“Eight Tory leadership candidates declare themselves feminists”: feminism and political campaigns

ABSTRACT

This study examines the co-optation of feminism by politicians. Adopting a case study approach, we explore three contemporary leaders who declared themselves feminists during political campaigns: Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Mayor of London Sadiq Khan, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. We analyse how these politicians communicated a feminist identity during and after electoral campaigns. Drawing from a thematic analysis of 503 international mainstream news articles, Instagram feeds, and selected Tweets we demonstrate how all three politicians reduce “feminism” to a neoliberal political theory that is neither radical nor revolutionary, but primarily focused on redistributive inequalities and ideals of getting women at the table. In this regard, we argue that the ambition to address “gender pay gaps” or achieve “gender-balanced cabinets” is inadequate in the project of gender emancipation. Using the concept of co-optation, we contribute to a critical interrogation of feminism in the mainstream media by providing insight into how self-identified male politicians engage with neoliberal, popular, and mainstream feminist rhetoric and action which provides them with both cultural and political capital. This draws attention to the context of political practice, the factors that shape such politicians’ behaviour in relation to hegemonic, neoliberal feminism, as well as the consequences of their actions on attaining gender justice.

KEYWORDS:

• Feminism
• feminist identity
• political campaign
• news
• Twitter

Introduction

In 2015, while on the campaign trail during the Canadian general election, Liberal leader Justin Trudeau tweeted: “I am a feminist. I’m proud to be a feminist. #UpForDebate” (@JustinTrudeau, September 22 2015). After winning the election the following month, his comments ignited a major media event, and were widely reported in major publications around the world. Two years later, London Mayor Sadiq Khan first declared himself “a proud feminist” on Twitter in 2017 after making gender pay gap closure and tackling sexual assault against women the focus of his 2016 electoral campaign (@SadiqKhan, November 10 2017). Boris Johnson’s first declaration of being a feminist was during his 2019 Conservative party leadership contest. Along with eight of his fellow leadership contenders, Johnson proclaimed his feminist identity after rival Conservative MP Dominic Raab admitted in an interview that he was “probably not a feminist”. Prominent newspapers carried headlines, such as “Eight Tory leadership candidates declare themselves feminists”, “Boris and Hunt: we call ourselves feminists” (Telegraph 2019; Rowena Mason 2019b). Johnson further reinforced his feminist stance while speaking to the Conservative Women’s Organisation on July 12 2019 by declaring, “I call myself a feminist … the reason I am a feminist is because I found in the last 20 years that feminism is the single magic bullet policy that really does address most of the problems of the world” (see, Boris and Hunt: “We call ourselves feminists”, Telegraph 2019).

Beyond Trudeau, Khan, and Johnson, there has been a recent visibility of self-declared feminist world leaders, such as Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand; Theresa May, UK; and Sanna Marin, Finland. According to feminist scholars, the popularity, widespread acceptance, and adoption of a feminist identity by some politicians and celebrities is due to the fact that feminism has lost its critical and radical edge (Sarah Banet-Weiser 2018; Rosalind Gill and Christina Scharff 2011; Catherine Rottenberg 2018). Culturally, scholars and pundits have noted it has become socially attractive, popular, and even “necessary” to engage with feminism (Roxanne Gay 2014), while politically, feminism is considered essential to effective governance (Elisabeth Olivius 2015). In this regard, Kirill Filimonov and Jakob Svensson (2016) state that incorporating feminist ideals such as intersectionality into governance and political campaigning is essential for tackling a broad range of inequalities.

While politicians embracing a feminist identity perhaps signals progressive values, respect for women, or an alignment with the bourgeoining “fourth wave” feminist movement (see Nicola Rivers 2017), this study scrutinises how, and which feminist ideologies are adopted in contemporary political campaigns. In doing so, it provides insight into why aligning oneself with feminism–even feminist lite–provides these male politicians cultural and political capital. Furthermore, the article interrogates the perceived success of feminisms and the adoption of feminist ideas by politicians, noting how as a political ideology, feminism is either largely undefined, or has been flattened to represent mainstream, neoliberal, and reformist ideologies–even by leaders across the political spectrum. Specifically, this article questions the socio-cultural implications of embracing an ill-defined, non-radical feminist identity after a political victory and what this “does” for the feminist movement. We conclude the article by reflecting on how feminism is imbricated within neoliberalism, and how this mainstream feminism is largely incapable of dismantling oppressive systems such as capitalism and the patriarchy.

