‘A Different 1956’: British Responses to the Polish Events, June–November 1956

Abstract

This article examines British policy towards the ‘events’ of 1956 in Poland that resulted in the return to office of Wladyslaw Gomulka, and Polish hopes for greater autonomy, prosperity and freedom. The British were sceptical if not pessimistic observers of the Polish events. Muscular political comment was never seriously considered in Whitehall as a policy option: strategically, a divided Europe was seen to provide greater security for the West, despite any bid for fundamental political or economic reform in Poland.

History is astir again in Eastern Europe. Poles and Hungarians have risen up to challenge the pessimistic view that a modern dictatorial State, controlling all the means of education and propaganda, and backed by police and terror, can shape men like clay and rob them of their inner citadel of thought and spirit. (The Times, 25 October 1956)

Notes

 [1] See generally, Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 200–13; Bell, The World since 1945, 124–28.

 [2] This article is based upon evidence to which the British had access in 1956. There has been much good recent work based upon new sets of archives which adds great interest to the Polish and Hungarian events and to our understanding of what was actually going on in the Eastern bloc at the time. The Cold War International History Project remains the most formidable source for scholars who wish to track the evidence that newly released archives brings. However, the aim of this article is to reconstruct events as they were perceived in Whitehall at the time, and without the benefit of later historical research and insights.

 [3] See particularly Prazmowska, Britain and Poland; Davies, God's Playground.

 [4] United Kingdom National Archives (henceforth, UKNA), FO371/122790, Report to the North Atlantic Council on the visit to Krushchev to the UK, which indicates that ‘a beginning has been made’ and ‘signposts were created’ in terms of understanding and leader-to-leader contacts. The phrase ‘war of smiles’ was used by Sir Christopher Steel, the UK Ambassador to NATO, UKNA, FO371/131024, “Annual Review of Events Concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for 1956,” 21 January 1957. For the Geneva meeting, Bischof and Dockrill, Cold War Respite.

 [5] UKNA, FO371/122081, Record of Meeting, 26 July 1956; FO371/122099, Figgures to Wright, 9 April 1956, “Economic Relations with the Satellites,” 25 April 1956; minutes from FO, 1, 3 May 1956.

 [6] Lucas, Freedom's War, 251–55 highlights the hypocrisy of US liberation policy.

 [7] Hayter, A Double Life, 153.

 [8] The Embassy files, which have been heavily weeded, are held at UKNA, FO688. Many JIC papers are still closed, but those available are held at UKNA CAB158 and CAB179. Prime ministerial papers are held at UKNA, PREM11. It is noteworthy that the press reporting in The Manchester Guardian and The Times was often fuller than the reports filed from Warsaw.

 [9] UKNA, FO371/122585, “Annual Review for Poland for 1955.”

[10] UKNA FO688/91, Berthoud to Director of Research, FO, 21 December 1956.

[11] Ibid. Berthoud suggested that if the Research Department could not do this work themselves, they should approach the Royal Institute of International Affairs to do it for them.

[12] UKNA, FO371/122585, “Annual Review for Poland for 1955.”

[13] UKNA, FO371/128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956”; UKNA FO371/122592, no. 22, Noble to FO, 17 February 1956.

[14] UKNA, FO371/128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956.”

[15] UKNA, FO371/122589, Noble to FO, 4 June 1956.

[16] UKNA FO371/122592, passim; UKNA FO371/122593, 8 May 1956.

[17] Daily Mirror, 24 April 1956.

[18] UKNA, CAB158/25, JIC (56) 95, 3 September 1956.

[19] UKNA, CAB158/26, JIC, (56) 121, 14 November 1956.

[20] UKNA, FO371/122589, no. 148, Noble to Lloyd, 24 July 1956; FO371/122593, no. 417, Warsaw to FO, 29 June 1956. That the troops were not Russian, FO371/128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraph 6; UKNA, CAB179/1, JIC weekly report for period ending 5 July 1956.

[21] The Manchester Guardian, 30 June 1956.

[22] UKNA, FO371/122594, no. 424, 2 July 1956. These included the distinguished economist of the Soviet economy, Peter Wiles, as well as J. R. Sargent.

