The foundation for Vienna: A reassessment of the CSCE in the mid-1980s

Abstract

This article analyses the interim Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) interim meetings held from 1984 to 1986 in Stockholm, Ottawa, Budapest, and Bern and reassesses previous characterisations of this period as one of stagnation in the CSCE. It demonstrates that the significant groundwork laid at these meetings later manifested itself during the Vienna CSCE Review Meeting. The two most important shifts in the CSCE during these years were an increased Western and neutral emphasis on compliance with existing CSCE agreements at the expense of achieving new concluding documents and a slow evolution in Soviet thinking on its role in the Helsinki process.

Notes

 [1] The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was the culmination of three years of negotiations at the CSCE and contained principles to govern East–West interactions in Europe. In addition to reaching an agreement on the inviolability of frontiers, which was the original impetus for the Soviet desire to hold the conference, the Helsinki Final Act committed the CSCE states to respect human rights and facilitate human contacts across East–West borders. See for example, Thomas, The Helsinki Effect; Wenger et al., Origins of the European Security System; and Nuti, The Crisis of Détente in Europe. The term ‘Helsinki process’ refers to the CSCE meetings that followed the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

 [2] For further discussion of the significance of the Vienna Meeting, see Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986–1989, 152; Gubin, International Regimes, Agenda Setting and Linkage Groups in U.S.–Soviet Relations, 254–5; Kashlev, ‘The CSCE in the Soviet Union's Politics’, 71; and Leatherman, From Cold War to Democratic Peace, 21.

 [3] The Madrid Concluding Document contrasted with the 1978 Belgrade Concluding Document, which had called for only three interim meetings.

 [4] Proposals in Ottawa would deal with gender equality, access to health care, the right to participate in religious education, and freedom from torture, whereas those at Bern would address such issues as family visits, postal communication, access to a passport, exit visa fees, and facilitating tourism. Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 23; Millicent Fenwick Papers, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Box 112, Helsinki/Madrid, CSCE Staff to CSCE Commissioners, 27 May 1981; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Archives, Prague, Czech Republic, Book 38, CSCE/RM.16, 12 December 1980; ibid., CSCE/RM.48, 9 November 1982; ibid., CSE/RM.49, 9 November 1982; and Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making, 260.

 [5] Human contacts provisions covered a range of educational and cultural exchanges.

 [6] Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982 after years of infirmity. His replacement, Yuri Andropov, only lasted 15 months in power and died in 1984.

 [7] Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 70.

 [8] Leatherman, From Cold War to Democratic Peace, 20.

 [9] Hazewinkel, ‘Ottawa 1985’, 40–6.

[10] Although the meeting recessed a number of times, the Stockholm Conference technically was ongoing throughout the years between Madrid and Vienna.

[11] Madrid Concluding Document, 6 September 1983, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1980/11/4223_en.pdf [cited 28 September 2009].

[12] The NATO negotiating proposal, SC.1, included measures to announce 45 days in advance military actions that involved 6000 ‘out of garrison’ troops. In addition, NATO proposals included measures to verify and observe groups of this size. Announcement, 24 January 1984, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ; and Aloysius A. Mazewski Papers, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Box 138, Folder 4, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Activities Report: 98th Congress; Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, 20; and Goodby, ‘The Stockholm Conference’, 150–1.

[13] Chernenko's leadership did not foster a new atmosphere at the Stockholm Conference or facilitate any political breakthroughs. The Soviet unwillingness to engage led United States Ambassador to the Stockholm Conference James Goodby to express his frustration publicly about the minimal progress at the conference. Mazewski Papers, Box 138, CSCE Digest, ‘Media Reaction-Stockholm Meeting’, 27 January 1984; and OSCE Archives, CSCE/SC/vol. 56, James E. Goodby Statement, 29 January 1985.

[14] Differing Western and Eastern ideas about what made an appropriate CSBM complicated the negotiations at Stockholm. Freeman, Security and the CSCE Process, 94–5; OSCE Archives, CSCE/SC/vol. 55, Boris Ivanov (USSR) Statement, 5 October 1984; ibid., 2 CSCE/SC/vol. 56, Oleg A. Grinevsky (USSR) Statement, 9 January 1985; ibid., Oleg A. Grinevsky (USSR) Statement, 15 March 1985; and Krehbiel, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, 21.

