International and local NGOs addressing violent and hateful extremism in Kenya

ABSTRACT

A string of terror attacks in Kenya in the late 2000s necessitated robust counter terrorism responses by the Government. The Washington-led countering violent extremism strategy in 2011 came as a salvage tool for countering violent extremism programmes in Kenya and beyond. In September 2016, the government of Kenya launched the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism in line with the call promoted by international development partners and INGOs for softer preventative approaches. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Kenya 2015–2021, the article examines the evolving top-down, international and national framings of the term ‘violent extremism’ and its mitigation within prevention and countering violent extremism (PCVE) programming. The article sheds light on the evolving threat of violent extremism (VE) and looks at contributions broader VE definitions can include, notably violent and hateful extremism addressing hatred and hate speech, toxic identity politics, misogyny, stigmatisation and marginalisation in PCVE initiatives.

KEYWORDS:

• Violent and hateful extremism
• violent extremism
• preventing violent extremism
• marginalisation
• Kenya

Introduction

The threat landscape in Kenya is contoured by diverse forms of violent extremism (VE). VE is a diverse phenomenon, lacking a single clear definition, and varies with changing local and global discourses. During the last decade, the concept of VE has been increasingly used in development programming and policies at national and global level. The concept has evolved via several manifestations accompanying the Global War on Terror (GWOT) discourse which swept many countries grappling with terror threats.¹ The swift counter terrorism strategies based on hard-lined military responses to curb terrorism came at a cost of tarnishing the already broken relationships in the marginal and peripheral communities in Kenya. Improving community relationships remained imperative in the face of counter terrorism (CT) responses by the law enforcement agencies. The cry for softer approaches to build community relationships became vital in the era of mitigating terrorism. Like in many other countries trying to restore communal relationships amidst hard power state-led CT responses, the Washington-led countering VE strategy ‘to win the hearts and minds’² in 2011 came as a salvage tool for preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes in Kenya. In Kenya, the National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE) launched in 2016³ emphasised this soft approach to CVE along with the emergence of county-specific local action plans (CAPs). Today, the international NGOs are promoting the Kenyan prevention and countering violent extremism (PCVE) experience as a successful template for the East African region and the continent and as a feasible model in the developing Global South.

A critical challenge to the concept of violent extremism is the lack of a uniform definition; hence, ensuring a shared understanding of the phenomenon is problematic. This lack of an agreed definition makes it difficult to mitigate or counter the phenomenon. Academics, governments, donors, NGOs and potential extremists define the phenomenon in diverse ways, and the concept has tendencies to be influenced by subjective perceptions, all of which influence responses and PCVE interventions.⁴ Diverse factors determine the definition of violent extremism, such as the prevailing political culture, the system of values, nature of political systems, political goals, religiosities, gendered experiences, generational gaps, ethnocentrism and de-colonial power relationships, among others. Most importantly, these factors need to be considered in the local context to give meaning to the phenomenon. This does not mean a common definition is the answer, but instead highlights the need to incorporate varied viewpoints based on both local and global drivers and its manifestations, into responses in Kenya. A broader definition of violent extremism that encapsulates violent and hateful extremism (VHE) allows engagement with underlying causal factors specific to each locality, demographic, time period and evolving inter-communal tensions, as defined and conceptualised by the locals themselves.⁵ In this article, violent extremism is defined as speech, rhetoric or behaviour which advocate values in opposition to democratic ideals and support violent acts to justify and further an ideology that promotes division and violence in communities.

This article examines the evolving context in Kenya and analyses different forms of VHE to understand the complexities confronting INGOs and other civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to address the challenge. This article is based on two sets of primary data collected during the period of 2015–2021⁶ and the author’s eight years’ experience as an evaluator for CVE programmes. The article strives to address the main research question: how has P/CVE been received in the Global South? Using Kenya as a case study, the article looks at the implications of the top-down, international or national framings of the term violent extremism in PCVE policy and practice in Kenya and its implications in local P/CVE efforts. The article also explores alternatives based on the contextual understandings of VHE dynamics in P/CVE programming. Following the introduction and the methodology, the analysis first, looks at the evolution of the violent extremism waves in Kenya. Second, the analysis describes PCVE trends operationalised by INGOs and NGOs within the Kenyan War on Terror (KWOT) discourse. The third section explores the different types of VHE existing in different local communities in Kenya and how INGOs and NGOs make sense of these local meanings in PCVE programming. The fourth section looks at how INGOs and NGOs navigate contextual and definitional challenges of PCVE in programming. The final section of the analysis explores the sustainability of PCVE initiatives in Kenya. The article then draws conclusions from the analysis for preventing or countering VHE in Kenya.