[23] UKNA, FO371/122594.

[24] UKNA FO371/122595, no. 131, 3 July 1956. Soviet troops were apparently not used, UKNA, FO371 12880, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraph 6.

[25] UKNA FO371/122594, Ward minute, 3 July 1956.

[26] UKNA, FO371/122594, Hohler minute, 3 July 1956.

[27] The Manchester Guardian, 30 June 1956, 1 July 1956; The Times, 30 June 1956, 1 July 1956; Lucas, Freedom's War, confirms Free Europe activity.

[28] UKNA, FO371/128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraph 7. It is noted here that, in retrospect, the Ambassador felt that the Embassy had underestimated the importance of this speech. See also UKNA, FO371/122787, “Trends of Communist Policy, July 1956.”

[29] UKNA, FO371/122597. Western diplomats were conscious that they had mishandled the East German uprising of 1953, and were anxious not to repeat this policy failure.

[30] UKNA, FO371/128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraph 10.

[31] UKNA, FO371/122081, meeting of 26 July 1956 between Secretary of State and leading FO officials. The paper by Ward that they discussed is dated 17 July 1956.

[32] UKNA, FO371/122099, Ward minute, 2 August 1956. UKNA, FO371/122081, meeting of 26 July 1956 between Secretary of State and leading FO officials. Papers made their way slowly around Whitehall: in September, Brimelow minuted that the ‘ill-conceived’ ideas should not be aired with the Russia Committee. FO371/122099, Brimelow minute, 18 September 1956.

[33] UKNA, FO371/122677, “General Ander's Petition,” 24 April 1956.

[34] He had been made a Marshall in the Second World War, before being sent to Poland and taking up citizenship there in 1949.

[35] The Manchester Guardian, 15 October 1956. There was also a strong Jewish and anti-Jewish dimension to the politics of these months, as many considered that the Jewish population was over-represented in government.

[36] UKNA, FO371/122599, minute by Balfour, 26 October 1956.

[37] The Times, 20 October 1956. UKNA, FO371/122599, Mathews minute recounts stories that Gomulka was sick, and had been maltreated in prison, 22 October 1956.

[38] UKNA, FO371/122589, no. 525, 6 August 1956.

[39] UKNA, FO371/122589, no. 164, 6 August 1956.

[40] UNKA, FO371/122589, FO minutes on the annual review for 1956.

[41] UKNA, FO371/12599, Berthoud to Foreign Secretary, 23 October 1956. This long telegram was sent to provide an overall picture of the events of 19–22 October, and to try to draw further comments and conclusions; for the FO resume of events, UKNA, FO371/122599, “Visit of the Soviet Leaders to Poland.”

[42] The Times, 20 October 1956, The Manchester Guardian, 20 October 1956.

[43] UKNA, FO371/122598, no. 721, 21 October 1956, Berthoud reported that the Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs joked to one of the Embassy staff that the unwelcome visitors did not even ask for visas. CAB179/1, JIC intelligence report for week ending 25 October 1956 indicated that the Polish upheavals were being assessed in Moscow in the light of contemporaneous events in Hungary, and in Yugoslavia. The FO took the view that the Soviets had no clear idea themselves of what they would do when they arrived in Warsaw on 19 October.

[44] UKNA, FO371/122598, no. 671, 20 October 1956; FO371/122599, no. 682, Belgrade to FO, 24 October 1956.

[45] UKNA/FO371/122600, FO minutes on no. 226 “S,” Berthoud to Lloyd, 30 October 1956.

[46] UKNA, FO371, no. 721, 21 October 1956.

[47] UKNA, FO371/122599, no. 218, 22 October 1956; no. 220, Berlin to FO, 23 October 1956; CAB179/1, weekly intelligence report for week ending 5 November.

[48] UKNA, FO371/122599, no. 727, 22 October 1956.

[49] UKNA, FO371, 122598, no. 2159, Washington to FO, 22 October 1956; see also McCauley, “Hungary and Suez,” 1956.