Feminism, politics, and the news

Since the 1970s, scholars have explored representations of feminism and feminist movements in the mainstream media (see Bernadette Barker-Plummer 2000; Patricia Bradley 2003; Sara De Benedictis, Shani Orgad and Catherine Rottenberg 2019; Jonathan Dean 2010; Barbara Freeman 2001; Jen Goddu 1999; Kaitlynn Mendes 2011, 2015; Monica Morris 1973; Susan Sheridan, Susan Magarey and Sandra Lilburn 2007; Liesbet van Zoonen 1992). This research was deemed important because of the recognition that the news media is a key source of information on social movements (Barker-Plummer 2000; van Zoonen 1992). Because many feminist theories such as radical, Marxist, and Socialist feminism challenge structural forms of oppression around gender, race, class and more (see Alison Harvey 2020), those holding these views have historically been constructed in the media as deviant, shrill, radical, man-hating lesbians (see Bradley 2003; Freeman 2001; Goddu 1999). While other scholars have found supportive media coverage of feminism at times, this was most likely when they weren’t perceived as fundamentally challenging patriarchal ideologies (see Dean 2010; Freeman 2001; Mendes 2011; van Zoonen 1992).

Such literature however seems out-of-date in our current “fourth wave” (Rivers 2017) feminist movement, in which feminism is experiencing both unprecedented “luminosity” (Rosalind Gill 2017) and “popularity” (Banet-Weiser 2018) as never before seen. Yet, we also know that not all types of feminism are luminous, but instead this attention is reserved for what scholars have variously called “mainstream,” (Gill 2017), “neoliberal”, and “lean in” feminism (Hester Eisenstein 2010; Catherine Rottenberg 2014), which privileges autonomy, individual effort, entrepreneurial spirit, and participation in the economy (see Gill and Scharff 2011). Indeed, in our current climate, it is not just well-known women who embrace the feminist identity, but men as well. These range from celebrities such as Benedict Cumberbatch and Joseph Gordon-Levitt, to politicians such as the UK’s former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg and opposition leader Ed Miliband, who posed in ELLE UK magazine’s 2016 “feminism” issue wearing a “This is What a Feminist Looks Like” T-Shirt. In such a context, it has become clear that feminism is not simply “having a moment” (Gill 2017, 611), but is an identity that women and men are increasingly adopting. In such a context it is pertinent to explore the ways, and which types of feminism are evoked in political campaigns.

The flattening and co-optation of feminism in mainstream politics

Feminism has been a major cause of political transformation, especially within the last decade. Feminist actors, discourses, and practices have impacted state policies and political rhetoric (Janet Halley 2006). This is driven by the idea that feminism provides a comprehensive approach to tackling at the very least inequalities (Heger Katharina and Christian Hoffmann 2019), and at most, structural, and intersectional forms of oppression (Sara Ahmed 2017; bell hooks 1984). Yet, the flattening of differences between feminist political theory and discourse is also a significant issue. In recent years, “feminism” has been accused of being an empty, vaguely defined signifier for women’s progress–a buzzword without further need to define (see Banet-Weiser 2018; Gay 2014; Andi Zeisler 2016). Of course, this is not always the case and at times, feminism has been more fully fleshed out in political arenas. Filimonov and Svensson (2016) reveal that incorporating feminist ideals such as intersectionality into governance and political campaigning is not only possible, but helps tackle a broad range of inequalities.

Also relevant to our article is scholarship interrogating the perceived success of feminisms in mainstream politics and governance. Hester Eisenstein (2005) describes the relationship between feminism and capitalism in the Twenty-First Century as a “dangerous liaison,” suggesting that the ethos of US feminism which asserts that paid work equals liberation for women is used to reinforce capitalism. In this regard, the so-called liberation of women is used as a strategy to delegitimize unwaged labour, eliminate the welfare safety net, and to satisfy the “demand” factor in the preference for female labour in many sectors of the economy (Lourdes Beneria 2007, 33). Nancy Fraser (2009) also points to how second-wave feminism incidentally contributed to neoliberalism by “resignifying” the critiques levelled against capitalism. She argues that capitalism periodically reinvents itself by “recuperating strands of critique directed against it, such as within the realms of economism, androcentrism, etatism and Westphalianism” (99). Hence, under “the label of ‘selective enlistment’, political, cultural, and economic strands of feminist critique got disentangled and then selectively enlisted for the neoliberal cause” (Fraser 2009, 99). In the same vein, Angela McRobbie (2009, 1) argues that terms such as “choice” and “empowerment” are transformed into much more “individualistic discourse” substituted for feminism and used to serve anti-feminist agenda. The “individualisation of subjects” forms part of the neoliberal discourse and an anti-feminist strategy which promotes “a new sense of isolation as well as forms of vulnerability among women” (McRobbie 2009, 159). This individualistic and inherently neoliberal and postfeminist language of choice and empowerment has become popuarlized, adopted by individuals, corporations (Elisabeth Prügl 2015), and as we will go on to show, male politicians.

