Sunset over Atomic Apartheid: United States–South African nuclear relations, 1981–93

Martha van Wyk is a Lecturer in International Studies at Monash South Africa. She obtained her DPhil from the University of Pretoria in 2005, on the topic of the institution and implementation of the 1977 US arms embargo against South Africa. The research for this article was partly undertaken in her previous capacity as post-doctoral research fellow in the Department of Historical Studies, University of Johannesburg. Her current research entails United States–South African military and nuclear relations during and after the Cold War. She is working on a monograph on the topic, utilizing international multi-archival sources. Correspondence to: Dr. Martha van Wyk, Department of International Studies, School of Arts, Monash South Africa, Private Bag X60, Roodepoort, 1725, South Africa. [email protected]

Abstract

This article, based on multi-archival research in the United States of America and South Africa, analyzes the nuclear relationship between South Africa and the US during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations, by tracing South Africa's journey to non-proliferation during the last decade of the Cold War. During the Reagan years, anti-communism and the Cold War formed a major component of US foreign policy and dictated a closer nuclear relationship between the US and South Africa, coupled with US non-proliferation efforts vis-à-vis South Africa. At the end of the 1980s, the US efforts coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet support and indeed a nuclear war potential from Southern Africa. In late 1989, South Africa at last gave up its nuclear weapons development and destroyed all its nuclear weapons, followed by signature of the NPT in July 1991.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the University of Johannesburg and the South African National Research Foundation for funding to undertake partial research for this article in the United States.

Notes

Martha van Wyk is a Lecturer in International Studies at Monash South Africa. She obtained her DPhil from the University of Pretoria in 2005, on the topic of the institution and implementation of the 1977 US arms embargo against South Africa. The research for this article was partly undertaken in her previous capacity as post-doctoral research fellow in the Department of Historical Studies, University of Johannesburg. Her current research entails United States–South African military and nuclear relations during and after the Cold War. She is working on a monograph on the topic, utilizing international multi-archival sources. Correspondence to: Dr. Martha van Wyk, Department of International Studies, School of Arts, Monash South Africa, Private Bag X60, Roodepoort, 1725, South Africa. [email protected]

 [1] In 1968, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was accepted by the United Nations General Assembly with an overwhelming majority. The NPT was sponsored jointly by the US and the Soviet Union, and is aimed at curbing the development and spreading of nuclear weapons. Its main provision is that signatory countries that do not possess nuclear weapons will voluntarily refrain from acquiring or manufacturing such weapons or nuclear explosive devices of any kind. Those countries that are deemed nuclear weapons powers and sign the treaty, agree to refrain from assisting any non-nuclear weapon country to acquire nuclear weapons, but agree to assist those signatory countries in all forms of peaceful nuclear development (De Onis, ‘Nuclear Treaty endorsed in U.N. by 92-to-4 vote’, 1, 2).

 [2] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 369–70; Keller, ‘South Africa Says it Built 6 Atom Bombs’, A1; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’.

 [3] Armaments Corporation of South Africa.

 [4] Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 53–4; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 284; Malan, My Life with the South African Defence Force, 216.

 [5] General Magnus Malan quoted in Hamann, Days of the Generals, 165.

 [6] South African Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter SAFAA), Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African dimension’, undated.

 [7] South African Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter SAFAA), Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African dimension’, Undated

 [8] The ‘total strategy’ emerged from a policy review by Prime Minister John Vorster in the wake of the widespread rioting in black communities in 1976. Vorster insisted that the position of whites in South Africa was not negotiable and commissioned the development of a ‘total strategy’ to stave off pressures for majority rule. The strategy also included guidelines on countering non-conventional actions like ideological, economic, psychological and cultural-religious onslaughts. This in effect meant that South Africa was put on a war footing. Pretoria arranged its defence establishment accordingly and a fundamental change took place in the process of armaments procurement and production, namely a reorientation towards a ‘landward threat’ and away from the traditional role of South Africa as a strategic partner of the West in protecting the sea-lanes around the southern point of Africa. Pretoria thereby severed most of its strategic ties with the West. Burns, ‘Afrikaners Dig In Against Threat to Their Rule’, 1, 8; Study Commission on US Policy toward South Africa (SCUSPTSA), South Africa: Time Running Out, 235; Armscor Archives Pretoria (hereafter AAP), State Security Board, Economic Liaison Committee, File 1/15/2/3/2, Volume 5: Main Management: Departmental Committees, Commissions and Management Boards, ‘Administration Total War: Feedback to the Management Committee’, 11 September 1981.

