (ECA) is a hybrid peace approach that involves state and traditional authority blend in conflict resolution. Basically, the ECA is a collaboration, where non-state traditional authority actors are consciously permitted by the state to dominate the process of finding a home-grown solution to the protracted Dagbon conflict. Following years of protracted conflict between the Abudu and Andani gates, the Ghanaian government appointed the CEC in November 2003 to find a home-grown solution to end the conflict in a mutually beneficial outcome. It is composed of a three-member committee of respected and influential Ghanaian traditional rulers: Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, the Asantehene (the Asante King, as the chair); Yagbonwura, Tuntumba Boresa Sulemana Jakpa I (the Gonja King); and Naa Bohogu Abdulai Mahami Sheriga, the Nayiri (the Mamprusi King). These mediators were carefully chosen because of their role and influence in traditional and modern political governance and peace processes within the Ghanaian society. The chair of the CEC, for instance, played a significant role in convening the eight presidential candidates in the 2012 general elections in Ghana to sign a peace accord (The Election 2012 Peace Pact – Kumasi Declaration) for a peaceful election outcome devoid of violence, impunity, and injustice.

We term the process used by the ECA as a home-grown hybrid peace mechanism because the process of conflict resolution involved the use of context-specific indigenous traditions and customs of Dagbon and the use of local actors both from Dagbon and other traditional areas to lead the peace process. This home-grown hybrid peace approach also had the Ghanaian state support in the form of finance, material/logistics and security. Importantly, the home-grown hybrid peace approach (ECA) moved the peace process away from the use of peace programmes/initiatives, the use of international and local NGOs, formal judicial processes, and use of government actors as mediators. It rather involves the local people using their culture and traditions to resolve the conflict. As noted by Kirby (2006), a successful termination of non-state conflict in Northern Ghana and other places would require the use of local beliefs, values, procedures, actors, practices, and attitudes within local settings.

The CEC was charged to mediate the conflict by finding ways to get the two disputants to agree to come to the peace table for negotiations which would lead to an amicable agreement. After deliberations for about four years, representatives of the two feuding gates jointly developed a ‘Roadmap to Peace’ in Dagbon on 30 March 2006.⁶⁶ The two parties accepted to participate in the negotiations leading to the ‘Roadmap to Peace’ for two key reasons: first, because the conflict was ‘ripe’ for a resolution⁶⁷; and second, because the CEC adopted a common and fair ground approach while utilising the existing indigenous knowledge. Importantly, unlike previous peace mechanisms, the ECA drew on local agency with local people (the parties themselves) being involved and leading the resolution process.

The ‘Roadmap to Peace’ enumerated five key benchmarks in the conflict resolution and peace-building process: (1) the burial of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II; (2) the enskinment of the regent of the late King; (3) the performance of the funeral of the deposed Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV; (4) the performance of the funeral of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II; and finally (5) the selection and enskinment of a new Ya Na. The credibility and legitimacy of the CEC as well as the conscious non-interference of the government paved way for the first two benchmarks to be fulfilled. The Andani royal gate agreed to bury the remains of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II on 10 April 2006,⁶⁸ and the enskinment of a regent‒caretaker King of Dagbon.⁶⁹ The CEC maintained that it was imperative to ensure a balance of power in the enskinment of the regent. The Mionlana Korle, who by the traditional arrangement became the chair of the so-called cabinet with two senior royals, Bavinlana of the Abudu royal gate and Sunlana Kpatinlana, Vugnaa of the Andani royal gate, were appointed as co-regents.⁷⁰ The inclusion of the two chiefs from opposing sides reflected the two interests in the conflict and the assurance of a non-zero-sum outcome.

