The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79

Kristan Stoddart was a Research Fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton and remains a Visiting Research Fellow. In 2010 he joined the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth as a Research Assistant where he also serves as Executive Secretary of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies. Kristan Stoddart is a member of the Project on Nuclear Issues run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington DC), a peer reviewer for the Journal of Cold War History and European Security. He has spoken at a wide number of conferences nationally and internationally as well as on BBC Radio 4. He holds a PhD, MSc (Econ.) in European Politics and both a BA (Hons.) and an MA in History.

Abstract

Between 1974 and 1979 the British Labour Government, led first by Harold Wilson and then by James Callaghan, developed a programme of improvements to the British Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system initiated during Wilson's first government between 1964 and 1970. This Polaris improvement programme was known from 1974 onwards as Chevaline. Chevaline offered Britain an indigenous solution to meet the ‘Moscow Criterion’ – the requirement that British strategic missiles had to be capable of penetrating Moscow's ‘Galosh’ Anti-Ballistic missile defence system (ABM) even in the absence of US support. This came during a time of economic austerity in a changing strategic environment which led Labour to explore nuclear cooperation with the French. It also led to calls from within the party to renounce nuclear weapons through unilateral disarmament. This article will shed fresh light on the bitter internal debates that ensued and how a select band of senior ministers responded to this dilemma.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank a number of people for their help and assistance in the preparation of this article. My gratitude is owed in particular to Professor John Baylis, the late and much missed Sir Michael Quinlan and Dr. Frank Panton, the anonymous peer reviewers of this article as well as participants at the British Rocketry Oral History Project Conferences (BROHP) at Charterhouse in April 2005 and again in April 2006, all of whom have offered useful comments in preparation of this paper. The author would also like to pay gratitude to a number of key officials who wish to remain nameless for their comments. Their contribution is referred to in the footnotes as ‘confidential correspondence’. All references prefaced by TNA are taken from The National Archives, Kew, UK. Any omissions or errata in this article are the author's own.

Notes

Kristan Stoddart was a Research Fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton and remains a Visiting Research Fellow. In 2010 he joined the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth as a Research Assistant where he also serves as Executive Secretary of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies. Kristan Stoddart is a member of the Project on Nuclear Issues run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington DC), a peer reviewer for the Journal of Cold War History and European Security. He has spoken at a wide number of conferences nationally and internationally as well as on BBC Radio 4. He holds a PhD, MSc (Econ.) in European Politics and both a BA (Hons.) and an MA in History.

  [1] On the ‘Moscow Criterion’ see Stoddart, ‘Maintaining the Moscow Criterion’.

  [2] For more detailed information on the threat see Stoddart, ‘The Wilson Government and British Responses to ABMs’. For more detail of what the Chevaline project involved see Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project’.

  [3] Through the Freedom of Information Act (2005) it is now possible to request all but the most recent documents. However FOIA has its limitations and it remains difficult to get access to certain evidence. This is particularly true of nuclear weapons-related documents. For more information see Twigge, ‘Freedom of Information and the Historian’.

  [4] Although oral evidence and the written testimony of surviving participants cannot supplant government records, it can offer personal insights and nuances not contained in the surviving documents which have been made publicly available. Oral and written testimonies have been used selectively in this article. Nevertheless it must be remembered that participants might also have a vested interest in shaping the historical record in a particular way in order to justify the role they played at the time.

  [5] Hennessy, Secret State.

  [6] Although a large number of key documents remain withheld by the British government under the Public Records Act it has been possible to overcome this ‘documentary deficit’ assisted by the British Nuclear History Study Group based at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at Southampton University (MCIS) and the British Rocketry Oral History Project (BROHP) conferences held annually at Charterhouse. Both provide a hub around which active academic researchers and former participants in UK nuclear weapons programmes can discuss aspects of the British nuclear weapons programme. MCIS website: http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk (accessed 26 March 2006) and BROHP website: http://www.brohp.org.uk (accessed 26 March 2006).

  [7] A select few include Gaddis, We Know Now; Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb.

  [8] The approach taken by the first Wilson government towards a Polaris improvement programme in the context of the developing arms control agenda is examined in Stoddart, ‘British Responses to Anti-Ballistic Missiles, 1964–1970’, 1–33; and Twigge and Schrafstetter, Avoiding Armageddon, 163–202.

