REVIEW ARTICLE: Books, Spooks and Nukes: British Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb

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Notes

I would like to thank the AHRB for funding this and subsequent research. All archival references are to the Public Record Office, London.

 1. On recent Cold War intelligence historiography see C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War’, Review of International Studies 24 (1998), pp.322–30. Also J. Ferris, ‘Coming in from the Cold: The Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945–1990’, Diplomatic History 19/1 (Winter 1995), pp.87–116; J.L. Gaddis, ‘Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins’, Diplomatic History 13/2 (Spring 1989), pp.191–212; D.C. Watt, ‘Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment on John Gaddis’, Diplomatic History 14/2 (Spring 1990), pp.199–204; R.J. Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government upon British History’, Twentieth Century British History 9/1 (1998), p.113.

 2. W.B. Mann, Quintessential Recollections: Was There a Fifth Man? (Oxford, 1982), pp.66–90. Also R.V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London, 1990), pp.16–19 and 23–29.

 3. Dorril details the earliest incarnation of the organization, for the mid-1950s organization see Public Record Office, DEFE 7/2105.

 4. For an excellent overview of the developments in military perceptions of the Soviet Union see the new introduction to Lewis, Changing Direction.

 5. ‘Notes on Second Meeting between Sir John Anderson and AVM Elmhirst on Collection and Collation of Atomic Intelligence’, 27 Oct. 1945, JIC/1567/45, CAB 176/8.

 6. ‘Lt. Gen. Sir F.Morgan to Lt. Gen. Sir N. Brownjohn’, 21 Sept. 1953, DEFE 7/2105.

 7. While such accounts stress the surprise Joe-1 was to the West, some Russian accounts detail the surprise the bomb was to the Soviet military. For example, see I.N. Golovin, ‘The First Steps in the Atomic Problem in the USSR’, in J.W. Behrens and A.D. Carlson (eds.), 50 Years with Nuclear Fission (Illinois, 1989), p.202.

 8. In fact Hennessy mentions that the ‘inflamed’ view of British intelligence stemmed from people like Young (p.41).

 9. For example, ‘H. Parker to Brownjohn’, 24 Oct. 1953, DEFE 7/2105. This is supported in that Jones in fact paid tribute to Welsh on his wartime successes. R.V. Jones, ‘Thicker Than Heavy Water’, Chemistry and Industry, 26 Aug. 1967, pp.1419–24.

10. R.J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” During the Cold War’, Review of International Studies 24 (1998), p.343; and D. Holloway, ‘New Light on Early Bomb Secrets’, Physics Today (Nov. 1996), p.26. ‘Morgan to Brownjohn’, 21 Sept. 1953, DEFE 7/2105. Morgan actually believed that considering this intelligence had been ‘comparatively good’.

11. See ‘Leakages of Information on Atomic Energy’, JIC/683/46, 17 May 1946, CAB 176/11. See also M.S. Goodman, ‘Grandfather of the Hydrogen Bomb?: Anglo-American Intelligence and Klaus Fuchs.’, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciencies 34/1 (2003), pp.1–22.

12. ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee and British Intelligence Assessment, 1945–1956’ (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999), p.82.

13. There must in fact have been some signals intelligence as Mann, when brought up to date with present knowledge, was shown ‘decyphered intercepts’. Quintessential, p.62.

14. In fact Paul Maddrell goes so far as to suggest that ‘Soviet security defeated British intelligence’. ‘Britain's Exploitation of Occupied Germany for Scientific and Technical Intelligence on the Soviet Union’ (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1998), p.338.

15. Ibid., pp.13–29. P. Maddrell. ‘British–American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration during the Occupation of Germany’, Intelligence and National Security 15/2 (Summer 2000), pp.74–94; M. Uttley, ‘Operation “Surgeon” and Britain's Post-War Exploitation of Nazi German Aeronautics’, Intelligence and National Security 17/2 (Summer 2002).

