Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations: Western Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame

Abstract

Fifteen years after the Baltic SSRs' independence declarations, this article sheds new light on the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian struggle to regain statehood in the context of international relations between 1988 and 1991. Based on declassified archival sources from Western and Eastern archives, memoirs and official histories, it reveals the nature of ‘Western’ Baltic policies and analyses how (far) they impacted on the Soviet Union's demise. Second, the role universal normative values played in Western, Soviet and Baltic politics will be discussed in historical perspective; with the article concluding by offering some reflections on the general relationship between political rhetoric and foreign policy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Patrick Salmon, the anonymous reviewers of Cold War History and the participants at the University of Glasgow Conference ‘The Baltic States: New Europe or Old’ in January 2004 (where I presented some of my early ideas) for their comments, and Kyllike and Indrek Sillaste-Elling for helping me getting access to the Estonian—British/French Foreign Ministry correspondence. I am especially grateful to Paul Readman for critically reading and discussing draft versions of this article. Research was aided by a Junior Research Fellowship at Christ's College, Cambridge.

Notes

  [1] Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilisation; Tuminez, “Nationalism”; Clemens, Baltic Independence; Gerner and Hedlund, Baltic States; Misiunas and Taagepera, Baltic States; Lieven, Baltic Revolution; Smith, Baltic States; Taagepera, Estonia; Titma, Estonia; Brettin, Das Scheitern; Senn, Gorbachev's Failure; Vardys and Sedaitis, Lithuania; Krickus, Showdown; Karklins, Ethnopolitics; Neimanis, The Collapse. Cf. Ahonen, “Politics,” 179–94.

  [2] The exception being, Trapans, “The West,” 153–73.

  [3] Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 205–6, 211–16. See also Kramer, “Collapse (2),” 3–64.

  [4] Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 181.

  [5] Suri, “New Historical Consensus,” 91.

  [6] Smith, Baltic States, 121, 128–9. Cf. Lauristin and Vihalemm, Return, 73–126, here 73–86.

  [7] See document no.30, “CIA Intelligence Assessment, ‘Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution’, April 1989 (NSA FOIA),” p. iii, in NSA Document Collection Folder: End of Cold War (henceforward NSA ECW); Smith, Baltic States, 129.

  [8] Taagepera, “Ecological and Political Problems,” 168–70; Kaski, “Phosphorite War,” 21–38; Auer, “Environmentalism,” 659–67. See also Lieven, Baltic Revolution, 220.

  [9] Rahvusarhiiv 1-44-90, “Eesti NDV-n mitmepartei susteemi tekkimine (1990.a jaanuaris); Kuokkanen, “Puolueiden muodostuminen,” 47–56; Ishiyama, “Founding Elections,” 277–99; Grofman et al., “Electoral Systems,” 227–49.

 [10] Misiunas and Taagepera, Baltic States, 303–22; Kramer, “Introduction,” 20.

 [11] Hiden and Salmon, Baltic Nations, 149–50; Lukkari, Viron itsenäistyminen, 170–77. There was for instance a plan for economic autonomy known as Isemajandav Eesti (IME) put forward on 26 September 1987. Written by four Estonian intellectuals – Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, Edgar Savisaar and Mikk Titma – this called for an autonomous, self-managing economic zone inside the USSR and for the decentralization of the Estonian economy. Crucially it was not only supported by the majority of Estonians, but it also had the backing of the Estonian Communist Party (EKP) and the Estonian Supreme Soviet. On IME, see Rahvusarhiiv 1-43-153, “IME Probleemn[otilde]ukogu, märts 1989”; Rahvusarhiiv 1-44-90, “Arvamusi poliitilise situatsiooni kujunemise kohta peala EKP KK xiv pleenumit (4.5.1989).” See also Miljan, “Proposal,” 149–64.

 [12] See Lauristin and Vihalemm, Return, 75–6; Smith, Baltic States, 139.

 [13] NSA ECW, Document no. 15, “Diary Excerpt Regarding Chernyaev's View of the Situation in the Baltics, 10 December 1988,” from Chernyaev, 1991: The Diary. Even if Chernyaev was not sure whether Gorbachev was serious or mocking his advisor with his comments, other evidence also suggests that the Soviet leader did not believe independent Baltic states would or even could survive without the centre. In practice, of course, such an option was not even considered from the Soviet side. See also NSA ECW, Document no.30, “CIA Intelligence Assessment, ‘Rising Political Instability under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution’, April 1989” (NSA FOIA), esp. 15.

