A Question of Timing: South Africa and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1964–65

Abstract

This article explores the attitude and behaviour of South Africa towards Rhodesia's growing confrontation with the British government, which culminated in the Smith regime's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. The issue of white minority independence in Rhodesia confronted the Verwoerd government with an acute dilemma: a UDI risked further international isolation and consequent danger for the Republic of South Africa (RSA) – the extension of economic sanctions against Pretoria, the possibility of racial war drawing in outside hostile powers, or indeed a United Nations Organization (UNO) force, which would breach the RSA's insistence on non-intervention in a country's domestic affairs. It therefore immeasurably complicated South Africa's own international position. However, the South African government appreciated the ideological, racial, geo-strategic and economic advantages that could accrue to South Africa in the context of the Cold War. ‘Never was a country so compromised in its foreign policy by its domestic agenda’,1 yet on the question of Rhodesia in 1964–65 Pretoria played a difficult hand in international relations with consummate skill.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Mr Neels Muller, Archivist of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, and his staff for their invaluable help in my research for this article. I would also like to thank Mrs Loreta Pretorius of the National Archives of South Africa and Mrs Kenau Barlow for their assistance.

Notes

 [1] Mr Alan Shearer, former Deputy Director of Department of Foreign Affairs, South African Government, conversation with author, 15 September 2003.

 [2] Young, Labour Governments, 172. See also Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 135–37.

 [3] Daantje Oliver, the South African Accredited Diplomatic Representative in Salisbury from 1966, reported this comment to Flower, the Rhodesian Chief Intelligence Organisation. See Flower, Serving Secretly, 32. Also Meredith, The Past is Another Country, 145.

 [4] The commercial, political and military support extended to the Smith regime post-1965 until Vorster's decision in February 1975 to sacrifice his northern neighbour in pursuit of South African détente, has been generally addressed in Blake, A History of Rhodesia; Smith, The Great Betrayal; Flower, Serving Secretly; Good, International Politics; Meredith, The Past is Another Country.

 [5] This is noted very briefly in Barber and Barratt, South Africa Foreign Policy, 135.

 [6] Flower, Serving Secretly, 32.

 [7] The Smith government argued that the 1961 Constitution made adequate provision for this, and the African nationalists had chosen to deny themselves the legitimate route of black political advancement and greater parliamentary representation by repeatedly boycotting elections.

 [8] Canada was also increasingly critical of Britain's failure to bring Rhodesia to independence under black majority rule.

 [9] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1, Vol. 1, Pretoria, Top Secret, Southern Rhodesia Possible Declaration of Independence, 23 July 1964.

 [10] The UNO instituted voluntary military sanctions against South Africa in August 1963.

 [11] DFAA BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, The Secretary from Mr Jordaan, 23 December 1964.

 [12] The question of official support for Rhodesian UDI became a campaign issue in the South African general election of March 1966.

 [13] Following the independence of Northern Rhodesia, as Zambia, in October 1964, Southern Rhodesia became known simply as Rhodesia.

 [14] See Flower, Serving Secretly; Smith, The Great Betrayal. Each country possessed cogent domestic and geopolitical reasons for cooperation. However, there was a fundamental difference between the ‘ideologically driven, dogmatic, rigorous and totalising’ practice of apartheid instituted by the Malan Government after 1948, the Rhodesian approach and the Portuguese policy of ‘assimilado’. Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok, 33.

 [15] DFAA, BTS 1/156/4, Vol. 1, Southern Rhodesia, 4 December 1964. Unsigned.

 [16] TNA PRO, CAB 148/20, OPD(65)48, 8 March 1965, Sanctions against South Africa, Burke Trend, Cabinet Office.

 [17] TNA PRO, CAB148/18, OPD/65, 1–55 Meetings, OPD(65) 10th Meeting, Cabinet, DOPC Committee, 17 February 1965.

 [18] Murphy, ‘An Intricate and Distasteful Subject’.

 [19] See Coggins, thesis; Murphy, ‘An Intricate and Distasteful Subject’..

 [20] TNA PRO, FO371/177074, JSA 1062/10, Southern Rhodesia, Relations with the Republic of South Africa, J.B. Johnston, 29 September 1964.

 [21] The Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, under Sir Roy Welensky, had initiated clandestine military and intelligence cooperation between Southern Rhodesia and the RSA to combat this threat. See Papers of the Rt Hon Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky MSS, file 234/8, Benoy to Minister of Defence, Visit to Cape Town and Pretoria 3rd and 4th Feb. 1961, ff. 11–12; file 235/10 To Federal PM from Chief of Air Staff, A M Bentley, RRAF, Visit by SA AF Staff Team, 14 May 1963, ff. 1–3; file 239/5, B M de Quehen to Prime Minister only, 2 August 1962, f. 1, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University.