 [9] Malan, My life with the South African Defence Force, 216.

[10] SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African dimension’, Undated; Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 56; Albright, ‘South Africa and the Affordable Bomb’; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 283.

[11] Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 53–4; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’, 3–6; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 284.

[12] For a detailed discussion, see Van Wyk, ‘Ally or Critic?’

[13] South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation.

[14] Van Wyk, ‘Ally or Critic?’, 201–3; SAFAA, Brand Fourie Personal Papers, Nuclear Energy, Top Secret (hereafter BFPPNETS), 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, Telegram, Donald Sole to Director-General, 22 April 1981; SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, Memorandum, ‘Koeberg nuclear power station: Explanatory notes from Escom for R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (translated from Afrikaans), 8 May 1981.

[15] Malan, My life with the South African Defence Force, 216; SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African dimension’, undated.

[16] The 1979 signal or so-called Vela incident, raised suspicions in Washington that South Africa had test-detonated a nuclear device. If true, it would have indicated failure of the US non-proliferation policy. When the information became public, Washington backed away from intelligence reports suggesting that South Africa had test-exploded a nuclear device, saying that there was no independent evidence that could link a particular country with the suspected explosion. Indeed, despite various investigations and circumstantial evidence, it could not be said with certainty who was responsible for the blast, and the incident remains a mystery to this day (Van Wyk, ‘Ally or Critic?’, 215–6).

[17] Frazier, ‘Atomic Apartheid’, 282.

[18] SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, Memorandum, ‘South African–United States’ Nuclear Relations', 20 March 1981; Pabian, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program’, 6.

[19] Nelson, ‘South Africa: Introduction’, 6; Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 487; Thatcher, ‘South Africa, How Vital to the West?’ 12; ‘Drifting into an African Policy’, The New York Times, 22 March 1981, D18.

[20] SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–6 May 1981, Memorandum, ‘Participation of South Africa in the Committee of Assurances of Supply of the International Atomic Energy Agency’ (translated from Afrikaans), 16 February 1981.

[21] Pabian, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program’, 6.

[22] Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL), National Security Council Executive Secretariat (hereafter NSCES), System File 8391020, Memorandum, ‘US–South African Nuclear Problems’, undated; RRL, South Africa Volume 1, 1/20/81–12/31/82, Box 4, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (hereafter OAPNSA), Memorandum, Haig to the President re ‘Appointment request: R.F. Botha, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information’, 7 May 1981; RRL, South Africa Volume 1, 1/20/81–12/31/82, Box 4, OAPNSA, Memorandum, Haig to the President re ‘Summing up of Pik Botha Visit’, 20 May 1981.

[23] RRL, OAPNSA, Memorandum, ‘South African Tactics to Play DOE versus State (TS)’, 27 March 1981.

[24] SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, Telegram, Donald Sole to Director-General, 24 March 1981.

[25] Parker, South Africa: Lost Opportunities, 151–2; Murphy, ‘S. Africa Powers Reactor with Uranium it Enriched’, A1; United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Report; Knight, ‘Constructive Engagement and the Arms Embargo’, 4; Murphy, ‘U.S. Nuclear Team Holds Talks in S. Africa’, A32.

[26] SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, Memorandum, J.W.L. de Villiers to F.W. de Klerk, re ‘Proposed talks between the RSA and the USA regarding nuclear matters’ (translated from Afrikaans), 24 March 1981; SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, ‘Directive for Discussions of Nuclear Matters with United States Authorities’, 28 March 1981.

[27] SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, ‘Minutes of a Meeting between a South African and a United States Delegation on Matters Relating to Nuclear Energy’, Paris, 30 March to 1 April 1981; SAFAA, BFPPNETS, 1 January 1981–8 May 1981, Telex, SA delegation to Director-General, 30 March 1981.

[28] RRL, South Africa Volume 1, 20 January 1981–31 December 1982, Box 4, OAPNSA Memorandum, Haig to the President re ‘Appointment request: R.F. Botha, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information’, 7 May 1981; RRL, South Africa Volume 1, 20 January 1981–31 December 1982, Box 4, OAPNSA Memorandum, Haig to the President re ‘Summing up of Pik Botha Visit’, 20 May 1981.

[29] Frazier, ‘Atomic Apartheid’, 279.

[30] Murphy, ‘S. Africa Skirts U.S. Efforts to Bar Nuclear Fuel Supply’; Parker, South Africa: Lost Opportunities, 153–4; O'Toole, ‘U.S. Firms Help South Africa get Uranium’.

