Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60

Roland Popp is Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH in Zurich. His research focuses on Cold War history, the politics of nuclear proliferation and the international history of the Middle East.

Abstract

The article reconsiders the attempts of the Eisenhower administration (1958–60) to come to terms with the realities of Middle Eastern politics by initiating a rapprochement with the forces of radical Arab nationalism. The establishment of a limited ‘working relationship’ with Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic had a stabilising influence on intra-regional developments and contributed to the containment of Soviet advances in Iraq and Yemen. Despite these successes, the Eisenhower administration proved to be ideologically disinclined to establish a constructive long-term relationship with the key regional force.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend his particular thanks to Pamela Rooney, Sinéad Traynor and Jost Dülffer. He would also like to express his gratitude to the Stiftung Bildung und Wissenschaft, the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation for funding archival research.

Notes

Roland Popp is Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH in Zurich. His research focuses on Cold War history, the politics of nuclear proliferation and the international history of the Middle East.

  [1] For the latter see Malcolm Kerr's classic account The Arab Cold War.

  [2] Rountree Letter to Hare, 3 March 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS) 1958–60, XII, 211.

  [3] Memo, 20 March 1958, FRUS 1958–60, III, 54.

  [4] Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism; Takeyh, Eisenhower Doctrine; for an earlier, contradicting perspective see Stivers, ‘Eisenhower and the Middle East’; McMahon, ‘Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism’; Little, American Orientalism, 183.

  [5] Brands, Specter of Neutralism, 9f.; this qualified broad-mindedness may have been confined to the Middle Eastern arena; the US response to Third World nationalism significantly varied in different regional settings on the periphery; see the contributions in Statler and Johns, The Eisenhower Administration.

  [6] Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 270–1.

  [7] Hahn, Caught in the Middle East.

  [8] Strong Letter to Jones, 15 November 1961, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Records of the Director 1958–63, f. ‘Middle East General, January–Dec. 1961’, Box 5, Record Group (hereafter cited as RG) 59, National Archives at College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NACP); for a related argument see Kupchan, ‘American Globalism’.

  [9] Assessment, 24 March 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 48–54.

 [10] MemCon, 15 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XI, 245–7.

 [11] Memo, 20 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 84, Memo, 23 July 1958, ibid., 98–100.

 [12] See ibid., Memo, 16 July 1958, ibid., 72–5; Rountree Memo to Dulles, 23 July 1958, ibid., 93–5.

 [13] Memo, 23 July 1958, ibid., 98–100; Planning Board Paper, 29 July 1958, ibid., 114–24.

 [14] 374th NSC Meeting, 31 July 1958, ibid., 124–34.

 [15] See Irwin Memo to Dulles, 28 February 1958, ibid., 42–5; all sanitisations in the FRUS version pertain to the question of the nuclearisation of Middle Eastern defence; the unsanitised document is to be found in f. ‘Department of Defense (2) [November 1957–November 1958]’, White House Office (hereafter WHO), Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952–61 (hereafter OSANSA), Special Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL); National Security Advisor Robert Cutler deemed that Irwin's suggestions ‘[…] fell like a sputnik into this troubled area’; Cutler Memo to Irwin, 17 March 1958, f. ‘March 1958 (2)’, WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 5, DDEL; earlier assessments with respect to the military implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine had still relied on quick deployments of ‘small mobile forces’; see CJCS Memo for Joint State–Defense Conference, 23 July 1957, f. ‘Iran (8)’, WHO, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Disaster File Series, Box 66, DDEL; for NSC Action 1753 see the editorial notes in FRUS 1955–57, XII, 553 and 573.

 [16] Memo, 1 January 1957, ibid., 432–7; on the Eisenhower Doctrine see Hahn, ‘Securing the Middle East’; on the ill-fated American attempt to establish itself as something akin to an extraregional hegemon in the Middle East in 1957–58 see Schulzinger, ‘Impact of Suez’; Kunz, ‘Emergence’, 80–91.

 [17] Boggs Memo, 5 September 1957, FRUS 1955–57, XII, 577–82; according to the memo, the ‘principal development of the past three years has been the assumption by the U.S. of main responsibility for the Near East on behalf of the free nations and tacit recognition of this fact by our allies’.

 [18] Rountree Memo to Dulles, 21 January 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 4–5; NSC Statement, encl. to Note by the Executive Secretary to the NSC, 24 January 1958, ibid., 17–32.