 [14] NSA ECW, Document no.15, “Diary Excerpt, 10 December 1988.”

 [15] See Smith, Baltic States, 139.

 [16] Suri, “New Historical Consensus,” 80, 82–3 and 85. For the speech, see “Address by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev to the 43rd U.N. General Assembly Session,” 7 December 1988 (Excerpts), CWIHP Bulletin #12/13, 29, 192, 307. On the Brezhnev doctrine, see Loth, “Moscow,” 103–18, and Ouimet, Rise and Fall.

 [17] Biermann, Zwischen Kreml, 87–100, here esp. 90–91.

 [18] In Estonia, the “Declaration of sovereignty” (16 November 1988) was followed by the affirmation of Estonian as the only official language (18 January 1989) and the restriction of voting rights of recent immigrants (8 August 1989). See “Eesti NSV Ülemn[otilde]ukogu erakonnaline istungjärk: Eesti n[otilde]ukogude sotsialistiku vabariigi ülemn[otilde]ukogu deklaratsioon Eesti NSV suveräänsusest. 16 november 1988,” in Laar, Teine Eesti, 453–4. Meissner, Die baltischen Nationen, 125. In Lithuania, Lithuanian was declared the state language, the interwar anthem became the official anthem of the republic, and the national tricolour flag became the state flag during the 18–19 November 1988 session of the Supreme Soviet of the LiSSR; the latter being a step Estonia and Latvia only took in May 1990. See Misiunas and Taagepera, Baltic States, 321.

 [19] See “The Tbilisi Massacre, April 1989: Documents,” CWIHP Bulletin #12/13, 31 as well as 32–48.

 [20] NSA ECW, Document no.37, “Meeting of the Politburo: Discussion of the Memorandum of Six Politburo members on the situation in the Baltic Republics, 11 May 1989 (from The Union could be Preserved (Moscow, 1995).”

 [21] Document no.3, “The Political Processes in the European Socialist Countries and the Proposals for Our Practical Steps considering the Situation which has arisen in them, 24 February 1989 [Memorandum of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs],” CWIHP Bulletin #12/13, 68–71, here esp. 70.

 [22] Lévesque, “Soviet Approaches,” 49–52. Cf. Wallander, “Western Policy,” 172–3.

 [23] See NSA ECW, Document no. 35, “Diary Excerpt, Regarding Gorbachev's State of Mind, 2 May 1989,” from Chernyaev, 1991. The Diary; see also Document no.63, “Meeting of the Politburo, Discussion of the Economic Autonomy for the Republics of Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, 9 November 1989 (Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation)”.

 [24] See Meissner, Baltische Staaten, 283–4. See also EST-VM Kirjavahetus 1990–1992 Suurbritannia–Iirimaa Laud, “Press Conference by Douglas Hurd, Brussels, 27 August 1991.” Hurd said: ‘there are no other Republics of the Soviet Union which enjoyed independence between the two wars, which were members of the League of Nations and whose absorption into the Soviet union was never accepted by most member states, never accepted certainly by Britain. History and the position under international law of the three Baltic states is different from that of any of the other Republics of the Soviet Union …’

 [25] See Misiunas and Taagepera, Baltic States, 328–9 and Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 207.

 [26] See Oplatka, Meri, 288–9.

 [27] Kramer, “Collapse (2),” 36–7.

 [28] Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 206–9. Meri qualifies Kramer's view by highlighting that Baltic peoples were at the same time so absorbed in their own developments, that their focus on the Eastern European revolutions was limited. Cf. Oplatka, Meri, 281.

 [29] For an assessment by US ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, see NSA ECW, Document no.25, “The Soviet Union over the next four years, U.S. Department of State Cable from Ambassador Jack Matlock, 3 February 1989” (National Security Archive FOIA); see also Document no.35, “Diary Excerpt, Regarding Gorbachev's State of Mind, 2 May 1989.”

 [30] NSA ECW, Document no.63, “Meeting of the Politburo, 9 November 1989.”

 [31] Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 208–10 and Bush and Scowcroft, World, 140.

 [32] Oplatka, Meri, 280.

 [33] See McHugh and Pacy, Diplomats, esp. 106–17. See also Vitas, The United States and Lithuania. See also Meissner, Baltische Staaten, 114.

 [34] See McHugh and Pacy, Diplomats, esp. 91–106. On Baltic Gold, see AA PolArch B 41 Band 103, “Britisch-sowjetisches Abkommen vom 5.1.1968 über gegenseitige Ansprüche aus den Baltischen Staten und den von der Tschechoslowakei, Finnland, Polen und Rumänien der Sowjetunion abgetrtenen Gebieten, (26.8.1969).”