[31] AAP, Sanctions and Arms Embargoes (hereafter SAE), Box 9, Report, ‘International Seminar on the United Nations Arms Embargo against South Africa’, 28–30 May 1986; Marshall, ‘U.S. Nuclear Policy toward South Africa’, 67; Leonard, South Africa at War, 158; Parker, South Africa: Lost Opportunities, 154–5; RRL, WHORM Subject File F003-02, 095932-292473, Letter, Mark O. Hatfield to the President, 24 August 1982; ‘U.S. Firms get OK for Nuclear Sale to S. Africa’, Los Angeles Times, 27 September 1983, 12; AAP, SAE, Report, International Seminar on the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa, 28–30 May 1986; Knight, ‘Constructive Engagement and the Arms Embargo’, 4.

[32] AAP, SAE, Box 9, Report, ‘International Seminar on the United Nations Arms Embargo against South Africa’, 28–30 May 1986; Marshall, ‘U.S. Nuclear Policy toward South Africa’, 67; Leonard, South Africa at War, 158; Parker, South Africa: Lost Opportunities, 154–5; RRL, WHORM Subject File F003-02, 095932-292473, Letter, Mark O. Hatfield to the President, 24 August 1982.

[33] The South African arms manufacturing firm, Armscor, obtained the blueprints of an advanced artillery system from Space Research Corporation (SRC) through a large-scale violation of the 1963 and 1977 arms embargoes, over a period of two years, i.e. 1976 to 1978. SRC also supplied shells, gun barrels, technicians and testing equipment to South Africa. The deal enabled South Africa to develop a world-renowned artillery system called G5 and a later system called G6. The smuggling took place without the knowledge of the Ford and Carter Administrations. Several incidents led to Carter Administration officials becoming suspicious, and the plot was laid bare in late 1978. US National Security Archives (hereafter NSA), Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Court document, ‘United States of America vs. Space Research Corporation (U.S.)’, 25 March 1980; Van der Westhuizen and Le Roux, ‘Armscor and the Birth of the G5 Artillery System’, 41–2.

[34] NSA, Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Cable, United States Defence Attaché South Africa to Defence Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 13 September 1982.

[35] NSA, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Scientific Intelligence (CIAOSI), Summary, ‘New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation’, 30 March 1983.

[36] Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 53–4; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’; Pabian, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program’, 5–6; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 370–1, 374; Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 217.

[37] Simpson, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’.

[38] RRL, OAPNSA 90163, Chizon File, Memorandum, National Security Council to Office of Management and Budget re ‘DOE and ACDA Draft Testimonies on HR 7220 and the Effectiveness of US Export Policy with Respect to South Africa’, 1 December 1982.

[39] Marshall, ‘U.S. Nuclear Policy toward South Africa’, 69; RRL, WHORM Subject File, TA003, 131544, ‘ACDA's Comments on H.R. 1020’, 2 March 1983; ‘U.S. Firms get OK for Nuclear Sale to S. Africa’, Los Angeles Times, 27 September 1983, 12; AAP, SAE, Report, International Seminar on the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa, 28–30 May 1986; Knight, ‘Constructive Engagement and the Arms Embargo’, 4.

[40] Van Slambrouck, ‘S. Africa Tries to Allay Fear on Nuclear Plans’.

[41] Department of State, ‘South Africa: Nuclear Safeguards and Exports Announcement’, 57.

[42] NSA, Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Statement, C.A. Crocker before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 April 1985.

[43] NSA, Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence (hereafter CIADCI), National Intelligence Estimate, ‘Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies and Programs’, 5 October 1984.

[44] The further refinements in reliability, safety and delivery design delayed completion of the fourth nuclear device until August 1987. Keller, ‘South Africa Says it Built 6 Atom Bombs’, A1; Keller, ‘Building (and Dismantling) a Threat’, D2; Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 53–4; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’.

[45] Hamann, Days of the Generals, 168.

[46] Hamann, Days of the Generals, 168

[47] NSA, CIADCI, National Intelligence Estimate, ‘Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies and Programs’, 5 October 1984.

[48] NSA, Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Resolutions, General Assembly 19/50 A and B, ‘Condemnation of the Occupation of Namibia and Demand for its Independence’, 12 December 1984; ‘Security Council Widens S. Africa Arms Embargo’, Los Angeles Times, 14 December 1984, 12.

[49] NSA, Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Statement, ‘C.A. Crocker before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’, 17 April 1985; Crocker, ‘U.S. Response to Apartheid in South Africa’, 39–40.

[50] Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 264; De Villiers, ‘US Sanctions against South Africa’, 246–8.

