Go-Between: Belgium and Détente, 1961–73

Abstract

The case of Belgium shows that in the area of détente, a small country will have more influence if it can cooperate with other small countries. The creation of the Benelux in 1944 and the Belgo-Polish dialogue of the 1960s, which paved the way for the ‘Reykjavik signal’, are clear examples of this. Moreover, in order to have even a slight influence on the international scene, the personality of the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister played a key role. Belgium's geographical situation was also an important factor. Finally, a small country, if it wishes to take initiatives, must have the support of larger countries. Without the ongoing support of the United States, Pierre Harmel would have been unable to persuade the Alliance to adopt his report.

Notes

  [1] On this question, see the thoughts of Fleury, “ºLes petits Etats,” 16,ºwho bases himself in particular on J.-B. Duroselle. See also Allain (ed.), La Moyenne Puissance au XXe siècle; Helmreich, Belgium and Europe; Coolsaet, Belgïe en zijn Buitenlandse Politiek; Trausch, Le rôle et la place des Petits Pays; van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd; Van den Wijngaert and Buellens, Oost West, West Best.

  [2] Brouwer, “La Belgique dans la politique européenne des Pays-Bas,” 217.

  [3] Dujardin and Dumoulin, Paul van Zeeland, 186.

  [4] On this see note 33.

  [5] See, however, Van den Wijngaert and Buellens, Oost West, West Best; Desmedt, “M. Spaak et M. Harmel”; Stengers, “La crise de 1968 vue de l'OTAN”; Dumoulin, Spaak; Dujardin, Pierre Harmel.

  [6] Paul van Zeeland, on 14 November 1951, speaking to the UN, declared himself to be in favour of disarmament. But politically speaking he was at the same time recommending vigilance, and told Acheson on 2 September 1951 that Belgium could do without the Marshall Plan if, in return, the US would strengthen measures for collective defence. See memorandum of the conversation, in UCL-GEHEC, Papiers van Zeeland, no. 272.

  [7] The Van Zeeland Plan of 1953 contained a renewed offer of negotiations with the East. It advocated the political unification of Germany, which would have its sovereignty fully restored, with the holding of free elections organized by the Germans leading to a single German government. Moreover, a series of mutual commitments were listed. The Russians would have to agree to the setting up of a European army including Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany, as well as the neutralization and demilitarization of Eastern Germany. In return, American, British and French troops would be withdrawn from the centre of Germany and transferred west of the Rhine. Only troops from the European army would be stationed on German territory in Bonn, between the Rhine and the eastern border of the Federal Republic. Russia would withdraw its 250,000 men from Germany. A buffer-zone would thus be created in Eastern Germany, and Soviet and allied forces would no longer be facing each other. Peace would thus be strengthened, and the possibility of generalised disarmament could be reconsidered. The text of the plan can be found ibid., no. 3.10. See also Soutou, La guerre de Cinquante Ans, 291.

  [8] As van Zeeland told the Italian ambassador to Brussels on 7 October 1943. Cf ibid.

  [9] Note concerning the Council of ministers of 19 October 1953, ibid., no. 3.9.

 [10] Deloge, “Paul van Zeeland et les questions de sécurité,” 88.

 [11] Deloge, “Paul van Zeeland et les questions de sécurité,”, 93.

 [12] Deloge, “Paul van Zeeland et les questions de sécurité,”, 95.

 [13] Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955–1957, vol. IV, Western European Security and Integration, no. 7, Paris, 11 May 1955.

 [14] Dumoulin, Spaak, 543.

 [15] Dumoulin, Spaak,, 544.

 [16] Newsweek, 6 May 1957.

 [17] Dumoulin, Spaak, 568.

 [18] APS, session of 5 March 1964.

 [19] Spaak, Combat inachevés, t. 2, Paris, 1969, 216–17.

 [20] Dumoulin, Spaak, 567.

 [21] Dumoulin, Spaak, 625.

 [22] Dumoulin, Spaak

 [23] Van den Wijngaert and Beullens, “De Buitenlandse en militaire politiek van Belgïe in een gebipolariseerde wereld,” 59.