 [19] ‘General Considerations Affecting U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, Annex A to NSC 5820 Draft Paper, 3 October 1958, Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2008, hereafter DDRS), 52.

 [20] See Planning Board Paper, 29 July 1958, 117.

 [21] See editorial note in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 162–6; for the final version of NSC 5820/1 see ‘Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, enclosed to NSC Report, 4 November 1958, ibid., 187–99; it was also recognised that ‘too direct efforts on our part to stimulate developments lessening the pre-dominant position of Nasser might be counter-productive’; see ibid., 195.

 [22] Memo, 4 August 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 136.

 [23] See n.18; see also the discussion of this question in 377th NSC Meeting, 21 August 1958, ibid., 154–6.

 [24] The main differences between NSC 5801/1 and NSC 5820/1 are summarised in Rountree Memo to Dulles, 10 October 1958, ibid., 167–70; already in July 1958 Eisenhower had contested the view the Arab ‘right of self-determination was identical with radical pan-Arab nationalism’; see 374th NSC Meeting, 31 July 1958, ibid., 127; Dulles also foresaw future splits inside the Arab nationalist movement – in the long run, ‘more moderate views may prevail than the views now rampant in radical pan-Arab nationalism’; see 383rd NSC Meeting, 16 October 1958, ibid., 176; regional experts inside the administration, however, emphasised that ‘the various divisive factors in the area will for some time to come be overshadowed by the powerful emotional appeal of the Arab unity movement’ and that ‘for all practical purposes it is necessary to think of Nasser and the mass of Arab nationalists as inseparable’; SNIE 30-3-58, 12 August 1958, ibid., 141; on the process leading to the toning down of earlier versions of the policy statement see Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 254–6.

 [25] 374th NSC Meeting, 31 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 129; for Dulles' scepticism with respect to the question of recognition of the newly formed UAR see Dulles Memo to Eisenhower, 8 February 1958, DDRS.

 [26] 383rd NSC Meeting, 16 October 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 178; Eisenhower's quite doubtful proposal to convince Kuwaitis to move closer to Iran demonstrated how limited his knowledge about the Middle East was; see 374th NSC Meeting, 31 July 1958, ibid., 134.

 [27] See Staff Study, 30 October 1957, FRUS 1955–57, XII, 619–47; NSC 5801 had devised the support of a federation between Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq as a US policy aim.

 [28] Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 256.

 [29] MemCon, 23 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 98.

 [30] 374th NSC Meeting, 31 July 1958, ibid., 124–34.

 [31] Dulles wanted paragraph 36-b of the new policy statement to be the ‘touchstone’ of the US approach; 36-b addressed the possible reduction of Soviet Bloc influence in the UAR and the region; see 383rd NSC Meeting, 16 October 1958, ibid., 177.

 [32] For assessments of the revolution and concomitant events see the contributions in Louis and Owen, A Revolutionary Year; Fernea and Louis, The Iraqi Revolution; for US policy toward Iraq prior to the revolution see Axelgard, ‘US Support’; Williamson, ‘Understandable Failure’.

 [33] Qasim immediately moved towards a strengthened relationship with the Soviet Bloc countries; Qasim Letter to Grotewohl, 7 August 1958, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (hereafter SAPMO-BA), DY 30/IV 2/20/358.

 [34] OIR Report No. 7921, 16 January 1959, 9 January 1959, DDRS.

 [35] MemCon, 23 December 1958, f. ‘State Department – September 1958 – January 1959 (4)’, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952–61, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, DDEL; also with sanitisations in FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 509–11; Cairo Telegram #1797, 15 December 1958, ibid., 505–9; for Rountree's trip see also Rountree Memo to Dulles, 27 December 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 200–204; Baghdad Telegram #1887, 16 December 1958, ibid., 361–3; NSC Planning Board Meeting, 6 January 1959, DDRS; Oral History Interview with William M. Rountree, 22 December 1989, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project (hereafter cited as FAOH), Special Collections Division, Georgetown University Library, Washington DC; the CIA warning in CIA Memo, ‘The Situation in Iraq’, 7 January 1959, DDRS.

 [36] See Burns, Economic Aid; for the initial internal debates on whether to accept Nasser's December 1958 ‘scarcely-veiled invitation to collaborate on Iraq’ see Draft Paper, 19 December 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 366–7; Rountree Memo to Dillon, 22 December 1958, ibid., 368–71; 393rd NSC Meeting, 15 January 1959, ibid., 375–7; Operations Coordinating Board (hereafter OCB) Paper, 18 February 1959, ibid., 389–94.

