The British Military Withdrawal from Southeast Asia and its Impact on Australia's Cold War Strategic Interests

Abstract

The impact of Britain's withdrawal on Western strategic interests in Cold War Asia constitutes the focus of this article. In particular, the article provides an analysis of the problems and the challenges which confronted Australia in its response to the Wilson government's controversial decision to pull out of Southeast Asia. While the US reaction to Britain's disengagement has been examined in some detail, Australian and New Zealand responses to changes in British policy in Cold War Asia have been largely overlooked. This article therefore aims to redress this situation by examining the consequences of withdrawal for Australia, a country strongly committed to the West's containment strategy in Cold War Asia.

Notes

 [1] For the American response see Dockrill, Britain's Retreat; Pham, thesis. For the first attempts to examine Australia's response by relying on recently released archival material see Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, Chap. 8; Kristensen, thesis.

 [2] National Archives of Australia, Canberra (henceforth NAA), A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, Joint Planning Committee Report 34/1957, ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy – South East Asia. Memorandum by the Defence Committee’, July 1957.

 [3] Malaya was granted independence in 1957.

 [4] The concept of a Strategic Reserve had been originally proposed by Britain. According to the British proposal, Commonwealth forces would be deployed in Malaya as a deterrent against communist aggression and, in situations short of war, would be available for counter terrorist operations. See Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 162–63; O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 347. The Australian contribution to the CSR consisted of naval, ground and air forces. Naval forces included two destroyers or frigates and one aircraft carrier on annual visits of six to eight weeks. The ground contribution amounted to a battalion group. The air force component consisted of a bomber wing of two squadrons (Canberras), a fighter wing of two squadrons (Avon Sabres) and an airfield construction squadron.

 [5] See Horner, Defence Supremo, 309–15. On the importance of the Middle East in British Cold War strategy in the years following World War II see Lowe, Menzies, 33.

 [6] Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 74.

 [7] A vast literature exists on the origins of the ANZUS Treaty and its significance in Australia's foreign and defence policies. See for instance McLean, ‘ANZUS Origin; O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 185–200.

 [8] Goldsworthy, ‘Australian External Policy’.

 [9] NAA, A2031/8, 4/1959, ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy: Report by the Defence Committee’, January 1959.

[10] For Australia's policy towards the establishment of SEATO see Lowe, Menzies, 172–77.

[11] See Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 184. In June 1948 the British colonial authorities in Malaya declared a state of emergency (hence ‘Malayan Emergency’) to quell an insurgency led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The state of emergency was only lifted in 1960. For Australia's involvement in the Malayan Emergency see Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation.

[12] NAA, A4926/XM1, Vol. 28, ‘The Future of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’, July 1957.

[13] NAA, A1838/280, 3004/12/11 part 1, McNicol to Tange, 30 January 1960.

[14] NAA, A1838/277, 3004/12/11 part 2, Ryan to Tange, memo 1051, 15 July 1961.

[15] NAA, A1838/2, 67/1/3 part 2, Harry to Tange, 12 March 1962.

[16] Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, 158.

[17] See Benvenuti, thesis, Chap. 3.

[18] Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 95–104; Pham, thesis, Chap. 1; Jones, ‘A Decision Delayed’; Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 146–49.

[19] Public Record Office, London (henceforth PRO), Cabinet Office (henceforth CAB) 130/213, MISC 17/8, OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Review’, 10 June 1965; PRO, Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 953/2255/PLA 12/46, PC(65)28, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’, 9 August 1965.

[20] PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/5th-7th meetings, 13 June 1965.

[21] For the causes that led to the break-up of the Federation of Malaysia see Tarling (ed.), Southeast Asia, 409–15.

[22] PRO, CAB 130/239, MISC 76/1st meeting, 15 August 1965.

[23] NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 1, Rogers to Border, 3 September 1965.

[24] NAA, A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 part.2, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, undated.

[25] NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 1, Eastman to Department of External Affairs (henceforth DEA), cablegram 7037, 14 August 1965.

[26] NAA, A1945/39, 248/10/17, DEA paper, ‘Quadripartite Talks on Malaysia and Singapore’, 26 August 1965.

[27] NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 1, Department of Defence (henceforth DOD) paper, ‘British Position in the Far East’, August 1965.

[28] For Australia's growing involvement in the Vietnam War see Edwards, ‘Singapore and Malaysia’, 193–94.

[29] The text of the British memorandum, ‘The Repercussions in South East Asia of the Separation of Singapore’, can be found in NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 1, Australian High Commission (henceforth AHC) London to DEA, cablegrams 7578 and 7579, 2 September 1965.

[30] NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 1, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 7578, 2 September 1965.

