The war in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra affair: Missing links?

Abstract

Though they were crucial international events during the 1980s, the final decade of the Cold War, the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra affair are usually considered in isolation from each other. The present article draws together declassified evidence to trace previously ignored connections between them, demonstrating that the secret arms dealings with Iran carried out by the Reagan administration's National Security Council staff included provisions for Tehran to transfer some of the American weapons it received to pro-Iranian mujaheddin in Afghanistan, and that covert cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan constituted an important dimension of the clandestine dialogue carried on by US and Iranian representatives.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was presented to the conference, ‘Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, on 29–30 April 2002, organized by the Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. For their advice and assistance related to this paper the author thanks Thomas S. Blanton and Malcolm Byrne of the National Security Archive, Christian Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu of the Cold War International History Project, and former CWIHP director David Wolff.

1. Even liberal Democrats, such as Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas, actively promoted Congressional support for aid to the Afghan resistance, and in October 1984 the Senate passed 97–0 and the House approved by an unopposed voice vote a resolution calling on the Reagan Administration to give the mujaheddin ‘effective material assistance’.

2. Inouye explained the ‘national security’ rationale behind the committee's decisions to limit the investigation's scope and duration in a speech at Tufts University in October 1988. See James G. Hershberg, ‘National Insecurity: How the Red Menace Derailed the Contragate Probe’, The Boston Phoenix, 3–9 Feb. 1989, pp.10, 16.

3. See Walter Pincus, ‘Iran Arms Cash Is Tied to CIA-Run Account Aiding Afghan Rebels’, Washington Post, 3 Dec. 1986, pp.A1, A32; Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p.502.

4. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.219.

5. Oliver L. North with William Novak, Under Fire: An American Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1991; citations from 1992 Harper Paperback edition), p.53.

6. The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board (Bantam/Times Books paperback edn., Feb. 1987), p.19. (Hereafter Tower Commission Report, NYT edition.)

7. One former US official involved in the initiative recalls efforts were made along these lines to ‘play mind games’ with the Iranians, who, for their part, ‘had no illusions about the Soviets’. Howard Teicher, interview with author, Washington, DC, 5 Sept. 2002.

8. See Vasily Mitrokhin, ‘Some KGB Active Measures in South-west Asia in 1980–82 Designed to Distract World Attention from the Activities of the USSR and its Armed Forces in Afghanistan’, paper presented to the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) conference, ‘Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan’, Washington, DC, 29–30 April 2002.

9. There is intriguing fresh evidence that, even as they flirted with the Americans, senior Iranians were also seeking to improve relations with the Soviet bloc, on an ‘anti-imperialist’ basis. See the record of a meeting in East Berlin on 13 October 1986. in the midst of the secret US – Iranian arms contacts – between East German leader Erich Honecker and visiting Iranian President Mir Hossein Moussawi, located by David Wolff in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) archives.

10. Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1993), pp.325–6; Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, pp.219–20; and Steve Coll's articles in The Washington Post, 19 July 1992 (‘Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War’, pp.A1, A24) and 20 July 1992 (‘In CIA's Covert Afghan War, Where to Draw the Line Was Key’, pp.A1, A12).

11. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm, p.328.

12. Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.112–15.

13. Draft NSCC, US Policy Toward Iran, in McFarlane to Secretaries of State and Defense, 6/17/85, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.116–18 (B-8/B-9).

14. See Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair (Washington: Government Printing Office, Nov. 1987), pp.165–6, and Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.118–20.

15. Poindexter testimony, 17 July 1987, 3 pm; I thank Malcolm Byrne for locating this quotation.

16. Regan testimony, 30 July 1987, afternoon session; I thank Malcolm Byrne for locating this quotation, too! Interestingly, Regan did not cite the Afghanistan motive in his testimony to the Tower Commission, his deposition to the Iran-Contra Committees, or in his memoir, Donald T. Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

17. North with Novak, Under Fire, p.53. He noted approvingly that ‘Iran accepted more than two million Afghan refugees, and provided more support for the Afghan rebels than any other country in the region except Pakistan’.

18. Thomas Thornton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Regional Cooperation re Afghanistan’, 24 Sept. 1979, in Conference Reader compiled by Christian F. Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu for the CWIHP conference, ‘Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, 29–30 April 2002; acknowledgement should also be made of Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive) and Todd Rosa (George Washington University), both of whom donated materials from the Carter Library, including this document, for use in the reader.