 [35] AA PolArch B12 Band 452 “Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zur Frage der Anerkennung der Annexion der baltischen Staaten durch die Sowjetunion (27.9.1960).”

 [36] AA PolArch B 12 Band 452, “Betr: Lage in den Baltischen Staaten (7.10.1960).”

 [37] The Act regulated de facto the territorial status quo, but allowed in principle the ‘peaceful change’ of borders. While Moscow had always placed most emphasis on the ‘inviolability of borders’, the West was keen to point to its position of principle that it neither recognized de jure Germany's division nor the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR. Crucial for the German question (as well as the Baltic one) was also the West Germans' push for incorporation of the universal right of peoples to self-determination into the catalogue of principles within the Helsinki Final Act. See Boris Meissner, Baltische Staaten, 115–16, 122–9.

 [38] Cf. Bush and Scowcroft, World, 187.

 [39] McHugh and Pacy, Diplomats, 112.

 [40] Sinha, “Self-determination,” 257–71.

 [41] “SOVA Research Paper, December 1982, Soviet Society in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects,” printed in Haines and Legget, CIA's Analysis, 108–10.

 [42] See NSA ECW, Document no.60, “Record of Gorbachev's Conversation with President of Finland Mauno Koivisto, 25 October 1989” (Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation). See also Cradock, In Pursuit, 104; Koivisto, Historian tekijät, 307–9; and Margaret Thatcher, Press Conference in Moscow, 23 September 1990, http://www.margaretthatcher.org [accessed 4 July 2005].

 [43] See Hertle, “The Fall,” 131–40.

 [44] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 190–91.

 [45] See Cradock, British Interests, 117, and Bush and Scowcroft, World, 207.

 [46] Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 128.

 [47] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 192.

 [48] Thatcher, Downing Street, 801 (emphasis added).

 [49] Cf. Cradock, British Interests, 116–18.

 [50] See Attali, Verbatim, 394–446; Frédéric Bozo in his book on Mitterrand and German unification which is based on unique access to Elysée and Quai d'Orsay documents also makes no mention of the Baltic question until events in 1990. See Bozo, La fin.

 [51] See Koivisto, Historian tekijät, 308–9.

 [52] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 172.

 [53] Ibid., 206; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 129.

 [54] Ibid.; Baker, Drei Jahre, 207.

 [55] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 207.

 [56] Gates, Shadows, 529.

 [57] Ibid., p. 515. Kramer, “Collapse (2),” 21.

 [58] Lieven, Baltic Revolution, 229–30; Kramer, “Collapse (2),” 19; Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, 492–501. See also Vardys and Sedaitis, Lithuania; Krickus, Showdown.

 [59] Kramer, Collapse (1),” 210–11; Financial Times, 30 January 1990.

 [60] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 207.

 [61] Bozo, La fin, 182.

 [62] Attali, Verbatim, 490–2; Bozo, La fin, chapter 4.

 [63] Landsbergis, Lithuania, chapter 13.

 [64] Attali, Verbatim, 544, 556. See also Weidenfeld, Auβenpolitik, 357. Cf. Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 127; Koivisto, Historian tekijät, 322.

 [65] Attali, Verbatim, 559.

 [66] Bozo, La fin, 250 and esp. his fn. 150.

 [67] Urban, Diplomacy, pp.128–9; Deutsche Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/1990 (henceforward Sonderedition), document 235, pp. 987–8; Bush and Scowcroft, World, 218.

 [68] Baker, Drei Jahre, 207–8.

 [69] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 215. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 241–2.

 [70] Sonderedition, document 235, p. 988.

 [71] EST-VM USA file I “George Bush to the press, 23 March 1990.” For a Baltic-American perspective, see Plain Dealer, 12 April 1990.

 [72] Koivisto, Historian tekijät, 321–7. On the lack of forthcoming Western support, see also Kohl's views in Sonderedition, document 278, p. 1119; Attali, Verbatim, 568.

 [73] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 216. Hutchings too has pointed to a long-term US strategy of a restrained public policy. See Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 126–7. For a critical newspaper report of US policy in which it was even claimed that Baker had moved so far towards the USSR's position as to imply the abandonment of the 50-year-old US non-recognition policy, see US News and World Report, 9 April 1990 in Hoover Archives, Estonian Subject Collection.