[31] NAA, A1209/80, 6595 part 1, Bunting to Menzies, 3 September 1965.

[32] NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 1, Rogers to Border, 3 September 1965.

[33] PRO, FO 371/181529, IM 1992/135/G, British Defence Liaison Staff (Canberra) to Ministry of Defence (henceforth MOD), 7 September 1965.

[34] NAA, A6706/1, 6, Menzies to Wilson, 3 September 1965.

[35] PRO, Prime Minister's Office (henceforth PREM) 13/431, Wright to Wilson, undated.

[36] PRO, FO 371/181529, IM 1193/161/G, QT(65) 2nd meeting, 7 September 1965.

[37] Attachment to Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 9 September 1965, doc. 250, FRUS, 1964–68, Vol. 12.

[38] PRO, FO 371/181529, IM 1193/155/G, Peck to Rumbold, 30 September 1965.

[39] In August 1965 American and British officials had begun negotiations on a multilateral package (valued between US$900 million and US$1 billion) designed to support sterling. The US contribution would amount to US$400 million. See Memorandum from Acting Secretary of the Treasury Barr to President Johnson, 10 September 1965, doc. 249, FRUS , 1964–68, Vol. 12.

[40] Attachment to Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 9 September 1965, doc. 250, FRUS , 1964–68, Vol. 12.

[41] See Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 9 September 1965, doc. 250, FRUS , 1964–68, Vol. 12. For the Anglo-American understanding on sterling and east of Suez see Pham, thesis, Chap. 2. See also Kunz, ‘“Somewhat Mixed Up Together”’; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 289–290.

[42] PRO, CAB 130/239, MISC 78/1st meeting, 6 September 1965.

[43] NAA, A1838/346, 682/4 part 5A, Eastman to McIntyre, 22 September 1965.

[44] PRO, PREM 13/889, Commonwealth Relations Office (henceforth CRO) to British High Commission (henceforth BHC) Canberra, telegram 2521, 24 September 1965.

[45] NAA, A1945/39, 248/10/19, Bunting to Menzies, 19 October 1965.

[46] NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 1, ‘British Presence in South-East Asia’: Note by Griffith, 6 October 1965.

[47] Pham, thesis, Chap. 3. See also Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 129–31.

[48] Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 291. For a short account on Indonesia's attitude to Konfrontasi following the October coup see Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 174–78.

[49] Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 179.

[50] The Treasury representative, Lennox Hewitt, however, was ‘reserved on the question of [Australia] being too eager to come forward with specific offers of help to the British at an early stage; he wondered whether there might not be other ways of persuading the British to stay in Singapore/Malaysia’. Air Chief Marshal Scherger ‘expressed strong doubts about the efficacy of our making preparations to enlarge base facilities in Australia’. NAA, A1838/346, 682/4 part 5A, McIntyre to Morris, 7 October 1965.

[51] NAA, A1945/39, 248/10/20, FAD Submission 1095, 18 October 1965.

[52] NAA, A5821/1, Vol. 4, Cabinet Decision 1330 (FAD), 19 October 1965.

[53] NAA, A1945/39, 248/10/20, Hicks to the Acting Minister, 23 November 1965.

[54] Peter Howson was Minister for Air.

[55] Howson, Diaries, 181. Also Howson's conversation with the author. The concept of ‘Fortress Australia’ postulated that Australia's military efforts should centre on the defence of the Australian mainland rather than on forward deployments in Southeast Asia.

[56] Pham, thesis, Chap. 3.

[57] The British were seriously concerned that in the Singapore general election scheduled for 1968 the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) might gain office. In that case, given their well-known opposition to the British bases, they were expected to put an end to Britain's military presence in Singapore.

[58] PRO, CAB 148/25, OPD(65)8th meeting, 23 January 1966.

[59] NAA, A5839, Vol. 1, Cabinet Decision 108 (FAD), 31 January 1966.

[60] NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 3, Defence Committee Agendum 2/1966, ‘British Defence Review: Matters for Discussion between British, Australian and New Zealand Ministers’, 20 January 1966.

[61] NAA, A5839, Vol. 1, Cabinet Decision 108 (FAD), 31 January 1966.

[62] PRO, PREM 13/889, Memcon, Defence in the Far East (Canberra), 1–2 February 1966.

[63] PRO, PREM 13/889, Memcon, Defence in the Far East (Canberra), 1–2 February 1966.

[64] NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 3, ‘Agreed Minute’ attached to PRO, PREM 13/889, Memcon, Defence in the Far East (Canberra), 1–2 February 1966.