 [24] Marian Naszkowski, Paryz-Moskwa, wspomnienia dyplomaty 1945–1950, Warsaw, 1986, 127–128.

 [25] AMAEP (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), IV/17/51, internal memo from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1963.

 [26] Quoted in Dumoulin, Spaak, 621–32.

 [27] Desmedt, “M. Spaak et M. Harmel,” 604.

 [28] Desmedt, “M. Spaak et M. Harmel,”, 632.

 [29] Soutou, “La décision française,” 185–208.

 [30] APS, 15 January 1969.

 [31] Dujardin, Pierre Harmel, 572.

 [32] American memorandum on the Harmel–Johnson conversation, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Department of State (DOS), E111B. Nato 3 Bel, Washington, 20 May 1966.

 [33] Archives du ministre des Affaires étrangères de France (AMAEF), Europe–Belgique, 1966–70, 2269, de Crouy-Chanel to Couve de Murville, Brussels, 27 October 1966.

 [34] Several studies have been made of the Harmel report, from various angles. From the French viewpoint Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance”; from largely American archives, Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance”; from a more general viewpoint, Haftendorn, “The Adaptation of the NATO Alliance.” This article is an adaptation and updating by Helga Haftendorn of the chapter “The Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliances” in her book NATO and the Nuclear Revolution , 320–74. See also Guderzo, Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale, 434–55; Cleveland, NATO, 144–7; Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”; Dujardin, Pierre Harmel.

 [35] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 99–110.

 [36] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 99–110

 [37] See also infra.

 [38] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 99–110.

 [39] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 99–110

 [40] Bagnato, “Handling the Alliance in a Time of Change,” art. cit.

 [41] Bagnato, “ºHandling the Alliance in a Time of Change.”

 [42] Bagnato, “ºHandling the Alliance in a Time of Change.”

 [43] Bagnato, “ºHandling the Alliance in a Time of Change.”

 [44] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 99.

 [45] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1870, Knight to DOS, 5 June 1968.

 [46] Bagnato, “Handling the Alliance in a Time of Change.”

 [47] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 398.

 [48] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 398

 [49] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 398

 [50] FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, no. 130. Record of the discussion between Jerzy Michalowski and Walter J. Stoessel Jr. (Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), 13–14 December 1967.

 [51] Louis Colot, had been principal private secretary to Paul van Zeeland (1949–51).

 [52] AMAEF, Europe-Belgique, 1966–70, 2269, de Crouy–Chanel to Paris, Brussels, 28 July 1966.

 [53] Public Record Office, Foreign Office (PRO, FO) 33/14. This report is dated February 1967.

 [54] For a further description of the Italian position within NATO, see Varsori, “A Minor Ally?,” 75–90.

 [55] The Italian representative, A. Alessandrini, had already announced this to his American counterpart, Harlan Cleveland, at the beginning of November. FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, no. 274. Record of the conversation between Harmel and Rostow in Brussels on 6 November 1967.

 [56] Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 337–44.

 [57] Van den Wijngaert and Beullens, “De Buitenlandse en militaire politiek van Belgïe in een gebipolariseerde wereld,” 60.

 [58] See Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 276 and 418.

 [59] See Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,”, 119.

 [60] See The Guardian, 18 January 1967.

 [61] Le dialogue belgo-polonais sur le désarmement en Europe, April 1968, in Archives générales du Royaume, Papiers Harmel (AGR, PH).

 [62] Le dialogue belgo-polonais sur le désarmement en Europe, April 1968, in Archives générales du Royaume, Papiers Harmel (AGR, PH)

 [63] AGR, PH.

 [64] For more details on these meetings between Harmel and his Eastern counterparts, see Dujardin, Pierre Harmel, 657–73.

 [65] AGR, PH, Brandt to Harmel, Bonn, 29 May 1968.

 [66] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1870, Knight to DOS, 5 June 1968. The diplomat writes that the ‘Foreign Affairs minister kept [the embassy] very closely informed as to the content of discussions’.