 [37] Hochmuth Report [Baghdad], 22 May 1959, SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/20/359.

 [38] The US apparently had foreknowledge of the Nasserite coup attempt in March 1959; none of the relevant documents has been declassified; see FRUS 1958–60, XII, 394; but see SNIE 36.2–59, 17 February 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 381–8, here 385 n.1; US ambassador to Baghdad, John Jernegan, described Communist advances in the aftermath of the coup, musing that ‘1959 will be year of the bear in Iraq’; see Baghdad Telegram #2758, 26 March 1959, ibid., 398.

 [39] Gray Memo to Herter, 3 April 1959, ibid., 410; the excised part referring to covert action has been retrieved through a FOIA request by Citino; see his ‘Middle East Cold Wars’, 255, 266 n.20; Eisenhower approved the creation of a Special Committee with NSC Action No. 2068; see FRUS 1958–60, XII, 437 n.12; for Halla's original proposal see Briefing Note, 11 March 1959, f. ‘The Middle East (2) [1957–59]’, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 13, DDEL; Halla had recommended either using existing UK or Nasser's assets and capabilities in Iraq to prevent a Communist takeover; the precedence for such a committee was the 1957 Special Committee on Indonesia.

 [40] NSC Staff Draft, 30 March 1959, ibid.; the idea to engage Qasim was detailed in the same document as an attempt to ‘buy off’ the regime through providing aid on a massive scale and by ‘outselling’ the Soviet Bloc; the importance of saving the new US–Egyptian relationship was mirrored in the assessment that such a policy might create difficulties with Nasser.

 [41] For the lack of information and the continuing refusal by US authorities to declassify the documentary record see Citino, ‘Middle East Cold Wars’, 255–7; see also Osgood, Eisenhower and Regime Change, 16–7.

 [42] Paper prepared in the Department of State, 15 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 417, 419, 421; see also ibid., 410 n.1; Position Paper for Macmillan Talks, 14 March 1959, DDRS.

 [43] ‘The Situation in Iraq – Comments and Questions’, 16 April 1959, f. ‘The Middle East (2) [1957–59]’, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 13, DDEL; the same commentator also criticised the idea that a solution ‘must come from within the region’ and recommended a more determined effort in order to promote such a regional solution; in order to circumvent the State Department's objections, he called for the creation of another high level working group in order to ‘present alternatives and variations to our present policy’, apparently counting on JCS and CIA support for ‘a more forward policy’.

 [44] Nixon Memo to Herter, 20 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 438.

 [45] This State Department point of view was set forth by Rountree in the NSC; see 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959, ibid., 426; the NSC critique of the ‘coordinated study’ mentioned that not all regional experts shared the opinion that there were no elements in Iraq which could be contacted; see n.40.

 [46] SNIE 36.2/1–59, 21 April 1959, ibid., 439–40; the SNIE mentioned that ‘the Communists will soon, if they do not already, have the ability to assume direct control in Iraq’ and that there was no Iraqi leader around able to stop them; Halla Memo, 11 May 1959, f. ‘The Middle East (2) [1957–59]’, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 13, DDEL; according to the same memorandum, Jernegan and the working group were ‘still not of the same mind’. Jernegan was ‘willing only to see contingency planning, but no action taken at this time’; see also Baghdad Telegram #2837, 4 April 1959, DDRS; Interagency Draft II 2, 6 May 1959; Memo for the Record, 20 May 1959, ibid.

 [47] SNIE 36.2/3–59, 19 May 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 454.

 [48] Memo, 21 April 1959; JCS Memo for McElroy, 22 April 1959, DDRS.

 [49] Memo, 27 April 1959; Memo, 8 May 1959, DDRS.

 [50] Baghdad Telegram #355, 9 August 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 474–7; the intelligence community had acknowledged that previous estimates had been ‘too gloomy’; see SNIE 36.2/2–59, 30 June 1959, ibid., 471.

 [51] Editorial note, ibid., 478; the assessment of these developments by the Special Committee in Jones Memo to Herter, 28 September 1959, ibid., 484–8; in an interesting reversal of roles, the Egyptians now tried to convince the Americans that Qasim had been a Communist party member and that the Soviet Union had practically taken over the country as part of a ‘thrust to the Persian Gulf and India via Iraq and Tibet’; see MemCon, 30 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 538–39; Briefing Note for NSC, 30 September 1959, DDRS.