 [22] Smith, The Great Betrayal, 107.

 [23] See Coggins, thesis.

 [24] In 1964 Taswell was appointed as South Africa's Ambassador in Washington.

 [25] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Taswell to Minister, Pretoria, 23 July 1964, referring to his letter as Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury, to Pretoria, dated 28 November 1963.

 [26] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, South African Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury to Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 29 November 1963. The RF party caucus was not happy that Field should meet Verwoerd unaccompanied, and wanted Smith present.

 [27] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, South African Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury to Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 4 December 1963.

 [28] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, South African Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury to Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 4 December 1963.

 [29] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Southern Rhodesia Relations with South Africa, 20.4.64–23.7.64. Washington Post report, quoted in The Star, 25 February 1964.

 [30] Flower, Serving Secretly, 32–33. Also DFAA, BTS 1/156/3 Vol. 1, ADR to Sec. for Foreign Affairs, Interview With Ian Smith, 24 July 1964.

 [31] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, ADR to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Interview with Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, 24 July 1964. .

 [32] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Verwoerd to Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 July 1964.

 [33] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, to Ambassador, Lisbon, 27 July 1964.

 [34] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, SA Ambassador, Lisbon, to Uys, Pretoria, 18 August 1964.

 [35] DFAA, BTS 1/56/1/3, Vol. 1, South African Embassy, London, to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria PS 2814/1, 26 August 1964, Top Secret. Southern Rhodesia.

 [36] The British government only belatedly realized the critical role of Dr Salazar in the formation of Portugal's policy towards Rhodesia. The Portuguese leader bitterly resented Britain's lack of support for Portugal when India annexed Goa in 1961, and London's failure to defend Portugal's colonial record and administration in Central and Southern Africa. See TNA PRO, FO 371/180087, CP103224/36 Lisbon to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 389, 1 October 1965.

 [37] Smith, The Great Betrayal, 73.

 [38] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, ADR to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Support to Southern Rhodesia, 7 May 1964.

 [39] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, RSA Treasury to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 25 August 1964, 12/588.

 [40] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3/1, Vol. 1, DC 17850/450, Top Secret, 28 August 1964.

 [41] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Commandant General SAW to Secretary of Defence, 26 June 1964.

 [42] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, Republic of South Africa Treasury, Secret, 17 August 1964, to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 12/588, Financial Assistance to Southern Rhodesia.

 [43] Sir Roy Welensky, as the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, had revived military cooperation and coordination with South Africa during the Congo crisis. See Wood, The Welensky Papers, 970.

 [44] As the Federal Secretary for Defence in the CAF, Benoy had been responsible for negotiating with the South African Government for arms and munitions in February 1961. Welensky MSS, WP 234/8, Welensky to Verwoerd, 3 February 1961, Rhodes House Library, Oxford. I am grateful to Dr Philip Murphy for this point.

 [45] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Top Secret, The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria from Accredited Diplomatic Representative, 22 October 1964.

 [46] For analysis of the significance of the sale of British arms to South Africa in 1964, rather than the traditional focus on the issue in 1967, see Young, ‘The Wilson Government’.

 [47] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Department of Defence to Secretary of the Treasury, Top Secret, Pretoria, 22 October 1964, Assistance to RRAF in connection with Air-to-Air Firing facilities in the Republic.

 [48] Rhodesia claimed it had inherited the entrustments of foreign policy previously exercised by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – which London vehemently denied, quoting Sandys' letter to the Rhodesian government of 10 December 1963. TNA PRO, FO 371/180086, CP103224/1, Confidential, Salisbury to CRO, Telno 1042, 3 September 1965.

 [49] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, Top Secret, Urgent. Assistance to RRAF in connection with Air-to-Air Firing facilities in the Republic. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 27 October 1964.

 [50] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria to The Secretary (undated).

 [51] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, Top Secret, Urgent. Assistance to RRAF in connection with Air-to-Air Firing facilities in the Republic. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 27 October 1964.

 [52] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, Top Secret, Urgent. Assistance to RRAF in connection with Air-to-Air Firing facilities in the Republic. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 27 October 1964.

 [53] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Salisbury, Top Secret, 5 November 1965.

 [54] The Star, 28 October 1964.

 [55] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Telegram Copy No 1 From Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria to SA Embassy, Washington, 4 November 1964.

