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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the post-amnesty politics in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. We argue that ex-militant leaders have risen to become influential political and economic actors since the implementation of the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP) for armed groups in the Niger Delta. Our argument suggests that the rise of ex-militant leaders as ‘new big men’ in the Niger Delta is a direct – yet unintended – outcome of the design and implementation of the PAP. We explain how ex-militant leaders were co-opted economically through the award of lucrative security contracts. Our findings show that ex-militants gained more power in their communities as they were given control over the access to the PAP programme. Ex-militant leaders subsequently used their positions of economic influence and power to become and remain influential political actors as well, thereby fundamentally changing politics at the community as well as state-level in the Niger Delta Region. This article also seeks to build on theories of neopatrimonialism, especially how patronage politics manifest in the context of peacebuilding in societies emerging from armed conflicts.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Cammett and Malesky, ‘Power Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies’.
2. Bayart, ‘The State in Africa’.
3. Weber, ‘Economy and Society’.
4. Eisenstadt, ‘Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism’.
5. Clapham, ‘Third World Politics’.
6. Farazmand, ‘The Elite Question Towards a Normative Elite Theory of Organisation’.
7. Ebiede, ‘Community Conflicts and Armed Militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’.
8. Ibid.
9. Tantua and Kamruzzaman, ‘Revisiting “Militancy”’.
10. Clapham, ‘Third World Politics’.
11. Erdmann and Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered’.
12. Ibid.
13. Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa’; Ilkhamov, ‘Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks’; Tripp, ‘Women’s Movements and Challenges to Neopatrimonial Rule’; Cammack, ‘The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism’; McCauley, ‘Africa’s New Big Man Rule?’.
14. Utas, ‘African Conflicts and Informal Power’.
15. Beswick, ‘The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building’; Themner, ‘Former Military Networks and the Micro-Politics’; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, ‘Conflict and Social Transformation’.
16. Themner, ‘Former Military Networks and the Micro-Politics of Violence and Statebuilding in Liberia’
17. Ibid.
18. Speight, ‘Warlord Undone’.
19. Hensell and Gerdes, ‘Exit from War’.
20. Hoffmann-Lange, ‘Methods of Elite Research’.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Albert, ‘The Odi Massacre of 1999’.
24. Ukiwo, ‘Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding’.
25. Ibaba, ‘Terrorism in Liberation Struggles’.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ikelegbe, ‘The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’.
29. Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion”’.
30. Joab-Peterside, ‘On the Militarization of Nigeria’s Niger Delta’.
31. The concept of ‘armed youths’ is used in the context of gangs and cult groups that are present in urban areas of the Niger Delta. See Briggs et al., ‘Guide to the Armed Groups Operating in the Niger Delta – Part 1’.
32. Iwilade, ‘Networks of Violence and Becoming’.
33. Asuni, ‘Demobilization and Reintegration of Armed Youth in the Niger Delta’.
34. Ibid.
35. This was confirmed through several local sources that were part of the Bayelsa State Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee.
36. Nwajiaku-Dahou, ‘The Political Economy of Oil and “Rebellion” in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’.
37. Authors Interview with DDR Staff, February 2014, Abuja, Nigeria.
38. Public Statement by Paul Eris. December 2015. Yenagoa, Nigeria.
39. Iwilade, ‘Networks of Violence and Becoming’.
40. This view was commonly expressed by community members during our field research.
41. Interview with community chief, Yenagoa, November 2014.
42. Interview with community youth, Ologbobiri, October 2014.
43. Interview with ex-militant, 2014.
44. Leadership, ‘NIMASA Pays Tompolo 1.5Bn Monthly – Ex- Chairman’. http://leadership.ng/news/438108/nimasa-pays-tompolo-n1-5bn-monthly-ex-chairman [Accessed 27 May 2016].
45. Utas, ‘African Conflicts and Informal Power’.
46. Alapiki and Ukiwo, ‘Anxious Godfathers, Errant Godsons’.
47. Interview with community member – Oporoma, 10 December 2015.
48. Ukpong, C., 2015. ‘Bayelsa: INEC Cancels Elections in Southern Ijaw Local Government, Declares Elections Inconclusive’. Premium Times: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/194772-breaking-bayelsa-inec-cancels-election-in-southern-ijaw-declares-election-inconclusive.html [Accessed 2 June 2016].
49. Channels News, 2016. ‘Dickson Wins Bayelsa Governorship Election’. http://www.channelstv.com/2016/01/10/dickson-wins-bayelsa-governorship-election/ [Accessed 1 May 2017].
50. Punch, 2016. ‘Dickson Appoints Ex-Militant Leader to Fight Militancy and Vandalism’. http://punchng.com/dickson-appoints-ex-militant-leader-fight-militancy-vandalism/ [Accessed 2 May 2017].
51. Discussions with those familiar with the matter suggests that the appointment was agreed by the federal government. However, the government in seeking state collaboration asked that the state announce the appointment.
52. Turner, ‘Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian State’.
53. Watts, ‘Antinomies of Community’.
54. Ikelegbe, ‘Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’; Ebiede, Op Cit.
55. Thisday, 2014. ‘Policemen, Suspected Militants Exchange Gunfire in Bayelsa Creeks’. http://allafrica.com/stories/201402101595.html [Accessed 1 May 2017].
56. Ibid.
57. Interview with community member − 14 November 2014.
58. Interview with community member − 3 October 2014.
59. interview with community member − 6 October 2015.
60. This event occurred during our fieldwork in the community.
61. Utas, ‘African Conflicts and Informal Power’.
62. Pratten, ‘The Precariousness of Prebendalism’.
63. Alapiki and Ukiwo. ‘Anxious godfathers, errant godsons’.
64. Levan, ‘Reciprocal Retaliation and Local Linkage’.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Tarila Marclint Ebiede
Tarila Marclint Ebiede is a political scientist, whose research straddles the politics of non-state armed groups, governance, security, and peacebuilding. He is co-founder of Conflict Research Network West Africa.
Arnim Langer
Arnim Langer is a professor in international relations at KU Leuven and director of the Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) at the Faculty of Social Sciences. He has researched and published extensively on the causes of violent conflict in heterogeneous societies and the challenges to sustainable peacebuilding.