Stalin and the Chinese Civil War

Donggil Kim is Associate Professor at Department of History, Peking University in Beijing, and co-author of History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1931–1945) (Beijing: CCP History Publishing House, 2009). He has published articles in Lishi yanjiu [Historical Research], Dangde Wenxian [Literature of Chinese Communist Party], Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies] and Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu [The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War and Against Japan] on Sino-Soviet Relations and Sino-North Korea relations, and is presently at work on Sino-Korea Cold War project.

Abstract

This article attempts to resolve the historical controversy over Stalin's attitude and action toward the Chinese Communist Party in early 1949. It specifically deals with the question of whether Stalin had indeed persistently tried to persuade the CCP not to cross the Yangtze River, a move that would have resulted in a divided China. With the aid of newly discovered telegrams sent to Moscow by the Soviet embassy in China, this article reinterprets the telegrams exchanged between Stalin and Mao Zedong in January 1949. On the basis of these, this article proposes a new analysis as to whether or not Stalin actually dissuaded the river-crossing; asserting that Stalin's telegram and the so-called ‘coalition government’ urged by Anastas Mikoyan in late January 1949, lend strong support for the argument in favour of Stalin's dissuasion of the river-crossing.

Notes

Donggil Kim is Associate Professor at Department of History, Peking University in Beijing, and co-author of History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1931–1945) (Beijing: CCP History Publishing House, 2009). He has published articles in Lishi yanjiu [Historical Research], Dangde Wenxian [Literature of Chinese Communist Party], Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies] and Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu [The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War and Against Japan] on Sino-Soviet Relations and Sino-North Korea relations, and is presently at work on Sino-Korea Cold War project.

 [1] Qu xing, ‘Sulian zai xinzhongguo jianguo qianhou de duihua zhengce’; Qu xing, ‘1949 nian sugong lingdao ganyu zhongguo genming de yige zuozheng’; Liu Xiao, ‘Chushi sulian’; Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou, ‘Guanyu sidalin zeng fou quanzu woguo dujiang de tansuo’; Xiang Qing, ‘Guanyu sidalin quanzu jiefang dajun guojiang zhi wojian’; Liao Gailong, ‘Kangri zhanzheng houqi he jiefang zhanzheng shiqi sulian yu zhongguo geming guanxi’; Garver, ‘New Light on Sino-Soviet Relations’.

 [2] In 1947 with the proclamation of the Marshall Plan, the Cold War began in actual and became further intensified following the Soviet initiated Berlin Blockade in 1948. Under such circumstances, insistence by Chinese Communist Party leadership that the Soviet Union had objected to the Crossing of the Yangtze River comes as a complete surprise to us.

 [3] Sergei Tikhvinsky, ex-Soviet diplomat to China during the 1940s, disclosed six telegrams exchanged between Stalin and Mao Zedong regarding the issue of peace talks in January 1949. The information disclosed is as follows: Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong (10 January 1949), Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong (11 January 1949), Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin (13 January 1949), Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong (14 January 1949), Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin (14 January 1949). Tikhvinsky, ‘Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Zedunom v Yanvare 1949 goda’.

 [4] Concharov interview with Kovalev; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 42–3; Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou, ‘Guanyu sidalin zeng fou quanzu woguo dujiang de tansuo’, 56–8; Xue Xiantian, ‘Huajiang er zhi de fengyuan’.

 [5] Murray, ‘Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China’.

 [6] Wang Fangming, ‘Yao shishi qiushi, dulisikao’, 3.

 [7] Editorial group of the Historical Chronicle of the Party, CCP Central Documentary Research Department, ‘Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao'shuoming(4)’, 13.

 [8] Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, Mao Zedong zhuan: 1949–1976, Vol. 1, 500; Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong, 396.

 [9] Pei Jianzhang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 226; CCP Central Documentary Research Department, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 322–33; For an alternate English translation, see Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, 250–8; Westad, Brothers in Arms, 348, 352.

[10] Liu Xiao, Chushi sulian, 15.

[11] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (15 July 1948), Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), the Far East: China 1948, Vol. 7, 360–1.

