Norms as a rhetorical competition: Soviet–American confrontations over Cuba, 1970–85Michael Griesdorf is a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He received his PhD from Harvard University in 2006.

Michael Griesdorf is a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He received his PhD from Harvard University in 2006.

Abstract

After going to the brink of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in 1962 President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev resolved the crisis by establishing an ambiguous ‘Understanding’, the terms of which were never publicly signed or ratified. In the absence of an explicit agreement in 1962, over the next 20 years the United States and the Soviet Union continued to compete over Cuba by seeking to portray revisionist behaviour as consistent or in concordance with the ’62 Understanding. I argue that this interaction is indicative of rhetorical-oriented conception of norms. Against constructivist approaches that focus on social identity and contractual institutionalist literature that focuses on focal points and convergent expectations, this approach emphasizes how states use norms to compete under circumscribed conditions. Under this perspective, norms are organic entities, which like the concept of judicial review, evolve in meaning in conjunction with their practical use.

Notes

Michael Griesdorf is a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He received his PhD from Harvard University in 2006.

  [1] Particularly important are Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; Nixon, RN: Memoirs; Brzezinski, Power and Principle; Vance, Hard Choices; Carter, Keeping Faith; Dobrynin, In Confidence; Gromyko, Memories.

  [2] Particularly important here are the declassified documents tabulated by the National Security Archive (US) and the International Cold War History Project (USSR). See also , ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’; Garthoff, ‘Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis’; Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’; Prados, Keepers of the Keys; Smith and Dominguez, Subject to Solution.

  [3] Kennedy later placed the odds that the CMC might have led to nuclear war as ‘somewhere between one out of three and even, in Sorenson, Kennedy, 705.

  [4] Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 19.

  [5] For examples of constructivist work on norms, see Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security; Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights’; Checkel, ‘Social Construction and Integration’.

  [6] Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict; Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation; Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy.

  [7] Checkel, ‘Why Comply?’, 555. Checkel describes contractual institutionalist approaches to norms as ‘rationalist.’

  [8] Cortell and Davis, ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact’; Powell, ‘Anarchy’.

  [9] Checkel, ‘Why Comply?’, 559.

 [10] Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap’, 117.

 [11] Fierke and Wiener, ‘Constructing Institutional Interests’, 724

 [12] Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 891.

 [13] Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory.

 [14] See Ronald Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson's claim that ‘norms are inherently subject to challenge and that the rhetorical arrangements sustaining norms are never fully stabilized and are at best relatively stable.’ Krebs and Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms’, 41.

 [15] Wiener, ‘Contested Compliance’.

 [16] Taylor, ‘To Follow a Rule…’, 57.

 [17] Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

 [18] See Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’.

 [19] Hurrell, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes’, 61.

 [20] Kratochwil, ‘How do Norms Matter?’, 52.

 [21] Dobrynin confirms that the Soviets perceived the Americans as operating according to this normative orientation, writing: ‘All subsequent US Administrations [after Kennedy] confirmed in one way or another their readiness to abide by the 1962 accords. On the other hand, the Americans repeatedly presented us with various claims attempting to interpret the accords more broadly, that is, in their own interest. They tried to take advantage of the fact that the understanding had never been formalized in writing.’ Dobrynin, In Confidence, 91.

 [22] Kennedy, ‘The President's News Conference of Nov. 20, 1962’, 831.

 [23] Dobrynin writes, ‘Kennedy had abstained from formalizing his commitment not to attack Cuba because Castro had refused to allow the Americans to monitor the removal of Soviet offensive weapons on site.’ Dobrynin, In Confidence, 91.

 [24] See Kennedy, Thirteen Days; Rusk, As I Saw It, for confirmation of the Jupiter trade. Dobrynin notes that ‘Kennedy was proclaimed the big winner in the crisis because no one knew about the secret deal [to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey].’ Dobrynin, In Confidence, 91.

 [25] It was not until 1973 that the White House released the official texts of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev's correspondences during the Cuban Missile Crisis, under Executive Order 11652. See ‘Messages Exchanged’.

 [26] The head of the USSR Merchant Fleet, I. Bakaev, outlines how the Americans conducted both aerial and on-board inspections of the IL-28 rockets that the Soviets removed from Cuba as part of the Missile Crisis settlement. See Bakaev, ‘Memorandum’.

 [27] ‘After the 1962 Crisis had ended, the US had never issued any public or official statement of commitment not to invade Cuba, since the requirements of the highly conditional statement of President Kennedy on 20 November 1962 – which called for international inspection to verify the absence of offensive arms – had not been met.’ Garthoff, Détente, 92.