Theoretical framing and methods

Violent extremism has no universally accepted definition and is often interchangeably used with the term’s terrorism and radicalisation. Violent extremism can be interpreted more broadly than terrorism and includes a diverse range of actors or groups. This is reflected in the VE Plan of Action, where the Secretary General observed that ‘violent extremism encompasses a wider category of manifestations’ than terrorism.⁷ This study captures hateful extremism which incorporates the complexity of VE more holistically.⁸ VHE includes acts like hate speech, hate rhetoric or behaviour based on supremacist ideals and beliefs of a group directed towards the other.⁹ Being responsive to issues of toxic identity politics, sectarianism, misogyny, discrimination, prejudice and hate can lead to more effective P/CVE programs whilst also better keeping the focus on helping communities strengthen social cohesion and promoting respect for diversity and pluralism.¹⁰ This broader definition incorporating hate is used in this article to capture various trends of extremist violence. CVE emerged as an alternative paradigm to counterterrorism,¹¹ which was meant to balance the security-driven, hard power strategies of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) regime prompted by the United States and its allies to focus on addressing the drivers or the root causes for violent radicalisation and extremism.¹²

States use a variety of terms to define how they counter VE. For example, in countries like Kenya, INGOs and NGOs often use terms such as PCVE, PVE or CVE interchangeably, based largely on donor preferences. However, the ability to counter violent extremism outside the purview of terrorism is hindered due to a lack of consensus on the definition of violent extremism and nature of the issue. Mostly donor driven CVE models itself within the political context of western interventions. Hence, like any other development interventions of INGOs in the South, CVE interventions are situated between two worldviews: Anglo-American or Eurocentric on one hand and the African or developing South on the other. The ways in which the INGOs, NGOs and other development partners negotiate their space in CVE programming is either by harmonising or contradicting within the CVE space. This is dependent on how they navigate these different worldviews. Knowledge and philosophies on how people construct their worldviews are contextually situated and rarely resonate universally. The praxis of knowledge production in identifying and conceptualising VE threats are culturally situated, specific to each region or location.¹³

However, given that VE emerges out of very local circumstances, local knowledge is vital in influencing effective CVE interventions. In a study conducted in Kenya, based on the understanding of VE in the ‘everyday life’, it was evident that local community members differed in their perceptions on VE. Locals identified and defined varied forms of violence as VE. Some identified acts of Salafi-Jihadist group such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS as VE, while others identified election violence, criminal gang acts and police brutality as VE. This study revealed that ‘individuals interpret and give meanings to VE based on attribution of feelings, emotions, intentionality, experiences and beliefs to each other’.¹⁴ Hence, awareness of the inherent power dynamics of knowledge production are vital, as local knowledge can be overshadowed with dominant state-led or global worldviews. The study stressed the need to acknowledge different viewpoints in defining VE as local definitions are based on local drivers and manifestations specific to different cultural contexts. Further, the study acknowledged that constructions of VE at the local levels are influenced by the lived experiences of insecurity based on gender, ethnicity, social status, location and interactions with the State.¹⁵

Increasingly, as the scope of PCVE continues to broaden and the inclination of INGOs and NGOs have been to address the root causes of VE, much of this work traces to the work of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding with their broad scope do encounter tenets of prevention and countering VHE Most often, VHE are drivers of conflict, and the need to address these drivers often fall within peacebuilding efforts. Hence peacebuilding work transverse across the PCVE space, though the two fields have similarities and differences in programming and practice. INGOs progressively navigate towards local, contextualised and inclusive approaches of peacebuilding to strengthen PCVE approaches. This is a two-way approach, where peacebuilding can add value to PCVE practice and similarly, PCVE policy and resources may provide the enabling conditions needed for effective peacebuilding efforts. A stronger connected and coordinated effort between the two fields would advance the whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering VE from theory to effective practice.¹⁶

In an attempt to understand the dynamics of INGOs and NGOs working in PCVE in Kenya, this article draws from two qualitative studies conducted during the period of 2015 to 2021. The first set of data comprises of the author’s ethnographic study on youth radicalisation in the coastal region of Kenya. Eighteen months of doctoral field research was completed by the author between December 2015 and June 2017, comprising 249 interviews with key informants, specifically: religious leaders (16), school or madrasa teachers (12) government, administrative and law enforcement officials (25), women leaders (12), youth leaders (42), academics (8), NGO/INGO personnel (27), other community leaders (61), youth alleged or accused as radicals (30) and their family members (16). This first study focused on the causes of youth radicalisation and mitigation in the coastal region of Kenya for the Al-Shabaab terrorist network.¹⁷ The second set of data consisted of a post-doctoral study conducted by the author on localising county action plans in CVE. In-depth interviews were carried out with 48 civil society actors working in PCVE. CSO actors included representatives from Faith Based Organizations, Community Based Organizations, NGOs, INGOs, community mobilizers/community development workers, human rights activists, academics, women leaders and youth leaders within a wider research study conducted by the author. The study was conducted in seven counties, namely, Mombasa, Nairobi, Tana River, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu and Isiolo during the period June 2020 to June 2021.

Gradual evolution of violent extremism in Kenya

The evolving discourse of VE and its prevention in Kenya becomes futile without an assessment of historical patterns of violence and its mitigation. Often VE builds upon local historical nuances of existing patterns of violence and the state counters via existing combatting pathways. History reveals the existence of different forms of violence and extremist waves in Kenya labelled under varied terms such as insurgencies, colonialism, tribal clashes, terrorism, racism, xenophobia, interethnic and inter-religious hatred, radicalism, cessation movements and religious fundamentalism.

