Analysing principled resistance to affirmative action

ABSTRACT

Why are some people resistant to affirmative action (AA) measures in Australia? On what grounds do people take a principled stance against AA? The article explores the resistance of online commentators to AA in a spread of domains, including politics, employment, and awards. These data reveal that sexism, misogyny, and the values of liberal humanism work together to present opposition to AA as justified. To alter this perspective, it will be necessary to challenge the scope of “prepackaged” liberal values in addition to addressing misogynistic hostility and fighting sexist tropes.

KEYWORDS:

• Affirmative action
• quotas
• merit
• sexism
• misogyny
• equality

Introduction

Why are some people resistant to affirmative action (AA) measures in the Australian context? This article explores the rationales offered by online commentators for their resistance to AA in a spread of domains, including politics, employment, and awards.¹ Given that western liberal democracies like Australia are only “allegedly post-patriarchal” (Kate Manne 2018, xii), this article also investigates the presence of sexism and misogyny amongst AA rejection. This analysis reveals that sexism, misogyny, and the scoping of liberal humanist values all work together to present opposition to AA as rational and justified, and present women (real or hypothetical) who support AA as flouting the norm of just deserts. To alter this perspective, it will be necessary to challenge the scope of “prepackaged” liberal values, not only to fight misogyny and sexism.

Background

AA in Australia

This article defines AA as any measure introduced to bring about gender parity. Importantly, AA is often conceptualised as support for women (Rainbow Murray 2014, 520). In Australia, AA measures are frequently, but not exclusively, discussed with respect to politics. “Australia,” says Margaret Thornton, “endorses the values of liberty, individual autonomy and equality, values which are realised in a democratic and market-conscious framework” (Margaret Thornton 1985, 28, my emphasis). And the anchor of this value-laden system is its individualism (Katrine Beauregard 2018, 306). Both major parties ascribe to this liberal humanism. The centre-left party is the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which has an internal quota for women candidates; they “introduced a 25% quota for female nominees in 1981 and aim to reach 50% by 2025 or earlier” (Ferran Martinez i Coma and Ignacio Lago 2021, 2). Interestingly, the “adoption of the quota system … in 1981 faced fierce opposition inside the party … [but] the system is currently uncontroversial within both the parliamentary and organizational wing of the party” (Katrine Beauregard and Jill Sheppard 2021, 224, my emphasis).

The centre-right party is the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA), which has refused to consider quotas “on the basis of pursuing a meritocracy” (Coma and Lago 2021, 5). However, in 2016 the LPA “agreed on an aspirational target of equal gender representation among all nominated candidates by 2020” (Katrine Beauregard and Jill Sheppard 2021, 224, my emphasis). Quotas, “unlike targets, involve a fixed number that must be achieved” (Elly Duncan and Julia Baird 2021). Quotas are a form of “hard” AA; targets, “soft”. Problematically, though, “in those four years [after agreeing on a target], the percentage of female candidates declined” (Beauregard and Sheppard 2021, 224). Prime Minister Scott Morrison has declared himself open to quotas; however, this issue remains divisive in the party (Duncan and Julia Baird 2021; Beauregard and Sheppard 2021, 220), as it was for the ALP.

While it is true that in terms of party ideology, leftist parties tend to be “more female-friendly than rightist ones” (Coma and Lago 2021, 1), rather than assuming opposition to AA comes only from the right, note instead that AA is a contested solution to gender inequality in countries “with citizenship norms emphasizing individualism and equality of opportunity” (Beauregard and Sheppard 2021, 220)—countries like Australia.² Crucially, both parties value liberty, individual autonomy, and equality—that is, they nominally endorse the same ends. The issue concerns the scope of these values. This can (partly) explain a difference in tactics from soft AA (targets) to hard AA (quotas), as well as initial opposition to AA on the left.

AA is not only considered in the Australian political landscape but has also been deemed necessary across the workforce more broadly. First came the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986, which aimed to have employers implement AA programs for women. This was superseded by the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999. While there were some substantive changes between these Acts, it is sufficient to note here the shift in language from AA to equal employment; it was observed that AA had “taken on connotations of quota based systems and reverse discrimination” (Parliament of Australia 1999). This was again superseded by the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012, which presently “aims to improve and promote equality for both women and men in the workplace”, as previously the legislation only applied to women (Equal Opportunity Commission 2021).