[50] UKNA, FO371/122599, Barker (Woton) to Brimelow (FO, London) letter, 19 October 1956. This was significant; George Kennan – no friend of Moscow – was to propose far-reaching changes to the European security system in 1957 in the Reith Lectures. For his interest in the Rapacki Plan he was to receive a public rebuke from Dean Acheson.

[51] The Times, 22 October 1956. See also, UKNA, FO371/122599, Barker (from the UK Embassy in Washington) to Brimelow, 19 October 1956.

[52] UKNA, FO371/122598, Cairncross to Logan, 22 October 1956.

[53] UKNA, FO371/122600, no. 226 “S,” 30 October 1956.

[54] UKNA, FO371/122599, no. 1442, Moscow to FO, 22 October 1956; 724, Warsaw to FO, 22 October 1956; 725, Warsaw to FO, 22 October 1956.

[55] UKNA, FO371/12599, Telegram 222, Warsaw to FO. This eight page telegram summed up the earlier, fragmented reports sent from the Embassy.

[56] Both The Manchester Guardian and The Times published a long summary of the speech, 22 October 1956; UKNA, FO371, 128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraph 13.

[57] UKNA, FO371/122675, Berthoud to Lloyd, 6 November 1956, on the establishment of a church–state commission, and for a moving account of Wyszinski's first celebration of mass on his return, and the careful phrases he used in his long sermon given to a packed and very emotional congregation.

[58] UKNA, FO371/122599, Balfour minute, 26 October 1956. In his inimitable style, Davies reflects that “Gomulka passed rapidly from national hero to crabbed old boss”; Europe, 1107.

[59] UKNA, FO371/122600, no. 226, 30 October 1956; UKNA, FO371/122601, no. 246, 19 November 1956.

[60] Gluc et al., “Hungarian Revolution and World Politics,” argue that Gomulka condemned the first Soviet intervention in Hungary, and only reluctantly supported the second because Hungary's desired neutrality would have jeopardised Poland's geostrategic position.

[61] UKNA, FO371, 128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraphs 14–15. There was little comment on the size of the demonstrations in Warsaw and elsewhere that took place during the Hungarian uprising and intervention.

[62] UKNA, FO371, 128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraphs 14–15, 20.

[63] UKNA, FO688/99, Brimelow to Berthoud, 18 November 1957. Dunbabin, The Cold War, argues that, as a result of Gomulka's domestic reforms, and despite the ideological and geopolitical constraints, Poland was then, ‘for a decade, the freest country in Eastern Europe’, 423.

[64] This is worth emphasising, as the Polish uprising has always had less coverage than the Hungarian, no doubt in part because intervention was forestalled, and less blood was spilt. It is barely mentioned, for example, in the biographies of Anthony Eden by Robert Rhodes James, David Dutton or D. R. Thorpe.

[65] The Manchester Guardian, 20 October 1956.

[66] The Manchester Guardian, 22 November 1956.

[67] The Times, 22 October 1956.

[68] Tudda, “Tantalus,” 3–35.

[69] UKNA, FO371 122380, telegram 180 on 27 October 1956. Christopher Steel, the British Ambassador to NATO, argued that ‘As we are not prepared to use force to liberate them, we should not encourage futile rebellions on their part’.

[70] NSC 5616, 31 October 1956, cited in Campbell, “Twin Crises,” 237; Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. XXV, 1955–57, 274; Department of State Bulletin, 5 November 1956, 695–99. Whereas the outcome for Poland was considered as well within the limits of what Dulles hoped for, some have considered that the American failure to act in Hungary in 1956 indicated that ‘American prestige was shattered’; Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, 176.

[71] UKNA, FO371/131024, “Annual Review of Events Concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for 1956,” 21 January 1957.

[72] “Report on Free Europe Press Operations,” Hugh Seton-Watson, 3 October 1956, CD Jackson papers, file 1956, Box 44. I am most grateful to Richard Aldrich for allowing me to see this document from the archives of the Eisenhower Library.