The active participation in the process subsequently led to widespread discussions and consultations by both feuding parties, which finally ushered in the ‘Final Peace Agreement’ signed on 18 November 2007.⁷¹ Significantly, unlike the previous attempts, where efforts to unite the factions ignited conflict, the grand meeting between the two royal gates ensued cordially with handshakes and traditional kisses signalling the end of hostilities between the two rival gates.⁷² The contents of the agreement were primarily to deal with the unsettled issue identified as the root causes of the conflict in 2002, including the compliance to the final funeral rites of the late Ya Na Mahamadu IV ‒ the third benchmark.⁷³ Together with both parties, the CEC developed a programme of activities which guaranteed that the final funeral rites of Ya Na Mahamadu IV preceded that of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II‒fourth benchmark, since the former’s death (in 1988) preceded the latter’s (in 2002).⁷⁴

In addition, the funeral plan safeguarded that the Abudu royal gate, especially, would not dominate or take the lead in the period to enskin a new King ‒ a key fear of the Andani royal gate in the event where the Abudus get access to the royal palace. And after which the new Ya Na would be selected through oracle consultation ‒ the final benchmark. On 21 November 2018, the CEC presented its progress report to the president of Ghana underscoring the procedures and efforts to bring peace to Dagbon. Following the report, the government again through the Northern Regional Security Council intensified security in Dagbon by deploying more military and police personnel to prevent the re-escalation of conflict and deter potential peace spoilers.

As agreed by the two parties, the Abudu royal gate had access to the royal palace to perform the final funeral rites of the late Ya Na Mahamadu IV from 14 to 28 December 2018. The supervision of the CEC ensured that the Abudu royal gate peacefully vacated the royal palace after the final funeral rites to give room for the Andani royal family to commence their funeral rites of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II. Progressively, the Andanis had back access to the royal palace and performed their funeral rites between 4 and 18 January 2019. The accomplishment of the final benchmark in the ‘Roadmap to Peace’ was expected to bring a lasting solution to the conflict in Dagbon. This benchmark rested on indigenous knowledge and divination systems based on Dagbon culture and tradition. Practically, the CEC provided a supporting avenue solely for the Kuga Na (Na Adam Abdulai) to champion the sacred selection process of the new Ya Na. The usefulness of local knowledge, rituals, and earth cult (sacrifices, prayers and spiritual consultation) were the only channel to restore peace in Dagbon. According to John Kirby (2006), the performance of earth cult rituals in most tribal communities in Northern Ghana plays vital roles in reconciliation and conflict termination. ⁷⁵ The approaches used by the ECA clearly involved aspects of the rites of the earth cult in which the gods, ancestors and earth god were involved in the resolution of the conflict. In congruence, Karim Issifu and Asante note that the traditional conflict resolution techniques from within the local people with the involvement of the Kuga Na and other soothsayers in divinely declaring the legitimate gate to serve as Dagbon King ensured sustainable peace in Dagbon. The CEC chair, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, reiterated that only traditional rulers and Dagbon citizens themselves are the best people to resolve the conflict using their traditional conflict resolution methods.⁷⁶ Importantly, there were objections to the aspects of the Roadmap for Peace from the Abudu gate especially concerning the composition of the local mediators and kingmakers. They, for instance noted that the Kugu Na was biased and sympathetic to the Andani gate. They withdrew from the CEC mediation efforts, prolonging it. They only joined after persuasions from government officials including the National Peace Council (NPC) and the president. Other issues such as disagreements from within the Andani gate about who to be part of their local mediation team meeting the CEC also delayed the mediation efforts of the CEC.

According to Dagomba custom, in the case of disputes arising from chieftaincy, especially over the Ya Na’s throne, Kuga Na is the prime person to mediate using Dagbon rituals for a peaceful resolution, which must be implemented and not ignored.⁷⁷Kuga Na is a respected ‘god father’ of both the Abudu and Andani families who is believed to be ‘all knowing’ and divinely blessed with great natural wisdom in sacred rituals to be able to mediate for peace and mend broken relationships. The superiority and unbiased reverence of the Kuga Na in mediation in the past helped to avoid disputes, which might have led to violent conflict and bloodshed. For example, in the seventeenth century, following the death of Naa Gungobli, the Nayiri with guidance from the Kuga Na mediated a succession dispute among nine contestants for the skins of Yani, which helped to prevent a bloodshed as happened in 2002.⁷⁸ Regarding the processes leading to the enskinment of the new Ya Na, the Kuga Na officially made the first proclamation of the death of the King, and after the final funeral rites were performed, divination began on that same day ‒ to establish the identity of the new successor. The Kuga Na is usually supported by other King makers/elders, including Mbadugu, Tuguri-nam, Gomli and Gushie-Naa in the process. Thus, only elders take part in the divination process together with soothsayers. The process also involved performing sacrifice to the spirits of former kings in the customary selection process.