[65] NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 3, ‘Agreed Minute’ attached to NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 3, ‘Agreed Minute’ attached to PRO, PREM 13/889, Memcon, Defence in the Far East (Canberra), 1–2 February 1966.

[66] See PRO, PREM 13/889, Healey to Wilson, 3 February 1966 and BHC Canberra to CRO, telegram 150, 2 February 1966.

[67] NAA, A1209/80, 1965/6595 part 6, Holt to Wilson, 25 February 1966.

[68] NAA, A5839, Vol. 1, Cabinet Decision 60, 2 March 1966. See Edwards, Nation at War, 93–96.

[69] See Pham, thesis, Chap. 4.

[70] See Pham, thesis, Chap. 4.

[71] The Canberra talks were followed by one last round of quadripartite discussions in London in October 1966. These talks at officials' level ended inconclusively.

[72] NAA, A4940/1, C4266, ‘The Quadripartite Talks’, summary note (DEA), 30 June 1966; PRO, Dominions Office (henceforth DO) 169/470, Memcon, Quadripartite Ministerial Discussions (Canberra), 30 June 1966).

[73] For the July sterling crisis see Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 408–26.

[74] ‘Into the Wasteland’, Economist, 23 July 1966, 330.

[75] Britain, Parliamentary Debates (PD), House of Commons (HC), 1966–67, Vol. 732, cols. 631–32. See also ‘The Defence Bill’, Economist, 23 July 1966, 332.

[76] Wilson quoted in Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 164.

[77] Britain, PD, HC, 1966–67, Vol. 733, col. 437. Darby, Britain's Defence Policy, 314.

[78] Britain, PD, HC, 1966–67, Vol. 734, col. 208. See also Chin, Defence of Malaysia, 134.

[79] Pham, thesis, Chap. 4; Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 173–174.

[80] PRO, CAB 148/25, OPD(66)48th meeting, 9 December 1966.

[81] For the role of the various ministers in the formulation of Britain's defence policy in early 1967 see Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 178–185; Pham, thesis, Chap. 5; Jones, ‘Decision Delayed’, 585–87.

[82] PRO, CAB 129/128, C(67)40, 31 March 1967.

[83] PRO, CAB 128/42, CC(67)19th meeting, 11 April 1967.

[84] PRO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 24/51, BHC Canberra to Commonwealth Office (CO), telegram 635, 21 April 1967.

[85] NAA, A1838/80, 1966/7335 part 2, Hasluck to Holt and Fairhall, cablegram 1585, 21 April 1966. See also PRO, PREM 13/1455, Memcon, Brown and Hasluck (Washington), 19 April 1967.

[86] NAA, A1838/80, 1966/7335 part 2, Hasluck to Holt and Fairhall, cablegram 1585, 21 April 1966. See also British Embassy Washington to FO, telegram 1269, 19 April 1967.

[87] NAA, A1838/80, 1966/7335 part 2, Hasluck to Holt and Fairhall, cablegram 1585, 21 April 1966. See also British Embassy Washington to FO, telegram 1269, 19 April 1967.

[88] PRO, CAB 128/42, CC(67)23rd meeting, 27 April 1967.

[89] NAA, A1838/346, TS691/1/1 part 1, DEA to Waller, cablegram 1371, 2 May 1967.

[90] See for instance NAA, A1838/346, TS691/1/1 part 1, Eastman to DEA, cablegram 1166, 3 May 1967; AHC Singapore to DEA, cablegram 808, 4 May 1967. For a brief examination of Malaysian and Singaporean attitudes towards the British withdrawal see NAA, A1209/84, 1967/7334 attachment 1, DEA working paper, ‘The Malaysian Attitude towards the British Presence’; DEA working paper, ‘Singapore's Attitude to the British Presence’, May 1967.

[91] PRO, PREM 13/1323, Memcon, Wilson and Holt (London), 13 June 1967.

[92] PRO, PREM 13/1323, Holt to Wilson, 16 June 1967.

[93] PRO, PREM 13/1323, Memcon, Healey, Holt and Fairhall (London), 14 June 1967.

[94] PRO, PREM 13/1323, Memcon, Wilson and Holt (London), 13 June 1967. The Commonwealth Brigade included a battalion from Britain, Australia and New Zealand, with British supporting units. It was stationed at Terendak, Malaysia. In 1967 it comprised 1,100 Australian, 700 New Zealand and 2,400 British troops. See PRO, PREM 13/1323, Memcon, Healey, Holt and Fairhall (London), 14 June 1967.

[95] NAA, A1838/346, TS691/1 part 2, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 7501, 13 June 1967; Holt to McEwen, cablegram 7759, 16 June 1967.