As McRobbie and others above have shown, these discourses are also linked to the concept of co-optation, which is defined as the process or state of being absorbed into the policy structures that one has been fighting against (Myra Marx Ferre and Beth Hess 2000). It reflects “an outcome where a patriarchal institution is applauded for a specific gender reform (for example, being gender/women-friendly or sensitive) without altering its actions in any way” (Sara de Jong and Susanne Kimm 2017; Alexa Trumpy 2008, 488). In this regard, such a hegemonic institution retains control and can deny its affiliation with such gender reform or movement when it is convenient or deemed irrelevant to the political agenda (Trumpy 2008).

Although scholars and feminist activists have been interested in the co-optation of feminism by mainstream media and popular culture (see Banet-Weiser 2018; Rottenberg 2014; Zeisler 2016), the extent to which feminist co-optation and the flattening of differences is found amongst politicians is a largely understudied phenomenon. As one exception, Sylvia Bashevkin (2009) tracks the visibility of feminism in Canadian politics, showing that female politicians willingness to voice feminist rhetoric is closely linked to changing factors of feminist and anti-feminist movements as well as parliamentary factors that include changing ideology and the competitive status of their parties. David Swift (2019) particularly draws attention to conservative self-identified female politicians in the UK, such as Theresa May, Amber Rudd, and Nadine Dorries, concluding that conservative feminist politicians construct their personal identity through a flat, “abstract version” of feminism, which helps them to distance themselves from feminism as well as to adopt it when “convenient” or “necessary”. Overall, the study substantiates the conception of conservative governments as more of feminism’s “strategic partners” than “allies” (Elizabeth Evans 2016, 631).

Recent studies also capture the social context in which feminism and political practice intersect by examining social media use among politicians for feminism-related discussions. Cristina Fernandez-Rovira and Isabel Villegas-Simon (2019) compare feminism-related tweets between male and female politicians in Spain. Their findings show that ideological beliefs, more than gender, determine Twitter behaviour regarding feminism. This challenges the conception that women in politics are inclined to support feminism and highlights the need to explore how male politicians engage with feminist rhetoric and action. As such, our study contributes to this research gap by providing rare insight–by not only analysing the political practice of male politicians in relation to feminism, but focusing on those who self-identify as feminists and how this translates to policy, rhetoric, and action. This study therefore contributes to a critical interrogation of feminist successes in the mainstream, including politics. In this regard, we critically explore the feminist ideologies that male politicians align with, how they are (narrowly) defined, and how we see an alignment of neoliberal feminist discourses across political divides.

Methodology

This study draws from mainstream news articles on the following three sitting politicians who all identify as feminist: Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, London Mayor Sadiq Khan, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. We selected these three politicians for a variety of reasons. First, they represent different political parties (Liberal, Labour, and Conservative) and enabled us to say something about political divisions/alignment around gender. Second, public announcements of their feminist stances attracted widespread media attention, meaning we had enough data to analyse. Third, these politicians are based in national and cultural contexts that we are familiar with and have insider knowledge of, and thus better position us to provide culturally grounded analysis.

The articles were curated from Nexis database and Google news using politicians’ names as keywords alongside terms, such as “feminism”, “feminist” and “gender equality”. The data was cleaned of repeats and articles that did not directly reflect the use of feminism or feminist identity by politicians in political practice, resulting in a final sample of 503 articles. The selected articles include news stories and opinion articles which form part of the cultural building blocks around feminism and political practice. We also examined tweets and Instagram posts about feminism made by the candidates–both during and after their campaign. Tweets were identified through mainstream media reports. In such cases, we searched for the original tweet via Twitter and conducted a thematic analysis of the tweet itself. This was supported by an examination of all Instagram posts made by each candidate since the start of their respective election.

The bulk of our analysis focused on news articles from the start of the three politicians’ campaigns, continuing for six months after their victory.¹ In selecting our case studies, although there were several high profile, unsuccessful female candidates we could have selected, such as Hillary Clinton (candidate in the 2016 US Presidential Election) or Jo Swinson (Liberal Democratic Party leader in the 2019 UK General Election), we deliberately focused on men. This was largely due to the increased visibility in recent years on male feminists (such as those featured in ELLE magazine’s “feminism” issue) and longstanding debates around if men can be feminists (see Tom Digby 1998; Aaronette White 2008). As such, we were interested in exploring the feminist ideologies that male leaders adopted, as well as subsequent challenges to these identities. In opting for a case study design (Joe Feagin, Anthony Orum and Gideon Sjoberg 1991), we recognize other feminist male leaders we could have selected (such as former Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven), as well as many other successful (Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin) or unsuccessful feminist female candidates (Sarah Palin, US) which are ripe for exploring. As such, we make no claims the findings are representative of all politicians, but argue this study provides a baseline for future research.