[15] Mazewski Papers, Box 138, Folder 4, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Activities Report: 98th Congress; Goodby, ‘The Stockholm Conference’, 162–3, 169; and Arthur J. Goldberg Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, District of Columbia, Part I: Professional File, 1793–1987, n.d. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Box 142, Folder 3, CSCE Digest, 18 July 1984.

[16] OSCE Archives, CSCE/SC/vol. 55, Oleg A. Grinevsky (USSR) Statement, 12 October 1984.

[17] OSCE Archives, CSCE/SC/vol. 57, V. M. Tatarnikov (USSR) Statement, 28 June 1985.

[18] OSCE Archives, CSCE/SC/vol.57, Oleg A. Grinevsky (USSR) Statement, 11 October 1985.

[19] For further discussion of the Soviet Union's original objectives for an ESC, see Snyder, ‘The U.S., Western Europe, and the CSCE, 1972 − 1975’.

[20] Mazewski Papers, Box 138, CSCE Digest, ‘U.S. Officials on the Helsinki Accords, Human Rights and the Stockholm Meeting’, 27 January 1984.

[21] Korey, The Promises We Keep, 168; and Interview, James Goodby, 1 April 2005.

[22] OSCE Archives, CSCE/SC/R.2, George Shultz (USA) Statement, 17 January 1984. Wallenberg's fate remained unknown, and some believed he was languishing in a Soviet prison.

[23] Goodby, ‘The Stockholm Conference’, 163.

[24] Goldberg Papers, Part I: Professional File, 1793-1987, n.d. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Box 142, Folder 3, CSCE Digest, 2 November 1984. The cases of Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner occupied the American imagination in the months that followed as Americans struggled to learn if Bonner had been arrested and sentenced to exile, if Sakharov was hospitalised and subject to force-feedings, or if they were enjoying domestic life as one videotape from the USSR suggested. Throughout this period, the United States government worked to secure Sakharov and Bonner's release from exile. Dante Fascell Papers, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, Box 2442, Memos, Memorandum, Fascell to CSCE Commissioners, 16 May 1984. Shultz developed a plan for American action including raising Sakharov's case in meetings with Soviets, releasing public statements, exerting pressure through American embassies, raising United States concerns with foreign leaders, corresponding with the American Academy of Sciences, developing a public diplomacy strategy through the United States Information Agency, communicating with Sakharov family members in the United States, and working with prominent Americans who might be able to help. The mystery concerning the Sakharovs' fate and the American efforts on their behalf make up one of the most dramatic elements of the CSCE in this period. Mazewski Papers, Box 138, Folder 4, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Activities Report: 98th Congress; Open Society Archives, Budapest, Hungary, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Box 974, USA: Diplomatic Relations, 1984–1984, ‘Group Asks Soviets to Reconsider Human Rights Issue’, 18 July 1984; and Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California, Matlock CHRON, Box 90887, May 1984 (2), Memorandum, Shultz to Reagan, 18 May 1984.

[25] Gorbachev became Soviet General Secretary after Chernenko's death on 13 March 1985. The Ottawa Preparatory Meeting was held from 23 April to 6 May 1985. The Experts Meeting opened the following day and ended on 17 June 1985.

[26] Madrid Concluding Document, 6 September 1983, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1980/11/4223_en.pdf [cited 28 September 2009]. According to United States Delegation Chief Richard Schifter, the United States hoped to encourage Soviet progress on human rights with several sessions leading up to Ottawa. Yet, the Soviet attitude in the pre-consultations convinced Schifter that the Soviets did not want to reach an agreement, resulting in a decision to highlight Soviet abuses while at Ottawa. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 99th Congress, 1st Session, ‘The Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting and the Future of the Helsinki Process’, 25 June 1985.

[27] Helsinki monitors observed governments' compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent CSCE agreements.

