Abstract
This article introduces and includes the Nicoll Report – a previously classified document written to assess the performance of the British Joint Intelligence Committee in warning about foreign acts of aggression. The Nicoll Report is a hugely significant document for four main reasons: it provides detail on intelligence estimates for case studies which have not yet been released into the archive; it provides an examination of the JIC's failures and in doing so it is far more candid than the ‘open’ investigations conducted by Lord Franks and Lord Butler; it provides an exploration of how intelligence must be relevant to policy-makers in order for it to be useful; and finally, it identifies general lessons for the future and which are immensely revealing with the benefit of hindsight.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Pete Davies, Peter Hennessy and Michael Herman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this.
Notes
[1] In a sense the Cabinet Office Advisory Group on intelligence records continues this role in the way that it suggests areas for proactive release.
[2] CitationCradock, Know Your Enemy, 261. For more explanation of the role of intelligence within the British government, see http://www.intelligence.gov.uk.
[3] CitationFreedman, The Official History of the Falklands War, Vol.I, 219–21 and Vol.II, 720.
[4] See (Cmnd.8787) CitationLord Franks, The Falkland Islands Review; (HC 898) CitationLord Butler, Review.
[5] Cradock. Know Your Enemy.
[6] Available at: http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/central_intelligence_machinery/joint_intelligence_committee/jic_terms.aspx.
[7] For more detail see CitationGoodman, “Learning to Walk”.
[8] In times of crisis the Committee would meet more frequently. In addition, when necessary the Current Intelligence Groups could issue urgent assessments on their own authority.
[9] Freedman. The Official History of the Falklands War.
[10] Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear.