Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years

Abstract

This article examines the historical origin of the present US strategic-military preoccupation with the Persian Gulf, which is traced back to the last two years of the Carter administration. It presents two main arguments. The first is that, although the shift in strategic concerns and priorities pre-dated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and should be seen primarily as a response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, the invasion was instrumental in paving the way for a new and ambitious US-led security framework for the Persian Gulf region. Secondly, recently available sources are being used to show that the military measures adopted by the Carter administration in order to increase US military capabilities and operational readiness in the Persian Gulf region, were implemented, and deliberately so, at the expense of America's capability to help defend its Northeast Asian and European allies.

Notes

 1. In strict terms, the Persian Gulf region is made up of the eight countries that border the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arabian Emirates. However, it is common to include also the territory today known as Yemen, as it is situated on the Arabian Peninsula, between Saudi Arabia and Oman. Both geographically and politically, the Gulf states are closely connected to some of the neighbouring countries in Central and Southwest Asia as well as with countries in the Horn of Africa. Thus, in the Carter years it was not uncommon to see references such as ‘the Persian Gulf-Middle East region’, ‘the Persian Gulf-Red Sea region’ or even ‘the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region’. When I refer to ‘the Persian Gulf region’ in this paper, it is usually with these broader definitions of the term in mind.

 2. Examples of otherwise excellent early studies are John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp.345–58; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Washington DC: Brookings, 1985); and Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 1993). Other early studies that do not address the shift of priorities, either because of lack of sources or different research focus, are Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987); John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (eds.), Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

 3. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: The Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977𝒶1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). By the time the new strategic priorities were formally adopted, Vance had already left the administration.

 4. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.469.

 5. Books and articles from the last decade that fall into this category are Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996); David Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996); William Stueck, ‘Placing Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy’, in Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham (eds.), The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 1998), chapter 12; Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000); Douglas Brinkley, ‘The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The “Hands on” Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President’, Diplomatic History 20/4 (Fall 1996), pp.505–29; and Thomas M. Nichols, ‘Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 13/2 (June 2002), pp.21–42. My own published doctoral dissertation, Peacekeeper and Troublemaker: The Containment Policy of Jimmy Carter, 1977–1978 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1995) only covers Carter's Persian Gulf policies in the first two years of his presidency.

 6. Instead, Garthoff discusses the important Presidential Directive PD-62 within the somewhat misplaced context of Carter's nuclear strategy, claiming that it represented a final codification of the concept of nuclear war fighting which had been cautiously introduced six months earlier with the issuing of PD-59. To my knowledge, nuclear weapons employment doctrine was not a topic specifically dealt with in PD-62. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p.790.

 7. For a full account of this process, see Olav Njølstad (ed.), The Cold War in the 1980 s: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

 8. Brzezinski to Carter, 2 Dec. 1978, NSC Weekly Report no. 81, Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter JCL), Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 41, ‘Weekly Reports 71–81’ folder.

 9. Toast of the President at a dinner honouring the Shah, 15 Nov. 1977, Public Papers of the Presidents, Carter: 1977. Book Two (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), p.2031.

10. It should be noted, though, that there were times of considerable tension in the US-Iranian relationship also after the CIA-sponsored coup of 1953, especially in the Kennedy years. For a comprehensive account, see Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988). The development of US-Iranian relations during the Carter years is described in Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); Warren Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Administration (New York: Putnam, 1982); and Njølstad, Peacekeeper and Troublemaker, chapter 5.

11. Alexander and Nanes (eds.), The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, p.406.

12. In 1975, Iran's conventional military power was ranked third for the entire Middle East–Persian Gulf region, outclassed only by two Middle East powers, Israel and Egypt. Cline, World Power Assessment 1977, p.127.

13. The closeness of Iranian-Israeli relations in the Shah era was revealed in full by the release of the classified US documents captured by the revolutionary students who occupied the US embassy in Teheran in 1979. See, for instance, the ‘top secret’ minutes from the meetings on 18 July 1978 between the Israeli foreign minister, General Moshe Dayan and General Tufanian, vice-minister of war, Iran, and between the latter and the Israeli minister of defence, General E. Weizmann, both in Iran Revolution Document Set, Accession No. 28683 and 37193, respectively, the National Security Archive.