[28] Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 71; OSCE Archives, CSCE/OME.22, 30 May 1985; ibid., CSE/OME.23, 30 May 1985; ibid., CSCE/OME.27, 31 May 1985; ibid., CSCE/OME.28, 31 May 1985; ibid., CSCE/OME.37, 3 June 1985; ibid., 29 May 1985, CSCE/OME.13; ibid., 29 May 1985, CSCE/OME.14; ibid., 3 June 1985, CSE/OME.40; and ibid., 29 May 1985, CSCE/OME.16.

[29] Statement, Armacost, 25 March 1986 in US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 344. The new Soviet strategy of combating criticism with counter-accusations led to some sharp exchanges at Ottawa between the Soviet Union and Western states. Fact Sheet: Soviet Human Rights Overview, 31 July 1985, www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/2596.pdf [cited 22 May 2006]; and van Esterik and Minnema, ‘The Conference that Came in from the Cold’, 3.

[30] Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 72.

[31] Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 70. Eight Western states submitted a draft concluding document, OME.47, on 14 June. The Western draft protected freedom of movement, religious freedom, gender equality, trade unions, and legal observers. In addition, it called for the redistribution of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document as well as the prevention of psychiatric abuse. OSCE Archives, 14 June 1985, CSCE/OME.47. In Ottawa, Schifter argues the United States tried to push for ‘concrete accomplishments rather than just having another piece of paper’. Richard Schifter Interview, 5 May 2008.

[32] Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Box 119, Warsaw Pact, 1985–1987, USIA, ‘Schifter Statement’, 27 June 1985.

[33] The delegations did not accept the East's final attempt to reach a concluding document – OME.50. The proposed agreement addressed only social and economic rights in a vague way and lacked any proposals from the Western draft document. OSCE Archives, 14 June 1985, CSCE/OME.50.

[34] Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Box 691, Human Rights, 1985–1985, ‘Tass Blames Failure of Ottawa Conference on U.S. and NATO’, 18 June 1985.

[35] Closing Statement, Richard Schifter, 17 June 1985, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[36] Brandtner, ‘Synopsis of the Discussions’, 158.

[37] Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Box 691, Human Rights, 1985–1985, Christopher Wren, ‘Reviewing the Process on Human Rights’, 23 June 1985.

[38] Hazewinkel, ‘Ottawa 1985’, 40–6. See also Höll, ‘The CSCE Process: Basic Facts’, 18.

[39] Richard Schifter Interview, 5 May 2008.

[40] Reagan, An American Life, 619.

[41] His efforts, such as suggesting the establishment of a Soviet human rights committee were opposed by a number of Soviet officials. Chernyaev did, however, continue work on a human rights memorandum for Gorbachev. 5 June 1985, 9 June 1985, 11 June 1985, 5 July 1985, The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev: The First Installment (Washington: The National Security Archive, 2006), no. 192, http://www.nsarchive.org [cited 28 May 2006].

[42] A celebration to mark the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act was held in Helsinki, Finland. As no proposals were submitted at the foreign minister-level session, I have not addressed it in this article. In addition, I have not addressed the Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation in the Mediterranean given its narrow geographic focus.

[43] The Cultural Forum was held from 15 October to 25 November 1985. Madrid Concluding Document, 6 September 1983, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1980/11/4223_en.pdf [28 September 2009].

[44] Heneka, A Besieged Culture: Czechoslovakia Ten Years After Helsinki, 74; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, ‘Human Rights and the CSCE Process in the Soviet Union’, 27 February 1986. Eastern and Western diplomats pursued different cultural agendas, as the Eastern states were concerned with cultural cooperation whereas the West was committed to securing protections for freedom of cultural expression, freedom of information, and international cultural contacts. Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 30–1.

[45] Open Society Archives, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Correspondence and Memoranda, Box 20, Memos, 1982–85, Projected Activities, 1985; and Memorandum, Nagler to National Committees, 14 June 1985. The IHF later issued a statement about the Hungarian restrictions: ‘The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights regrets that the Hungarian authorities have forbidden us to use public facilities for a citizens’ cultural forum … In our view, the Hungarian government's action violates the 1975 Helsinki accords'. Open Society Archives, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Project Files, Box 2, Cultural Forum: Budapest: General Information, 1985. United States Ambassador Walter Stoessel condemned the Hungarian authorities' prevention of the IHF parallel forum from taking place in its reserved space. He noted that the Hungarian action went against its commitment to follow CSCE practices at Madrid by not impeding NGO demonstrations. Statement, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 11 December 1985, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Korey, The Promises We Keep, 186–7.