 [67] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1870, Knight to DOS, 5 June 1968. The diplomat writes that the ‘Foreign Affairs minister kept [the embassy] very closely informed as to the content of discussions’

 [68] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 989309/16, Harmel to Rostow, Brussels, 15 May 1968.

 [69] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 989309/16, Harmel to Rostow, Brussels, 15 May 1968

 [70] FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, no. 307, Rusk to Harmel, Washington, 25 May 1968.

 [71] Soutou, “L'attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l'Allemagne,” 294.

 [72] Soutou, La guerre de Cinquante Ans, 478. This is what Harmel was advocating in October 1967. See Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 276.

 [73] Soutou, La guerre de Cinquante Ans, 478.

 [74] Record of the Stewart–Harmel discussion of 14 July 1969 in PRO, FCO 33/443. See also NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969033/212, J.S.D. Eisenhower to DOS, 20 May 1970.

 [75] As Pierre Harmel said to Eugene Rostow on 22 November 1966. See Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 89.

 [76] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969033/212, J.S.D. Eisenhower to DOS, report of 20 May 1970.

 [77] Record of the discussion in PRO, FCO 33/1298. See also NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969033/2120. This contains a summary note on Belgian–American relations, dated 19 January 1971. Archives Nationales de France (ANF), Papiers Pompidou, 5AG2/1013, Record of discussions between the French President and the President of the Council of Ministers of Belgium in the Palais royal in Brussels, 25 May 1971 from 10h00 to 11h30.

 [78] ANF, Papiers Pompidou, 5AG2/1013, Jean-Bernard Raimond (head of mission, deputy Secretary General at the Elysée) to Pompidou, Paris, 6 August 1969.

 [79] We are using here the translation made by a diplomat at the French embassy in Moscow. See AMAEF, Europe-Belgique, 1966–70, 2269, Raoul Delahaye à Paris, Moscou, 29 July 1969. The article in Izwestia, entitled “Fruitful Negotiations,” dates from 28 July 1969.

 [80] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969033/2120. This contains a summary note on Belgian–American relations, dated 19 January 1971.

 [81] AMAEP, 17/48/5. The note is signed Raczka.

 [82] On this subject see Dujardin, Pierre Harmel, 308–19.

 [83] Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête par MM. Daniel Bacquelaine, Ferdy Willems et Marie-Thérèse Coenen. Enquête parlementaire visant à déterminer les circonstances exactes de l'assassinat de Patrice Lumumba et l'implication éventuelle des responsables politiques belges dans celui-ci, Chambre des représentants de Belgique, 16 November 2001, 772.

 [84] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1869, Knight to Secretary of State, Brussels, 10 July 1967, 12h43.

 [85] As told by Harmel to the United States Ambassador. NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1869, Knight to Secretary of State, Brussels, 10 July 1967, 9h05.

 [86] This is what he said to Knight. NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1869, Knight to Secretary of State, Brussels, 22 July 1967.

 [87] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1869, DOS to Knight, Washington, 25 July 1967. Document not signed.

 [88] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969000/1869, 3 August 1967.

 [89] Constantin Léopold Patijn, born in 1908 in's-Gravenhage, was Professor of International Relations at the University of Utrecht. A member of the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), he was a member of the Dutch Parliament from 1956 to 1978.

 [90] For a history of the various sub-groups, see Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 173–266 and 501–56.

 [91] “Le transfert du SHAPE et du Conseil de l'OTAN en Belgique,” CHCRISP, 357, no.10 (March 1967): 22.

 [92] AMAEB, Service de sécurité européenne, van der Straten–Waillet to Harmel, The Hague, 29 June 1966.

 [93] AMAEPB, 2613, G. Beelaerts van Blokland to Luns, Moscow, 29 July 1969.

 [94] The political writer A. van Staden, feels that Luns copied his Ostpolitik from Harmel (Een trouwe bondgenoot, p. 158). This theory was taken up by Duco Hellema (Neutraliteit en vrijhandel, 158–9).