Quota discourses

The existing literature on AA proposes several possible reasons for resistance to Drude Dahlerup 2006 calls these “quota discourses” (23). The first objection is that people should be treated as individuals, and that gender should be absent from consideration (Iris Marion Young 1990, 192). The second is that AA is discriminatory (Thornton 1985, 35; Iris Marion Young 1990, 194). Third, equal numerical representation should be a low priority (Drude Dahlerup 2018, 71; Murray 2014, 527; Young 1990, 196); fourth, AA is demeaning (Murray 2014, 522; Rosemary Whip 2001, 42); fifth, AA violates people’s free choices (Linda Barclay 2013, 167; Beauregard 2018, 295; Claire Chambers 2013, 565; Dahlerup 2018, 71, 73); sixth, AA undermines the principle of merit (Beauregard and Sheppard 2021, 221; Dahlerup 2018, 60; Murray 2014, 521; Thornton 1985, 30; Whip 2001, 41; Young 1990, 193, 200); seventh, women will be seen as tokens (Dahlerup 2018, 71, 75; Murray 2014, 521; Whip 2001, 42); eighth, AA strategies reduce to absurdity (Dahlerup 2018, 69, 71); and ninth, AA doesn’t get to the root of women’s inequity—the strategy is symbolic only (Dahlerup 2018, 71; Young 1990, 199).

Sexism and misogyny

In addition, as mentioned above, western liberal democracies are only nominally post-patriarchal. This means they appear to be egalitarian; however, scratch the surface and one can readily find pervasive sexist and misogynistic patterns of action. Thus, it would be unsurprising to find (tenth) opposition to AA that is misogynistic and sexist, especially as a feminist goal (Manne 2018, 51; Young 1990, 116). According to Manne (2018), sexism is behaviour that promotes an ideology which functions to justify or reinforce men’s dominance over women (78–80):

Sexist ideology will often consist in assumptions, beliefs, theories, stereotypes, and broader cultural narratives that represent men and women as importantly different in ways that … would make rational people more inclined to support and participate in patriarchal social arrangements (Manne 2018, 79).

By contrast, misogyny is a disposition towards women shaped by the contours of a patriarchal social environment; misogyny tends to appear in the form of impulse reactions triggered by women who (seem to) step “out of line”, it is not necessarily caused by an explicitly held conviction that women are inferior to men (Manne 2018, 71). Manne (2018) distinguishes between overt misogyny (explicit hostility to “unbecoming” women) and covert misogyny (the praising or rewarding certain women, and tacit hostility to unbecoming women), which both work to “police and enforce women’s subordination and to uphold male dominance” (33). Since misogyny works by differentiating “between good women and bad ones” (Manne 2018, 80), one may expect to find, eleventh, the opinion that AA unjustly benefits untrustworthy, power seeking, manipulative, or inferior women (Beauregard and Sheppard 2021, 221; Murray 2014, 522; see also Dahlerup 2018, 44, 75).

Two research questions were posed: RQ1 Which of these rationales occur most frequently in these data? And RQ2 what commitments, idea(l)s, and concerns must a person draw upon or tacitly assume for resistance to seem important, right, and even necessary?

Method

The data are drawn from comments posted in The Australian’s Facebook comments sections between September 2018-February 2019—a subset of a broader dataset tracking overt and covert misogyny and sexism online. Facebook was chosen as the site of collection because it is the largest social networking platform with 2.41 billion monthly users worldwide. The Australian was chosen because it is Australia’s only daily national broadsheet. Starting September 2 2018, I proceeded to read and manually document in an excel spreadsheet the seemingly sexist and misogynistic comments that had been posted in the previous 24 hours. I applied screening criteria to the articles, collecting comments only from those which were either written by or about a woman, featured an image of a woman in the accompanying thumbnail, or whose content centred on gendered issues (e.g., the gender pay gap; sexual assault; gender quotas; “toxic” masculinity; “having it all”; etc.).

To arrive at the narrower dataset analysed here, I initially scanned headlines and descriptions of the 6 months’ worth of articles, searching for mentions of quotas, gender targets, or balanced gender representation in politics, employment, and other areas of social life. I undertook an initial reading of the available comments replying to these articles to identify common words and phrases. These were then used to conduct a second search of the broader data set. In total, 994 comments were identified for analysis. I then coded quotes pertaining to each quota discourse, highlighting exemplary quotes for qualitative analysis.

Results

Having searched for evidence of the 11 discourses mentioned above, I sorted comments in order of frequency; they are listed in Table 1. I discuss each discourse in turn.

Table 1. Reasons against AA in order of frequency.

Theme^3	Men % of comments (n = 687)	Women % of comments (n = 290)	Ambiguous % of comments (n = 18)	Total % of comments (n = 994)
(6) Merit	42.65% (n = 293)	56.90% (n = 165)	44.44% (n = 8)	46.83% (n = 466)
(1) Gender Irrelevant	23.87% (n = 164)	37.24% (n = 108)	22.22% (n = 4)	27.74% (n = 276)
(10) Explicit Anti-Feminism, Sexism and Misogyny	25.91% (n = 178)	21.74% (n = 63)	38.89% (n = 7)	24.94% (n = 248)
(2) Discrimination	31.00% (n = 213)	10.34% (n = 30)	05.56% (n = 1)	24.52% (n = 244)
(11) Good/Bad Women	14.12% (n = 97)	29.31% (n = 85)	27.78% (n = 5)	18.79% (n = 187)
(8) Reductio ad Absurdum	12.81% (n = 88)	06.55% (n = 19)	16.67% (n = 3)	11.06% (n = 110)
(4) Demeaning	04.66% (n = 32)	11.03% (n = 32)	00.00% (n = 0)	06.43% (n = 64)
(5) Violates Choice	04.95% (n = 34)	05.52% (n = 16)	05.56% (n = 1)	05.13% (n = 51)
(7) Tokens	02.33% (n = 16)	04.14% (n = 12)	00.00% (n = 0)	02.81% (n = 28)
(9) Symbolic	01.89% (n = 13)	00.34% (n = 1)	05.56% (n = 1)	01.51% (n = 15)
(3) Low Priority	01.31% (n = 9)	00.69% (n = 2)	00.00% (n = 0)	01.11% (n = 11)