 [74] On the promotion of Lithuanian-Soviet negotiations, see Margaret Thatcher, House of Commons PMQs, 20 March 1990, and 3 April 1990, http://www.margaretthatcher.org [accessed on 4 July 2005]. See also Bush's views, Margaret Thatcher, Joint Press Conference with US President (George Bush) after Bermuda Summit, 13 April 1990, http://www.margaretthatcher.org [accessed on 4 July 2005]. See also note 66.

 [75] Baker, Drei Jahre, 208.

 [76] Baker, Drei Jahre, 214–30; Gates, Shadows, 527.

 [77] On Margaret Thatcher's views and Britain's outwardly ‘inactive attitude’, see Urban, Diplomacy, 150. See also Margaret Thatcher, House of Commons PMQs, 17 May 1990, http://www.margaretthatcher.org [accessed on 4 July 2005]. For a French perspective, see Attali, Verbatim, 592.

 [78] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 223–4; Attali, Verbatim, 593; Sonderedition, document 257, p. 1056.

 [79] Sonderedition, documents 135, 192, 266, pp. 688, 864, 1081.

 [80] Sonderedition, document 278, p. 1119. See also note 72.

 [81] EST-VM Taani 1990–1992, “The Danish Foreign Minister's Reply of 18 April 1990 in the Folketing to the following interpellation no. F 25 of 22 March to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from Mr Knud Lind (PP), Mrs Kirsten Jacobsen (PP), Mrs Pia Kjaersgaard (P) and Mr Poulsgaard (PP): ‘Which initiatives does the Government intend to take to support Lithuanian's efforts to obtain independence?’.”

 [82] EST-VM Islandi 1990–1992, “The Baltic states' quest for independence: Iceland's policy and actions”; “Resolution of the Althing of 12 March 1990 on congratulation to the Lithuanian people”; “Message to E. Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the USSR, from J.B. Hannibalsson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1990.”

 [83] See Johannesson, Studningur Islands, 38 where he refers to Hannibalsson's address to the foreign affairs committee of the Althingi (closed meeting) on 28 May 1990.

 [84] Koivisto, Historian tekijät, 327–8. See Johannesson, Studningur Islands, 36–7. NB Afraid of being coerced by Denmark into an unwanted political stance on the Baltic, Finland and Sweden had sent under-secretaries in the place of their foreign ministers to a special, informal Nordic Council meeting on the question of how to support the Baltics (held on 22 March 1990). No agreement was reached on a final official statement on the Baltics' right to independence and in the event, Denmark blamed Finland for the meeting's failure.

 [85] Sonderedition, document 266, p. 1081.

 [86] See “US embassy to MFA of Iceland, 24.3.1990” from notes for his MA thesis Studningur Islands provided to the author by Gudni Johannesson. The materials on which these are based have been declassified recently.

 [87] Attali, Verbatim, 594.

 [88] See Sonderedition, document 278, p. 1119. Cf. Beschloss, Highest Levels, 198–203, 216–223, 318–25, 443–4; Matlock, Autopsy, 268–73.

 [89] On Mitterrand, see Bozo, La fin, 250–51.

 [90] Sonderedition, documents 257, 266, 277, pp.1056, 1080, 1118; Letter published in Bulletin no.48, 28 April 1990, 384.

 [91] Sonderedition, document 266, p. 1081.

 [92] See note 83.

 [93] Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 257; Bush and Scowcroft, World, 226.

 [94] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 221–2.

 [95] Ibid., 225–7.

 [96] Baker, Drei Jahre, 209–10. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 241.

 [97] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 222–3; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 257.

 [98] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 225–6. Scowcroft highlights that he wanted stronger US action, not because of domestic pressure but because in his view Gorbachev ignored the USA. But Scowcroft did not want to break the consensus and hence did not press his point.

 [99] Ibid., 227.

[100] Sonderedition, documents 267, 277, pp.1086–7, 1114–18.

[101] Spohr Readman, Germany, 26–8.

[102] Sonderedition, document 299, pp. 1178–80.

[103] See Margaret Thatcher, Speech at dinner given by Soviet president (Mikhail Gorbachev), 8 June 1990; and Margaret Thatcher, Radio Interview for IRN (visiting Moscow), 8 June 1990, http://www.margaretthatcher.org [accessed on 4 July 2005].

[104] Gates, Shadows, 518; Zlotnik, “Yeltsin,” 146–8.

[105] Gorbachev, Memoirs, 446.