[46] Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 31.

[47] Statement, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., 11 December 1985, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Stoessel made his comments in testimony before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[48] Prompted by the deaths of a number of Helsinki monitors in prison, several exiled Soviet dissidents argued in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that Western states should withdraw from the CSCE because the agreement was not working. Op-Ed, ‘Exiles: Nullify Helsinki Pact’, Wall Street Journal, 8 May 1985. Reagan's election in 1980 had previously raised the possibility the United States might withdraw from the CSCE.

[49] Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 3.

[50] The term refusenik referred to those, usually Jewish, who had been denied permission to emigrate. Anatoly Shcharansky changed his name to Natan Sharansky upon his emigration to Israel. I have chosen to use the original spelling of his name when discussing his activities in the Soviet Union.

[51] Madrid Concluding Document, 6 September 1983, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1980/11/4223_en.pdf [accessed 28 September 2009].

[52] 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearings, 18 March and 18 June 1986, Michael Novak (United States) Statement, 17 April 1986; Albert William Sherer, Jr. Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, Box 7, Post-Helsinki CSCE, GIST, Bern Experts Meeting on Human Contacts, March 1986; Korey, The Promises We Keep, 198; Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Joint Baltic American National Committee Records, Box 6 Unprocessed, Bern CSCE Meeting, Letter, Johnson to Friend; and Hearings Before CSCE, 18 March and 18 June 1986, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Michael Novak (United States) Statement, 24 April 1986. Western proposals at Bern concerned expanding travel for family reunification, easing restrictions on freedom of movement, increasing telephone and postal communication, granting the right to a passport, ending exit visas, and facilitating religious contacts. OSCE Archives, CSCE/BME.4, 1 May 1986; ibid., CSCE/BME.9, 1 May 1986; ibid., CSCE/BME.17, 1 May 1985; and ibid., CSCE/BME.26, 2 May 1986.

[53] Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Box 1118, Helsinki: Stockholm, 1985–1986, Radio Liberty Research, ‘An Interview with Michael Novak’, 7 May 1986.

[54] Open Society Archives, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Old Code Subject Files, Soviet Red Archives, Box 692, Human Rights, 1987–1987, Eggleston, ‘The Berne Conference at the Half Way Point’, 29 April 1986; and Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 75.

[55] OSCE Archives, CSCE/BME.49, 23 May 1986; and Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 172. This was a traditional role of the neutral and non-aligned delegations. Fischer, ‘Bridging the Gap Between East and West’. The Warsaw Pact draft concluding document emphasized co-operation as well as person-to-person contacts, although it had many qualifications such as allowing family members to travel together only ‘when possible’ that could weaken the contest of the proposals. OSCE Archives, CSCE/BME.48, 23 May 1986.

[56] In a letter to a Canadian ethnic group, Bauer, Canada's CSCE ambassador, indicated that the decision to veto was ‘taken at the last minute (and rather unexpectedly)’, clearly indicating poor communication between the NATO allies. Canada thought that the draft concluding document ‘had only marginal utility and was only just acceptable’. Joint Baltic American National Committee Records (JBANC), Box 6 Unprocessed, CSCE Vienna – November 1986, Letter, Bauer to Magas, 24 June 1986.

[57] In Heraclides' view, the American decision to turn against the agreement ‘has remained one of the mysteries of the CSCE’; the Swiss, on the other hand, blamed Novak's ‘amateurism’ for the collapse. Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 80.

[58] Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 4, 155, 159, 171. Richard Schifter, then Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, subsequently wrote to Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber to explain the government's decision at Bern. Schifter passed along a 28-page paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the Bern proposal from which the United States withheld consensus. The United States defended its decision by citing the ‘long history of the Soviet bloc's non-compliance with its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act’ and the document's ‘deficiencies and loopholes’. Human Rights Watch Records, Center for Human Rights Documentation and Research, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library, New York, New York, General Files, New York Office Files, Helsinki Watch, Box 40, CSCE-Vienna Conference, 1986, Schifter to Laber, 12 September 1986.