Violence marked the state control of populations in colonial and post-colonial Kenya. In colonial Kenya, scholarly attention on the history of violence focused on Mau Mau uprisings against the colonial administration.¹⁸ Land and Freedom Army revolts, known as Mau Mau militias rose against the British colonial state leading to the abolishment of discriminatory land policies. Colonial histographies reveal African Rifle regiments, Maxim guns and spears, and the spread of colonial authority through violent means.¹⁹ Colonial administration utilised state-led violence to defeat Mau Mau fighters in the forest of central Kenya, physically and psychologically crushed civilians and combatants in detention camps, protected villages and jails.²⁰ Patterns of violence were also evident during the post-colonial era, such as during the electioneering periods, as well as extrajudicial killings by the police, the Rift Valley land wars of the 1990s, assassinations of Kariuki, Mboya and Pinto, and the torture chambers of Nyayo House during the Moi regime.²¹

Compared to its neighbours, Kenya maintained stability in the political landscape since independence. Nevertheless, the development discourse of the country was influenced by the ethnicization of politics evident via tribal demarcations. After independence in 1963, land distribution and civil service appointments were highly favoured along ethnic lines of the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta.²² Land grievances followed similar trends of the colonial rule where large tracts of land expropriated by the White settlers benefited specific ethnic groups, mainly in the Rift Valley region. Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta in 1978 and during his regime favoured the Kalenjin tribe. His regime from 1978–2002 was known for its dictatorial tendencies and human rights abuses. State sponsored vigilantes and militias as well as counter militias peaked during this era such as the Kalenjin warriors, Taliban and Mungiki vigilante groups.²³

State-led or political party linked violent radicalised movements influenced successive elections of 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013 and 2017. This includes ethnic and religious clashes such as the rifts between the police and supporters of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in Mombasa in 1992;²⁴ the Wagalla massacre in 1984 in Wajir;²⁵ the Sabaout Land Defence Force in Mount Elgon region in 2005, the Kaya Bombo killings in the coastal region in 1997²⁶ and the street and gang violence with the emergence of politically linked groups shaped the violence discourse.²⁷

The Kenyan backdrop of political violence can be well defined as VE due to the existence of an extremist ideology to legitimise the suppression and control of the ‘other’ whether ethnic or religious and is often politically motivated with the destructive use of violence to terrorise the other.²⁸ Most often, extremism fuelled along ethnic lines was labelled as ethnic clashes or political violence and was rarely considered VE. Today, ethnic clashes are prime drivers of tribal or clan conflicts, often driven by cattle rustling in the north and north eastern regions of Kenya or even farmer-herder clashes in Tana River where ethnically driven ideologies intersect with micro-level conflicts.

Since the 1990s, Kenya allegiance to the west has designated the country to be a frontline state in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) discourse.²⁹ Kenya has a long history with terror attacks. In the 1980s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) attacked the Jewish owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. In 1998, the bombings at the United States (US) Embassy in Nairobi brought in the affiliation of Al-Qaeda motivated attacks on Kenyan soil. Attacks were further carried out in the 2000s by the Al-Qaeda which included the Kikambala Hotel bombing in Mombasa in 2002 and an anti-aircraft missile fired in an attempt to down an Israeli chartered passenger jet at the Moi International Airport in 2002. This was followed by Al-Shabaab led attacks such as the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, Mpeketoni attacks in 2014, terror attacks in Mandera, the Garissa University attack in 2015, the Dussit attack in 2019, the attack in Lamu military base in 2020 and subsequent attacks in January³⁰ and March 2022³¹ among others. Al-Shabaab has its origins in Somalia. As a transnational network, the Al-Shabaab has successfully expanded its activities to other countries in the region. Kenya, bordering Somalia, has borne the brunt of the attacks carried out by the Al-Shabaab network.

Countering violent extremism as an externally imposed and a donor-driven agenda

Kenya is dynamically engaged in activities and programs aimed at countering VE. Key actors include national and county governments, civil society organisations, international organisations, development partners and the local communities. Kenya has been proactive in aiding regional CVE initiatives in East Africa, including hosting regional conferences, and also contributing to the AMISOM (since 2021, referred to as ATMIS – African Union Transition Mission) as part of the African Union military force fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In Kenya, models to curb terrorism and VE evolved due to the increased violent radicalisation and extremism along the Islamist extremism discourse. At inception, it was seen that hard security measures weakened the military capacity of extremists.³² The construction and framing of terror threats as existential threats to be dealt with urgently legitimised state actions and resources in the form of militarised responses for mitigation.³³ Military responses facilitated the timely focused curbing of terror attacks; however, these band-aid CT responses fell short of deconstructing the threat and had unintended negative consequences such as stigmatising specific communities in Kenya and inadvertently building community contempt and distrust.³⁴

Operation Usalama Watch was launched in 2014 in the aftermath of the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi. The operation detected illegal immigrants, specifically from the Somali ethnic group, who were arrested, detained and prosecuted on suspicion of involvement with terrorist activities.³⁵ The operation was criticised by the many CSO networks as it targeted specific ethnic and religious minorities.³⁶ Likewise, in 2015, the Operation Linda Boni was launched in Lamu, in the aftermath of the Mpeketoni attack. The operation aimed to flush out the Al-Shabaab militants. The operation exacerbated existing community grievances of coastal marginalisation and underdevelopment, as the operations negatively impacted people’s livelihoods due to prolonged curfews and crackdowns that led to local insecurities. It was revealed that the local communities were burdened by the attacks perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab as well as the CT responses by the government.³⁷

In the face of these challenges, the government of Kenya, donors and civil society organisations looked towards more inclusive approaches to CVE. The CVE strategy to counter extremism aimed at softer responses to address the root causes of VE.³⁸ This was further followed by responses to reduce risks among populations vulnerable to violent radicalisation, often termed as preventing violent extremism (PVE) or combined as PCVE.