[106] Landsbergis, Lithuania, 199–213; Zlotnik, “Yeltsin,” 146–7; Gorbachev, Memoirs, 446–50. On Gorbachev's viewpoints regarding the relationship of Baltic sovereignty declarations and the Soviet constitution as well as moves towards a new Union Treaty, see EST-VM Venemaa/Ukraina 1990–1991, “Statement by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev regarding relationship between USSR and Estonia, Sunday, August 12, 1990.”

[107] See Spohr Readman, Germany, 28–9.

[108] EST-VM USA I 1990–1991, “Meeting 12 October 1990: Letter from Estonian-American National Council Inc. From Washington office: Report on Bush–Savisaar meeting.”

[109] Oplatka, Meri, 319.

[110] Dobbs, Down, 323–6; Harris, Subverting.

[111] See EST-VM Kirjavahetus 1990–1992 Suurbritannia-Iirimaa Laud, “Douglas Hurd 12 March 1991.”

[112] Thatcher, Downing Street, 821; “NSD 45 U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 20 August 1990,” http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/reserach/nsd/NSD/NSD%2045/0001.pdf [accessed on 4 July 2005].

[113] Attali, Verbatim, 821–2.

[114] Bozo, La fin, 363–4 and chapter 7. Attali, Verbatim, 781–91.

[115] EST-VM Poliitika V Prantsusmaa Juuni 1990–Märts 1993, “Meeting between Lennart Meri, Thierry de Beauce, Xavier North, Elizabeth Barsacq 23.11.1990.”

[116] EST-VM Islandi 1990–1992, “Meetings with Baltic representatives [7/1990–2/1991, undated document]”; “Statement by J. B. Hannibalsson in the general debate at the UN, 24.9.1990”; EST-VM Taani 1990-1992, “Baltic Bureau to be established in Copenhagen 28.9.1990”; “Letter of Poul Schluter to Savisaar, 15.10.1990”; “Danish Initiatives in support of the reform process in central and Eastern Europe, 14.12.1990.”

[117] EST-VM Taani 1990–1992, “Politiken articles of 21.12.1990.”

[118] EST-VM Soome 1990–1992, “P[otilde]hjamaade ja Baltiamaade VM-e kohtumise aruanne, 20. dets. 1990 Kopenhaagenis”; EST-VM Soome 1990–1992, “Declaration of the participating states of Conference 5+3 on the Baltic States. Draft (20.12.1990 Kopenhagen).”

[119] Koivisto, Historian tekijät, 404–12; Oplatka, Meri, 317.

[120] Margaret Thatcher, Speech at the Paris CSCE Summit, 19 November 1990; and HC STMNT: (CSCE Summit), 21 November 1990, http://www.margaretthatcher.org [accessed on 4 July 2005].

[121] EST VM Poliitika V Prantsusmaa Juuni 1990-Märts 1993, “üleskirjutus vestlusest prantsuse välisminister Alexandre [sic! It should be Roland] Dumas'ga, 19.11.1990”; “Letter of Michel Pelchat [president of Baltic study group of parliamentarians] to Gorbachev, 21.11.1990”; “Letter of Claude Huriet [senator] to Gorbachev, 21.11.1990.”

[122] EST-VM Prantsusmaa Juuni 1990–Märts 1993, “Republic of Estonia: Paris Declaration, 19.11.1990.”

[123] Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 211–13.

[124] Dunlop, “August Coup,” 96–8; Taylor, “Soviet Military,” 40–43.

[125] Thomas, “Human Rights,” 137–8.

[126] On the assumption that the crackdown was well planned, Kramer has further argued that it would probably have been worse had it not been for the peaceful nature of Lithuanian resistance; a pattern of behavior he has put down to the “demonstration effect” of changes in Eastern Europe. See Kramer, “Collapse (2),” 47–8.

[127] Oplatka, Meri, 326.

[128] Ibid., 325–7.

[129] Hoover Archives, Estonian Subject Collection, Box 1, “Baltic Appeal To the United Nations (BATUN): Special edition, 13 January 1991”; “BATUN: Special Edition, 20 January 1991”; “BATUN: World Reaction Builds to Soviet Use of Force against the Baltic States, 21 January 1991+updates.” See also The Washington Times, 27 May 1991.

[130] Hoover Archives, Estonian Subject Collection, Box 1, “BATUN: World Reaction Builds to Soviet Use of Force against the Baltic States, 21 January 1991.” EST VM Islandi 1990–1992, “Iceland's prime minister's letter to Gorbachev, 13 January 1991”; “Joint Statement by the Foreign Minister of Iceland and Estonia on 21 January 1991”; “Parliamentary Resolution adopted 11 February – unofficial translation.”