 [52] 420th NSC Meeting, 1 October 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 489 n.6.

 [53] For the speculation that these covert operations might have been organised outside the purview of the Committee see Citino, ‘Middle East Cold Wars’, 257; Osgood, Eisenhower and Regime Change, 20–1; there apparently was some discussion inside the administration whether to kill Qasim; former Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Armin H. Meyer, later remembered that Allen Dulles vigorously refused to contemplate such action; see Powers, ‘Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks’; the Church Committee hearings confirmed an assassination attempt on a pro-communist Iraqi colonel in 1960; see US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Washington DC 1975, 181 n.1; Richard Bissell, soon to be named the CIA's deputy director for plans, summarised somewhat ominously during deliberations in the NSC: ‘if no further assassination attempts were made against Kassem, there was a strong possibility of a growth in Communist power’; quoted from 428th NSC Meeting, 10 December 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 494; for the continued sharp policy differences in the Special Committee see Memo, 8 December 1959, DDRS.

 [54] ‘Wait and See’ was a characterisation for the course followed by the US which had been coined by one Special Committee member; see Memo, 8 Jun. 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 467; ‘friendship and non-involvement’ in Wilson Memo, 18 March 1960, ibid., 507–8; Memo for the Record, 4 January 1960, DDRS.

 [55] ‘More forward policy’ was the term used in the earlier critique of Foggy Bottom's approach in April 1959; see n.37; Ambassador Jernegan, long-time opponent of direct intervention, seemed to have retracted in early 1960; see Memo, 13 January 1960, f. ‘The Middle East (2) [1957–59]’, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 13, DDEL; for the 12 January meeting of the Special Committee see also FRUS 1958–60, XII, 500.

 [56] The strong emphasis on strict adherence to non-intervention also by the regional allies in 420th NSC Meeting, 1 October 1959, ibid., 488–9; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lewis Jones even went as far as arguing that contingency planning might do more harm than good if Iraq became aware of the planning; on the modified course including cooperation with neighbouring states see the Special Committee meeting of 12 January 1960; see n.55.

 [57] See OCB Paper, 14 December 1960, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 524–30; the Iraqi Communist Party apparently regarded the turn in its fortunes as a result of self-inflicted mistakes in its policies; dominating left radicalism had led to an accelerated programme of societal change while Qasim's fundamental bourgeois character had been misunderstood; undated Memo (ca. 1960), SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/20/357; the West German embassy predicted in summer 1960 an early overthrow of the regime after which a ‘turn to the right’ was expected; see Botschaft Bagdad to Auswaertiges Amt, Fernschreiben No.169, 17 August 1960, B 12, Bd. 977, Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts, Berlin (hereafter PAAA).

 [58] Some observers admitted that Qasim's suspicions might have been a result of the evidence of previous US policies the revolutionaries had found in captured documents of the Ancien Regime; according to one official, ‘the revolutionary regime had dug into the archives and found out that CIA was heavy into the royalist regime and all the ministries’ and in consequence was ‘suspicious of everything we were trying to do’; Oral History Interview with Andrew I. Killgore, 15 June 1988, FAOH; Foster Dulles also noticed that ‘the Iraqis have no doubt seized the Baghdad Pact records as well as the Crown Prince's records and Nuri's files’; MemCon, 16 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 75.

 [59] 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959, ibid., 430.

 [60] 391st NSC Meeting, 18 December 1958, ibid., 363; 393rd NSC Meeting, 15 January 1959, ibid., 376.

 [61] Ibid., 376; 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959, ibid., 433; in the same meeting, Rountree again countered Allen's views with the argument that he believed ‘that the possibilities that Nasser could permanently take over in Iraq were very remote’ and that he ‘was not particularly worried about the US policy of encouraging Nasser in his current anti-Communist program’; the remarks by Treasury Secretary Anderson in ibid., 431, 432; Herter's remark in 428th NSC Meeting, 10 December 1959, ibid., 494–5, here 495.

 [62] 384th NSC Meeting, 30 October 1958, ibid., 185; Fain, ‘Unfortunate Arabia’.

 [63] Addis Ababa Telegram 751, 15 April 1957, FRUS 1955–57, XIII, 760.