PCVE approaches were often donor-led (mainly US, and the West) and remained less inclined to locally designed programmes. INGOs and NGOs complied with donor agendas due to funding pathways along the GWOT. PCVE projects in Kenya had considerable achievements as it did enable people to collaborate in projects aimed at prevention.³⁹ The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in 2016 marked a softer approach alongside CT strategies. In Kenya, the NSCVE (2016) refers to VE as, ‘radicalised individuals prepared to engage in or actively support acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies, p.1’. The definition gives a clear picture on VE, conceptualised as both an ideology and action. The NSCVE defined VE primarily along Islamist extremist ideologies in line with GWOT.⁴⁰ Hence, prevention and countering violent radicalisation and extremism are mainly focused at Al-Shabaab or ISIS forms of Islamist extremism.

THE NSCVE opened space for the government to partner with INGOs and local civil society actors to prevent and counter Islamist violent radicalisation among at risk communities in the country.⁴¹ The NSCVE cascaded to the county levels in planning and implementation via the CAPS catering to local needs and interests. Nevertheless, local CSOs are yet to implement the CAPs due to implementation delays and funding. The hierarchical nature of NSCVE with the national government leading PCVE efforts were viewed by some CSOs as ‘too much control in PCVE under the name of national security. This entails shrinking the CSO space’.⁴² Further, some CSOs criticised this limitation as supported by the 2019 Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act that amended the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act. This amendment along with the Security Laws Amendment Bill 2014, gives the national government the control to first approve all the CVE policies and programmes of CSOs before they are implemented. This process has been unclear and slow, and some CSOs still await approval for their activities in addressing VE programmes.⁴³

Gaps in defining threats of extremism by donors, the state and the CSOs

External dominance in defining VE and determining appropriate counter interventions obscure PCVE programming in local contexts. Being reliant on external funding for PCVE programmes, governments and the civil society borrow existing models, templates and VE definitions, which are rarely scrutinised. Donor-led PCVE strategies along the GWOT hype has focused on Islamist extremism and this cascades to government approaches and local CSOs as well.⁴⁴ In Kenya, VE was synonymously used with Salafi-Wahhabi oriented Islamist extremist trends associated with terrorist groups such as the Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda or its affiliated networks such as the Al Muhajiroun, Al Hijra, Jaysh Al-Ayman and the Nabhan brigade in Kenya.

PCVE focused along Islamist extremism have the tendency to categorise any Salafi or Wahhabi inclined group or movement under surveillance on the notion of suspect communities or individuals.⁴⁵ This includes other Islamic movements which are considered extreme or suspicious such as Hizbut Tahrir movement, the Muslim Brotherhood cells or other Salafi Jedida groups.⁴⁶ Fixing definitions on VE strengthens the rigid notion that there is only one legitimate worldview which is correct and the other is wrong or evil. Any compromise in between is seen as wrong or immoral, reinforcing the binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Most donor-led or government supported PCVE initiatives have fortified the notion of ‘extreme versus moderate Muslims’ in PCVE. First, those who support the donor-led or government-led or supported PCVE initiatives are clustered as moderates strengthening democracy or patriotism while others who do not support are viewed as extremists who are against the state and democratic ideals.⁴⁷

Complexities involve when ideals of movements differ with the mainstream views such as democracy. For example, movements such as Hizbut Tahrir differ in opinions on state formation and democracy. This is based on their versions of Islamic beliefs, culture and governance practices. This ideology or belief may be viewed as different, extreme or seen as opposing democracy ‘according to western ideals’.⁴⁸ Most of the adherents of these movements fall under the label of suspect communities. Suspect communities are often identified as pre-criminals, and discriminating them further as individuals of ‘being at risk for criminal acts’ increases their risks to commit criminal acts in retaliation.⁴⁹ PCVE grapples within these concealed differences when dealing with ideologies pertaining to Islamist extremism. Often construing VE as the problem of a bad ideology, PCVE implementers may neglect underlying cultural and structural issues which contribute to violence.

Defining VE is more a political top-down process. Power politics influence labelling specific groups as violent extremists. Governments play a role in labelling and defining the term VE to situate security threats which the government of the day feels are important. Therefore, how VE is conceptualised at the policy level inform how counter strategies are developed and implemented in the country.⁵⁰ As explained above, VE depends entirely on the personal viewpoint of the person who defines it and the timeframe in which it was defined. Hence, definitions of VE may differ among individuals based on their viewpoints and affinities to specific movements and ideals. For example, some research participants from the coastal region of Kenya described the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) as a political movement of the coast with a secessionist ideology to benefit the coasterians,⁵¹ while others viewed it as a violent extremist group in line with government labelling of the MRC as an ‘outlawed group’.⁵²

Similarly, the historical evolution of different forms of violence reveals how movements can be categorised as VE. History becomes a constant reworked arena for the existing state recognised forms of VE as well. Extreme forms of political violence by the state since colonial and post-colonial periods are not considered in the official version on defining terrorism. The colonial regime’s violence towards indigenous movements like the Mau Mau and labelling them as terrorists,⁵³ to the post-colonial atrocities towards opposition movements, or to the contemporary context of the use of excessive force on specific ethic groups in counterterrorism strategies⁵⁴ are not labelled as VE or terrorism. Unheeded atrocities conducted by the state or political elites’ pave room for extremists to thrive using historical state-led grievances in their campaigns for youth recruitment.⁵⁵ For example, the Al-Shabaab recruitment drive utilises community grievances regarding the historical marginalisation of the coastal region of Kenya by the post-colonial Kenyan governments. Their narratives harp on blaming the government for their lop-sided policies which exacerbated poverty, discrimination and unemployment in the region.⁵⁶