We chose thematic analysis as an analytical framework based on its reliability for analysing and summarising the key features of text while offering a thick description of the phenomenon under study (Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke 2006). Approaching thematic analysis from a constructionist perspective helped us to build themes in accordance with how political candidates build feminist identities using the media, while applying an interpretive perspective enabled us to interrogate media representations, as well as politicians’ attitudes and behaviours against wider political and social factors. We begin with our finding that all three politicians adopted neoliberal feminist identities over other feminist political philosophies.

Neoliberal feminism

Through analysing mainstream and social media accounts by Justin Trudeau, Sadiq Khan, and Boris Johnson in the run up and aftermath of political campaigns, the most significant finding we identified was that despite coming from differing political parties, all three adopted what can be defined as mainstream, neoliberal feminist identities. This includes a feminism defined by individualism, choice, and agency; the “muting” of vocabularies to address structural solutions to gender inequality (see Rosalind Gill 2016, 613; Gill and Scharff 2011; McRobbie 2009); and an identity which is packaged and styled as positive and desirable, but which lacks real substance or explanation (see Gill 2016, 619). In essence, it has become a flattened “cheer word”, which, while holding “positive value … does not necessarily pose any kind of challenge to existing social relations” (Gill 2016, 619). The adoption of a neoliberal feminist position we show, not only aligns with the growth of “popular feminism” (Banet-Weiser 2018), and affords the candidates cultural and political capital, but also indicates that when it comes to issues of gender, political divides may not run as deep as previously thought.

We demonstrate the presence of neoliberal feminism first through an analysis of mainstream and social media coverage of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

Justin Trudeau

Justin Trudeau (alongside his Liberal Democrat rival Tom Mulcair) announced his stance as feminist mid-way through the 2015 Federal Election campaign at an “Up for Debate” event on women’s issues–an event that then sitting Prime Minister, Steven Harper, declined to attend. Speaking at the event, Trudeau stated: “My mom raised me to be a feminist. My father … raised me to respect and defend everyone’s rights, and I am deeply grounded in my own identity in that, and I am proud to say that I am a feminist” (Heather Saul 2015). Here, Trudeau emphasises individual rights, and choices, which neatly aligns with neoliberal values.

As a leader known for his strategic use of social media (Mireille Lalancette and Vincent Raynauld 2019), Trudeau followed up the next day with a tweet: “I am a feminist. I’m proud to be a feminist. #UpForDebate” (@JustinTrudeau, September 22, 2015). Although he aligns himself as a feminist, an identity which he sees as holding positive value, it is an empty signifier and sheds no further light on what this means vis-a-vis broader issues of gender oppression and inequality. That Trudeau first declared himself a feminist at an event coordinated by women’s organisations, most of which are feminist in orientation, is likely a strategic move to win their support and ultimately, their member’s votes. Such positioning is no surprise given Trudeau’s 2015 campaign largely focused on issues of multiculturalism and acceptance of diversity (Asa Lotfi 2019), which are rooted in liberal ideology (Will Kymlicka 1996).

Yet, while Trudeau identified as a feminist during his campaign, this fact only became a newsworthy event after his 2015 electoral win, with few mainstream articles interrogating what it might mean to be a feminist prime minister. Only 5 articles (less than 1%) mentioned his feminist position during the campaign itself. The remaining 120 news articles (99%) were published after his victory, with headlines such as: “25 reasons why we love new Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau; He’s a dope-toking, kilt-wearing, boxing feminist” (Sussanah Butter 2015), and “Canada’s blast of fresh air” (The Press 2015). Indeed, Trudeau became more linked with (neoliberal) feminism shortly after taking office, when he announced Canada’s first gender balanced cabinet, sparking headlines such as: “Trudeau gives Canada first cabinet with equal number of men and women” (Jessica Murphy 2015). As one article noted, the move was a “symbolic gesture” and was Trudeau’s way of winking to feminists as if to say, “I’m on your side” (Robyn Urback 2016). Amongst these articles however, the discussion of Trudeau’s feminism was superficial, with little elaboration on what feminism means, other than balancing gender at the federal level, and adding more women on banknotes (Urback 2016). In speaking about a singular feminism movement, these articles erase significant ideological differences amongst feminists, and thus flattens the potential to probe deeper into alternative feminist political ideologies.

From a critical perspective, while having equal gender representation in cabinet is of course important, it does not fundamentally challenge structural gendered inequalities. As one National Post journalist noted in a rare critique, these symbolic gestures are emblematic of an “‘easy feminism’ that looks good on a partisan checklist, but doesn’t actually do a whole lot to improve the lives of women” (Urback 2016, A17).