16. For the earliest, most in depth yet largely fanciful account see J.R. Shepley and C. Blair, Hydrogen Bomb: The Men, The Menace, The Mechanism (New York, 1954).

17. D.E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: Volume II, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945–1950 (London, 1964), pp.569–73. Also L.L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (London, 1963), pp.201–7.

18. C.A. Ziegler, ‘Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia's First Atomic Bomb Test’, Social Studies of Science 18 (1988), pp.197–229. For the navy see H. Friedman, L.B. Lockhart and I.H. Blifford, ‘Detecting the Soviet Bomb: Joe-1 in a Rain Barrel’, Physics Today (Nov. 1996), pp.38–41. For analysis see L.R. Zumwalt, ‘Analysis of Fission Products from Russia's First Atomic Bomb Test’, in Behrens and Carlson (eds.), 50 Years, pp.343–50. Also L. Machta, ‘Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test’, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 73 (1992), pp.1797–806.

19. H.S. Lowenhaupt, ‘On the Soviet Nuclear Scent’, Studies In Intelligence 11/3 (Fall 1967), p.14. For example, Strauss, Men, p.201. Also Ziegler, ‘Waiting’, pp.197–9.

20. L. Aronsen, ‘Seeing Red: US Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945–1949’, Intelligence and National Security 16/2 (Summer 2001), p.120. In fact the USAF was placed in charge of detection, though it appears unlikely that the move was initiated by LeMay.

21. C.A. Ziegler and D. Jacobson, Spying Without Spies: Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (London, 1995), pp.177–96.

22. ‘Discussions Held on September 2nd and 3rd, 1948: Area 5’, AB 16/2676. For more details see M.S. Goodman, ‘British Intelligence and the Soviet Atomic Bomb, 1945–1949’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26/2 (June 2003), pp.119–50.

23. Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying; C.A. Ziegler, ‘Intelligence Assessments of the Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945–1949: Myths, Monopolies and Maskirovka’, Intelligence and National Security 12/4 (Oct. 1997), pp.1–24; Aronsen, ‘Seeing’, pp.103–32.

24. Aronsen, ‘Seeing’, pp.121 and 124. One can only assume therefore, that the USAF was lucky in its predictions.

25. Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying, pp.31 and 68–9. Also Ziegler, ‘Intelligence’, pp.5 and 10–15.

26. See, for example, the folder DSND 4/7, ‘Nuclear Tests in Russia’, amongst the Duncan-Sandys papers held at Churchill College Archives, University of Cambridge.

27. For details see USAF document ‘Notes on Technical Cooperation with British and Canadians in the Field of Atomic Energy Intelligence.’ www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB7/ae1-1.htm.

28. J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford, 1995), p.163. Also ‘Note by Sir F.Brundrett [CSA MoD]’, 29th Nov. 1957, AIR 20/12137.

29. R.V. Jones, ‘Intelligence and Command’, Intelligence and National Security 3/3 (July 1988), pp. 288–98.

30. B. Cole, ‘British Technical Intelligence and the Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Threat, 1952–1960’, Intelligence and National Security 14/2 (Summer 1999), pp.70–93.

31. I. Clark and N.J. Wheeler, British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford, 1989), pp.5 and 60–64.

32. See also the excellent P. Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War (Gloucestershire, 1998), pp.144–5.

33. Septimus H. Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations 1941–52 (Ohio State University Press, 2000).

34. D.C. Watt, ‘The Historiography of Intelligence in International Review’, in L.C. Jenssen and O. Riste (eds.), Intelligence in the Cold War: Organisation, Role and International Cooperation (Oslo, 2001), pp.173–92.

35. R. Lowe, ‘Plumbing New Depths: Contemporary Historians and the Public Record Office’, Twentieth Century British History 8/2 (1997), p.254.

36. Cited in J. Peyton, Solly Zuckerman: A Scientist Out of the Ordinary (London, 2001), p.63.