INGOs and NGOs need to take context and time period into account in defining and addressing the issue of violent and hateful extremism. In areas considered as hotspots for violent extremism such as in Bongwe in Kwale or Majengo in Mombasa, Al-Shabaab radicalisation and recruitment are the priority concerns. However, community members highlighted other issues including criminal and juvenile gangs, drug abuse and police brutality as VE and drivers for VE in different localities.⁵⁷ There was no single term for VE and it differed from region to region and was deeply entrenched with incidences, acts, particular groups, beliefs, ideologies, processes, drivers and the impact of VE or the CT or CVE strategies on the individual and the community. Pinning VE to Islamist extremism disregards other types of violent and hateful extremism in the localities and ignores local communities who may not prioritise Islamist extremism as VE.

In Kilifi, some participants elucidated VE as a political or tribal form of violence. The phenomenon of VE linked to pre and post-election violence in Kenya since the 1990s reveals the grievances of historical violence tied to cycles of electioneering where hate speech and hate acts escalates along tribal affiliations, often leading to violence and deaths. Political or other forms of extremism linked to tribal politics discloses how particular tribes try to take control of the other tribes via political grouping along tribal lineages. Tribal influencers often promote hatred on the other tribe via hate speech and hate acts, which culminate in local violence. Tribal connotations are used to portray the ‘us versus them’ narratives as well as dwell on local tribal grievances where political propaganda was framed to incite the other.⁵⁸

There is a need to understand extremism within existing political violence which drives individual motivations. For example, Al-Shabaab recruiters in their recruitment drives make references on their ideological narratives tied to Islamic marginalisation, religious discriminations, extrajudicial killings, torture or arbitrary arrests. Rarely do these ideological tenets fall within the list of risk factors for VE or seen as priority concerns in PCVE programmes. Violence is a product of social injustices and social inequities. Often injustices drive belief systems that cause people to become violent.⁵⁹ What CVE interventions try to do is to address the ideology without addressing the injustices associated with the ideology. Some argue that PCVE efforts are only focused on trying to prevent people from getting violent about these injustices rather than facilitating alternative pathways for dissent.⁶⁰

Violence is constructed along the notions of ‘good violence’ and ‘bad violence’.⁶¹ Hence the notion is that to curtail bad violence, there is a need for good violence. Good violence here entails law enforcement interventions to restrain bad violence which pave the way for police brutality or police violence which are given carte blanche in the war against terror. While this can be argue for the necessity of CT interventions to thwart terror attacks, the long-term impacts of CT measures often culminate in spirals of violence. The objective of counter violence should go beyond extremism and ideology and focus on any forms of violence, whether it is police violence, state violence or criminal violence. In the field research, some participants linked VE with their personal encounters on counter-terrorism strategies such as arrests, mosque raids, detentions and the death of their loved ones. These counter terrorism strategies were viewed as police brutality and was considered as VE, which paves way for affected individuals to foment hate, then rebel and revolt that can lead to violence.⁶²

Existence of varied forms of violence and hateful extremism in communities presses us to understand our localities and to question why there are more individuals engaging in hatred or violence on a particular day, or in a particular location or for a particular identity? What layers of context are a person’s actions occurring within? Therefore, flexibility of PCVE projects enables to adopt to these questions within changing environments, rather than confine interventions only on Islamist extremism.

Balancing competing interests by CSOs within the CVE agenda

PCVE strategies need to engage with violent radicalisation as a wider societal issue, including different forms of violence, hate acts and hate speech. VE is an outcome of a wider system of violence and hateful extremism prevailing in particular contexts embedded in the history, violent movements and events. In Kwale County, the area is marked by incidents such as Kaya Bombo, mobilisation for the Mombasa Republican Council, recruitment for the Al-Shabaab or the ISIS and even youth mobilised for election violence reveals much more structural and relational issues to be addressed than the violence alone. In such environments, CVE programmes focusing on an individual change approach will not generate envisioned results without a good system analysis of the context. System analysis will enable exploration of the dynamics between the drivers of violent and hateful extremism, individual motivations and other existing drivers of violence in the particular context.⁶³ Drivers can be push factors or pull factors. Push factors include marginalisation, poverty and lack of employment or educational opportunities, which can drive individuals to these networks. Pull factors include what attracts individuals to these groups such as group belonging, group support or enabler factors such as networks and ideology. Specific push factors described by research participants as violent extremism in themselves were marginalisation and discrimination. Here violent extremism was described as state marginalising specific regions such the coast in terms of development mainly after the post-colonial period.⁶⁴

Drivers are context and local specific, embedded with socio-political histories of the regions which plays out in defining cultural and structural violence by the communities. Peripheral communities highlight these historical marginalisation issues as ‘violence from the central government’. The same drivers for the Al-Shabaab may also be the same driver for political extremists groups during elections in Isiolo.⁶⁵ In the coastal region, extremist entrepreneurs often use the local marginalisation and poverty narrative to mobilise their supporters.⁶⁶ A contextual assessment reveals that the root causes contributing to individual grievances such as social injustices, political marginalisation, poverty, unemployment are important to be taken into consideration when attempting to understand the nature of violent radicalisation and extremism. Most participants assessed CVE interventions by INGOs and NGOs as addressing the tip of the iceberg where most structural issues are neglected. Interventions have been mainly concentrated to address impacted men and women associated with VE or the at-risk communities vulnerable to VE with skills designed to prevent individuals getting involved with VE networks. It is relatively easier to address the violent act, but difficult to address the culminating grievances. Structural and cultural violence embedded in communities needs different types of interventions. However, programmes that focus on structural and cultural grievances needs to be done with caution where interventions will not lead to the creation of suspect communities. Maintaining a clear distinction between different forms of extremism and hate acts remain at the core of CVE work. For no single programme may suffice to address every grievance that causes hate and violence in communities. The root causes of these grievances should be addressed through a range of efforts and different programmes.