[59] Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 33; and Korey, The Promises We Keep, 209.

[60] Korey, The Promises We Keep, 207. Novak noted the American veto had given ‘Moscow an easy propaganda victory’. Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 157.

[61] ‘Breakthrough in Bern’, Wall Street Journal, 4 June 1986 in Korey, The Promises We Keep, 208.

[62] ‘For Them the “Iron Curtain” is Real’, Washington Post, 4 June 1986 in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing, ‘Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting’, 18 March and 18 June 1986, 99th Congress/2nd Session.

[63] Fry, The Helsinki Process, 101.

[64] Novak, Taking Glasnost Seriously, 173.

[65] Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing, ‘Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting’, 18 March and 18 June 1986, 99th Congress/2nd Session.

[66] Korey, The Promises We Keep, 436.

[67] Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 71; Open Society Archives, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Correspondence and Memoranda, Box 17, Correspondence: National Committees: Canada, 1984–1992, David Matas (Canadian Helsinki Watch Group) to Gerald Nagler, 10 February 1986; and Korey, ‘Challenge in Vienna: Making Helsinki Matter’, 12–13.

[68] Barry replaced Goodby as the head of the United States delegation in Stockholm in November 1985. Korey, The Promises We Keep, 224; and OSCE Archives, Robert L. Barry (United States) Statement, 16 May 1986, CSCE/SC/vol.58.

[69] Interview, James Goodby, 1 April 2005.

[70] Rotfeld, ‘Developing a Confidence-Building System in East–West Relations’, 107.

[71] Speech, Robert L. Barry, 4 February 1986, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[72] Birnbaum and Peters, ‘The CSCE: A Reassessment of its Role in the 1980s’, 310–1.

[73] The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, reached in December 1987, committed the United States and Soviet Union to destroy all of their intermediate and short-range missiles within three years. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 209; and Roth, ‘From Madrid to Vienna: What Progress in the Helsinki Process?’, 3–16.

[74] Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, 60.

[75] Goodby, ‘The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security System for Europe’, 157.

[76] Lehne, The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 26.

[77] Leatherman, From Cold War to Democratic Peace, 17.

[78] The agreement at Stockholm ultimately facilitated a range of other arms agreements including the INF Treaty. Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 90–1; and Jankowitsch, ‘The CSCE and the Future of Confidence-Building in Europe’, 75.

[79] Interview, James Goodby, 1 April 2005.

[80] Provisions in the agreement included notification 42 days in advance for military actions involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks. CSCE states agreed to offer notification two years in advance for activities involving more than 75,000 troops. In addition, the parties agreed to exchange annual calendars of such actions. There were provisions for mandatory observations of exercises involving more than 17,000 and a system of ground and air on-site inspections. Bloed, ‘The CSCE Process From Helsinki to Vienna: An Introduction’, 18; Joint Baltic American National Committee Records (JBANC), Box 6 Unprocessed, CSCE London Meeting 1989, GIST, ‘Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Negotiations’, March 1989; and Robert L. Barry Statement, 22 September 1986, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[81] Ronald Reagan Statement, 22 September 1986, US Department of State, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[82] In addition, the proposal offered guidelines for how states should respond to exit applications. OSCE Archives, CSCE/WT.22, 10 February 1987. In a sign of the changes underway in Eastern Europe, Hungary submitted its own proposal on travel for business purposes that addressed shortening the wait for entry visa applications. OSCE Archives, CSCE/WT.103, 6 March 1987.

[83] OSCE Archives, CSCE.WT.9, 19 December 1986. There followed a range of Western proposals addressing freedom of movement as related to human contacts. OSCE Archives, CSCE/WT.23, 10 February 1987; ibid., CSCE/WT.24, 10 February 1987; and ibid., CSCE/WT.53, 17 February 1987.

[84] Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 102.

[85] Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 128–9.