Rationales for resisting AA

Gender is irrelevant

According to liberal humanism, a just society aims at the elimination of group difference, creating a world where people can exist simply as individuals (Young 1990, 158). Thus, it is unsurprising that readers presented themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, as impartial judgers with respect to gender. Liberal humanists (nominally) endorse a principle of non-discrimination, which is to “treat everyone according to the same principles, rules, and standards” (Young 1990, 158). Here is a typical example:

“Most don’t care if male or female, gay or straight, black or white. I think they care if the person is good at their job.” (Matthew)

However, entrenched androcentrism and a disposition to misogyny was also present among those whose comments attempt to centre impartiality. Consider:

“[…] Give equal opportunity to both sexes. Don’t need “token” women in to make up a stupid quota. Don’t care if man or woman, best person for the job.” (Malcolm₁)

“Surely people want the best person for the job, not the best woman.” (Edward)

While Malcolm says he does not care whether a man or woman is hired, note that only women are figured as possible tokens—the notion that men might be tokens never emerges. And though Edward suggests that people want to see the most suitable individual in a role, he contrasts “best person” with “best woman”, which laterally suggests the “best person” is in fact a man.

Discrimination

Since AA measures are often conceptualised as measures to support women, some see AA as discriminatory to men. What underscores this conclusion is a certain conception of equality. If AA is about equality of opportunity rather than numerical equality, then discrimination occurs whenever positions are held without recourse to merit. AA can then also be seen as discriminating against women, too.

“[…] If 60% of females were best for job then there’s 10% too many blokes. This is a form of discrimination. Gender is irrelevant. Choose best person for role, please.” (Pablo)

“It doesn’t matter if they are male or female … just get best people for the job for goodness sake! Stop trying all this PC rubbish. If you have to have 50% women you may miss getting some future brilliant male person and end up with some female who’s not brilliant at all!” (Annie)

Pablo is careful to frame his comment to show that he (believes he) is not biased, insofar as he would accept an uneven outcome which sees women in the numerical majority if they were the most meritorious. Annie approaches AA with the same logic. She sees herself as unbiased, as an adherent of a principle of non-discrimination, insofar as she, too, would accept men in the majority if they were the most meritorious. Numerical equality, by contrast, is “PC rubbish”.

AA is unnecessary

Some commentators seemed to oppose AA on the grounds that women and men are already equal, like Shay:

“You can’t fix something that isn’t broken.” (Shay)

But a few commentators tacitly acknowledged that inequality was still a problem, like Karissa, who nevertheless said:

“Isn’t there more important things to discuss[?] I don’t think the gender balance in the Australian Government is the most urgent matter in world affairs. It will right itself without interference.” (Karissa)

Karissa’s comment is dismissive of gender inequality as a serious issue, assuming we will achieve parity eventually. This coheres with liberal humanism’s “progress” narrative which assures us:

… few vestiges of prejudice and discrimination remain, but we are working on them, and have nearly realized the dream those Enlightenment fathers dared to propound … a society in which differences of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity no longer make a difference to people’s rights and opportunities (Young 1990, 157).

The narrative (and Karissa’s comment) suggests that we do not need AA: the system is not broken; women can (and will, eventually) make it on their own.

Changing tack, while positioning himself as unbiased, Adam makes an interesting observation about political representation, suggesting another reason AA is unnecessary:

“It should be whoever has the best policies not based on gender and skin colour. I’m a white male, that doesn’t mean i’m going to automatically vote for white male candidates.” (Adam)

Adam is objecting to the experience argument: that different types of people have different types of experiences, and thus it is necessary to have diverse group-based political representation to cover the interests of all (Dahlerup 2018, 17). Kildare makes the point more forcefully and extends its logic:

“[…] you are suggesting that only a person of the same gender can represent the issues of that gender. Your words “you have to set quotas to get representation” ie without quotas ergo female representatives then you won’t have representation. […] You are sexist and your argument is sexist.I am saying that the best person for the job regardless of their gender should get the job. […]” (Kildare)

Kildare claims anyone advocating for the experience argument is presupposing falsehoods (that people who belong to different social groups can represent diverse interests), which invalidates the claim. The only explanation for endorsing AA, then, must be sexism. With this conclusion, Kildare takes the moral high ground.