Governments do have the possibility of regulating and monitoring donors and civil society organisations via policies and practices. In Kenya’s devolved system, very few components of security are devolved (for example, Community Oriented Policing, Article 41 and 96 of the National Police Service Act 2011), hence the total control of security remains with the national government. Most of the PCVE implementations are regulated at the national level via the NSCVE. Such regulation is understandable and regulation of PCVE activities has been key to monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of PCVE activities in Kenya. However, this limits PCVE efforts to align with county-level decision making, despite the existence of County Engagement Forums and the CAPs. CAPs define and align PCVE along the National Strategy on CVE, for example the Nairobi City County Prevention of Violent Extremism Bill 2021. Duplication in CAPs and the stringent focus on defining VE as per the national strategy has wider implications in the overall PCVE approach where CSOs respond along two major outcomes. A positive outcome with the government entails the harmonisation of PCVE projects and policies of INGOs and local NGOs along government-led PCVE strategies. Here, the government is in the know-how and know-who of all initiatives in the region. Hence CSOs working in collaboration with the government can roll out their PCVE projects with relative simplicity.⁶⁷

A negative outcome of this is the closing of space for dissent and resistance by CSOs on government CT strategies. Individuals or communities who consider themselves affected by VE associated with state injustices or discrimination may disconnect with INGOs and local NGOs who are obliged to work along government-led PCVE measures. Being in favour with the government is a necessity in donor operations, particularly in PCVE programming. Accordingly, this can influence the definitions and interpretation of VE and PCVE based on government priorities. Sometimes, CVE programming by donors may cater less to the impact of CT strategies such as arbitrary arrests or disappearances of individuals in CT, as it reduces the hassles on government confrontations in work operations.⁶⁸ The enabling environment of securitising PCVE efforts restricts donors as well as the civil society organisations’ ability to concentrate on the real threats of violence at the local levels.

Sustainability of the P/CVE Agenda

Capacity building of local NGOs in PCVE interventions is pivotal for sustainability. PCVE multi-sectoral initiatives promoted by donors and other implementing partners recognise the influence of key stakeholders in the sustainability of the process. NGOs working in PCVE vary in capacity building and resources and often struggle to keep up with donor expectations. It was revealed through this research that PCVE is dominated by a few elite NGOs and other civil society actors who control the PCVE space in most of the local counties.⁶⁹ Hence, some participants viewed PCVE as confined to few circles led by local PCVE elites and gatekeepers with little knowledge and benefit trickling to the communities in need. Local peacebuilding actors and mechanisms such as local peace committees, village elders or clan-based conflict resolving methods needs to be enhanced for PCVE activities due to their acceptance in local communities.⁷⁰

Exported CVE concepts which lack local contextual knowledge will not cater to the needs of the local population hence lacking sustainability. PCVE interventions geared towards the GWOT trends on Islamist extremism often contradict local expectations and aspirations for PCVE programming. PCVE designed along Islamist extremism alone may negate other forms of violent and hateful extremism existing in specific neighbourhoods. Often local NGOs incorporate CVE in their development mandates as the buzzword ‘CVE’ has scope for attracting donor funding. Some local NGOs compete for this CVE focused funding without an evidence-based assessment, whereby they try to fix a rigid model to the local needs and the context.⁷¹

The discrepancy between global trends and local needs lead to the lack of effectiveness as local community members confine themselves to participation on a project-by-project bases, rather than buying into a visionary agenda for social change. In some locations in Kenya, CVE related activities are considered a trend where community members feel they are part of a CVE business venture. A youth leader who is a peace champion from Kwale, echoed this as, ‘you earn money while you attend these CVE meetings. Each day, you may hop from one meeting to another. By the end of the day, you have made a venture out of it!’⁷²

A recent shift by INGOs and NGOs have focused on a broader approach to bridge evolving tensions and mistrust between community members and law enforcement officials as a long-term commitment towards PCVE. Improving trust is vital among community members who believe the police are corrupt, brutal and cause community grief through arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings. Freedom of Religion and Belief (FORB) implemented by the Kenya Community Support Centre, highlighted the importance of trust building efforts for effective partnerships in PCVE via their community-law enforcement training programmes particularly in highly volatile areas. Attitudes are gradually shifting towards a better relationship between the community and the police officials where hatred towards the police, attacks on police officers or mistrust over the police are reducing among community members.⁷³ Key in PCVE initiatives are trust building initiatives, which include trust between civil society, government, donor, law enforcement officials and the local communities. However, the time-bound nature of individual PCVE projects limit trust building initiatives, which in the longer run impacts the programme sustainability. Durability of PCVE initiatives are critical where trust and gradual changes towards positive attitudes are visible to ensure the expected social change.⁷⁴

Conclusion

This article has interrogated salient issues to be considered in international and local NGO programming with regard to preventing and countering violent and hateful extremism in Kenya. A dearth of in-depth reflection on VHE in the localisation of PCVE policy and practice can lead to affected communities eventually disconnecting from INGOs and local NGOs as they are obliged to work along donor or government-led PCVE measures. The article looked at how the existing assumptions and the lessons learnt from the last two decades deal with the evolving threats of violent extremism for PCVE and how broader VE definitions can include violent hateful extremism for sustainability of PCVE initiatives in Kenya beyond the scope of Islamist extremism.