[96] According to MOD plans, the British capability would consist of an amphibious force based on two commando battalions and ‘six substantial naval vessels’. Singapore and Australia were contemplated as possible locations. NAA, A1838/346, TS691/1 part 2, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 7501, 13 June 1967 and AHC London to DEA, cablegram 7763, 16 June 1967.

[97] PRO, PREM 13/1323, Memcon, Healey, Holt and Fairhall (London), 14 June 1967.

[98] NAA, A1838/346, TS691/1 part 2, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 7763, 16 June 1967.

[99] PRO, PREM 13/1323, Memcon, Wilson and Holt (London), 15 June 1967.

[100] NAA, A1838/346, TS691/1 part 2, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 7763, 16 June 1967.

[101] NAA, A5840/XM1, Vol. 2, Cabinet Decision 403, 4 July 1967. However, as for the retention of effective ground forces in Malaysia and Singapore, the Cabinet noted that ‘the British position was unchanged and that it would be moving in the 1970's to a situation in which naval and air forces only would be maintained for the area’.

[102] PRO, CAB 128/42, CC(67)45th meeting, 6 July 1967. In 1967 total personnel working in and for the British Services in Singapore and Malaysia numbered roughly 80,000. By 1970–71 the number of British troops in the area was expected to drop to a total of about 40,000, of which about half would be civilians. Between 1970/71 and the mid-1970s the remaining British commitment in the region would largely consist of naval (including an amphibious force) and air forces. As for Hong Kong, Britain would maintain a garrison there (about 9,000 men).

[103] PRO, CAB 128/42, CC(67)45th meeting, 6 July 1967. In 1967 total personnel working in and for the British Services in Singapore and Malaysia numbered roughly 80,000. By 1970–71 the number of British troops in the area was expected to drop to a total of about 40,000, of which about half would be civilians. Between 1970/71 and the mid-1970s the remaining British commitment in the region would largely consist of naval (including an amphibious force) and air forces. As for Hong Kong, Britain would maintain a garrison there (about 9,000 men).; Statement on Defence Estimates 1967.

[104] PRO, CAB 128/42, CC(67)45th meeting, 6 July 1967.

[105] NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 4, Holt to Wilson, cablegram 7227, 13 July 1967.

[106] NAA, A5840/XM1, Vol. 2, Cabinet Decision 473, 19 July 1967.

[107] NAA, A4940/1, C4626, Cabinet Submission 443, August 1967.

[108] NAA, A5840/XM1, Vol. 3, Cabinet Decision 771 (FAD), 11 December 1967; NAA, A5840/XM1, Vol. 3, Cabinet Decision 658 (FAD), 28 September 1967.

[109] See Benvenuti, ‘Shifting Priorities’, 7–8.

[110] Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal, 164.

[111] Roy Jenkins became Chancellor of the Exchequer on 29 November 1967. For Jenkins' role in demanding further defence cuts see Pickering, ‘Politics and “Black Tuesday”’, 154–57, 158–64 and 169–70. See also Pham, thesis, Chap. 7.

[112] Thomson had replaced Bowden as Commonwealth Secretary on 29 August 1967 as a result of a minor Cabinet reshuffle. For the role played by Healey, Thomson and Brown in opposing further cuts see Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 201; Pham, thesis, Chap. 7; For a differing view see Pickering, ‘Politics and “Black Tuesday”’, 170; Jones, ‘Decision Delayed’, 594.

[113] Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal, 171.

[114] PRO, CAB 128/43, CC(68)1st meeting, 4 January 1968.

[115] PRO, CAB 128/43, CC(66)6th meeting, 12 January 1968.

[116] PRO, PREM 13/2081, BHC Canberra to CO, telegram 92, 12 January 1968.

[117] PRO, FCO 24/95, Aide Mémoire: Talks with George Thomson, 12 January 1968.

[118] Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, 228.

[119] PRO, CAB, 128/43, CC(68)7th meeting, 15 January 1968.

[120] According to British plans, the naval capability in the area would amount to five frigates or destroyers (one located in Hong Kong) and a share in afloat support. Visits by RN vessels for training and exercises were also contemplated. The ground contribution would include one battalion group to be stationed in Singapore, and some supporting elements. Britain's aerial capacity would consist of four Nimrods and a flight of Whirlwind helicopters. The British government envisaged a rotation of aircraft in and out of the area (at the rate of about 600–700 movements a year).

[121] On this point see Benvenuti, ‘Shifting Priorities’, 1–10.

[122] On the withdrawal of Australian defence forces from Vietnam see Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, 301–2.

[123] Healey quoted in NAA, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 5, AHC London to DEA, cablegram 291, 8 January 1968.