AA is demeaning

Since, according to the principle of non-discrimination, each person should be evaluated based on individual effort and achievements, it is easy to understand why some commentators would view AA proposals as demeaning: they seem to imply that their recipients are not deserving of the roles or status they have been awarded. This objection was more frequently raised by women than men (see Table 1). Women commentators said things like:

“Sorry but I would only want to be employed on merit not just to make up the numbers Anything less would be disrespectful to women.” (Irene)

“Once at university I won a prestigious award for drawing along with 2 other students. Being the only female of the three a lecturer told me they couldn’t pick all male students, I felt my work was good enough but even 20 years later I wish I’d earned it ‘fairly’, and feel that perhaps another student missed out. Best person for the job is the only system that’s fair, yes women need to be supported but we want to earn things on merit.” (Lilith)

“Gender equality in the workplace is unethical. I’d be pretty embarrassed to get a job based on what’s between my legs instead of my ability. In fact it goes against the feminism earlier generations fought for. Every time I hear the words “gender equality” I hear women screaming for special treatment.” (Mary)

While Lilith believes that women still need some kind of institutional support to achieve gender equality, other women either assume that equality has already been realized (Mary) or that the measure of an individual’s achievements is incompatible with supporting people on grounds of group membership (Irene). Compare these to some comments made by men:

“If women truly want to force the opinion that they require ‘quotas’ to achieve anything then that speaks volumes about their abilities. I can’t even imagine how insulted I’d be to be selected because of my genitals.” (Andy)

“If you put women in to fill a quota, you devalue the woman who earned it.” (Sid)

“Feminists can be so proud to have a woman win this seat just because of her gender.” (Walter)

These comments generalise about (certain) women and their abilities. While a woman can be meritorious (in theory), they must always fight suspicions of ineptitude as soon as AA is suggested—even, as Sid points out, when they should not be.

Choice

Dahlerup (2018) proposes that resistance to AA could turn on the conviction that numerical inequality “is the result of women’s own choices” (68). As Chambers (2013) helpfully explains, “for a liberal, one respects individuals by respecting their choices” (574). Within liberal humanist logic, choice, because it is an exercise of both liberty and autonomy, “is a normative transformer: something that, by its mere presence, transforms an unjust (because unequal) situation into a just one” (Chambers 2013, 574, original emphasis). Here, “unequal” means numerically unequal. Numerical inequality can have its normative status transformed because liberal humanism does not aim at uniform lives for all (Barclay 2013, 169). That choice is a “normative transformer” has interesting logical extensions.

“Why [impose AA]? If women don’t want to work there and only men who cares.” (King)

“Maybe it’s because no ladies wish to be in politics. It’s not a mater [sic] of being equally placed it’s a mater [sic] of wanting the job. […]” (Cedric)

To respect preferences, there should not be AA measures forcing women into (and subsequently men out of) a job.

Furthermore, endorsing the principle of non-discrimination does not entail rejection of all hierarchies, merely rejection of group-based hierarchies:

“A fair go for all [individuals] will lead to winners and losers. Everyone finishing at the same level can only […] be brought about by force.” (Will)

In exercising choices, it will likely come to pass that an uneven percentage of women and men will gravitate to certain fields. The argument, then, is that numerical equality is unjust because it is manufactured. Numerical equality removes the capacity for individuals to freely exercise their agency.

Merit

We have already seen tacit and explicit appeals to merit as the central good that AA undermines in the foregoing. Hundreds of comments centre on merit and qualifications (see Table 1). Some of these comments take a lot for granted, such as these:

“hiring because of gender isn’t merit.” (Geoffrey)

“It should be on merit not gender.” (Louise)

“so much for being qualified and competent.” (Dev)

“Quotas are sexist. Merit is best.” (Xavier)

Each is underscored by a conviction that wherever AA measures are in place, quality (determined by merit) will suffer as a result. This conviction warrants questioning because it rests upon a false dichotomy. As Nancy Jay 1981, 42) explains,

The most basic of these logical rules are three. They are the Principle of Identity (if anything is A, it is A); the Principle of Contradiction (nothing can be both A and Not A); and the Principle of the Excluded Middle (anything, and everything, must be either A or Not-A).

Here, merit holds the position of the positive signifier (A) while AA measures, such as quotas, hold the position of the negative signifier (Not-A). According to the principle of contradiction, it is impossible for merit and AA to coexist simultaneously, for, according to the principle of identity, that which is AA is not merit. Moreover, according to the principle of the excluded middle, there is only merit and AA, one or the other, no alternative, and certainly not both. This tacit application of this false dichotomous logic explains why there is much principled opposition to AA.

There are also those who appeal to merit to insinuate, and sometimes flat-out state that women are rarely, if ever, as talented and worthy of public roles and honours as men. This is misogynistic and sexist. Such comments include:

“The female candidates musr[sic] be [shit] and can’t get there on merit if they need quota’s/affirmative action.” (Colby)

“There’s women applying for preselection they just aren’t picked because someone else is better.” (Violet)

“Problem is, the good women aren’t as good as the good men. You have to earn your stripes. Not get tokens.” (Austin)

If these commentators are to be believed, it is just a matter of fact that, excluding some rare cases, men’s skills and talent supersede women’s (Murray 2014, 523).