 [56] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, EAS telegram From Sahicom, Salisbury, to Secextern, Pretoria, No 84, Top Secret, 29 October 1964. This information had already been exhaustively prepared by the Rhodesian Front Government.

 [57] ‘This remark refers to a news item that appeared rather prominently on the front page of this morning's Rhodesia Herald under the heading “South Africa is not expected to help”, which reads as follows, “The Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd, has so far remained silent on events in Rhodesia, but it is believed that his decision not to give formal recognition to Rhodesia in the event of a unilateral declaration, as well as reasons why he could not afford to do so, have been conveyed to the Rhodesian Government through diplomatic channels”.’ DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, SA Accredited Diplomat, Salisbury, to Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria, Top Secret, 29 October 1964.

 [58] TNA PRO, FO371/177074 JSA1062/15, Fingland, HM Minister, Pretoria to Foreign Office, Telno 379, 1062/17, 2 November 1964. ‘In fact [Vewoerd] was careful not to commit himself in support of Rhodesian Government further than he has done previously.’

 [59] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Accredited Diplomatic Representative to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Top Secret, 5 November 1964. Withdrawal of Preliminary Arrangements for Joint Exercises in the Republic by the South African Airforce and the RRAF.

 [60] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, Top Secret, 5 November 1964.

 [61] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, Top Secret, 5 November 1964.

 [62] DFAA, BTS1/156/3, Vol. 1, Dept of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, undated (probably 26/27 October 1964).

 [63] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, Secextern, Pretoria to Salisbury, 6 November 1964.

 [64] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Top Secret, Crisis in Rhodesia, undated December 1964.

 [65] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Southern Rhodesia, Top Secret, 4 December 1964.

 [66] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Southern Rhodesia, Top Secret, 4 December 1964.

 [67] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Crisis in Rhodesia, undated December 1964.

 [68] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Jordaan to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 24 December 1964.

 [69] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Top Secret, Dr Du Plooy, Cape Town, undated December 1964.

 [70] Rand Daily Mail, 14 October 1965. However, South Africa turned down a request from the Portuguese Embassy in Cape Town to join a number of feasibility studies (on the construction of road and rail links between the RSA and Angola) and a proposal to join Portugal and Rhodesia in tripartite cooperation to promote tourism to the whole region. BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Embasaixada de Portugal, Cape Town, to Minister, External Affairs, 1 April 1965.

 [71] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, Accredited Diplomatic Representative to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, Top Secret, 29 October 1965. The Independence crisis in Rhodesia.

 [72] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Rhodesia, Top Secret, 4 December 1964.

 [73] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Rhodesia, Top Secret, 4 December 1964.

 [74] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/3, Vol. 1, SA Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 22 October 1964, Top Secret.

 [75] BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 1, SA Accredited Diplomat, Salisbury, to The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Pretoria, Top Secret, 29 October 1964.

 [76] In reality Britain had already paid £2m of the £4m promised at the dissolution of the Central African Federation. See TNA PRO, CAB 148/1, OPD (65) 3rd Meeting. 21 January 1965.

 [77] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, From Secretary, Foreign Affairs to SA Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury, Code Telegrams No. 84 and 85, 18 December 1964.

 [78] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, SA Accredited Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury to Secretary, Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 30 December 1964, Top Secret.

 [79] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Treasury, Cape Town Top Secret. Secretary for Finance to Secretary for External Affairs, 19 February. 1965.

 [80] TNA, PRO, FO 371/177074, JSA1062/11, Southern Rhodesia: Relations with the Republic of South Africa (Despatch No.8), J Johnston, 11 September 1964, and Despatch No.61, Sir Hugh Stephenson, 17 October 1964; JSA1062/20, Snelling, Commonwealth Relations Office to Le Quesne, Foreign Office, 27 November 1964, covering note to Johnston to CRO, 25 November 1964. See also Coggins, thesis, 89–90.

 [81] TNA, PRO, FO371/177074, JSA 1062/20 Johnston, BHC Salisbury, to Sir Arthur Snelling, CRO, 25 November 1964. Also Stephenson to Le Quesne, FO, 17 December 1964.

 [82] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, His Honour the Prime Minister, from Pretoria, 7 December 1964.

 [83] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, S/FACT to SAADR, 10 May 1965.

 [84] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Top Secret, The Implications of the Independence of Rhodesia, Unsigned, Pretoria, 19 August 1965.

 [85] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, H Muller, Foreign Minister, to Verwoerd, 19 August 1965; and Verwoerd to Muller, 19 August 1965.