In principle, it is the ‘ghosts’ of former Ya Nas that choose the new King, although in practice diviners are consulted.⁷⁹ Usually, the divinely preferred is the one whose reign is believed will bring peace and enough material gains to the kingdom.⁸⁰ Among other contestants, including the regent of Dagbon, Kampakoya Naa Abdulai Yakubu Andani, Bolin Lana Mahamadu Abdulai, and Tampion Lana, the uninterrupted sacred selection process led by the Kuga Na ended with the nomination of Yo Naa Abukari Mahama (from Andani gate), the regent of Savulugu on 18 January 2019. Subsequently, Yo Naa Abukari Mahama was taken to the Katini (Sacred House) for rituals pertaining to his enskinment as Ya Na Abukari Mahama II, the undisputed 42nd overlord of the Dagbon Kingdom. After all the traditional processes, the new Ya Na’s formal inauguration took place on 25 January 2019. On 12 June 2019, he was officially inducted into the National House of Chiefs and gazetted as a legitimate chief following the adherence of the statutory procedures for installing a chief by the CEC. Since his enskinment and subsequent gazette, the people of Dagbon have continued to live in relative peace. However, as the peace-building process continues, there have been a few issues about the appointment of some chiefs in Nanton, Karaga and other sub-chiefs by the Ya Na.

Importantly, one characteristic that make the ECA a hybrid approach was a clear use of a peacekeeping force made of a joint police-military to provide security for all the benchmarks outlined in the ‘Roadmap to Peace.’ This use of peacekeepers is not indigenous, but rather a western peace approach. Therefore, its fusion with the indigenous approaches adopted by the CEC makes it hybrid. Besides, government provided logistics, financial support and some personnel to support the CEC to mediate the conflict for win-win solution. Meanwhile, a regularly cited factor making the Dagbon conflict intractable is government or political interference.⁸¹ Yet, it appears that the CEC was resilient and impartial, and the government was supportive as it consciously did not want to lead or interfere in the process. The Dagbon case illustrates a scenario of a state centric-traditional authority collaboration peace approach whereby the state supports traditional actors to find indigenous solutions to conflict without the state prying in the indigenous mechanisms.

The use of the CEC reinforces the idea of hybrid peace systems where state-traditional authority collaboration ensured the use of tradition, customs, practices, and local knowledge to effectively help resolve a protracted conflict. The CEC is a form of fusion peace where the Ghanaian state provided the impetus for traditional authorities and entities to work with laid down traditions and practices to find solution to the intractable Dagbon conflict. Essentially, the use of the CEC reflects the failure of liberal peace-building where top-down national and international approaches such as the establishment of commissions/committees of inquiry, involvement of international and national NGOs and the use of judicial processes through the law courts to resolving the conflict failed for almost a century. The CEC is a form of ‘local-liberal’ ⁸² peace approach with forms of local agency and ownership, where the Ghanaian state provided the incentive for the workings of local agents towards finding localised solutions to the conflict. This type of domesticated hybrid peace approach combines some features of liberal peace, herein seen by the Ghanaian state/government facilitation of the CEC, provision of resources/funds and security, with the traditions and indigenous resolution practices of Dagbon to resolve the conflict.