  [9] PREM 15/2038 (TNA), RTA Note for the Record, 8 February 1974.

 [10] It has been suggested that before 1970 the Royal Aircraft Establishment received a letter from the Cabinet Office prohibiting them from talking to certain left-wing Labour Ministers such as Tony Benn and Barbara Castle. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006.

 [11] For information on the UK state structure as it relates to the military establishment see Edgerton, Warfare State, in particular 235–44 and 256–63.

 [12] CAB 130/720 (TNA), MISC 1(74) 1st Meeting International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room D, Cabinet Office on Monday 11 March 1974 at 11.15 am, 11 March 1974.

 [13] For the purposes of continuity this key group of senior ministers will be referred to as the MCNP. On its formation see CAB 134/3120 (TNA), PN(66)1, 30 September 1966.

 [14] CAB 134/3821 (TNA), PN(74) 1 April 1974 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy Composition and Terms of Reference Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 1 April 1974.

 [15] CAB 134/3821 (TNA), PN(74) 1 April 1974 Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy Composition and Terms of Reference Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 1 April 1974.

 [16] DEFE 5/192/45 (TNA), The Rationale for the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force, 25 April 1972.

 [17] PREM 15/1359 (TNA), Strategic Nuclear Options (Memorandum by the Ministry of Defence), 2 November 1972.

 [18] Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 15 August 2006.

 [19] Confidential correspondence, 7 April 2006. In terms of the amount of damage required see Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 220–362.

 [20] Confidential correspondence, 7 April 2006.

 [21] This included an option designated Variant A. DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Top Secret UK Eyes A MO 18/1/1 Note for the Record Meeting British National Criteria for Strategic Deterrence, 27 November 1975. It was assumed that Soviet hunter killer submarines would ‘observe’ when the Polaris submarines went out on Patrol from Faslane and could therefore choose the best moment of a ‘bolt from the blue’ – a Soviet fist strike with little or no warning of attack. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006.

 [22] Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project’, 128–33.

 [23] This decision had been communicated to the Americans in January 1974. PREM 15/2038 (TNA), Cromer FM Washington 172124Z, 17 January 1974.

 [24] The codename was chosen by Kevin Tebbit of the Ministry of Defence who telephoned London Zoo and asked for the name of an animal like an Antelope. He was given the name ‘Chevaline’. British Academy Review webpage: http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/perspectives/0703cabinetsandbomb-2.html (accessed 19 June 2008).

 [25] Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background, 1964–1982’.

 [26] At a working level the codename KH 793 continued to be used but all central government correspondence refers to the improvement programme as Super Antelope. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006.

 [27] Operating with a minority government Wilson had called a second general election in October 1974 and had gained an overall majority of four seats.

 [28] This is not unusual in specific discussions concerning the British nuclear deterrent. What is discussed in full Cabinet is the government's overall policy on nuclear weapons and even then discord is stifled by Cabinet collective responsibility.

 [29] McInnes, Trident: The Only Option?, 13–4.

 [30] Grove, Vanguard to Trident, 348.

 [31] United Kingdom Parliament Page, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13804.htm (accessed 11 November 2002).

 [32] United Kingdom Parliament Page, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13804.htm (accessed 11 November 2002)

 [33] The Secretary of State for Industry and then Energy.

 [34] Ziegler, Wilson, 460.

 [35] Benn, Against the Tide, 267–8.

 [36] Ziegler, Wilson, 460.

 [37] Confidential correspondence, October 2002.

 [38] No delegated financial control existed for the project. This was later criticised by the findings of the Public Accounts Committee into the improvement programme in 1982. Ministry of Defence: Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile System , Ninth Report.

 [39] Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background’.

 [40] This was despite every effort having been made at the working level to meet the performance criteria laid down by the Royal Navy and the Chiefs of Staff. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006.

 [41] Letter to the Editor by Vice Admiral Sir J. Roxburgh, The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 1990. Quoted by Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background’.

 [42] Private correspondence with Frank Panton, 24 September 2002.

 [43] In arriving at this figure the Ministry of Defence was assisted by a working party report chaired by Fred East, a former Director of the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) based at Fort Halstead. Records Management, Operational Selection Policy OSP11, Nuclear Weapons Policy 1967–98, http://www.pro.gov.uk/recordsmanagement/acquisition/osp11nuclear.htm (accessed 2 February 2003).