 [64] See ibid., 750 n.7; Wilkins Memo, 2 January 1957, ibid., 753; Smith Memo, 28 October 1957; Dearborn Memo, 23 August 1957; Cabell Memo, 13 August 1957, f. ‘Near East (Middle East) (2)’, WHO, OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 4, DDEL.

 [65] Rockwell Memo to Rountree, 21 February 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 796–8, 796 n.1; on Badr's opposition see Aden Telegram #59, 22 September 1958, ibid., 802–4; Melbourne Memo, 25 February 1958, f. ‘091.4 NEAR EAST’, Records of the OCB, Box 4, RG 273, NACP.

 [66] ‘Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, enclosed to NSC Report, 4 November 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 197; it also mentioned the encouragement of US private economic activity; already in late 1957 the State Department had approached Standard Oil of New Jersey in order for the company to take over the expired concession of the Yemen Development Corporation which had gone into liquidation; see MemCon 11 March 1958, f. ‘Yemen–Economic Development 1958’, Lot 61 D 12, General Subject Files Relating to the Middle East, 1955–58, Box 13, RG 59, NACP; Cassilly Memo, 13 November 1957, FRUS 1955–57, XIII; 769–70; see Rockwell Memo to Rountree, 21 February 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 796–8.

 [67] Cairo Telegram #2964, 9 April 1959, ibid., 811 n.1, 812 n.2; discussions inside the Administration continued in the following months as to whether the original offers to Nasser should be expanded; Rockwell Memo to O'Connor, 9 June 1959; Rockwell Memo to Sheppard, 22 Jun. 1959; Meyer Memo to Jones, 17 July 1959, f. ‘Yemen’ Lot 61 D 43, Office Files Relating to Middle Eastern Affairs, 1958–59, Box 15, RG 59, NACP.

 [68] OCB, Intelligence Notes, 25 September 1958, DDRS.

 [69] JIC(60)22(Final), 19 May 1960, CAB 158/39, The National Archives of the UK (hereafter TNA), Public Record Office (hereafter PRO); Staff Notes, 19 May 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 814; Gustin Memo to OCB, 30 March 1959, f. ‘091.4 NEAR EAST’, Records of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), Box 5; CIA Intelligence Precis ‘Sino-Soviet Bloc Activity in Yemen, 15 September 1959, f. ‘091 NEAR EAST’, Records of the OCB, Box 4, RG 273, NACP; MemCon, 6 November 1959, f. ‘Yemen’, Lot 61 D 43, Office Files Relating to Middle Eastern Affairs, 1958–59, Box 15, RG 59, NACP; the Western powers also refrained from direct budgetary support ‘to a declining and unpopular regime’; Meyer Memo to Jones, 20 November 1959, f. ‘Middle East – General Folder 2 of 2’, Lot 61 D 43, Office Files Relating to Middle Eastern Affairs, 1958–59, Box 14, RG 59, NACP.

 [70] For ill-conceived projects see e.g. Rockwell Memo to Rountree, 11 May 1959; Meyer Memo to Rockwell, 19 June 1959; Crawford Memo to Hare, 11 August 1959, f. ‘Yemen’, Lot 61 D 43, Office Files Relating to Middle Eastern Affairs, 1958–59, Box 15, RG 59, NACP; for the Soviet answer see Terrill Memo to Dillon, 7 July 1960, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 817; on the Chinese attempt to displace the US road building project and US concerns about an unfavourable impression of their gravel paving proposal compared to the Chinese offer of a ‘first class asphalt road’ see Jones Memo to Dillon, 7 July 1960, ibid., 818–9.

 [71] See CIA precis in n.69; there was a growing worry about the presence of an increasing number of Soviet Bloc nationals in the Yemen – in mid-1960 the number of Chinese and Soviet ‘technicians’ was estimated as 800 and 400–600 respectively; see Terrill Memo in previous note; Meyer Memo to Rockwell, 19 June 1959; Crawford Memo to Hare, 11 August 1959, f. ‘Yemen’, Lot 61 D 43, Office Files Relating to Middle Eastern Affairs, 1958–59, Box 15, RG 59, NACP; see also editorial note in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 812–13.