Sadiq Khan

While running in the 2016 London Mayoral contest, Labour candidate Sadiq Khan, proudly, and regularly identified as a feminist in interviews, speeches, and public appearances, including annual International Women’s Day events, with slogans and catchphrases about how he put “gender equality at the heart of his campaign” (Rebecca Gillie 2016). While his feminist stance was not as newsworthy as Trudeau’s 2019 Federal campaign, it nonetheless generated 43 news items, almost exclusively in the UK, with headlines such as “Make me mayor and I’ll close gender pay gap, says Sadiq Khan” (Rowena Mason 2016). However, just like Trudeau, Khan critiques existing inequalities and pushes for capitalist development while ignoring the ways these inequalities stem from a global capitalism that oppresses women differently based on axes of power such as ethnicity, religion, ability, class, or sexuality. Such “media friendly” (Zeisler 2016) feminist stances reflect neoliberal feminism, centred on market calculus rather than social justice. Furthermore, by acknowledging the gender pay gap as a continued sign of inequality, Khan ultimately directs his address to middle-class women, effectively erasing the vast majority of women from view.

Like Justin Trudeau, who often credits his family, particularly his mom, for raising him to be a feminist (Saul 2015), Khan regularly drew on his position as a father, using his two daughters to explain why he identified as a “feminist dad” (Sarah Sands and Joe Murphy 2016). In this way, he provides personalized justification for his feminist beliefs, connecting the dots between sexism and patriarchy, and the barriers he wants to remove for his daughters. For example, he spoke “indignantly” about a female journalist who was called a “totty” by an MP, noting: “It beggars belief. One of my daughters is thinking about becoming a journalist. When you have daughters, it matters even more. Why should they be limited in anything because they are women?” (Sands and Murphy 2016). In this way, Khan purports a neoliberal sensibility by individualising the need for feminism through the example of his daughters. Of course, neoliberalism is unlikely the only reason politicians link their feminist views to a person, including female relatives–such use of personal stories is also an oft-used strategy employed by politicians to evoke empathy, stress relatable values and to call for urgent political action (Myra MacDonald 2000; Pablo Vazquez 2016). In Khan’s case however, it is also representative of what Rivers (2017) calls “feminist lite” which emphasized “individual experiences and women’s ‘potential,’ rather than an analysis of what may limit or restrict such potential” (62).

The vast majority of all 43 news articles included a description of Khan as a “feminist” or a “proud feminist”–terms which were evoked with positive connotations. Like Trudeau, Khan uses the feminist identity to mark himself as “different” to his main political rivals. In Khan’s case, it was to mark himself different to main rival Zac Goldsmith, who said “he would never describe himself as a feminist” (@Sadiq Khan, April 21 2016). Indeed, Khan regularly referred to the fact he was “the only one of the two leading candidates who’s a proud feminist” (Peter Walker 2016). Although Khan did not have an Instagram account at the time of his 2016 election, (he started it a year later), it is filled with posts indicating his commitment to gender equality, eliminating the gender pay gap, and support for various feminist issues (tackling period poverty, LGBTQ+ rights, and more). While these are important issues, the solutions proposed were inherently neoliberal–and often include market or legislative solutions to structural problems (e.g., elimination of tax for menstrual products). In this sense, although still neoliberal in nature, Khan’s social media account showed potential as a space to flesh out in more detail what it might mean to be a feminist, and even if only done superficially, how it could intersect with other forms of structural oppression (e.g., homophobia or capitalism).

Boris Johnson

The technique of claiming a feminist identity as an advantageous way to secure votes and contrast oneself to political rivals was also one adopted by Boris Johnson in his 2019 Conservative party leadership contest. Johnson, along with eight of his fellow leadership contenders were quick to proclaim their feminist identities after rival Conservative MP Dominic Raab admitted in an interview that he was “probably not a feminist” (Mason 2019b). Raab’s comments came as no surprise to anyone who remembered his previous statement that “feminists are some of the most obnoxious bigots” and that “men are getting a raw deal” (Rowena Mason 2019a). Over the coming days, Johnson, along with his political rivals embraced the term, in what some critics derisively labelled “virtue signalling” (James Bartholomew 2015). The virtue signalling in this case of identifying as a feminist may have been more salient in the British context in this time, as Johnson and other candidates looked to take over from self-identified feminist Prime Minister, Theresa May.