 [28] Kennedy, ‘President's News Conference’, 832.

 [29] This list was not visible in the declassified documents until 1978: Stevenson, ‘United States–Soviet Understandings’. Stevenson's authorship is not challenged. In a declassified draft of this document, Document 0280, this list is blacked out. In a November 15, 1962 telegram from Gromyko to Mikoyan, Gromyko underscores that Mikoyan should instruct the Americans that the Soviets interpret the term ‘offensive weaponry’ to refer to any ‘weapons that we agreed to remove from Cuba following the agreement reached by correspondence between the heads of our two governments’, expressing concern that the Soviets not give the Americans the chance to broadly and arbitrarily interpret the term ‘offensive’ weaponry to include other sorts of weaponry (including nuclear arms) that the Americans might classify as offensive.’ See Gromyko, ‘Telegram’.

 [30] Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 633. Emphasis original.

 [31] McCloy, ‘Meeting’.

 [32] Kennedy, ‘Proclamation 3504’, 809.

 [33] Cleveland, ‘Conversation’.

 [34] Stevenson, ‘Draft Text’.

 [35] Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 633; Garthoff, Détente, 91 relays Voronstov's oral explanation for posing the question: the Soviets were ‘concerned over a possible American attack, and that the Soviets did not want to again arouse Cuban fears at being endangered by USSR rapprochement with the US.’

 [36] Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 637.

 [37] See Kissinger, White House Years, 638.

 [38] See Garthoff, Reflections, 146; Garthoff, ‘Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis’, 54.

 [39] Nixon, RN: Memoirs, 487.

 [40] Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 649.

 [41] Ibid., 650.

 [42] Indeed, Garthoff argues that the Soviets were motivated to construct the Cienfuegos base in order to ‘erase that legacy from a time of American superiority […], an imposed constraint not in keeping with “parity” with the United States as a global power, to which they now aspired. In Garthoff, Reflections, 145.

 [43] Kissinger, White House Years, 345.

 [44] See New York Times, 1 October 1970; New York Times, 4 October 1970.

 [45] Haig, Inner Circles, 255.

 [46] Sulzberger, ‘Ugly Clouds in the South’.

 [47] Garthoff, ‘Considerations’.

 [48] Garthoff, Reflections, 147.

 [49] Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 650.

 [50] As cited by Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 650. Dobrynin is more circumspect on the subject, writing in his memoirs that Kissinger was concerned there had been ‘no Soviet reaction to his message […] expressing concern over the increased activity servicing Soviet submarines in Cuban ports’. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 210.

 [51] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971, 24412.

 [52] Several times in February 1971, US and Soviet forces exchanged flares and high-speed manoeuvres in the Caribbean. See Garthoff, ‘Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis’, 59.

 [53] Nixon, ‘The President's News Conference’, 163. Kissinger justifies the American concession by writing, ‘formally proscribing port calls would have had widespread ramifications for the movement of the US Navy and our principle of the freedom of the seas’, Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 652. Emphasis added.

 [54] Blechman and Levinson, ‘The Umpteenth Confrontation’.

 [55] Evans and Novak, ‘Cuba's MiG 23s’. Garthoff claims that the deliveries began in April 1978, in Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’, 438.

 [56] Evans and Novak, ‘Cuba's MiG 23s’.

 [57] Evans and Novak, ‘Cuba's MiG 23s’.

 [58] See Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’, 348; Garthoff, Détente, 682.

 [59] Brown cites in particular Senator Stone of Florida, who faced re-election in 1980 and had alienated many constituents when he voted in favour of the Panama Canal Treaty. See Brown, ‘Demarche’.

 [60] Garthoff, Détente, 682; The American reconnaissance is confirmed in a David Newsom summary document prepared during the Brigade Crisis. ‘Through surveillance and diplomatic exchanges we ascertained that the MiG23s in Cuba were not configured so as to have a nuclear weapon capability.’ Newsom, ‘Statement’.

 [61] Carter, ‘The President's News Conference’.

 [62] In both the MiG 23 and Brigade Crises, Brzezinski continually argues that an enhanced Cuban military will increase its interventions in Africa, particularly in Angola and Zaire. See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 340–356.

 [63] Carter writes that he chose Brzezinski as his NSA to ensure that opinions from both the left and right were articulated in the White House. See Carter, Keeping Faith, 52.

 [64] Garthoff, Détente, 682.

 [65] Kennedy, ‘Radio and Television Report’, 806.