 [95] The political writer A. van Staden, feels that Luns copied his Ostpolitik from Harmel (Een trouwe bondgenoot, p. 158). This theory was taken up by Duco Hellema (Neutraliteit en vrijhandel, 158–9)

 [96] The political writer A. van Staden, feels that Luns copied his Ostpolitik from Harmel, 159.

 [97] Partij van de Arbeid.

 [98] For the PvdA's assessment of the Harmel exercise, see Zuijdam, Tussen wens en werkelijkheid, 185–6.

 [99] Van Staden, Een trouwe bondgenoot, 158.

[100] Van Staden, Een trouwe bondgenoot, 154.

[101] Labohm (ed.), De waterdragers van het Nederlandse europabeleid; Harryvan et al . (eds.), Voor Nederland en Europa. Neither is he mentioned in Molegraaf, Boeren in Brussel.

[102] On 14 February 1948, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium responded together to Ernest Bevin's call for treaties to be signed between the ‘free nations of Western Europe’, even though the customs union treaty, which had just come into force, did not require them to do so.

[103] Agger, “Denmark's Pursuit of a Policy of Détente”; Faurby, “Danish Alliance Policy 1967–1993,” 55–91; Villaume, “Denmark and NATO Through 50 Years,” 29–61.

[104] The Director of the Politico-Juridical Department of the Danish Foreign ministry wrote in September 1967: ‘Danish participation in the operation must have as its main objective to elicit a result which can support the declared policy of the government. This aims at the effect that NATO, and also Danish membership of it, must live on. Hence it follows that, seen from a narrow Danish point of view, it does not per se revolve around making the Alliance viable, seen objectively, for it will pull through – but around making it more attractive to the part of the Danish electorate which is, or may be, sceptical. The key instrument in this policy up to this point has been, and must supposedly be during the Harmel study too, a stronger assertion of NATO's role as protagonist of détente between East and West’. Agger, “Denmark's Pursuit of a Policy of Détente.”

[105] In the words of the Danish representative, Henning Hjorth-Nielsen, on 17 January 1967. Charles, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,” 126.

[106] Agger, “Denmark's Pursuit of a Policy of Détente.”

[107] Agger, “Denmark's Pursuit of a Policy of Détente.”

[108] The New York Times Magazine, 24 September 1944, 9 and 44. On 26 July 1944, van Zeeland was congratulated in a letter from A. Berle, assistant to the American Secretary of State for his article “Small Countries and International Reorganization,” see Dujardin and Dumoulin, Paul van Zeeland, 217.

[109] Van Zeeland, “L'Otan et les petits Etats,” 8. On the role of small countries in the post-war period, see also van Zeeland, “Belgium in the Postwar World.”

[110] NARA, DOS, Belgium, 969033/212, J.S.D. Eisenhower to DOS, 20 May 1970. This is a report on Belgian foreign policy in 1969.

[111] Archives générales du Royaume, Papiers Harmel (AGR, PH), Rusk to Harmel, Washington, 4 February 1969.

[112] Dujardin, Pierre Harmel, 619.

[113] See Helmreich, Belgium and Europe, 380.

[114] Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity.”

[115] Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West, 11–14, 152–4. When Carter, Giscard d'Estaing, Schmidt and Calaghan agreed on the famous ‘dual track decision’ at the Summit of Guadeloupe in January 1979, they stuck to the main ideas of the Harmel report of 1967, centring around the two main elements – defence and détente. The idea behind this was really to propose to the Soviets negotiations on the withdrawal of the SS-20s. But were this to meet with refusal, the agreement was that the US should establish in Europe Pershing II and cruise missiles which could reach the territory of the USSR. Cf. Soutou, La guerre de Cinquante Ans, 599.

[116] Bozo, La France et l'OTAN, 183.

[117] Harmel to Zagladin, 19 October 2000, in AGR, PH.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Vincent Dujardin

Vincent Dujardin is Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL, Belgium) and Research Associate at the National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS, Belgium). Since 1995, he has been carrying out research on the political history of Belgium, European integration and international relations. He recently published the book Pierre Harmel (Brussels, Le Cri, 2004).