Unlike the other candidates, Johnson did not take to social media to further elaborate what it meant to be a feminist, nor was it a major focus of news coverage during the snap general election which took place in December 2019. Instead, a review of his Twitter and Instagram accounts, reveals only a handful of equality focused posts, relating to events such as International Women’s Day, or celebrity led campaigns to improve the education of girls around the world. In fact, out of the 97 articles we collected during the 2019 General Election campaign, almost none mentioned feminism in relation to Johnson. Instead, the majority associated the term with others, including his political rival, Liberal Democrat leader Jo Swinson. It should however be noted that in many articles, the feminist label was not always considered positive. For example one article titled: “Jo Swinson’s disingenuous cries of ‘sexism’ are setting back the cause of feminism” (Emma Revell 2019) critiqued Swinson for claiming she was excluded from the political debate between the leaders of the two largest parties–Labour and Conservative–because of sexism. Noting that the UK had a female Prime Minister not 100 days before, the columnist chided Swinson for playing “the sexist card when things don’t go our way” (Revell 2019). While Johnson, unlike Khan and Trudeau did not take to social media to proclaim his feminist identity, his colleagues and supporters did, with many sharing supportive news articles via Twitter, such as “Why am I backing Boris? Because he’s a real feminist” (Nimco Ali 2019).

In addition, while Trudeau and Khan personalize the justification of their feminist beliefs, Johnson hinges on the idea of feminism as “a single magic bullet policy” that addresses most of the world’s problems. This reflects a neoliberal agenda of gender mainstreaming used to advance political goals and enhance market value rather than “ruffle feathers”, “provoke hostilities” or effect structural change (Andrea Cornwall, Jasmine Gideon and Kalpana Wilson 2008; Rottenberg 2018). Overall, while the strategies used to justify feminist beliefs might slightly differ among politicians, Johnson, Trudeau, and Khan demonstrate that it does not matter where a politician is positioned on the political spectrum—gendered political ideologies, goals and ambitions remain largely similar–suggesting that when it comes to gender inequalities, political divisions may not run that deep. For example, when it comes to feminist ambitions—whether conservative (Boris) or progressive (Trudeau and Khan)—are driven by the market rationality of neoliberalism which validates the economic context. In this regard, the inclusion of women signals feminism—though this inclusion isn’t committed to interrogating sexist and racist structural ground (Sarah Banet-Weiser, Rosalind Gill and Catherine Rottenberg 2019). As such, our research supports the argument that neoliberalism blurs differences in political agendas and strategies between progressive and conservative camps.

As discussed in the next section, employed by Trudeau, Khan, and Johnson, these ideologies, tactics, and ambitions reflect a neoliberal politics of “selective enlistment” where creating gendered visibility or “balance” is used/positioned as the qualification for adopting a feminist identity while very little attention is paid to areas concerning the cultural devaluation of gendered identities such as tackling sexism or misogyny.

Political practice and neoliberal feminism

The relationship between feminism and political practice today highlights a hierarchization of redistribution over cultural politics of inequality. Political practice, and indeed neoliberalism thrive on the metrification of inequality and “visibility of change” which seems to be “better” represented using economic forms of marginalisation. This trivialises the redistribution of inequality which should be based on concrete change that simultaneously addresses cultural structures of inequality. Although Trudeau and Khan have a more extensive record of feminist engagement than Johnson, all three politicians’ claims of feminism closely align with neoliberal feminism. Their political actions reflect the individualisation of inequality discourse where they primarily focus on specific dimensions of inequality, which can be classified as redistributive. For instance, by focusing predominantly on issues such as “gender pay gap”, “political misrepresentation” and “girls” education’, the three political candidates limit their focus on the recognition of gender identity, which is a crucial catalyst for concrete socio-political change.

While Trudeau, Khan, and Johnsons’ gender reforms focus less on the underlying cultural inequalities and structures that reinforce economic and political marginalisation, they are heralded as “proud”, “real”, and “true” feminists by the public and mainstream media which ultimately flattens significant differences in feminist political thought and activism. However, their focus on redistributive inequalities is strategic, reflecting a politics of visibility centred on the equality of representation (or identities) as tangible evidence of success. This is evident in Trudeau’s ambition to achieve a gender-balanced cabinet, Khan’s aspiration to tackle the gender pay gap, and Johnson’s so-called record of supporting girls to go to school as well as improving the number of women in his cabinet. In this regard, the visibility of identities and equality of (gendered) representation becomes an end rather than a process of structural socio-political change (Sarah Banet-Weiser 2015). This results in a hegemonic neoliberal individualism that prizes equal visibility in the political space as the apotheosis of empowerment (Sarah Banet-Weiser and Laura Portwood-Stacer 2017). As noted by Joan Scott 1991, 25), including women in governance does not address the framework of (historically contingent) dominant patterns of sexuality and the ideology that supports them.