14. Briefing Memorandum, Lord Winston and Alfred L. Atherton to Kissinger, 26 July 1976, Iran Revolution Document Set, Accession No. 01069, National Security Archive.

15. Am Embassy Tehran to SecState Wash DC, Annual Policy and Resource Assessment for Iran-Part One (Secret), 5 April 1977, Iran Revolution Document Set, Accession No. 01159, National Security Archive.

16. Am Embassy Tehran to SecState Wash DC, Annual Policy and Resource Assessment for Iran-Part One (Secret), 5 April 1977, Iran Revolution Document Set, Accession No. 01159, National Security Archive.

17. Brzezinski to Carter, 2 Dec. 1978, NSC Weekly Report no. 81, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 41, ‘Weekly Reports 71–81’ folder.

18. PRM-10, ‘Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review’, 18 Feb. 1977; PRM-10, Final Report, ‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review’, undated, JCL, Presidential Review Memoranda Collection.

19. As formulated in PRM-10, ‘From their viewpoint the Soviets would be hard-pressed to find a better spot than Iran for a crisis-confrontation with the U.S.’ This part of the original report is still classified but the key sentence quoted here is cited in the declassified ‘Overview’ to ‘Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978’, attached to Brzezinski to Carter, 30 March 1979, NSC Weekly Report no. 92, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 42, ‘Weekly Reports 91–101’ folder.

20. Memo (top secret XGDS), Thomson and Utgoff to Brzezinski, 8 July 1977, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings PRC 22: 7/8/77’ folder.

21. Interview with William Odom, Miller Center Interviews, Carter Presidency Project, vol.15, 18 Feb. 1982, pp.38–9, JCL.

22. For its impact, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983), p.177.

23. Memo (top secret/sensitive – XGDS), Policy Review Committee Meeting: Summary of Conclusions, 8 July 1977, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings PRC 7/8/77’ folder.

24. PD-18, ‘US National Strategy’, 24 Aug. 1977, JCL, Presidential Directives Collection. The document is still heavily sanitized, bit its general content is known from a number of well-informed sources. See, for instance, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp.177–8.

25. PRM-10, Final Report, ‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review’, p.9, undated, JCL, Presidential Review Memoranda Collection.

26. The inter-agency debate on PRM-10 shows that Carter's top advisers were fully aware of this dilemma. Memo (top secret XGDS), Thomson and Utgoff to Brzezinski, 8 July 1977, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings PRC 7/8/77’ folder. See also Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp.177–8.

27. The summary of the Policy Review Committee meeting on 8 July 1977 shows that Carter's top advisers were fully aware of this dilemma. Memo (top secret/sensitive – XGDS), Policy Review Committee Meeting: Summary of Conclusions, 8 July 1977, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings PRC 7/8/77’ folder.

28. Brzezinski to Carter, 28 Dec. 1978, NSC Weekly Report no. 83, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 42, ‘Weekly Reports 82–90’ folder.

29. Memo (top secret/sensitive), Brzezinski to Carter, ‘Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East’, 3 March 1979, JCL, National Security Affairs: Staff Material/Horn, Box 3, ‘4/79’ folder.

30. Memo (top secret/sensitive), Brzezinski to Carter, ‘Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East’, 3 March 1979, JCL, National Security Affairs: Staff Material/Horn, Box 3, ‘4/79’ folder.

31. PRM-42, ‘US strategy for Non-military Competition with the Soviet Union’, 24 Aug. 1978, JCL, Presidential Review Memoranda Collection.

32. PRM-43, ‘United States Global Military Presence’, 24 Aug. 1978, JCL, Presidential Review Memoranda Collection.

33. Memo (top secret/sensitive), Brzezinski to Carter, ‘Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East’, 3 March 1979, JCL, National Security Affairs: Staff Material/Horn, Box 3, ‘4/79’ folder.

34. ‘Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978: Overview’, attachment to Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 30 March 1979, NSC Weekly Report no. 92, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection, Box 42, ‘Weekly Reports 91–101’ folder.

35. Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 22 June 1979, NSC Weekly Report no. 101, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection, Box 42, ‘Weekly Reports 91–101’ folder.