[12] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (1 December 1948), FRUS, the Far East: China 1948, Vol. 7, 625–7.

[13] Mr. Chakravarty, after leaving China, relayed the contents of his meetings with the Soviet diplomat and prospects of Chinese situation to an American diplomat, Cloyce K. Huston, stationed in Japan; Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Cloyce K. Huston, Counselor of Mission, Office of United States Political Advisor in Japan (8 January 1949), FRUS, the Far East: China 1949, Vol. 8, 24–5.

[14] Stuart, John Leighton Stuart's Diary, 45.

[15] Xue Xiantian, Zhongsu guanxishi: 1945–1949, 412.

[16] Ledovsky, SSSR i Stalin v sudbakh Kitaya, 48–9.

[17] History Department of Fudan University, Zhongguo jindai duiwai guanxishi ziliao xuanji, Vol. 2, 484–5.

[18] ‘Telegramma I. V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 10 January 1949, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Fond (F.) 45, Opis (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 330, Listy (LI.) 95–6.

[19] ‘Telegramma I. V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 10 January 1949, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Fond (F.) 45, Opis (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 330, Listy (LI.)

[20] ‘Prodolzhenie I okonchanie predydushchei telegrammy I.V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 11 January 1949, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 330, LI. 97–9.

[21] ‘Zapiska A.I. Mikoyana v Prezidium TsK KPSS o poezdke v Kitai v yanvare-fevrale 1949 g’, 22 September 1960, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 606, LI. 2–3.

[22] Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, Zhongsu Guanxi:Eguoyuanwen Fuyinjianhuibian, 1381–2; Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), Fond (F.) 100, Opis (Op.) 42, Papka (Pap.) 288, Delo (D.) 17, Listy (LI.) 3–5.

[23] ‘Telegramma Mao Zeduna I.V. Stalinu’, 13 January 1949, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 330, LI. 100–3.

[24] The American withdrawal from consideration as a mediator surprised the USSR very much. The Soviet Union believed that the CCP purposely disclosed the information that the CCP and the USSR will not participate in peace talks, and therefore cause the diplomatic passiveness of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the Xibaipo meeting on 3 February, Mikoyan confronted Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders, saying: ‘We know that Britain, the United States and France would like to mediate between the KMT and CCP. Later I do not know how they found out that the Soviet Union and the CCP were against mediation of foreign countries. They did not want to lose face, so they changed their attitudes and refused to mediate. Therefore we must pay more attention to our secrecy-keeping, as we must notice whether there are unreliable people around the CCP who may hand over the information to the Americans’. Facing Mikoyan's interrogation, Mao Zedong bluntly answered that ‘Earlier, even before knowing about our attitudes, the British and American people reported publicly that the USSR and CCP will be against intermediation’. But Mikoyan did not accept Mao's explanation and replied that ‘This was only their conjecture. However, it was after receiving the certain information on our attitudes that those western countries were hurry to turn down to mediate’. This documentation clearly shows that the USSR suspected that the CCP had disclosed the secret purposely. See Ledovsky, SSSR i Stalin v sudbakh Kitaya, 67; APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 39, LI. 47.

[25] ‘Telegramma Mao Zeduna I.V. Stalinu’, 14 January 1949, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 330, LI. 104–5.

[26] ‘The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (January 14, 1949)’, FRUS, the Far East: China 1949, Vol. 8, 47.

[27] ‘The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State (January 9, 1949)’, FRUS, the Far East: China 1949, Vol. 8, 25.

[28] Eight conditions declared by CCP for peace talks were: 1. punishing war criminals; 2. abolishing current National Government constitution; 3. abolishing current law; 4. reorganising all the reactionary armies on the principle of democracy; 5. confiscating all bureaucratic capitals; 6. reforming the land system; 7. abolishing treasonous treaties; 8. holding a political consultative conference without any reactionaries and establishing a democratic united government, therefore taking over all the power of Nanjing Government as well as its affiliated institutions. See CCP Central Documentary Research Department, Mao Zedong nianpu: 1893–1949, Vol. 2, 435–6.