Khan also adopts the term “gender equality”, which tends to be substituted or used interchangeably for feminism within his campaign. His equality campaign #BehindEveryCity draws on the feminist slogan in the 60s and 70s “behind every great man stands a great woman”, arguing that women don’t stand behind great men, but instead power great cities. Yet his campaign fails to recognise the role of unwaged labour (mostly carried out by women) in the home as the source of the surplus value that powers such great cities and sustains capitalism. Rather, it focuses on the visibility and involvement of women across various sectors of the economy. Fraser (2009, 111) argues that this so-called strategy of empowerment is often “harnessed to the engine of capitalist accumulation, intensifying the system’s valorisation of waged work” and delegitimising unwaged labour. Khan’s use of “gender equality” also draws attention to its susceptibility for co-optation due to “suggesting some form of openness of feminisms” (Berit von der Lippe and Tarja Väyrynen 2011, 20). In this regard, gender equality tends to be conceived as less radical, contentious, and more acceptable in comparison to the term “feminism”.

Media representation of politicians’ feminist identity

While the mainstream media rarely interrogated the substance or version of feminism adopted by politicians, some did deploy feminism as a critical lens, highlighting inconsistencies, changes, and shifts in politicians’ discourses and practices. However, as we will show, at times these articles simply continued to flatten differences in feminist political discourse. For example, several journalists used a feminist lens to evaluate the “authenticity” and track record of candidates, to help the public make voting decisions. Yet here, we noted that the media often adopted binary superficial distinctions of feminisms–e.g., “real” versus “fake”, rather than critical versions such as Marxist, socialist, popular, neoliberal, intersectional, radical, and so on. As such, in many ways, the media seems to echo/amplify rather than challenge/interrogate politicians’ feminist claims, providing limited room for socio-political change.

It is also significant the way feminism (dis)appears in varying political elections—even for the same candidate. For example, whether candidates identified as a feminist was a major news story in the UK during the 2019 Conservative Party Leadership contest, it was almost completely forgotten during the General Election a few months later, in which Boris Johnson’s identity seemed irrelevant, as he prioritized his commitment to “getting Brexit done.” Although worthy of a separate piece of research, where Johnson seemed to avoid discussing identity politics during this campaign, his rival Jo Swinson continued to stress the importance of her feminist identity and not only lost the election, but her seat as MP.

During his 2019 campaign for re-election, a significant number of articles questioned Trudeau’s feminist track record. Many of the 138 news articles were no longer willing to simply accept Trudeau’s superficial feminist identity, demanding accountability, with headlines such as: “Women aren’t buying Trudeau’s feminist act” (Brian Lilley 2019a). Indeed, in the 2019 campaign, scepticisms over Trudeau’s feminist record became a major news story. As such, we can see that the media was focused on Trudeau defending himself as a true feminist, including his wife Sophie, evident in articles such as: “‘I kind of laugh it off’: Sophie Grégoire Trudeau says PM is not a ‘fake feminist’” (Kelvin Gawley 2019). By 2019, The assumption in public discourse is, not only therefore that feminism is singular, but is something that can be conceived of as either authentic or fake. Yet, it is also within this space that other, nuanced feminist ideologies were able to evolve.

While recognising important moves such as appointing women to half of his cabinet, introducing “feminist” budgets which mandate gender-based analysis for all budgetary measures, publishing Canada’s first Gender Statement, creating a Department for Women and Gender Equality, and putting the first Canadian woman on new banknotes, Trudeau’s first term as Prime Minister was also marked by ejecting two of his most prominent female cabinet ministers from the Liberal party after they protested his office’s interference in a corruption investigation; elbowing a female opposition MP in Parliament; allegations that he groped a reporter at a beer festival in 2000; and although not directly linked to feminism, the “brownface” scandal in which photos emerged of Trudeau’s face painted brown at two separate events, thus raising broader questions about his truly “progressive” values. As such, while only five news articles focused on Trudeau’s feminist position during the 2015 Federal Election, 138 did so for the 2019 elections, signalling the ways he was being held to account over what being a feminist leader actually means.

The dynamics of adopting and discarding feminist rhetoric and practice amongst politicians often reflects the changing ideology of feminist and anti-feminist movements, parliamentary factors, and the competitive status of political parties (Bashevkin 2009; Swift 2019). Although previous studies have highlighted that feminist rhetoric and practice is often deployed by political candidates to boost competitive status in circumstances of political disadvantage, this study has shown that such efforts are further intensified by adopting a neoliberal feminist identity. This strategy is particularly useful for male politicians in a global political landscape where feminism is still largely attributed to women.