 [44] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Top Secret UK Eyes A MO 18/1/1 Prime Minister Polaris Improvements, 18 September 1975.

 [45] The exclusion from Roy Mason's review of any consideration of Poseidon was due to the political difficulties associated with purchasing a second generation nuclear missile system for a Labour government with an entrenched wing of the party committed to unilateral disarmament. Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background’.

 [46] A number of subcontracts were issued to Vickers for the launching system, GEC for the fire control and test implementation subsystem, EMI for the weapon control subsystem simulator, BAC for the some elements of the construction of the Polaris missiles and Elliot and Sperry for the navigational aids and associated systems. All in all some 350 contracts were issued, 250 for development and 100 for production. McInnes, Trident: The Only Option?, 7.

 [47] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Top Secret UK Eyes A MO 18/1/1 Prime Minister Polaris Improvements, 18 September 1975.

 [48] The only remaining area of ‘major technical risk’ was the development of the sophisticated Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC). The PAC is a simplified ‘Bus’ which acted as carrier and to protect all the sub-systems needed to motor and eject discriminants, decoys and re-entry vehicles. TNA, DEFE 24/895, J.E. Hansford to R.A. Pearson, 20 August 1974 and confidential correspondence, October 2002.

 [49] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Top Secret UK Eyes A MO 18/1/1 Prime Minister Polaris Improvements, 18 September 1975.

 [50] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Polaris Improvements, 26 September 1975.

 [51] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), D.W.H. to Prime Minister, Polaris Improvements, 2 October 1975.

 [52] As with all UK nuclear tests the first codename refers to the trial name and the second to the name of the warhead tested. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006.

 [53] The Official Report, House of Commons, 5th Series, Hansard, 25 November 1975.

 [54] Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1974–6, 227–8.

 [55] McInnes, Trident: The Only Option?, 6.

 [56] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Polaris Improvements, 26 September 1975.

 [57] Reade, ‘The Role of British Aerospace in the Chevaline Project’.

 [58] A further consideration, according to Victor Macklen, was the realisation by the Secretary of State for Defence that until the RN had control of the programme they would not stop pushing for Poseidon. Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background’.

 [59] TNA DEFE 13/1039, Extract from Note to S of S on Meeting with PUS at 5.30 pm, 22 September 1975.

 [60] As Panton himself recounts, ‘it was always inevitable that, as a Naval project, managed by the Navy, a Naval officer would be appointed as head, even if only, in reality, a figurehead and that the technical staff under him would largely be drawn from the MOD R and D Establishments, then part of the Procurement Executive, headed by Sir Clifford Cornford’. He continues, ‘I was asked by Cornford if I wished to be considered for the post of CSSE. I declined and asked to be moved out of the Defence nuclear scene. It was clear to me the past four years of progressing Chevaline in the face of determined opposition by the Navy had not endeared me to them, to put it mildly, and a post for me in the Navy, even if they would accede to my appointment … would have placed me in a most difficult and essentially untenable position’. Panton concludes, ‘Fred East was a good choice for that post, at RAE he had been responsible for that establishment's contribution to the development of other UK nuclear weapons, such as WE177, but he was not tarred with the Chevaline brush. It is interesting to note that, at East's insistence, his post of CSSE was at Deputy Secretary (three star) level, whereas Scott's post of Chief Polaris Executive, in charge of the Chevaline project, was at Rear Admiral (two star level)’. Private correspondence with Frank Panton, 12 October 2005.

 [61] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Annex B to Enclosed to DUS(P)377/75, 25 October 1975.

 [62] The role of the Royal Navy is well covered by Metcalf et al. , ‘Role of MOD (Navy) Support Organisations’.

 [63] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), MO 18/1/1, Note for the Record, Record of a Discussion between the Defence Secretary and Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, Chief of the Naval Staff held in the Secretary of State's Room at 4.30 on Thursday 30 October 1975.

 [64] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), MO 18/1/1, Note for the Record, Record of a Discussion between the Defence Secretary and Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, Chief of the Naval Staff held in the Secretary of State's Room at 4.30 on Thursday 30 October 1975, 30 October 1975

 [65] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Chevaline Management, C.T. Sandars to PS/CPE, 16 December 1975.

 [66] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Senior Staff in Confidence, 4 December 1975. The reorganisation of the project from 1975 through to completion is well covered by Orman, ‘Evolving The Management of Chevaline’.