 [86] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3 Vol. 3, Verwoerd to Muller, 26 August 1965.

 [87] Welensky MSS, WP 235/10 ff. 1–3, To Federal PM from Chief of Air Staff, A B Bentley, RRAF, 14 May 1963, Visit by SA AF Staff Team.

 [88] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Top Secret, The Acting Secretary of Defence from Naude, Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 9 August 1965.

 [89] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3 Vol. 3, Top Secret, The Implications of the Independence of Rhodesia, 19 August 1965.

 [90] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Southern Rhodesia, Relations with South Africa, August 1964–11 November 1965. See Dr Verwoerd speech to Nationalist followers, De Wildt, 31 October 1964, reported in Rand Daily Mail, 2 November 1964.

 [91] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, ADR to Secretary for External Affairs, S.8/3/5, 12 May 1965; and BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Secretary of External Affairs to ADR, 25 May 1965.

 [92] Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 135–36.

 [93] Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 135–36.

 [94] Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 135–36.

 [95] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, from SA ADR, Salisbury, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, No. 90, Top Secret, Despatched 21 October 1965.

 [96] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, To His Honour the Prime Minister, unsigned, 18 October 1965.

 [97] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, SA Accredited Diplomat, Salisbury, to Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria, Telegram No. 80, Top Secret, 16 September 1965.

 [98] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Immediate Telegram from Secretary, External Affairs, to SA Accredited Diplomat, Salisbury, 21 September 1965, No. 92, Top Secret.

 [99] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, SA Accredited Diplomatic Mission to Secretary, External Affairs, Pretoria, 22 September 1965. Proposed Rhodesian Financial Arrangements. The British Cabinet was made aware of the transfers on 7 October 1965, but was powerless to act against Rhodesia. The British files do not give any indication of a private approach to the RSA on this matter. See TNA PRO, CAB 148/8, OPD/65, 1–55 Meetings, OPD (65) 43rd meeting, 7 October 1965. DOPC.

[100] Key men in Rhodesian Railways had also been secretly appointed to safeguard all strategic points for the transportation of essential goods by road from Beit Bridge to West Nicholson. BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Telegram No. 84, Top Secret (EAS) from SA Accredited Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury, Secretary, External Affairs, Pretoria, 1 October 1965. Also Flower, Serving Secretly, 47.

[101] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Secretary for Finance, Treasury, Pretoria to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 19 October 1965. On 12 January 1966 the Department of Foreign Affairs asked that this decision be reconsidered on grounds that ‘political decisions … may outweigh financial risk … We could explain [to the British Government] if necessary that making loans to Rhodesia falls within the pattern of maintaining normal relations with Rhodesia as we have already before UDI been established as a source of capital for Rhodesia’. This was approved on 22 February 1966. BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Top Secret, Financial Loans to Rhodesia, Request for R2m; and Telegram to Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury, from Secretary, Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, Top Secret, 22 February 1966, Financial Assistance to Rhodesia.

[102] Stanley Uys in the Sunday Times, 10 October 1965. Headline, ‘South Africa may aid Rhodesian economy in crisis’.

[103] Rand Daily Mail, 11 October 1965.

[104] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, His Honour the Prime Minister from The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, undated October 1965.

[105] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Telegram GPO, 3 November 1965, Immediate from SA Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, No. 93, Top Secret.

[106] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 2, Telegram GPO, 3 November 1965, Immediate from SA Accredited Diplomatic Representative, Salisbury to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, No. 93, Top Secret.

[107] Pretoria News, 12 October 1965.

[108] DFAA, BTS 1/156/1/5, Rhodesia, Statements on South Africa's Official Attitude, Statement by the Hon The Prime Minister Dr HF Verwoerd, for release midnight 11 November 1965..

[109] DFAA, BTS 12/156/1/5, Extracts from Prime Minister's Speech on No-confidence debate on 24/25th January 1966, United Nations and International Relations.

[110] Interview with Ian Smith, conducted by Grahame Pinnell, on author's notes, questions and instructions, 9 December 2003.

[111] Coggins, thesis, 52, referring to George Rudland interview, 5 September 1972, National Archives of Zimbabwe ORAL/RU3.

[112] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Top Secret, the Implications of the Independence of Rhodesia, 19 August 1965.

[113] DFAA, BTS 1/156/3, Vol. 3, Verwoerd to Muller, 19 August 1965.

[114] Young, The Labour Governments, 172.

[115] TNA PRO, FO 371/180088, CP103224/65, C Le Quesne, Foreign Office, to Sir Archibald Ross, British Ambassador to Lisbon, 20 December 1965.