19. Though much of the record of the setting up of the covert arms network remains classified, for an account of the US – Pakistani dealings concerning Afghanistan see Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

20. Two popular Shiite mujaheddin organizations based in Iran were the Shua-Inghalabi Etafaqh-e-Islami Afghanistan (SIEIA) and Harkat-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA). According to one analyst and veteran of the mujaheddin, ‘SIEIA, led by Sayid Ali Bahishti and ex-military officer Sayid Hassan (Sayid Jagran), dominated central Afghanistan, especially Hazarahjat. HIA, led by Shaikh Mohammed Assef Mohseni, was popular mostly among Shia and some segments of Sunni Muslics all over [Afghanistan]. These two political parties struggled to maintain their political independence from the Iranian government, and this struggle caused their subsequent expulsion from Iran’. Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p.99.

21. Memorandum of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Babrak Karmal, Berlin, 19 May 1982, located and translated by David Wolff in ‘Documents on Afghanistan from DDR Archives, 1979–1989’, prepared for CWIHP conference, ‘Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, Washington, DC, 29–30 April 2002.

22. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan – The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 1992, 2001), pp.110–12.

23. 11/20/86 2000 Historical Chronology, released as exhibit no. 24 for Oliver L. North's testimony (OLN-24) by the Congressional Iran Committees in July 1987 and also available in the National Security Archive microfiche collection, Malcolm Byrne and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), The Iran-Contra Affair: The Making of a Scandal, 1983–1988 (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1990), as document ic03856. The italicized words were deleted from exhibit JMP-76, released by the Congressional Iran-Contra Committees for John M. Poindexter's testimony. The reference to Afghanistan at this meeting also does not appear in numerous other declassified versions of the November chronologies, nor does it appear in the final Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair, released in November 1987.

24. Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.245. The Report also notes that North's desk calendar did indicate that he traveled to London on 5 February and returned from that city on 7 February.

25. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Vol. I: Investigations and Prosecutions (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 4 Aug. 1993), p.19. (Hereafter ICFR with volume and page number.)

26. 11/20/86 2000 Historical Chronology. 077, available in the National Security Archive microfiche collection, The Iran-Contra Affair, document ic03857. The italicized words were sanitized in OLN-24 by the Congressional Iran-Contra Committees.

27. Cave, conversation with author, 29 April 2002, Washington, DC. Twetten recalls that he did not take seriously the Iranians' interest in channelling arms to the Afghan mujaheddin (and that he considered the entire Iran arms trading initiative ‘asinine’). Telephone interview with author, 6 May 2002.

28. North PROF to McFarlane, 2/27/86, 8:54:13, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.250 (TC, B-76/77).

29. DCI, Talking Points, 2/27/86, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.257 (TC, B-80/81).

30. Shultz, SRB, 51-52, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.255 (TC, B-79).

31. Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.260 (TC, B-82).

32. North PROF note to RCM, 3/10/86, 21:10:24, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.259–60 (TC, B-82).

33. Undated Cave memorandum, CIIN0251, available in National Security Archive Iran-Contra microfiche collection, document ic02461. The italicized words were sanitized in an attached version of the document and replaced by.[other operations]. in the Iran-Contra Committees Final Report, p.223.

34. North PROF note to RCM, 3/26/86, 09:19:12, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.265–6.

35. Unsigned, undated memorandum, ‘Release of American Hostages in Beirut’, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.271–2 (TC, B-88/89); North's identity as the author is confirmed in the Iran-Contra Committees Final Report, pp.225, 235 n102. The italicized portion was sanitized in later releases, such as Congressional Iran-Contra Committees exhibit OLN-1, reproduced in Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrnes (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: New Press, 1993), pp.319–23.

36. ‘Per request of JMP [Poindexter] have prepared a paper for our boss which lays out arrangements’: North PROF note to McFarlane, 4/7/86, 23:18:58, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.266. For an excellent consideration of evidence on Reagan's personal knowledge of both the Iran and Contra sides of the scandal, see Malcolm Byrne, ‘Ronald Reagan's Role in the Iran-Contra Affairs’, paper presented at the ‘Conference on the Reagan Presidency’, Interdisciplinary Humanities Center, University of California, Santa Barbara, 27–30 March 2002.

37. While letting him in on the secret contacts with Tehran in late February or early March 1986, North told Teicher that ‘the Iranians had expressed grave concern about the Soviet threat, particularly in western Afghanistan, and what the United States could do about it’. Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm, p.362. Teicher later recalled that from his perspective the aim of opening a new arms channel to the mujaheddin via Iran was a ‘very important’, if not decisive, aspect of the Iran initiative, since ‘access to Afghanistan through Iran would reduce the complexity of the support network for the muj that flowed solely through Islamabad’, which also complicated relations on the subcontinent and with China. Author's interview with Teicher, Washington, DC, 5 Sept. 2002.