 [66] Prados, Keepers, 402.

 [67] Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’, 438.

 [68] Garthoff felt that it was conceivable that Kennedy would have tightened the embargo on 20 November had the Soviets refused to remove the IL-28s, in Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’, 437.

 [69] In a 6 November 1962 document, Kuznetsov and Zorin challenge the offensive designation of the IL-28 in a meeting with Stevenson and McCloy, arguing that the ‘IL-28 bomber […] is a purely defensive weapon, long ago outmoded, and that it can be used only for coastal defense when escorted by anti-aircraft units.’ See Kuznetsov and Zorin, ‘Telegram’.

 [70] ‘Bundy had anticipated the IL-28s and his statement on October 14 clearly signaled that a modest number of these bombers for conventional bomb delivery – such as had been supplied both to Egypt and Indonesia – would not alone be regarded as representing a “major offensive capability”’. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 180.

 [71] ‘After describing the MRBM and IRBM missile sites, Kennedy stated: ‘In addition, jet bombs, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba while the necessary air bases are being prepared.’ The quarantine of 23 October included among the offensive arms prohibited from entering Cuba bomber aircraft, not further defined.’ Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’, 430.

 [72] Kuznetsov rejected a request made on 5 November by UN Secretary-General U Thant that the IL-28s be removed, writing ‘the bombers are “a new issue” […] and are not covered in the Kennedy–Khrushchev correspondence’. Reported by Stevenson, ‘Summary’.

 [73] Garthoff, Détente, 415.

 [74] Vance, ‘Secretary's Letter July 27, 1979’, 63.

 [75] Newsom, ‘Soviet Ground Unit in Cuba’.

 [76] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 347.

 [77] Prados, Keepers, 404; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 347; Oberdorfer, ‘Cuban Crisis’.

 [78] Quoted in Garthoff, ‘American Reaction’, 429; Oberdorfer, ‘Cuban Crisis’ 1979. Emphasis added.

 [79] Dobrynin describes the Brigade Crisis as a ‘farce [that] cost the ratification of the treaty’. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 429.

 [80] All exerts are taken from Department of State Bulletin 79, no. 2031 (October 1979): 63–6.

 [81] In the 1 October Address to the Nation on Peace and National Security, Carter outlines the Soviet position as follows: ‘The Soviet Union [has assured the US] […] that the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training and can do nothing more; that they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities.’ Carter, ‘Peace and National Security’, 1804.

 [82] As reported by Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 350. Dobrynin reports telling Cyrus Vance that ‘It's still the old stuff. I've just come from Moscow and I checked it all again. Nothing has changed from 1962. It's the same situation as during the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations.’ Dobrynin also suggests that the entire Brigade Crisis was a ‘premeditated leak’ instigated by American intelligence. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 429, 428.

 [83] ‘Only Henry Kissinger remained adamant: No such Soviet unit had been in Cuba during his time in office’, Prados, Keepers, 405. Emphasis original.

 [84] Bundy, ‘The Brigade's My Fault’. Emphasis added.

 [85] Carter, ‘Peace and National Security’, 1802–6.

 [86] ‘I should have judged more accurately the extent of the President's concern for SALT and I might have served the President's interests better if I had concentrated my efforts on dampening down the whole issue’, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 352.

 [87] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346.

 [88] Vance was answering a reporter's question concerning whether he would ask the Soviets to remove the troops. Of the status quo remark, Oberdorfer writes, ‘it implies that you are going to be able to do something about the Soviet buildup, […] thus setting up a public perception of failure if this does not happen.’ Oberdorfer, ‘Cuban Crisis’, 1979.

 [89] Oberdorfer, ‘Cuban Crisis’, 1979.

 [90] Carter, ‘Question and Answer Session’, 1760.

 [91] Garthoff, Détente, 431, and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 359.

 [92] Both Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 359, and Prados, Keepers, 404, support this assessment.

 [93] Reagan, ‘Remarks’, 1274.

 [94] Reagan, ‘Radio Address to the Nation’, 1477.

 [95] Clines, ‘President Accuses Soviets’.

 [96] See Maoz and Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace’; Owen, ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’.

 [97] Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences’.

 [98] Clines, ‘President Accuses Soviets’.

 [99] Garthoff, Détente, 435.

[100] See Casey, ‘The Real Threat in El Salvador’.

[101] Reagan, ‘Radio Address’, 1477.

[102] The applause is noted in Reagan, ‘Remarks’, 1274.

[103] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 406.

[104] Chayes and Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, 189.