36. Memo (top secret), Tarnoff to Brzezinski, 1 May 1979, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Alpha Channel, Box 20, ‘Alpha Channel 5/79-8/79’ folder. The Alpha Channel was used to distribute particularly sensitive documents among the very top leaders of the NSC, State Department and Department of Defense. Only a total of 12 listed principals and assistants were allowed to open and read Alpha documents without a specially granted permission in each case. Memo, Gates to Hougthon and Hanson, 19 June 1979, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Alpha Channel, Box 20, ‘Alpha Channel 5/79-8/79’ folder.

37. Memo (top secret/eyes only), Brzezinski to Brown, 1 May 1978; Memo (top secret), Brzezinski to Brown, 2 May 1978, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Alpha Channel, Box 20, ‘Alpha Channel 5/79-8/79’ folder.

38. Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report no. 105, 3 Aug. 1979, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL.

39. Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report no. 105, 3 Aug. 1979, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL.

40. Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report no. 101, 22 June 1979, ZB Collection – Weekly Reports, Box 42, JCL.

41. Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, 31 July 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘8/79’ folder, JCL.

42. Brown's memorandum is referred to in Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, 24 Aug. 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘8/79’ folder, JCL.

43. The disagreement between Vance and Newsom is reported in a memo from Henze to Brzezinski, 24 Aug. 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘8/79’ folder, JCL.

44. Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, 2 Aug. 1979; and Memo, Sick to Brzezinski, 3 Aug. 1979, National Security Affairs - Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘8/79’ folder, JCL.

45. Odom's position is reported in Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, 24 Aug. 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘8/79’ folder, JCL.

46. Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, 24 Aug. 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘8/79’ folder, JCL.

47. Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report no. 105, 3 Aug. 1979; NSC Weekly Report no. 108, 6 Sept. 1979, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL.

48. Memo, Ermarth and Welch to Brzezinski, 16 Jan. 1980, ZB Collection – Meetings, Box 32, ‘Meetings SCC 254’ folder, JCL.

49. Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, 12 Oct. 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘9-10/79’ folder; Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report no. 114, 26 Oct. 1979, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL.

50. Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, 16 Oct. 1979; and Memo, Henze to Brzezinski, 24 Oct. 1979, National Security Affairs – Staff Material/Horn, Box 4, ‘9-10/79’ folder, JCL.

51. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p.974.

52. Memo, Ermarth and Welch to Brzezinski, 16 Jan. 1980, ZB Collection – Meetings, Box 32, ‘Meetings SCC 254’ folder, JCL.

53. ‘Instructions for State/Defense Team Visit to Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Saudi Arabia’, draft as of 28 Jan. 1980, ZB Collection – Meetings, ‘Meetings SCC 264a’ folder, JCL.

54. Brzezinski to Carter, 7 March 1980, ‘Afghanistan Follow-up’, attachment to NSC Weekly Report no. 132, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL. See also, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p.446.

55. State of the Union, address by President Carter, 23 Jan. 1980, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1977–1980, p.55.

56. Memo, Brzezinski, 16 May 1980, NSC Weekly Report #141, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Weekly Reports, Box 42, ‘WR: 136–150’ folder.

57. Memo, Aaron to Brzezinski, 27 Dec. 1979, ZB Collection – Meetings, Box 32, ‘Meetings SCC 254’ folder, JCL.

58. Memo, Odom to Brzezinski, 7 Jan. 1980, ZB Collection – Meetings, Box 32, ‘Meetings SCC 254’ folder, JCL.

59. Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1980, ZB Collection – Meetings, Box 32, ‘Meetings SCC 254’ folder, JCL.

60. Memo, Brzezinski to Brown, 25 Jan. 1980, ZB Collection – Meetings, Box 32, ‘Meetings SCC 254’ folder, JCL.

61. The RDJTF was given complete planning purview for the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, and the RDJTF Commander, Lieutenant-General P.X. Kelley, would become Commander-in-Chief for the region in times of contingencies and war. Brzezinski to Carter, 7 March 1980, ‘Afghanistan Follow-up’, attachment to NSC Weekly Report no. 132,, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL.

62. Denend to Brzezinski. Accompanying note to Brigadier General Smith to Tarnoff and Denend, 11 Feb. 1980, Brzezinski Collection, Box 34, ‘Meetings VBB 1-2/80’ folder, JCL.