[131] EST-VM Islandi 1990–1992, “Position Paper presented by the Icelandic Foreign Minister, Mr Jon Baldwin Hannibalsson to the ambassador of the Soviet Union to Iceland on 12 April 1991.”

[132] EST-VM Taani 1990–1992, “Joint Protocol on cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Estonia, 11 March 1991”; “Uffe Elleman-Jensen article on Denmark's Baltic policy in Jyllands-Posten, 4 March 1991”; EST VM Islandi 1990–1992, “NL Välismin. noot Islandile, 15.2.1991.”

[133] EST-VM Taani 1990–1992, “Eesti Vabariigi Välimsministeeriumi alalise esindaja Arvo Alase eelinformatsioon Phjamaade Nòukogu 39. istungi kohta Kopenhaagenis, 23.2.1991.” Hoover Archives, Estonian Subject Collection, Box 1, “BATUN: World Reaction Builds to Soviet Use of Force against the Baltic States, 21 January 1991.”

[134] Kramer, “Collapse (1),” 213–15.

[135] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 February 1991, 4.

[136] Quote in ICE-MFA Iceland 8.G.2-6, “Icelandic embassy, Bonn Bad-Goderberg to MFA Reykjavik, 17 January 1991” according to Johannesson's notes given to the author, and also in diary of official from chancellor's office shown to the author.

[137] On Germany's caution with regard to supporting Baltic aspirations, see EST VM Taani 1990–1992, “Arvo Alas, telex Kopenhaagen, 2.2.1991.”

[138] EST-VM Prantsusmaa 1991.a–1993.a, “Kohli ja Mitterrandi kohtumine (Lille) 29.–30 ma˝rts 1991”; On calculations regarding 2+4 ratification, information from diary of official from chancellor's office shown to the author. On economic linkage see Newnham, “Price,” 421–46.

[139] EST-VM Saksamaa 1990–1992, “Kohtumine Hand-Dietrich Genscher, Janis Jurgans, Mavrik Wulfsons, A. Saudargas, V. Katkus, Lennart Meri, J. Luik, 20.6.1991.”

[140] Korte, “Solutions,” 1–22; idem, “Art of Power,” 64–90.

[141] On British views, EST-VM Kirjavahetus 1990–1992 Suurbritannia-Iirimaa Laud, “Susan Miller (FCO Soviet Dept) to Maido Kari (cc:fax to Lennart Meri), 19 April 1991”; “Letter from CRV Stragg (FCO Soviet Dept) to John Probert, 26 March 1991.” On French views, see Bozo, La fin, 364–5.

[142] EST-VM Prantsusmaa 1991.a–1993.a, “Michel Pelchat to Rüütel, 10.4.1991”; fax by Mrs Talvet, 17 April 1990 “representation diplomatique de L”Estonie à Paris”; “EV saatkond Pariisi: Raskustest kohtuprotsessi alustamisel 6. juuli 1991”; Meri to Dumas 30.5.1991”; EST-VM USA I 1990–1991, “Priit Pallum MFA to Hans Mirka, American Airlines 20.5.1991.” On British attitudes, see note 124 and EST-VM Kirjavahetus 1990–1992 Suurbritannia-Iirimaa Laud, “Letter from John Probert to David Ramsey on Parliamentary visits to the Baltic states, 5 March 1991”; “Sara Webb FT to Eerik Kross on the Estonian Legation in London, 14.3.1991.”

[143] Genscher told me in an interview on 14 April 1999 how he had to persuade an unwilling Helmut Kohl to agree to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Baltic states at the time of the putsch when the three states needed immediate support from the international community for their cause. For the Baltic states the putsch in Moscow was a real window of opportunity, which could not be missed. On the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, see also EST-VM Tunnustamine 1991–3, “Eesti Vabariigi otsene (taas)tunnustamine vastavate kirjade alusel.”

[144] Bush and Scowcroft, World, 537–40.

[145] Gates, Shadows, 525.

[146] Wallander, “Western Policy,” 171.

[147] On the issue of unpredictability and great uncertainty, see for instance “Speech by CIA Director William H. Webster before the Palm Beach Round Table on 20 March 1989,” CIA official use on DDRS [accessed on 4 July 2005].

[148] On rhetoric, cf. Creswell and Trachtenberg, “France,” 27.