38. ‘Terms of Reference U.S. – Iran Dialogue’, 4 April 1986, North trial, defendant's exhibit no. 93, copy in Iran-Contra collection, National Security Archive; italicized portions deleted in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.275–6 (TC B-90), as well as in exhibits released by the Congressional Iran-Contra Committees. My thanks to Mircea Munteanu for locating the trial version of this document and to Malcolm Byrne for identifying its provenance.

39. North PROF note to Poindexter, ?5/5/86, 22:34:44, in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.283 (TC, B-94).

40. For the memoranda of conversations, see Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.300–330.

41. This official is identified in government reports as a ‘Senior Foreign Ministry official’ or ‘foreign affairs adviser’ but identified as Najafabadi in Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), pp.59–65.

42. Memorandum of Conversation, 26 May 1986, 9:30 p.m., Tehran, Independence Hotel, Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.311–12 (B-108).

43. Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, p.321.

44. Ibid., p.333 (B-118-119).

45. Tab II to North to Poindexter, 7/17/86, in Tower Commission Report, p.B-137.

46. Roy Furmark interview, quoted in Tower Commission Report, p.B-147, fn 85.

47. Memorandum of Conversation, 19–20 Sept. 1986, Congressional Iran-Contra Exhibit OLN-201, available in the National Security Archive Iran-Contra microfiche collection (ic03445).

48. Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, pp.413–14.

49. ‘SUBJECT: Rundown of Visitor's comments on 19/20 Sept 86’, National Security Archive Iran-Contra microfiche collection document ic03444; this paragraph is sanitized in Congressional Iran-Contra Committees exhibit OLN-202, CIIN #171 and omitted from its summary in IC CFR, pp.251–3.

50. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, pp.224–7; Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, pp.174–7.

51. Cave, comments at CWIHP conference, ‘Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, Washington, DC, 29 April 2002. It is impossible to judge the veracity of this Iranian claim. It had been earlier reported that Iran obtained four Stinger launchers and 16 missiles, after Passadars (Iranian Border Scouts) intercepted a shipment intended for mujaheddin use in western Afghanistan, but only in early 1987. See Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, pp.187–8.

52. NSC chronology, ‘US/IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES’, 11/18/86 1930 (Maximum Version), Iran-Contra Committees exhibit 7, available as National Security Archive Iran-Contra microfiche collection doc. No. ic03812; also identical language in 11/20/86 2000 (Historical Chronology), Iran-Contra Committees exhibit OLN-24 and CJC-8; Maximum Version 9: Historical Chronology 13–14, quoted in Tower Commission Report, NYT edition, fn.94, p.5461 (B-167). The Iran-Contra Congressional Committees Final Report, p.259, and Independent Counsel's Final Report, p.23, give the Mainz location and date as 29–30 rather than 26 October. Afghanistan discussed at Frankfurt 6–8 October talks: Cave quoted in Tower Commission Report, p.B-167, though the Afghan aspect is omitted from the IC CFR description, pp.254–5.

53. Cave, comments at CWIHP conference, ‘Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, Washington, DC, 30 April 2002. Cave described a jocular exchange in which he asked Bahramani how many Stingers the Iranians would keep if the Americans gave them some to transfer to the Afghan rebels. ‘Would 10% be OK?’ Bahramani is said to have replied.

54. Cave recalls that with North locked into the Geneva Inter-Continental to avoid reporters, he, Cave, handled most of the negotiations with the Iranians at this meeting. He also notes that a week before the Beirut weekly magazine Ash-Shiraa revealed McFarlane's trip to Tehran, a newspaper in Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (a stronghold of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah) had also published a similar account, but it failed to attract wider notice. Cave, comments at CWIHP conference, ‘Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, Washington, DC, 30 April 2002.

55. According to the Congressional Iran-Contra Committees Final Report (p.263) the Engine proposed a four-part agenda for joint discussions that included the Iran-Iraq War, US delivery of Iranian-purchased military equipment, new weapons, and the release of the Shi ‘ite Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait’ On the other hand, given classification of the subject elsewhere, it is not clear whether references to Afghanistan at that meeting were sanitized.

56. Cave, comments at CWIHP conference, ‘Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989’, Washington, DC, 30 April 2002.

57. Teicher, interview with author, Washington, DC, 5 Sept. 2002.

58. The murky story of potential US – Iranian collaboration against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s recounted here offers an interesting perspective on the equally mystery-enshrouded subject of their cooperation against a common enemy, the Taliban, during the Afghanistan war in autumn 2001.