 [67] During his first stint as Prime Minister there were discreet moves at the very highest levels of government to assist the French nuclear weapons programme with the quid pro quo of British entry into the EEC. See for example files contained in the class CAB 165/600 (TNA).

 [68] These included European doubts about the ‘neutron bomb’, NATO Theatre Nuclear Modernisation and the eventual dual track decision.

 [69] See for example DEFE 13/891 (TNA), Meeting with President Pompidou: Speaking Notes on Defence, 13 November 1973. See also Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield.

 [70] Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, 161.

 [71] France had withdrawn from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966.

 [72] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), PS/CSA to PS/PUS, 16 October 1974.

 [73] DEFE 19/180, J.A. Thomson, ‘French Thinking About Nuclear Weapons’, 23 October 1974.

 [74] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Edward Peck to Admiral of the Fleet Peter Hill-Norton, 17 October 1974. It is not clear how much Labour knew of previous Conservative initiatives towards the French. See Stoddart, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 1960–1974’.

 [75] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), E.E. Tomkins to Sir John Killick, 5 November 1974.

 [76] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), A.P. Hockaday to Sir John Killick, 8 November 1974.

 [77] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), A.P. Hockaday to Sir John Killick, 8 November 1974

 [78] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Bondi to Dr Harold Agnew Director Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 28 November 1974.

 [79] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), J.A. Thomson to Sir E. Peck, 6 December 1974.

 [80] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), John Killick to Sir E. Tomkins, 6 December 1974.

 [81] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), C.C.C. Tickell to Mr Morgan Sir J. Killick, 21 March 1975.

 [82] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), C.C.C. Tickell to A.P. Hockaday, 11 March 1975.

 [83] NATO Basic Texts Page, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b740619a.htm (accessed 18 May 2007).

 [84] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Intelligence note by DGI, 27 May 1975.

 [85] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), DRIG Translation No. 4335, Undated summer 1975.

 [86] This was publicly revealed in 1989 by Richard Ullman and came as a surprise to many who had always believed (as the had French maintained) that no assistance had ever been given to the force de frappe. Ullman, ‘The Covert French Connection’.

 [87] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), J.A. Thompson to Mr. Wilberforce, 9 October 1975.

 [88] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), J.A. Thompson to H of C, 12 May 1976.

 [89] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), J.A. Thompson to H of C, 12 May 1976

 [90] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), J.A. Thompson to H of C, 12 May 1976

 [91] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to DUS(P), 7 June 1976.

 [92] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Note of a conversation between the Secretary of State and the French Defence Minister Monsieur Bourges during a flight from Exeter to Northolt in an Andover of the Queen's Flight on Monday 4th April 1977, 5 April 1977.

 [93] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), E.A.J. Ferguson to S of S, 25 April 1977.

 [94] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), E.A.J. Ferguson to S of S, 25 April 1977

 [95] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), S.W.A. Fuller to R.T. Jackling, 28 April 1977.

 [96] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PS/S of S, 3 May 1977.

 [97] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PS/S of S, 3 May 1977

 [98] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PS/S of S, 3 May 1977

 [99] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PS/S of S, 3 May 1977

[100] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Dr A.W. Fox to AUS(OR), 28 October 1977.

[101] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), W.J. Challens to V.H.B. Macklen, 2 November 1977.

[102] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), W.J. Challens to V.H.B. Macklen, 2 November 1977

[103] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), John Hunt to Sir Frank Cooper, 7 November 1977 and DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Frank Cooper to Sir John Hunt, 9 November 1977.

[104] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to DUS(P), 14 November 1977.

[105] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to DUS(P), 14 November 1977

[106] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Nuclear Matters, France, 21 November 1977.

[107] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Nuclear Matters, France, 21 November 1977

[108] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), Nuclear Matters, France, 21 November 1977

[109] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), M.E. Quinlan to CDS, PUS, 29 November 1977.

[110] DEFE 19/180 (TNA), M.E. Quinlan to CDS, PUS, 29 November 1977

[111] Hennessy, Muddling Through, 125–6.

[112] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), F.H. Panton ACSA(N) to DCA(PN), Nuclear Test, 19 February 1976.

[113] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to PS/S of S, Chevaline Nuclear Warhead Tests, 27 February 1976.

[114] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Draft Note from S of S to Prime Minister, Polaris Improvement Programme – Nuclear Testing, 3 March 1976.