[29] ‘Telegramma I. V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 14 January 1949, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 330, LI. 110–3.

[30] ‘Vrucheno A. Ya Vyshinskim Fu-Binchan’, 17 January 1949 in AVPRF, F. 100, Op. 42, Pap. 288, D. 17, LI. 7.

[31] See CCP Central Documentary Research Department, ed., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 78.

[32] Ledovsky et al., Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, 411–2: ‘Telegramma I. V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 20 April 1948, in APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, LI. 28–9.

[33] ‘Zapiska A.I. Mikoyana v Prezidium TsK KPSS o poezdke v Kitai v yanvare-fevrale 1949 g’, 22 September 1960, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 606, LI. 1–17.

[34] ‘Zapiska A.I. Mikoyana v Prezidium TsK KPSS o poezdke v Kitai v yanvare-fevrale 1949 g’, 22 September 1960, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 606, LI.

[35] ‘Zapiska A.I. Mikoyana v Prezidium TsK KPSS o poezdke v Kitai v yanvare-fevrale 1949 g’, 22 September 1960, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 606, LI.

[36] ‘Telegramma I. V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 14 January 1949, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 330, LI. 110–3.

[37] Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou, ‘Guanyu sidalin cheng fou quanzu woguo dujiang de tansuo’, 56–8.

[38] Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, 23–31.

[39] Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 52.

[40] While analysing the core of the United States’ foreign policies after World War II, Novikov stated that the United States had given up its isolation in a bid for world hegemony. For this goal the United States employed all diplomatic measures and made use of military forces as well as industrial and scientific power to force the USSR to make a series of compromises. Jensen, Origins of the Cold War, 7–10; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 103.

[41] ‘Obstanovka v Kitae posle soveshchaniaya desiati compartii’, 23 January 1948, in Rossiskii Tsentr Khraneniya i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), F. 17, Op. 128, D. 1173, LI. 1–37.

[42] ‘Kratkaya spravka k voprosu ob obstanovke v kitae’, 2 April 1948. AVPRF, F. 018, Op. 10, Pap. 24, D. 21, LI. 9–14.

[43] ‘Amerikanskaya politika v Kitae v obstanovke voennogo porazhenia Gomindana’, 27 December 1948, in AVPRF, F. 100, Op, 42, Pap. 296, D. 117, LI. 7, 20, 23.

[44] ‘Telegramma I. V. Stalina Mao Zedunu’, 14 January 1949, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 330, LI. 110–3.

[45] Concharov interview with Kovalev, 105.

[46] Tao Wenzhao, Zhongmei guanxishi: 1911–1950, 456.

[47] Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star, 585; Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, Vol. 3, 679.

[48] Author's interview with Andrei Ledovsky. He had worked as first secretary at the embassy of Soviet Union to China in 1949.

[49] APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 346, LI. 13–23, 46; Bazhanov, Aktualnye Problemy, 37.

[50] Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 2–3.

[51] Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council, 14 April 1950, 16.

[52] On the assistance of the United States to China during the Liberation War, see Tao Wenzhao, Zhongmei guanxishi: 1911–1950, 442–54.

[53] Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, 412.

[54] Report on Kim ll Sung's visit to the USSR, 30 March–25 April 1950. Prepared by the International Department of the CC of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Cited in Bajanov and Bajanova, The Korean Conflict, 1950–1953.

[55] August 1950, Stalin sent letter to Soviets Ambassador in Prague, conveying message to CSSR leader Klement Gottwald. This letter can be found in Rossiiskii Gosudartsvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii(RGASPI), F. 558, Op. 11, D. 62, LI. 71–2; Kim and Steuck, ‘Did Stalin Lure the United States into the Korean War?’

[56] This ‘Neutrality Pact’ not only violated China's territory sovereignty by recognising Japanese dominion over Manchuria, but also negatively influenced Chinese the anti-Japanese war. Li Jiagu, ‘Suri zhongli tiaoyue'qianding de guoji beijing jiqi dui zhongsu guanxi de yingxiang’, 88.

[57] Yang Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongchan guiji he zhongguo geming, 529–55.