In the Dagbon resolution process, we unpack three important accounts that strengthen the support that the CEC is a scenario of the local-state interplay (hybrid peace) in peace processes. In the preceding debates, we observe that the state provided peacekeeping support and there was state recognition and promotion of ‘indigenous’ knowledge and traditional authority actors in the conflict resolution process as well as the embracement of statutory procedures for installing a chief by the CEC in the Dagbon chieftaincy succession process. First, the state’s collaborative commitments in the peace processes were evident in the deployment of peacekeepers to Dagbon, which ensured a tranquil outcome, allowing the CEC to draw the conflicting actors to the peace table and outline the ‘Roadmap to Peace’ founded in home-grown solutions (Dagbon traditions and customs) to the conflict.⁸³ Second, the role of local and indigenous knowledge in conflict resolution and peace-building cannot be overemphasised in the Dagbon peace process. The CEC’s resolution mechanisms involved members of the Dagbon Traditional Council and other sub-chiefs, believed to be more familiar and conversant with the local context regrading indigenous Dagbon peace ideals. In fact, the Dagomba Succession Constitution, which is based on the traditions and customs of Dagbon, became useful in the peace process. It was used and helped guide actors in the process leading to peace. Also, members of the Committee did not directly mediate on issues relating to people’s culture. Instead, they facilitated meetings and reached a trustworthy deal with the Kuga Na to mediate between the factions, using rituals for a peaceful resolution in line with the Dagbon custom. By creating the CEC, the state provided a platform for indigenous knowledge to determine an ‘organic’ settlement of the protracted conflict.⁸⁴

Third, the CEC was guided by the laid down procedures which led to the gazette of the new Ya Na. In Ghana, once a chief is gazetted, it means that person is duly installed or enskinned and recognised by both the state and its subjects as legitimate. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana acknowledges the chieftaincy institution and defines who a chief is in Article 277: ‘chief means a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, who has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customarily law and usage’.⁸⁵ In a similar vein, the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) has defined the procedures and guidelines for traditional kingmakers to instal, enskin, destool and deskin chiefs in Ghana. Therefore, for the new Ya Na to be gazetted suggests that the CEC accepted to follow the Act 759, which is grounded in formal rules. Embracing this formal norm by the CEC in the Dagbon peace process suggests the fusion of Dagbon customs with formal statutory provision is important for durable peace. Clearly, Dagbon ‘indigenous peacemaking approaches used in the resolution were rituals of the earth cult involving sacrifices and prayers to the gods, performance of funerals of dead chiefs, divination in the selection of a chief, use of elders in mediating conflicts (Gerontocracy), reconciliation ceremonies and ground durbar for celebrations after chiefs have been selected.

Rethinking the use of homegrown hybrid mechanism in resolving the Dagbon conflict

Hybrid peace approaches are bottom-up peace-making processes that ensue local ownership of peace process and often emanate from local people themselves. Therefore, hybrid peace approaches operate through non-state customary institutions which lead peace-making processes and ensure the termination of violence and sustainable peace-building. Volkan Boege maintains that:

through hybrid peace approach the existing forms of control violence and conflict transformation are respected and given space to be operated in the process of peace-building in which these forms have basically gained legitimacy from the local indigenous people, instead of imposing solely the Western-liberal models to the native people which may be perceived as alien and these may only be well understood by the state-political elites, not by the people on the ground. ⁸⁶

The domesticated home-grown resolution approach used in Dagbon succeeded in resolving the conflict, where liberal approaches failed to. Despite the outstanding accomplishments and role in the use of the CEC approach in supervising and facilitating the peaceful termination of the Dagbon conflict, there are some key issues and obstacles that are worth observing.