[73] Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 336–41. Richard Aldrich also kindly showed me a report by Robert Lang on why he resigned as director of the US' Radio Free Europe in March 1955, which unintentionally reveals the limited, factional and ad personam initiatives that liberationist groups were trying to carry out in Eastern Europe, and the mismanagement of the revelations of former Polish secret policeman Swiatlo on Radio Free Europe.

[74] “Report on Free Europe Press Operations,” Hugh Seton-Watson, 3 October 1956, CD Jackson papers, file 1956, Box 44, Eisenhower Library.

[75] This was a dilemma that was all-too-well understood by the Germans themselves throughout the later decades of the Cold War. Ash, In Europe's Name, 236–37, 303–4.

[76] One particularly sad reflection is that of Bros, “Les consequences,” 162–63. I am most grateful to Professor André Liebich, of the Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, Geneva, who drew my attention to this publication, and who also gave me valuable comments and insights into interpretations of the events of 1956.

[77] UKNA, FO371/122677, Zawiska to Lloyd, 29 October 1956.

[78] UKNA, FO371/122081, “Relations with the Soviet Union and the Satellites,” November 1956.

[79] UKNA, FO371, 122601, Berthoud letter to Reilly, 19 November 1956.

[80] UKNA, FO688, 99, Brimelow letter to Berthoud, 18 November 1957.

[81] UKNA, FO371/122081, Weston minute, 30 September 1956. This was a joint effort from the Treasury, FO and the Board of Trade (who had prevaricated when the issue of better trading relations was raised at the end of the previous year) that did not relate in its early stages to the October events: but Weston commented that prospects for Polish trade were not good, as Polish coal was more expensive even than American coal; and that bacon, the second staple export, was, by September, being contracted to private traders which would affect prices. A request from Arthur Lewis, MP, that a loan to Poland should be made, was turned down in November 1956, FO371/122099.

[82] Bienkowski, “The Political and Economic Situation,” 137–144. Bienkowski also argued that Poland's history was littered with the experience of opposition to laws imposed by conquerors: now the Poles were handicapped by an inability to shake off this mentality and develop better social discipline.

[83] UKNA, FO371, 128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956,” paragraphs 17–19; FO371/122617, “Policy towards Poland,” Annex B, “Propaganda to Poland,” 28 March 1956.

[84] UKNA, FO371/122081, minutes by Reilly, 17 November 1956, and Dean, 19 November 1956. The new paper was called “Relations with the Soviet Union and the Satellites.”

[85] Lachs, “Poland's Quest for European Security,” 305–9.

[86] UKNA, FO371/122081, “Relations with the Soviet Union and the Satellites,” November 1956.

[87] The Soviets pulled out their advisors from Egypt as the crisis began. McCauley, “Hungary and Suez, 1956,” 777–800. Despite the threats by Khrushchev to Britain and France on 5 November, Suez was not considered a causus belli by a Soviet government that was itself clearly divided even by what to do within Eastern Europe. Khrushchev was not initially aware of US views on Suez.

[88] Anthony Eden to Dwight Eisenhower, 5 November 1956, in Boyle, Eden–Eisenhower Correspondence, 184. This is the only time in which a reference to Poland is made in a letter from Eden to Eisenhower during this period.

[89] See, for example, UKNA, CAB 179/1, Joint Intelligence Committee Report on Soviet Policy, Annex I, “Soviet Designs on the Middle East,” report for period ending 15 November 1956: ‘The Soviet aim in the Middle East remains the elimination of Western influence and the substitution for it of Soviet protection. In pursuit of this, the Soviet leaders will use all means short of direct hostilities with the West, such as economic penetration, propaganda, subversion and if necessary, revolution. Their main weapon is Arab nationalism – ’, quoted in McCauley, “Hungary and Suez, 1956.”

[90] UKNA, FO371/128801, “Poland: Annual Review for 1956”; The Times, 1 July 1956.

[91] UKNA, 371/122081, “Relations with the Soviet Union and the Satellites,” November 1956.

[92] Gluc et al., “Hungarian Revolution,” 5. For an assessment of the continuity of Soviet policy, despite nervousness about the coincidence of events, see UKNA, FO371/122788, “Trends of Communist Policy: November 1956.”