63. Memo, Brzezinski to Aaron and Denend, 14 Feb. 1980, ZB Collection, Box 34, ‘Meetings VBB 1-2/80’ folder, JCL.

64. Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report no. 129, 15 Feb. 1980, ZB Collection – Weekly Report, Box 42, JCL.

65. Memo, Odom to Brzezinski, 28 Feb. 1980, ZB Collection, Box 34, ‘Meetings VBB 1-2/80’ folder, JCL.

66. A first such meeting took place on 5 Sept. 1980. Memo, Dodson to Mondale, Vance, Brown, McInityre, Turner and Jones, 26 Aug. 1980; Memo, Summary of SCC Meeting, 5 Sept. 1980, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 33, ‘Meetings SCC 9/80’ folder.

67. SCC Meeting on 24 Nov. 1980: Summary of Conclusions, attachment to Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 25 Nov. 1980, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 23, ‘Meetings – Misc. 3/78-11/80’ folder.

68. SCC Meeting on 24 Nov. 1980: Summary of Conclusions, attachment to Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 25 Nov. 1980, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 23, ‘Meetings – Misc. 3/78-11/80’ folder.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. PD-63, ‘Persian Gulf Security Framework’, 15 Jan. 1981, JCL, Presidential Directives collection.

73. PD-62, ‘Modifications in U.S. National Strategy’, 15 Jan. 1981, JCL, Presidential Directives collection.

74. Ibid.

75. First of all, the declassified parts of PD-63 are an almost verbatim copy of the corresponding portions of the drafts, containing a few minor changes of style only. Secondly, the revised DOD version of the original NSC draft did not contain any major changes from the NSC draft. Since DOD and the NSC staff were the main contributors to the decision making process on this PD, the chance for major alterations being made seems remote. Thirdly, the parallel preparation of PD-62 shows that there were almost no differences whatsoever between, on the hand, the original NSC draft and revised DOD version, and, on the other hand, the final document. Finally, we know that Brzezinski's personal assistant on military affairs, General Bill Odom, who directed the staff work on the two PDs, advised Brzezinski that, in his view, Brzezinski could ‘support the Defense version if you favor “accelerated” Japanese defense growth as opposed to gradual. Otherwise, the substance is unchanged’. Memo (secret) w/att, Odom to Brzezinski, 6 Jan. 1981, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings MBB 10/80-1/81’ folder.

76. The NSC and DOD drafts to PD-62 and PD-63, refered to in the present and five previous paragraphs, were attached to Memo (secret), Odom to Brzezinski, 6 Jan. 1981, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings MBB 10/80-1/81’ folder.

77. Kaufman's claim that ‘the United States had made a commitment to the Persian Gulf without giving serious thought to the military or foreign policy implications of that move’ thus seems quite exaggerated. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., p.165.

78. Dumbrell, The Carter presidency: A Re-evaluation, p.202.

79. Minton F. Goldman, ‘President Carter, Western Europe, and Afghanistan in 1980: Inter-Allied Differences over Policy toward the Soviet Invasion’, in Rosenbaum and Ugrinsky (eds.), Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years, p.20.

80. NSC and DOD drafts to PD-62 and PD-63 attached to Memo (secret), Odom to Brzezinski, 6 Jan. 1981, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 24, ‘Meetings MBB 10/80-1/81’ folder.

81. SCC Meeting on 24 Nov. 1980: Summary of Conclusions, attachment to Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 25 Nov. 1980, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection: Subject File, Box 23, ‘Meetings – Misc. 3/78-11/80’ folder.

82. For an overview of European reactions to the Carter Doctrine and other US responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Goldman, ‘President Carter, Western Europe, and Afghanistan in 1980’, pp.19–34.

83. Memo, Odom to Brzezinski, 3 Sept. 1980, attachment to Brzezinski to Carter, 12 Sept. 1980, NSC Weekly Report no. 153, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Weekly Reports, Box 42, ‘WR: 151–161’ folder. For a thorough description of this interesting memorandum, see O. Njølstad, ‘The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War’, in Njølstad (ed.), The Cold War in the 1980s (London: Frank Cass, 2003 (forthcoming)), chapter 14.