First, a key challenge with the conflict resolution process is that the CEC limited the negotiation process to only the ‘veto players’ − Abudu and Andani leaders, ignoring ‘limited peace spoilers’ such as youth leaders, women group leaders, religious leaders, and other civil society whose influence can either make or unmake the peace attained.⁸⁷ The involvement of these key civil society actors like religious leaders, Islamic clerics, youth/women group leaders and community leaders in both Yendi and Tamale are needed in the post-peace building processes as their involvement would make the peace process more robust.⁸⁸ This is because these groups play crucial roles in the conflict in determining its cause and course. Secondly, post-peace building activities seem to be slow or non-existent. The peace-building process will need to continue as it is not just the cessation of violence that brings sustainable peace. Other contentious issues such as selection and appointment of sub-chiefs and performance of rituals, peace education and early warning and response systems will still have to be done to ensure lasting peace and not a relapse of violence. While the work of the CEC has completed, peace-building is a process and sustaining peace is a daunting task. Already, the new Ya Na faces challenges of enskinning some chiefs in the area. Factions in the conflict are still distrustful of each other and have rejected the Ya Na’s nominated chiefs for some chieftaincy titles and have described those appointments as bias. This has the tendency to ignite the conflict and derail the success chalked by the CEC in essentially resolving one of the most protracted conflicts in Ghana.

Importantly, the Ghanaian state/government is proposing using this home-grown approach (CEA) in resolving other protracted conflicts, especially chieftaincy ones like the Bawku and Bimbilla. While this decision could help in bringing an end to these intractable conflicts, the challenge remain using this ‘all-size fit all’ approach in other conflicts when the social, political, and cultural context of these conflicts are different. The Bawku conflict, for instance, is an inter-ethnic conflict whereas Dagbon is intra-ethnic. The problem in dealing with inter-ethnic conflicts is with which ethnic group’s indigenous peace-making approaches should be used in resolving conflicts.⁸⁹ Thus, the circumstances and causes of these conflicts are different and may require different home-grown solutions. Therefore, we propose a re-think of the CEA and a framework that works similar like the CEA could be developed in resolving other protracted non-state conflicts in Ghana, taking cognisance of the cultural, political, social and dynamics of these conflicts across Ghana. Therefore, home-grown domesticated resolution approaches peculiar to a certain area can be used in resolving that conflict and may not apply in resolving a different conflict with dissimilar context and actors.

Conclusion

We contribute to an expansion of the international gaze on hybrid peace literature to the domestic aspects of hybridisations by demonstrating how state-liberal and local-customary players collaborated to resolve one of the most complex and protracted chieftaincy conflicts in the history of Ghana. We show how such a collaboration promoted traditional conflict resolution through the eminent chief’s approach, rooted in home-grown hybrid peace. This home-grown approach enhances local ownership and legitimacy in the peace process as well as hinges on a win-win outcome, which sustain peace and strengthen relations.⁹⁰ We have illustrated that through the resort to indigenous customs, precepts and usages, the CEC appointed and supported by the formal Ghanaian state finally resolved the Dagbon conflict. Further, we note that the Dagbon peace process illustrates a scenario of a domesticated hybrid peace, where non-state traditional authority actors in the form of the CEC consciously was permitted by the state to dominate the process of finding a home-grown solution to the protracted conflict, even though traditional procedures do not dominate state and sub-state governance in Ghana.

Though these conflict resolution dynamics provoke an in-depth analysis to unpack the key nuances and intricacies associated with such an interaction, we uncover three key dynamics of the home-grown hybrid peace: 1) the aspect of state recognition and promotion of ‘indigenous’ knowledge conflict resolution. This suggests that without the state’s appreciation of the potency of local knowledge in peace-making, there may be no recognition for or limited impetus of the use of traditional authority in conflict resolution; 2) the feature of a collaboration reflected in state provision of security (peacekeeping mission) throughout the conflict resolution process. This suggests that the CEC could not mediate for peace in a large-scale conflict like the Dagbon without peacekeeping mission required to keep combatants apart, deter potential conflict entrepreneurs and peace spoilers to prepare the way for the facilitated negotiations; 3) embracing the statutory procedures for installing a chief in Ghana by the CEC in the Dagbon conflict resolution process is an indication that fusing traditional and aspects of liberal peace-making is vital for durable peace. Following the ‘success’ of the CEC in the Dagbon resolution process, we therefore argue that empowering traditional leaders and strengthening home-grown hybrid conflict resolution mechanisms can play a pivotal role in ending non-state conflicts.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Abdul Karim Issifu

Abdul Karim Issifu is a PhD student in the Department of Geographical and Historical Studies, University of Eastern Finland (Finland). He is also a Rotary Peace Scholar with a Master of Social Science in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University (Sweden), and a Master of Philosophy in Peace and Development Studies from University of Cape Coast (Ghana). His publications and areas of research concentrate on ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts; land and natural resource conflicts; women, peace and security; post conflict peace-building; and conflict resolution.