[115] There is video footage of this debate between Allaun and Mason available on the internet via the BBC website. BBC ‘On this Day Page’: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/24/newsid_2526000/2526963.stm (accessed 26 June 2006).

[116] Mason, Paying the Price, 146.

[117] BBC, ‘On this Day Page’.

[118] Mason, Paying the Price, 146.

[119] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), F.H. Panton, ACSA(N) Further Nuclear Test, 3 October 1975.

[120] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), F.H. Panton, ACSA(N) Further Nuclear Test, 3 October 1975

[121] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Roy Mason to Jim Callaghan, MO 18/1/1 Nuclear Tests, 29 October 1975.

[122] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Roy Mason to Jim Callaghan, MO 18/1/1 Nuclear Tests, 29 October 1975

[123] This letter was also copied to the Prime Minister. DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Roy Mason to Jim Callaghan, MO 18/1/1 Nuclear Tests, 29 October 1975.

[124] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), Roy Mason to Jim Callaghan, MO 18/1/1 Nuclear Tests, 29 October 1975.

[125] Enviroweb.org, British Nuclear Testing Page, http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Uk/UKTesting.html (accessed 20 January 2003).

[126] Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 86–100. This would have been a test of a primary device used as the first stage to detonate a thermonuclear secondary.

[127] DEFE 19/181 (TNA), Note for the Record Avis 202 Discussion with Harry L Reynolds Associate Director for Nuclear Explosives LLL, 17 July 1978.

[128] DEFE 19/181 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PUS, 15 August 1978. Callaghan gave his approval of this test (now due to take place later in December) on 2 October 1978. DEFE 19/181 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to Drake Seager, 2 October 1978.

[129] DEFE 19/181 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to Secretary of State, 23 November 1978.

[130] Owen, Time to Declare, 380–1.

[131] Owen, Time to Declare, 380–81

[132] Hennessy, Muddling Through, 120–9.

[133] Ziegler, Wilson, 460.

[134] DEFE 13/1039 (TNA), J.F. Mayne to Secretary of State, Top Secret UK Eyes A Atomic Artificer, 18 November 1975.

[135] Nessel was the American codename for the test, the British codeword was Dicel. DEFE 19/181 (TNA), AWRE Aldermaston Classification Notice No. 40 Classification Guide for Dicel/Nessel, 14 March 1979.

[136] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN), British Nuclear Test Programme, 23 October 1978.

[137] DEFE 19/181 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PS/S of S, 23 October 1978.

[138] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), David Owen to the Prime Minister, British Nuclear Test Programme, 31 October 1978.

[139] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), FM to Prime Minister, British Nuclear Test Programme, 3 November 1978. This warhead was not compatible for the Mk. 3 re-entry vehicle used in Poseidon but it was a step towards a British equivalent of the warhead for the Mk. 4 re-entry vehicle for both the C-4 and D-5 versions of Trident. With the development work on the Chevaline warhead now completed, work had begun to focus on the next most likely requirement (the US Trident missile). The lead-in time for a UK warhead was likely to be long and needs had to be anticipated if designs were to be available when required. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006.

[140] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), V H B Macklen DCA(PN) to Secretary of State, British Nuclear Test – 20 November 1978, 23 November 1978.

[141] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), FM to Prime Minister, British Nuclear Test Programme, 3 November 1978.

[142] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), David Owen to Prime Minister, PM/78/125 British Nuclear Test Programme, Undated, 16 November 1978.

[143] DEFE 19/181 (TNA), David Owen to Prime Minister, 16 November 1978.

[144] Macklen found Owen's minute ‘not very helpful’ from the MoD's point of view. DEFE 19/181 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to Secretary of State, 22 November 1978.

[145] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), G.G.H. Walden to B.G. Cartledge, British Nuclear Test Programme, 28 November 1978.

[146] DEFE19/181 (TNA), Bryan Cartledge to R.L.L. Facer, 1 December 1978.

[147] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), SCDS(B)1 to PSO/CDS, British Nuclear Test Programme, 30 November 1978.

[148] DEFE 25/335 (TNA), Bryan Cartledge to Roger Facer, UK Nuclear Test Programme, 1 December 1978.

[149] Private correspondence with Frank Panton, 12 October 2005.

[150] Ullman, ‘The Covert French Connection’.

[151] Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent, 114.