Conclusion

Banet-Weiser (2018, 8) recently argued: “[t]he question du jour for female (and some male) celebrities has become, ‘Are you a feminist?’” We would conclude this paper by extending this sentiment to include politicians. As feminism continues to experience an unprecedented “luminosity” (Gill 2017) in many nations around the world, we are increasingly likely to see neoliberal feminism play a major role in political campaigns. Adopting a case study approach, we explore three contemporary leaders who declared themselves feminists during political campaigns: Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (Liberal), Mayor of London Sadiq Khan (Labour), and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Conservative). By exploring mainstream news coverage and social media accounts of these self-identified feminist politicians who serve at the municipal and national/federal levels, this study provides a baseline snapshot of how feminism has been conceptualized, and ultimately co-opted and flattened by politicians. We show that despite coming from differing political camps, these three politicians invoked a similarly neoliberal feminism. Drawing from a thematic analysis of 503 international mainstream news articles, Instagram feeds, and selected Tweets we demonstrate how politicians reflect neoliberal feminism that is neither radical nor revolutionary, but primarily focused on redistributive inequalities and ideals of getting women at the table. In this regard, we argue that while a neoliberal feminism, whose ambition to address “gender pay gaps” or achieve “gender-balanced cabinets” may be a successful political tactic to signify respect for women, it works in favour of the neoliberal agenda and is ultimately inadequate in the project of gender emancipation, failing to tackle the systemic/cultural devaluation of gender identity, capitalist dispossession, unwaged labour, and persistent violence against women (see Silvia Federici 2018; Fraser 2009; Alison Phipps 2020).

By using the concept of co-optation, we have been able to contribute to a critical interrogation of feminist successes in the mainstream by providing rare insight into how self-identified male politicians engage with neoliberal, popular, and mainstream feminist rhetoric and action. Furthermore, we show how politicians seem to get away with acquiring cultural and political capitals of acceptance, trust, and influence through adopting a (neoliberal) feminist label. This draws attention to the context of political practice, the factors that shape such politicians’ behaviour in relation to hegemonic, neoliberal feminism, as well as the consequences of their actions on the attainment of gender justice. What our research demonstrates, is that despite the plethora of feminist ideologies and political thought (see Valerie Bryson 2003), and the fact our politicians came from three different political parties, they articulated strikingly similar neoliberal feminist positions. That is, they promote a feminism defined by a predominant focus on economic, educational, and political reform, rather than identity politics or cultural-valuation structures. In doing so they and subsequent media coverage, also tended flatten out significant differences in the root cause and solutions to sexist oppression. We argue that this flattening of feminism into a few digestible soundbites or liberal reforms appears to be an “easy win” for politicians, who our analysis shows are rarely or substantively held to account for the ways their actions or policies remove structural and intersectional barriers oppressing women.

Limited by our case study design, we therefore conclude this article with two recommendations. First, we suggest that more scholarly attention should be paid to how politicians around the world, from different political parties articulate or conceptualize their feminist identities. And second, we equally need to evaluate the extent to which their actions and policies dismantle or uphold patriarchal power.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Diretnan Dikwal-Bot

Diretnan Dikwal-Bot is a Research Fellow at De Montfort University, UK. She is a qualitative researcher with a wide range of experience working with vulnerable groups both in the UK and Africa. Her research has contributed novel insights on the role of social policy in reinforcing gender marginalisation in West Africa and her interests and expertise focus broadly on the analysis of media use, social inequality and cultural change with a particular interest in family, gender, disability and ethnicity. With an undergraduate background in performance arts, she has also designed local school plays aimed at changing perceptions of child marriage practices in Plateau State, Nigeria. Her latest research explores the family, being especially interested in creativity and talent development in children and young adults. Her publications are currently within the fields of media, gender, cultural politics and childhood studies. E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

Kaitlynn Mendes

Kaitlynn Mendes is Associate Professor of Sociology and Canada Research Chair in Inequality and Gender at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. She is a feminist scholar whose work sits at the intersections of media, sociology, education and cultural studies. She has written widely around representations of feminism in the media, and feminists’ use of social media to challenge rape culture and is particularly interested in the everyday experiences of using digital technologies to speak about feminist issues. She has written about the #MeToo movement and other relevant feminist campaigns. More recently, she has been interested in issues of online sexual harassment in school settings, and translating my research findings to impactful resources for schools and young people. She is author or editor of five books including the award winning SlutWalk: Feminism, activism and media (2015), Feminism in the News (2011) and Digital Feminist Activism: Girls and Women Fight Back Against Rape Culture (2019, with Jessica Ringrose and Jessalynn Keller). E-mail: [email protected]

Notes

1. Justin Trudeau was first elected as Canadian Prime Minister in 2015 and was re-elected in September 2019. We included Boris Johnson’s campaign for Conservative Party Leader in the summer of 2019, and the General Election in December 2019. For Sadiq Khan, we focused on his 2016 Mayoral campaign. In total, we collected 263 articles about Trudeau, 97 articles about Johnson and 143 articles about Khan.