Kaderi Noagah Bukari

Kaderi Noagah Bukari is a Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies, School for Development Studies, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. He holds a PhD degree from the University of Gottingen and the Centre for Development Research (ZEF), Germany. He earlier obtained an MPhil degree in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast. His research interests are in peace, security and conflict studies, governance, climate/environmental security and development studies. He has undertaken field research on ethno-political conflicts, elections, conflicts and voting patterns, political vigilantism, and farmer-herder conflicts and climate change.

Notes

1. Gyimah-Boadi, ‘Another Step Forward for Ghana’; Sithole, ‘The African Union Peace and Security Mechanism’s Crawl from Design to Reality’.

2. Kusimu et al., ‘Conflicts in Northern Ghana’, 225; Brukum, ‘Chieftaincy and Ethnic Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana’.

3. Opoku, ‘The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building’ 12–16; Ahiave, ‘Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Ghana’.

4. Awedoba, ‘An Ethnographic Studies of Northern Ghanaian Conflicts’; Issifu, ‘An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana’.

5. Branch, ‘Neither Liberal nor Peaceful?’; Mac Ginty, ‘Where is the local?’.

6. Paalo and Issifu, ‘De-Internationalising Hybrid Peace’.

7. Ibid.

8. Maclean, Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa; Stacey, ‘Political Structure and the Limits of Recognition and Representation in Ghana’.

9. Murithi, ‘African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution’; Mac Ginty, ‘International Peace-Building and Local Resistance’.

10. Paalo and Issifu, ‘De-Internationalising Hybrid Peace’.

11. Mac Ginty, ‘International Peace-Building and Local Resistance’; Debiel and Rinck, ‘Rethinking the Local in Peace-Building’.

12. Debiel and Rinck, ‘Rethinking the Local in Peace-building’.

13. Issifu, and Arthur, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace-Building Approach’.

14. Debiel and Rinck, ‘Rethinking the Local in Peace-Building’.

15. Mac Ginty and Richmond ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building’; Mac Ginty, ‘Where is the Local? Critical Localism and Peace-Building’.

16. Isike and Uzodike ‘Towards an Indigenous Model of Conflict Resolution’.

17. Brounéus, ‘Truth-Telling as Talking Cure?’.

18. Murithi, ‘African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution’.

19. Mac Ginty, ‘International Peace-Building and Local Resistance’; Hughes, ‘The Struggle Versus the song – The Local Turn in Peace-Building’.

20. Richmond, ‘A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’; Mac Ginty, ‘International Peace-Building and Local Resistance’; Bukari, ‘Exploring Indigenous Approaches to Conflict Resolution’.

21. Boege, ‘Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation: Potentials and Limits’.

22. Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’ 50.

23. Ibid, 50.

24. Massey, ‘Space, Place and Gender’; Massey, ‘World City’.

25. Issifu and Arthur, ‘Beyond Liberal Peace-Building Approach’.

26. Richmond, ‘A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’, 26.

27. Ibid., 27.

28. Yamashita, ‘Peace-building and “Hybrid” Peace’.

29. Richmond, ‘A genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’.

30. Yamashita, ‘Peace-Building and “Hybrid” Peace’.

31. Boege, ‘Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peace-Building’; Richmond, ‘A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’.

32. Mac Ginty, ‘International Peace-Building and Local Resistance’; Albrecht, ‘Separation and positive accommodation’.

33. Von Billerbeck, ‘Whose Peace?’.

34. Annan, ‘Providing Peace, Security and Justice in Ghana’; Ibrahim, ‘Transforming the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict in Ghana’.