A range of effects has stemmed up from CVE projects in the Global South, very few of which have been intended. Unintended impacts of stigmatising communities and the abuse of human right in the name of terrorism mitigation further deprives individuals and communities their rights to life and wellbeing. These unintended impacts have been scrutinised globally and PCVE programming are in the process of taking a more right based humane approach. Donors are in a tug of war trying to rectify unintended impacts of CVE programming by utilising locally led empirical findings to strengthen PCVE interventions. While done in good intentions, donor institutions struggle to balance knowledge on local VE threats along with their respective government interests in framing VE in policy and programming.⁷⁵ Similarly, CSOs face operational dilemmas trying to navigate their CVE interventions in realms of community threat priorities versus Anglo-American, Euro-centred or Kenyan government led VE definitions which are often politically driven favouring specific national and global interests.⁷⁶

Addressing structural violence is key in localities prone to different forms of VHE. In these localities, it is recommended to address attitudes of hatred, hate speech or hate acts among tribal denominators or nepotism that may not count to violent extremism but address broader structural issues linked to hateful violence. For example, in the coastal region of Kenya, the notion that people from the western or central Kenya derogatorily termed ‘watu wa bara’ [outsiders] are given job preferences or the opportunity to hold titled land ownership over coastal populace becomes an imperative jargon used in political campaigns to incite coastal tribes during general elections. Coasterians are framed as ‘losing out to the outsiders’ in the coastal job market and land ownership while outsiders reap from the coastal region.⁷⁷

Local politicians and influencers have used this narrative around all electoral cycles since the 1990s. The hateful and divisive narrative has been a trigger for violent outbursts such as the Kaya Bombo clashes during the 1997 general election and the 2007 post-election periods.⁷⁸ This hate speech rhetoric haunted the 2022 general election where hostile outbursts during speeches by incumbents and those in power marked the local political landscape during campaigning periods. Therefore, in communities where toxic identity politics embeds in ethnicity, religion and other markers, it is necessary to probe into different forms of VHE. This allows a broader discussion of issues concerning community dynamic and structural conflicts, reflecting on the role of violent groups as well as the state’s role as indirectly or directly contributing to hateful extremism. This hateful extremism or violence has the propensity to fuel resentment in communities, facilitating non-state actors in VE.⁷⁹

A dearth in locally relevant CVE evidence for programming means PCVE is confined to donor preferences rather than locally relevant forms of violent and hateful extremism.⁸⁰ Implications for further research should be to recognise different forms of violence and hateful extremist trends resting side-by-side and impacting one another in specific locations. Often curbing one form of violent extremist trend can curtail the other as extremist groups may feed off each other’s narratives. For example, the mobilisation for the Mombasa Republican Council, Kaya Bombo, the Al-Qaeda, and the Al-Shabaab centred on the same discontented populace in Kwale in the coastal region of Kenya. All these movements mobilised individuals using hateful rhetoric linked to structural violence such as political and economic marginalisation, poverty and unemployment evident in the region.

Today, PCVE projects are progressing towards an increased use of innovative, evidence-based engagement and employing conflict sensitivity and do no harm models aimed to prevent unintended PCVE programmatic consequences of forming ‘suspect’ communities.⁸¹ For example, PCVE related projects have become innovative focusing on diverse and locally relevant priorities such as the prevention of religious discrimination, safeguarding minority rights, gender-based violence and youth issues to address existing structural issues in the localities.⁸² While this is commendable, the need for more evidence based contextual programming to counter and keep up with existing trends in violent radicalisation and hateful extremism are steadily increasing. Locally relevant models to understand violent radicalisation processes and hateful extremism is still work in progress, as existential knowledge on radicalisation and de-radicalisation are oriented towards Islamist extremism and are mainly coopted from the West. Additionally, local knowledge in programming is yet to be fully realised in PCVE approaches along with the necessity for sustainability.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen

Dr Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Groningen, Netherlands. She is also a lecturer at the Department of Social Sciences at the Technical University of Mombasa, Kenya. Her research interests focus on religion and peacebuilding; countering violent extremism; and the sociological analysis of recruitment for violent extremist organisations and human trafficking networks. She has been an academic/practitioner working on countering violent extremism in the East and Horn of Africa since 2012 and has also worked in the field of conflict transformation, peacebuilding and post-conflict development in Sri Lanka.

Notes

1. Striegher, ‘Violent-Extremism: An Examination of a Definitional Dilemma’.

2. Aldrich, ‘First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID’s Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa’.

3. Beyond the Lines, ‘The Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism Simple Put!’

4. Striegher, ‘Violent-Extremism: An Examination of a Definitional Dilemma’.

5. Barton et al., ‘Introduction’, 3.

6. Primary data from the authors’ PhD study (2015–2017) and other research studies (2020–2021) conducted during this period as described in the theoretical framing and methods section.