Tokens

The framing of high-achieving and high-profile women as tokens was rarely explicit, but it did occur:

“If you’re part of a quota and not based on merit then you’re just there to make up the numbers.” (Victor)

“Female best person for the job, fine. If not then just a token.” (Malcolm₂)

“So which ones are the tokens, just to make it up to 50%?” (Jack)

But how is one to tell the difference between a meritorious woman and a token woman? As Sara Ahmed 2014 puts it, “the possibility that we may not be able to tell the difference swiftly converts into the possibility that any of these incoming bodies may be bogus” (47, my emphasis). Because of the dichotomous logic which figures merit and AA as contradictory, and because AA traditionally targets women, the revelation that any political party, organisation, institution, or awards body has, or is considering, AA measures gives people license to suspect that the contributions, qualifications, and talents of women are subpar. Though Malcolm and Jack (try to) leave open the possibility that some women are not tokens, the suspicion is (inevitably) cast across women as a class.

Reductio ad absurdum

Some commentators asked why AA is proposed for some areas of public life but not others. For example:

“why not gender targets for prisons?” (Imogen)

“I agree the quicker we can Get 50% Female Brickies Labours [sic] The Better, Im thinking we just start rounding up Girls and forcing them to do a minimum of 8 hours a day moving full wheel barrows of concrete and bricks in 40degree heat because girl power, sexism, Misogyny.We need to force Equality of outcomes asap before its too late … .” (Sam)

“If there has to be quotas then it should be universal for all jobs, garbage collectors, portable toilet cleaners, abattoir staff, plumbers, coal miners, sewage inspectors, oil rig worker.” (Wilbur₁)

Such logic is also applied to identity traits:

“Why not targets for red heads, or people with lactose intolerance? Or short men? Why arbitrarily designate gender as the thing that must be represented? The left are built on childish logic.” (Carter)

“Intersec[t]ionality is a never ending game. What about representation for all groups where our laws are made? That means having to adjust for relevant percentages of each race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, hair colour, eye colour, height, weight, shoe size etc.” (Jafar)

“I’m surprised they dont also control award quotas for skin colour, sexual preference, vegan identity. If you tick all the right boxes you get the grand prize regardless of what you have done for Australia.” (Leigh)

The logic between both is the same: if numerical equality must obtain between two “arbitrary” groups—men and women—or “arbitrary” jobs—e.g., politics—then it must extend to all groups and fields. But such an extension is presented as an absurdity: if we keep going down this path, such advantages will impede those who would excel through individual effort (i.e., merit).

Commentators also identified an absurdity in “progressive” logic, especially with regard to the metaphysical status of gender.

“If gender is a social construct, why do [we] need any quotas? They really need to get their tenets straight before they go proselytizing their religion.” (Wilbur₂)

“it’s a bit hypocritical that all the gender neutral politics go out the window when the feminazis want only women in politics.” (Lulu)

At times this lot (women, feminists, take your pick) hold that gender is a social construct, yet, when it benefits them, they turn around and cry oppressed. This we cannot abide.

AA is symbolic

According to Dahlerup (2018), some believe that AA strategies “only treat the symptoms of women’s underrepresentation and therefore will only be a symbolic gesture” (71). This is a woman-friendly view: it does not deny women’s inequality is both real and a problem; rather, it denies that AA has the capacity to rectify this situation. However, none of the commentators who offered “symbolism” as a rationale seemed to recognise that women remain an oppressed group in Australia.⁴ Rather, they viewed (what they assumed were) AA measures as symbolic in other ways. For example, take the following comments made after Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews revealed his gender-balanced Cabinet:

“[…] the article is literally about Andrews bragging about his politically correct 50/50 cabinet. This has nothing to do with the abilities of the people and everything to do with creating a 50/50 cabinet to virtue signal […]” (Grant)

“Typical of him, has to look like he is doing the popular thing. Gender should have nothing to do with it, best person for the job should get it […]” (Brian)

Grant sees the women Ministers of the Victorian Cabinet as symbols of a progressive political ideology. Furthermore, by his choice of the pejorative term “virtue signalling”, the reader is aware that Grant views such “progressiveness” as unfair and unjust. Brian views AA measures as merely symbolic in a neighbouring way: as a ploy to curry favour with the general public and win votes at future elections. This is symbolism that uses women to make oneself more popular.