[51] The White House, ‘South Africa: Presidential Actions’, 1–3; RRL, Online document 90985c. Available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1985/90985c.htm, Message to Congress, ‘The Prohibition of Trade and certain other Transactions involving South Africa’, 9 September 1985; National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Online document e12532 http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/codification/executive_order/12532.html, Federal Register, Executive Order 12532, ‘Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions involving South Africa’, 9 September 1985.

[52] RRL, NSCES, System File, 8804975, Memorandum, R.T. Kennedy and F.G. Wisner to Acting Secretary re ‘Nuclear Discussion with the South African Government’, 21 March 1986.

[53] RRL, NSCES, PA Files, 8603438, Memorandum, C.A. Crocker and R. Kennedy to the Secretary re ‘Our Discussions with the South Africans on Nuclear Matters’, 23 April 1986.

[54] Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 188; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 372.

[55] F.W. de Klerk quoted in Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 188.

[56] RRL, NSCES, System File, 8804975, Memorandum, R.T. Kennedy and F.G. Wisner to Acting Secretary re ‘Nuclear Discussion with the South African Government’, 21 March 1986; RRL, NSCES, PA Files, 8603438, Memorandum, C.A. Crocker and R. Kennedy to the Secretary re ‘Our Discussions with the South Africans on Nuclear Matters’, 23 April 1986; RRL, NSCES, PA Files, 8603438, Memorandum, P.H. Ringdahl to J.M. Poindexter re ‘South Africa – Nuclear Matters’, 29 April 1986.

[57] AAP, SAE, Box 3, File 5, Legislation, ‘The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act’, 18 October 1986; AAP, Main Management, Foreign Affairs and Organization (hereafter MMFAO), Embargo, File 1/17/1, Volume 5, Research Document, ‘Sanctions against South Africa: Current legislative issues’, 14 August 1986.

[58] RRL, Cohen, Herman J, NSDD-273, Box 92295, National Security Decision, ‘United States Policy toward South Africa’, 7 May 1987.

[59] Battersby, ‘South Africa Says it may Soon Sign Atomic Agreement’; ‘Pretoria to stay in atom agency’, The New York Times, 23 September 1987, A9; ‘The One Club that May Admit South Africa’, The New York Times, 27 September 1987, D3; RRL, NSC African Affairs Directorate (hereafter NSCAAD), South Africa – Nuclear, 91876, Memorandum, D. Tice to Herman J. Cohen re ‘South Africa in the IAEA’, 2 September 1987; RRL, NSCAAD, South Africa – Nuclear, 91876, Telegram, Department of State to All Embassies re ‘South Africa and the IAEA’, September 1987.

[60] Although it was true that since 1979, nuclear weapons research and manufacturing was no longer done at the Pelindaba and Valindaba facilities, but at the new, ultra top-secret facility called Advena, 25 kilometres west of Pretoria, the Y-Plant still produced the bomb-grade uranium needed for South Africa's nuclear bombs. Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 53–4; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’; Albright, ‘A Curious Conversion’.

[61] Lewis, ‘Pretoria Willing to Discuss Atom Ban’, A3.

[62] ‘Pretoria Says it Can Build A-Arms’, The New York Times, 14 August 1988, 18.

[63] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: ‘A Balanced Approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint’, September 1988.

[64] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: ‘A Balanced Approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint’, September 1988

[65] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: ‘A Balanced Approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint’, September 1988

[66] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: ‘A Balanced Approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint’, September 1988

[67] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: ‘A Balanced Approach to the NPT: Armscor/AEC Concerns Viewed from a DFA Standpoint’, September 1988

[68] ‘Superpowers Urge SA to Sign Nuke Treaty’, The Citizen, 22 September 1988, 5.

[69] Lewis, ‘U.S. Averts Atom Agency's Ouster of Pretoria’, A7.

[70] NSA, Microfiche collection, South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Telegram, FBIS Mbabane to United States Department of State, 22 June 1989; ‘SA to Launch Space Rocket’, The Cape Times, 21 June 1989, 1; ‘Cape Missile Test Soon, Says US, but Armscor Keeps Quiet’, The Argus, 21 June 1989, 3; ‘Armscor Tests Cape Missile Range – No Comment on US Report’, The Citizen, 22 June 1989, 2.

[71] Gordon, ‘U.S. sees Israeli Help in Pretoria's Missile Work’, A1; ‘Yank-satelliet sien toe SA missiel toets’, Die Burger, 7 July 1989, 9.

[72] Stumpf, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement’, 6; SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African Dimension’, undated; Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 218.

[73] Stumpf, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program’, 6.