 [72] See MemCon, 21 Jul. 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 67–72; Ben-Gurion letter to Eisenhower, 24 Jul. 1958, f. ‘White House – Meetings with the President July 1, 1958–December 31, 1958 (9)’, Papers of John Foster Dulles, White House Memoranda Series, Box 7, DDEL; the large excised segment in the MemCon between Dulles and Eban of 27 July probably refers to the proposed intelligence cooperation; see FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 74–7; the same applies to Dulles’ letter to Ben-Gurion, 1 August 1958, ibid., 77–9.

 [73] See Eisenhower's remarks in Memo of Discussion at the 377th NSC Meeting, 21 August 1958, ibid., 154–6; for the overall context in wider US-Israeli relations during the Eisenhower administration see Hahn, ‘United States and Israel’.

 [74] Rountree Memo to Dulles, 17 January 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 137–8; Rountree Memo to Dulles, 27 December 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 200–4.

 [75] 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959, ibid., 423.

 [76] For Dulles' remarks see editorial note in ibid., 377–8; for the hasbara campaign see Hahn, Caught in the Middle East, 270–1.

 [77] MemCon, 23 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 98–100.

 [78] In April 1959, the Turks asserted that they were going to intervene militarily if Nasser moved into Iraq; see Paper prepared in the Department of State, 15 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 416; they apparently reassessed their position after a visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Parker T. Hart to the region; see Memo, 1 June 1959, ibid., 460–3; for Israeli influence on the Turkish posture see also 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959, ibid., 423–37; Mrozinski Memo to Gustin, 20 March 1959, DDRS.

 [79] CIA Memo RR GM 60–61,‘The Shatt Al ‘Arab Dispute’, 7 January 1960, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NACP.

 [80] 432nd NSC Meeting, 14 January 1960, ibid., 501–2; Rivinus Memo to Smith, 19 October 1959, f. ‘091 NEAR EAST’, Records of the OCB, Box 4, RG 273, NACP.

 [81] See SNIE 36.2-2-59, 28 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 442–3.

 [82] See editorial note in ibid., 328; State Telegram #203 to Amman, 19 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XI, 344–5.

 [83] See MemCon, 24 March 1959, ibid., 692–4; see also Oral History Interview with Andrew I. Killgore, 15 June 1988, FAOH; Oral History Interview with Francesca and Sheldon Mills, 6 January 1987, FAOH.

 [84] See Jidda Telegram #847, 4 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 413–14; shortly after the coup in Iraq, the Saudis had demanded immediate intervention by the Baghdad Pact powers; see Briefing Notes by DCI Dulles, 14 July 1958, ibid., 308–11; for the domestic background on Saudi–UAR relations see Hart, Saudi Arabia and the United States, 82–4; Citino, Arab Nationalism to OPEC, 145–60.

 [85] See 423rd NSC Meeting, 5 November 1959, DDRS, a version of the document with more sanitisations is in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 492; 428th NSC Meeting, 10 December 1959, DDRS, Jordanian ambitions are sanitised in the version of the document in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 494f.

 [86] Memo [Name excised] to Jones, 13 October 1959, Case Number F-2005-01572, CIA Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov (accessed 25 June 2007); this is the classified document mentioned in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 491.

 [87] Rountree Memo to Dillon, 22 December 1958, ibid., 368–71; Oral History Interview with William M. Rountree, 22 December 1989, FAOH; White House staff had hoped that ‘some excuse be found to the effect that Baghdad Pact forces were going in to restore the Iraqi Government to the Iraqi people and that they would withdraw as soon as this had been done’; see n.40.

 [88] See e.g. Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 80; 373rd NSC Meeting, 24 July 1958, ibid., 106; 374th NSC Meeting, 31 July 1958, ibid., 132.

 [89] For Dulles’ disposition in favour of wider operations see his revealing talk with the Vice President; see TelCon Dulles–Nixon, 15 July 1958, ibid., XII, 321; see also his remarks in MemCon, 20 July 1958, ibid., 81–7; ‘clearing up’ in MemCon, 15 July 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XI, 245; Eisenhower refused to be committed by Macmillan; see TelCon Eisenhower–Macmillan, 14 July 1958, ibid., 231–4.

 [90] Anglo-American cooperation and conflict during the 1958 crisis has received considerable attention; see Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan; Ovendale, ‘Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion’; Blackwell, ‘Desert Squall’; for comprehensive studies on British thinking during the crisis see Louis, ‘Britain and the Crisis of 1958’; Blackwell, British Military Intervention, 107–25; for a provocative re-interpretation of US motives see Gendzier, Notes from a Minefield.