Explicit misogyny, sexism, and anti-feminism

Sexism, overt misogyny, anti-feminist sentiment, and women-blaming are issues that frequent this data set. (See: Andy, Austin, Colby, Dev, Edward, Lulu, Mary, Malcolm₁, Sam, Sean, Violet, and Wilbur₁.) Here are two more examples of sexism:

“from now on, these are the rools, okay? (I’m adopting playground speak) Whenever any of you boys feel the compulsion to […] rush a bloke on a train who is threatening to shoot everybody […] you’ve got to make sure you get equal numbers of females involved in your take down of the bad guy before you do it. Okay?You know it’s not fair for you to get all the glory!” (Shonnee)

“women are not as political as men, simple as that.” (Noah)

Shonnee’s comment is sexist because she reproduces stereotypical tropes of men as strong protectors, and that it would be ridiculous for women to attempt to match men in strength and bravery. Noah’s comment is also sexist in its assertion that women are—by nature, presumably—less political than men. He presents this as a matter of fact, and an obvious one at that.

Meanwhile, Willa, Elanor, and Yannick put their misogyny on display when they tell us outright that:

“They need to be chosen on merit just take a look at the useless bimbos in the labor party and what they’re [sic] done, absolutely nothing in the best interest of Australians [expletive emoji].” (Willa)

“I won’t be voting for the girls club. Merit, not quotas please.” (Elanor)

“The women who are owed respect are given respect. The whole ‘I may be weak, stupid and hypocritical but I don’t have a Y chromosome so respect me’ circus just won’t cut it. Nice try though.” (Yannick)

Yannick’s comment exudes a hostility designed to let women know they can (theoretically) earn respect, but the “I” of his hypothetical woman implies any woman may be a token, in which case she’ll receive no respect. Likewise, Elanor’s casting of women politicians as belonging to a “girls club” presents them as immature and self-absorbed, rather than hard-working and impartial (by tacit contradistinction to men). Willa, while targeting only ALP women, deploys a gendered slur (“bimbo”) in her critique of said women’s political performance, clearly exhibiting woman-directed hostility. (As we will see next, targeting only some women with gendered hostility still counts as misogyny).

Continuing to anti-feminism, “feminist” seems to function as a derogatory slur. We see Mimi say that women politicians are a:

“bunch of wingers[,] most of them more interested in pushing their own feminist agendas than looking after their own electoral communities.” (Mimi)

There is nothing about feminist beliefs which are explored in this comment; rather, there is a lateral association drawn between “selfish” women and feminists. This type of misogyny is a kind of two-for-one deal: it castigates a certain sort of woman (bad, bogus, token) and it warns other women (potential good women) against that movement which ultimately aims at their liberation. Myles makes this distinction directly:

“A feminist as opposed to a female, is a person wanting gender favorism without merit, anti male, status and attention seeking, usually had male problems that drive a mentally stuck attitude creating inner undue self hurt till they let go and move on. To be honest most women find feminism is spoiling many things for them and do not like its attitudes.” (Myles₁)

Positioning feminists as biased selfish man-haters, Myles also laterally associates feminism with opposition to the principle of non-discrimination, thereby connecting it to the idea that feminists really aim at gender privilege, not gender equality.

Interestingly, anti-feminism also was also expressed in a way that ultimately supported women’s increased presence in politics. Take the following, for example:

“Even though I think it should be the best ‘man’ for the job, [former political advisor] Peta Credlin is right [about the need for more women in the LPA]. As long as they aren’t radical feminists or hold blank cheques it is what the modern conservative Liberal Party needs to move ahead.” (Glenda)⁵

Glenda’s comment tracks Manne’s (2018) anti-predication in her reflections on misogyny: that “women’s power will be tolerated when it’s wielded in service of patriarchal interests” (115). Indeed, Glenda wants women to advance in public life, but she does not want to upset the patriarchal apple cart to achieve this aim. Perhaps this also explains Willa’s hostility to ALP women.

Specific women (not) of merit

Finally, this last theme is a specific variety of misogyny—intradivisional misogyny (Louise Richardson-Self 2018)—which is more covert than the hostility we just witnessed. This view presents only some women as lacking in merit while specifying others who do merit their positions. (This lends a convenient excuse to anti-AA advocates, allowing them to assert they are not really biased, they call “merit” as they see it.) These comments typically take two forms. The first is rewarding discourse (Manne 2018, 72), and it is usually reserved for women who adhere to (and hence entrench) women’s generally subordinate role in patriarchy:

“I wonder if [former UK Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher had these problems? Probably not … because she beat the boys at their own game, and was tougher than they were.” (Marty)

“So far [Australian women politicians] are making a shocking impression per merit and ability of job obligation and venture outside of the roles with exception of maybe NSW premier [Gladys Berejiklian].” (Myles₂)

“[Senator] Jane [Hume] is an Excellent politician but the LNP⁶ must go after the highly intelligent ones and weed out all the dumb ones (both male and female) and all the lefties that have wormed their way into what was once a conservative right of centre part.” (Teddy)

The second is policing discourse. It explicitly names bogus women who lack merit in the eyes of the commentators:

“[Introduce AA?] So they can have more useful idiots like [former MPs] Julie Bishop and Julia Banks playing the victim card when they don’t get what they want - no thanks.” (Ishan)

“Julie Bishop was not the best person for the job. Playing the gender card to try and explain away her failure only puts her in the same boat as [former Prime Minister] Julia Gillard.” (Faisal)

“Do we really want more women like [former Speaker of the House of Representatives] Bronwyn Bishop, or [former MPs] Julia Banks, or Kelly O’Dwyer, or [Senators] Mikayla [sic] Cash, or even Pauline Hanson, who, don’t forget, was a pre-selected Liberal candidate. Unless they can come up with some plausible candidates of the calibre of Julie Bishop, they might as well not bother.” (Klaus)

Note how Julie Bishop is meritorious to some and bogus to others—in fact, no woman is safe from the bad woman label; hence, such comments are more than personal slights. They constitute misogyny.