[74] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: Herbert Beukes to Richard Carter, ‘Main Points Arising from Luncheon on 14 November 1989’, 17 November 1989.

[75] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: Herbert Beukes to Richard Carter, ‘Main Points Arising from Luncheon on 14 November 1989’, 17 November 1989

[76] SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African dimension’, undated; Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 218.

[77] SAFAA, NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on full-scope safeguards, Memorandum: Herbert Beukes to Richard Carter, ‘Main Points Arising from Luncheon on 14 November 1989’, 17 November 1989.

[78] Stumpf, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program’, 6.

[79] SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African Dimension’, undated.

[80] Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 218; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’, 3–6; Albright and Hibbs, ‘South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb’; Africa Report , ‘De Klerk: ‘South Africa had the Bomb’, 6; Louw, ‘Waarom bomme gebou is … en waarom dit nou afgetakel is’, 9; ‘Are Missiles on Target?’, The Sunday Star, 28 March 1993, 26.

[81] George Bush Library (hereafter GBL), Bush Presidential Records, Staff and Office Files (hereafter BPRSOF), National Security Council (hereafter NSC), Daniel B Poneman Files (hereafter DBPF), South Africa [OA/ID CF01350], Analysis, ‘South Africa: Ready to Accede to the NPT’, 8 February 1990.

[82] GBL, BPRSOF, NSC, DBPF, South Africa [OA/ID CF01350], Memorandum, Daniel Poneman to Brent Scowcroft re ‘Proposed Press Release on South African Adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty’, 27 June 1991.

[83] Wren, ‘Pretoria Accepts Atom-Arms Ban and Agrees to Plant Inspections’, A1; Nelmapius, ‘SA sal kernsperverdrag onderskryf’, 1.

[84] Wren, ‘Pretoria Accepts Atom-Arms Ban and Agrees to Plant Inspections’, A1; GBL, Public Papers, Statement on South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 28 June 1991.

[85] GBL, Public Papers, Statement, ‘South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’, A1.

[86] SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African dimension’, Undated; Albright and Hibbs, ‘South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb’, 32–38; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’; ‘Bombs Away’, Economist, 27 March 1993, 1; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 376–9.

[87] ‘Bombs away’, Economist, 27 March 1993, 1; Albright and Hibbs, ‘South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb’; Albright, ‘South Africa and the Affordable Bomb’.

[88] Albright and Hibbs, ‘South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb’.

[89] Wolfsthal, ‘South Africa Reveals it had Six Nuclear Weapons until 1990’, 23; Stumpf, ‘South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program’, 3.

[90] Keller, ‘South Africa Says it Built 6 Atom Bombs’, A1; ‘News Summary: Pretoria Built Nuclear Bombs; Old Suspicions Confirmed’, The New York Times, 25 March 1993, A2; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’; Africa Report, ‘De Klerk: South Africa had the Bomb’, 6; Liberman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb’, 56; Smith, ‘South Africa's 16-Year Secret’, A1.

[91] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 370; Keller, ‘Building (and Dismantling) a Threat’, D2; ‘Bombs Away’, Economist, 27 March 1993.

[92] Albright and Hibbs, ‘South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb’; Malan, My Life with the SA Defence Force, 218.

[93] Africa Report, ‘De Klerk: South Africa had the Bomb’; Gordon, ‘Washington Welcomes de Klerk Disclosure, but Wants More Details’, A12; ‘South Africa's Unexploded Bombs (Editorial)’, The New York Times, 27 March 1993, A2; Keller, ‘Building (and Dismantling) a Threat’, D2; Albright, ‘South Africa Comes Clean’.

[94] ‘Bomb, Bomb, who had the Bomb?’ U.S. News and World Report ; ‘South Africa's Unexploded Bombs (Editorial)’, The New York Times, 27 March 1993, A2; Africa Report, ‘De Klerk: South Africa had the Bomb’, 6.

[95] Pretorius and Swart, ‘Wapenverbod teen SA kan gou waai; Thabo Mbeki na VN met brief van pres. Mandela’, 1; Swart, ‘Kernkrag: SA se rol ter sprake’, 4; McNab et al. , ‘UN Security Council Lifts Arms Embargo’; ‘Curbs on South Africa End’, The New York Times, 26 May 1994, A10; SAFAA, Jeremy Shearer Papers, ‘Denuclearization in Africa: The South African Dimension’, undated; Crossette, ‘South Africa Emerges as a Force for Extending Nuclear Arms Pact’; Robinson and Boutwell, ‘South Africa's Arms Industry’, 599–619.