7. UN Secretary General, ‘General Assembly Report A/70/674’, para. 4.

8. Commission for Countering Extremism, ‘Challenging Hateful Extremism’, 7.

9. Barton et al., ‘Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia’, 5.

10. Sonrexa et al., Perspectives on Violent Extremism from Development-Humanitarian NGO Staff in South Asia.

11. Michael, ‘The Discourse Trap and the US Military’, 38.

12. Boutellis and Fink, ‘UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism And Violent Extremism’, 4.

13. Plaatjie, ‘Rural Development and the Search for an African Development Paradigm’, 2.

14. Badurdeen, F. A., Aroussi, S., and Jakala, M. 2022. ‘Lived Realities and Local Meaning Making in Defining Violent Extremism in Kenya: Implications for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Policy and Practice’. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15(5).

15. Ibid, 32–33.

16. Holmer, ‘Countering Violent Extremism’, 7.

17. Al-Shabaab is a transnational terrorist organisation originating from Somalia. The organisation has its membership recruitment and operations in the East African region and beyond.

18. Anderson, ‘Histories of the Hanged’, 5.

19. Elkins, ‘Imperial Reckoning’, 366.

20. Branch, ‘Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya’, 59.

21. Carotenuto and Shadle, ‘Introduction’, 5.

22. Shaguhyia and Koster, ‘Land and Conflicts in Kenya’s Rift Valley’, 191–223.

23. See: Kagwanja, ‘Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca?’, 25–49; Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), ‘Killing the Vote: State-Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya’.

24. Chome, ‘From Islamic Reform to Muslim activism: The Evolution of an Islamic Ideology in Kenya. African Affairs’, 531–552.

25. Whittaker, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya’.

26. Human Rights Watch, ‘Armed Political Violence in the Coast’.

27. Nderitu, ‘Kenya – Bridging Ethnic Divides.

28. Baket al., ‘Defining the Concept of “Violent Extremism”’.

29. Mogire and Agade, ‘Counter-Terrorism in Kenya’ 473–491.

30. FRANCE 24, ‘Several People Killed in Suspected Al-Shabaab attack in Kenya’.

31. CRISIS 24, ‘Kenya: Al Shabaab Claima Responsibility for Attack on a Construction Site in Lamu County’.

32. Bachmann and Honke, ‘Peace and Security as Counterterrorism’, 98–99.

33. Howell and Richter-Montpetit, ‘Is securitisation theory racist?’ 3–5.

34. Zak, ‘Building a Culture of Resistance’, 743.

35. Interview with Youth Leader, Nairobi, 17 January 2021.

36. Interview with NGO Personnel, Nairobi, 19 January 2021.

37. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 2 June 2020.

38. United Nations, ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’.

39. Life and Peace Institute, ‘Horn of Africa Bulletin’.

40. Mogire, and Agade, ‘Counter-terrorism in Kenya’, 473–491.

41. Badurdeen and Goldsmith, ‘Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya’.

42. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 2 June 2021.

43. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 5 May 2021.

44. Interview with CSO Member, Nairobi, 8 June 2020.

45. Interview with Academic, Kilifi, 4 August 2020.

46. Interview with Academic, Mombasa, 15 September 2020.

47. Interview with CSO Member, Mombasa, 9 September 2020.

48. Interview with NGO Personnel, Lamu, 8 February 2021.

49. Interview with NGO Member, Nairobi, 8 June 2020.

50. Nasser-Eddine et al., Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review’.

51. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 2 June 2017.

52. McGregor, ‘Kenya’s Coast Province and the Mombasa Republican Council’.

53. Mwangi, ‘The Truth about the Mau Mau Movement’, 1–18.

54. Van Metre, ‘Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya’.

55. Badurdeen, ‘Youth Radicalisation in the Coastal Region of Kenya’.

56. Interview with Youth Leader, Kwale, 12 June 2017.

57. Badurdeen et al., ‘Lived Realities and Local Meaning Making in Defining Violent Extremism in Kenya’.

58. Interview with Women Leader, Kilifi, 5 August 2020.

59. Interview with Youth Leader, Kwale, 7 October 2020.

60. Interview with Religious Leader, Mombasa, 21 October 2020.

61. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017. ‘Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice’.

62. Interview with Youth Leader and Women Leader, Nairobi, May 2017.

63. Ernstorfer, ‘Effective Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism’.

64. Badurdeen, ‘Youth Radicalisation in the Coastal Region of Kenya’.

65. Interview with NGO Personnel, Isiolo, 14 November 2020.

66. Badurdeen, ‘Youth Radicalisation in the Coastal Region of Kenya’.

67. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 12 September 2020.

68. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 10 September 2020.

69. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa, 10 September 2020.

70. Interview with Peace Committee Member, Kwale, 7 October 2020.

71. Interview with NGO Personnel, Kwale, 7 August 2020.

72. Interview with Youth Leader, Mombasa, 21 October 2020.

73. Interview with Village Elder, Kwale, 7 October 2020.

74. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa 16 September 2020.

75. Interview with INGO Personnel, Nairobi, 20 August 2020.

76. Interview with NGO Personnel, Kwale, 15 September 2016.

77. Interview with NGO Personnel, Mombasa 16 September 2020.

78. Interview with Village Elder, Kwale, 15 September 2016.

79. Barton et al., ‘Introduction’, 3.

80. Aroussi et al., ‘Body Maps of Resistance Understanding Everyday Resistance to Violent Extremism in Kenya’.

81. Interview with NGO Personnel, Nairobi, 19 August 2020.

82. Interview with Peace Committee Member, Kwale, 7 October 2020.