35. Staniland, ‘The lions of Dagbon’.

36. Sibidow, ‘Background to the Yendi skin crisis’.

37. Aikins, ‘Institutionalising Effective Local Government in Ghana’; Issifu, ‘An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana’, 109.

38. Ibid, 85.

39. Staniland, ‘The lions of Dagbon’.

40. Bukari, Osei-Kufuor and Bukari, ‘Chieftaincy Conflicts in Northern Ghana’, 164.

41. Sibidow, ‘Background to the Yendi Skin Crisis’.

42. Aikins, ‘Institutionalising Effective Local Government in Ghana’; Issifu, ‘An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana’, 21.

43. Paalo and Issifu, ‘De-Internationalising Hybrid Peace’.

44. Tonah, ‘The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict’.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Wuaku-Commission Report, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Yendi Events)’.

48. IRIN, ‘Ghana: Counting the Cost of the Dagbon crisis’.

49. Paris, ‘Peace-Building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’.

50. Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’.

51. Fortna and Lise ‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping literature’ Von Billerbeck, ‘Whose Peace?’.

52. Issifu, ‘An Analysis of Conflicts in Ghana’.

53. Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’.

54. Ibid, 8.

55. Debrah et al., ‘Mediating the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict’.

56. Wuaku-Commission Report, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Yendi Events)’.

57. Brukum, ‘The Conflicts in Northern Ghana’.

58. Ibid.

59. Carey, ‘The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent’.

60. Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the Local Turn in Peace-Building’.

61. Doe, ‘Indigenising Post-War State Reconstruction’; Zaum, ‘Beyond the “Liberal Peace”; Von Billerbeck, ‘Whose Peace?’.

62. Ahorsu and Gebe, ‘Governance and Security in Ghana’.

63. Ahiave’, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Ghana’.

64. Konlan, ‘Peace-Building in Post-Conflict Societies’.

65. Kirby, ‘The Earth Cult and the Ecology of Peace Building in Northern Ghana’.

66. Awedoba, ‘An Ethnographic Studies of Northern Ghanaian conflicts’, 214.

67. Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’.

68. Tonah, ‘The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict’.

69. Ibid.

70. Debrah, Owusu-Mensah and Gyampo, ‘Mediating the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict.

71. Ibid.

72. The Chronicle, ‘Dagbon Crises and NPP in the North’.

73. Asiedu, ‘Examining the State’s capacity in the Management of the Dagbon Crisis in Ghana’.

74. Debrah, Owusu-Mensah and Gyampo, ‘Mediating the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict.

75. Kirby, ‘The Earth Cult and the Ecology of Peace Building in Northern Ghana’.

76. Issifu and Asante, ‘An Analysis of Conflicts using SPITCEROW Model’.

77. Tonah, ‘The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict’.

78. Ahiave, ‘Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Ghana’.

79. Aikins, ‘Institutionalising Effective Local Government in Ghana’.

80. Mahama and Osman, ‘Dagbon Chieftaincy Crisis’.

81. Tonah, ‘The Politicisation of a Chieftaincy Conflict’; Ibrahim, ‘Transforming the Dagbon chieftaincy Conflict in Ghana’.

82. Richmond, ‘A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’.

83. Paalo and Issifu, ‘De-Internationalising Hybrid Peace’.

84. Ibid.

85. Republic of Ghana, ‘Constitution of the Republic of Ghana’, 153.

86. Boege, ‘Potential and Limits of Traditional Approaches in Peace-Building’, 446.

87. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’; Cunningham, ‘Who should be at the Table?’.

88. Nilsson, ‘Anchoring the Peace’.

89. Bukari, ‘Exploring Indigenous Approaches to Conflict Resolution’.

90. Murithi, ‘African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution’; Mac Ginty, ‘International Peace-Building and Local Resistance’.