General findings and gender differences

There are some interesting gender differences worthy of note (see Table 1). Men were about twice as likely as women to claim that AA is unnecessary and to protest that advocates of AA were endorsing an inconsistent ideology. Men raised the issue of double-standards and reverse-discrimination roughly three times more often than women, and they accused AA of being a symbolic act five times more often than women did. These men find AA unfair, as directly negatively affecting them men as a group. They also find it intolerable that AA is accepted by some in specific domains and not others. Women, meanwhile, said that AA was demeaning twice as often as men. They understood themselves to be the “targets” of AA, yet they want to appear “as good as men” and so do not want “special” treatment. This perhaps explains why they were slightly more likely to raise the principle of merit, and why they were twice as likely as men to claim that gender is irrelevant. They were also twice as likely to object to “token” women and name specific women who are/not meritorious—presumably to demonstrate that they do not support women just because of gender. That said, in real terms, men were far more vocal in their opposition to AA—roughly two thirds of all comments came from them. This answers RQ1.

Discussion: “prepackaged” values and feminist critique

While singular quota discourses can be pulled into focus for the purposes of detailed analysis, often multiple discourses interlock. Thus, it is necessary to consider what logic makes sense of them, unifying them into one big picture (RQ2). I posit that these discourses hang together in the widespread application of “prepackaged” liberal humanist values and tacit androcentrism tending toward misogyny and sexism.

We have seen that AA seems to fundamentally challenge the primacy of a principle of non-discrimination which holds that all people should be treated the same, and mandates “that persons should be treated only as individuals and not as members of groups” (Young 1990, 192). As Thornton (1985) explains, “The theory is that if the individual is unencumbered by the traits of invidiousness attaching to group membership [e.g., gender], she or he will be necessarily accorded equal treatment at the starting points”, which is tantamount to equality of opportunity (33). Hence, “equality” = “equal opportunity”. To treat everyone as equal, you have to treat them as always and only an individual, remembering all individuals are “the same”.

Some feminist critiques of the public sphere point out that it presumes and maintains women’s exclusion from the public life (Thornton 1985, 29). Women are not treated as individuals ought to be treated. Women seeking opportunities in the public sphere are disadvantaged by the stigmas attached to their group. This is unjust. Some think justice requires “bringing women’s lives into line with those of men” (Rachel Alsop, Annette Fitzsimmons and Kathleen Lennon 2002, 183). To realise the central value of equality between gender groups, women did need social support—to have equal opportunity supported by legislation and policy. But such supports were already introduced in Australia in the 1980s. It would not, then, be unreasonable to assume that equality of opportunity has been established for women in Australia.

Importantly, as Young (1990) explains, “equal opportunity has come to mean that no one is barred from entering competition for a relatively few privileged positions … assuming a division between scarce highly rewarded positions and more plentiful less desirable positions” (214–215). The implication of this is spelled out by Thornton (1985): “Essential to the concept of equality of opportunity, then, is the notion of winners and losers” (34). If we live in a world where it is destined that some will win and some will lose, but everybody gets to choose, how shall it be decided who gets to be a winner? The answer: merit. Plenty of commentators endorse this view (e.g., Lilith, Malcolm₁, Sam, Will). Going further, I posit that behind every appeal to merit rests an assumption that equality of opportunity obtains in that society.

When it comes to understanding why, today, some reject AA in principle, one must consider what are the “taken for granted facts”. If every individual is seen to be already equal, merit can be the only fair distinction between them. But is it a fact that equality of opportunity obtains? It is plain to see that men and women generally follow quite different life paths, and that highest and most prestigious positions are typically awarded to or held by men. For example, in December 2020 there were 46 federal women Members of Parliament (MPs) out of 151 seats, and 39 federal women Senators out of 76 seats (Parliament of Australia 2021). Men are more frequently the recipients of the Order of Australia, an honour for eminent achievement and merit of the highest degree in service to Australia. Given this—and the many other gendered patterns in this society, such as the gender pay gap (Workplace Gender Equality Agency 2021)—it may seem obvious that society has pockets of numerical inequalities.

Gender patterns exist, that is true. But the matter is also normative. Gender patterns can be explained away by appeals to both merit and choice. Individual autonomy, closely aligned with structural freedoms (liberty), essentially boils down to the principle that every one of us ought to be able to choose our own life path and thus control how one’s life goes. As Chambers (2013) summarises, “the ideal-typical liberal citizen is in control: of her career, of her consumer choices, of her family life” (565, original emphasis). If individual women happen to choose careers in caring fields, whereas men happen to choose careers in politics, the consequent “gender patterns” are just because women could have chosen differently (Beauregard 2018, 295; Wendy Brown 2019, 41). And, if men happen to hold more powerful social roles, this is because they are more competent; they merit that standing. Thus, one can, in a logically consistent way, tolerate numerical inequality while claiming to uphold the liberal humanist values of equality (of opportunity), autonomy, and liberty. We have seen this displayed in comments like those of Annie, Austin, Cedric, King, Mary, Matteo, Pablo, Violet, and Will.

But here’s the rub: one cannot be “in control” of one’s life (fully) if one’s life is negatively impacted by socially entrenched group-based biases, exclusion, or stigmas. And if one’s life is so impacted, it is unlikely that one will have the opportunity to meet the heights of merit achieved by non-burdened others, nor have access to the same choices. This puts strain on the appropriate interpretation of equality. Some commentators clearly think that the removal of barriers (negative liberty) is tantamount to “equality of opportunity” (e.g., Matteo, Shay, Violet). However, “liberal egalitarians argue that merely removing formal barriers to offices, positions, and jobs does not equalize opportunities” (Barclay 2013, 164–165). In other words, what some see as “equality of outcome” others see as “unrealised equality of opportunity”. Karissa and Glenda come closest to endorsing this type of view.

Thus, we see that the crux of the debate over AA really concerns the scope of liberal humanism’s prepackaged values: what constitutes equality (of opportunity), what other values it must be weighed against (liberty, autonomy), and what is the appropriate scope of moral evaluation (tacitly: individualism). This is all ongoing amidst stubborn androcentrism tending to misogyny and sexism, which makes women advocating for AA appear to be asking for more than a fair go.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I am going to highlight an ethico-epistemic problem that these anti-AA discourses—and especially appeals to merit and choice—create as they are circulated in online comments sections.

How does one make another believe there are structural, institutional, and agential biases affecting a whole class of people when those very same biases can be interpreted as a series of freely made (so just) choices? When people look at Australian society today and ask “Where is the proof that people are being overlooked because of gender? Just because the numbers aren’t even? That’s not proof” (Matteo), one can only respond with the worrisome question: If that is not proof, what is? What can an oppressed group do when its markers of oppression fail to be recognised as proof of oppression? How is one meant to engage in dialogue with others on the matter of women’s liberation under conditions of misrecognition, seeing those who are oppressed as already liberated, but simply less meritorious—a belief helped along by dispositions to misogyny and sexism?

One encouraging suggestion is reframing AA as AA for Men (Murray 2014). Tacitly, it is taken for granted that AA = women’s “special” treatment. Thus, shifting of focus onto men and away from women would surely lessen the degree of sexism and misogyny women face in public life. But this analysis reveals that it is what underscores opposition to AA—rather than AA itself—which is the problem. Fighting explicit sexism and misogyny will never be sufficient. Women’s liberation in western liberal democracies like Australia requires a repackaging of its core values. Most fundamentally, it is necessary to actively avoid individualism because this is what obscures group-based injustices. These data reveal that principled resistance to AA is founded on an inability to see numerical inequality for what it is—evidence of oppression.

However, this study is limited in the following ways. First, The Australian represents a conservative worldview. We cannot assume that these comments are representative of Australians’ general attitudes towards AA. Future research should compare with left-leaning or centrist news commentary to determine degrees of hostility to AA. Second, due to the scope of the wider project, this dataset does not include comments supportive of AA. Future research could look at AA dialogue to develop a sense of what the “general public”, and not just what a hostile and individualistic public, thinks about AA. Finally, the study is limited by the overall approach to data collection, which was manual. The use of other methods for collecting data may yield a richer pool of commentary to analyse.

Disclosure statement

Ethics approved by the University of Tasmania’s Human Research Ethics Committee, ref: H0018328.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the Australian Research Council, grant number: DE190100719

Notes on contributors

Louise Richardson-Self

Louise Richardson-Self is a social feminist philosopher and Lecturer at the University of Tasmania. She is the author of Hate Speech Against Women Online: Concepts and Countermeasures (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2021). E-mail: [email protected]

Notes

1. This article only analyses Australia; however, principled resistance to AA exists in other contexts (Dahlerup 2018, 70).

2. The LPA could be described sympathetic to neoliberalist logic, but I follow Barclay's (2013, 164) approach, examining the widely endorsed core commitments shared by liberals of different stripes.

3. Note that individual comments sometimes displayed more than one theme.

4. Karissa’s comment is close to this rationale; however, she does not seem to be concerned with women’s rights in particular, just “bigger issues”.

5. Beauregard and Sheppard (2021) have also found that “benevolent sexism”, or “covert misogyny” in Manne’s terms, sometimes leads to support of AA.

6. “LNP” stands for the Liberal National Party (the Coalition). Hume, however, is a member of the LPA.