 [91] See Rountree Memo to Dulles, 10 October 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 167–70; ‘Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, enclosed to NSC Report, 4 November 1958, ibid., 192.

 [92] See Blackwell, ‘Pursuing Nasser’; Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, 190–207; Ovendale, Britain, the US and the Transfer of Power, 216–24.

 [93] GEN. 658/1st Meeting, 22 July 1958, CAB 130/153, TNA:PRO.

 [94] OME (58)45, ‘Points for a Middle East Policy–Part I’, 15 October 1958, CAB 134/2342, TNA:PRO; see also Blackwell, British Military Intervention, 177–9.

 [95] Worrall, ‘Coping with a Coup’, 182.

 [96] The plotters had approached the US embassy; see State Telegram #1505 to Baghdad, 4 December 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 355–6; see remarks by Dulles in 393rd NSC Meeting, 15 January 1959, ibid., 375–7; Cairo Telegram #1797, 15 December 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 508.

 [97] MemCon, 30 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 536; on such British deliberations see Ovendale, Britain, The US and the Transfer of Power, 219; Ashton, ‘Macmillan and the Middle East’, 55; the Joint Intelligence Committee saw ‘much more serious implications for the West’ in case of a Communist takeover; see JIC(58)114(Final), ‘The Possible Consequences of the Early Collapse or Overthrow of the Government in Iraq’, 5 December 1958, CAB 158/34, TNA:PRO.

 [98] MemCon, 22 March 1959, DDRS.

 [99] Cairo Telegram #2357, 11 February 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 515–8; MemCon, 4 April 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 411–3; MemCon, 22 March 1959, ibid., 217f.

[100] Briefing Note for NSC, 29 April 1959, DDRS.

[101] The Americans noted much greater Anglo-American consent on Iraq at the working levels than at the top level; see editorial note, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 441.

[102] CC(59)24, 20 April 1959, CAB 128/33, TNA:PRO.

[103] 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959, FRUS 158–60, XII, 424; MemCon, 4 April 1959, ibid., 411–3.

[104] See Jones, ‘Anglo-American Relations after Suez’; see Eisenhower's remarks in 383rd NSC Meeting, 16 October 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XI, 176.

[105] Foreign Office to Embassy Washington, No. 5366, 31 July 1958; T.369/58 Dulles to Macmillan, 3 August 1958; WFD/426 Dickson to Bishop, 25 August 1958, PREM 11/2399, TNA:PRO; Dennison Memo, 29 June 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 224–6; MemCon, 28 August 1959, ibid., 233–5; Rountree Memo, 20 May 1959, ibid., 456–8.

[106] Macmillan to Eisenhower, 14 May 1959; Eisenhower to Macmillan, 15 May 1959, Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence, 255–6; Foreign Office to UK Delegation in Geneva, No. 669, 31 July 1959, PREM 11/2753; ME(M)(59)(6), Trend Memo to Macmillan, 10 March 1959, CAB 21/3935, TNA:PRO; some of the results of the joint study on various contingencies in Iraq, Iran and Kuwait resulting from the US–UK agreed minute of 23 March 1959 can be found in f. ‘Near and Middle East 1959–61’, Lot 67 D 548, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1957–61, Box 154, RG 59, NACP.

[107] MemCon, 15 May 1959, f. ‘Meeting with the President – 1959 (2)’, WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Box 4, DDEL.

[108] Lennox–Boyd Memo to Middle East Committee, ME(M)(59)4, 4 February 1959, CAB 134/2230; Amery Letter to Macmillan, 8 September 1958, PREM 11/2397, TNA:PRO; for the demise of the Arab threat to the postwar petroleum order see Citino, Arab Nationalism to OPEC, 152–6.

[109] 364th NSC Meeting, 2 May 1958, DDRS.

[110] See Rockwell Memo to Rountree, 21 February 1958, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 796ff.; Foreign Office Brief No. 6, 4 June 1958, CAB 130/147, TNA:PRO; Fain, ‘Unfortunate Arabia’, 130f.; Mawby, ‘Clandestine Defence’, 116ff.; Briefing Book for Macmillan Visit, 9 Jun. 1958; MemCon, 10 June 1958, DDRS; MemCon, 9 October 1958, f. ‘Memos of Conversation – General – A Through D (3)’, Papers of John Foster Dulles, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 1, DDEL.

[111] See FRUS 1958–60, XII, 192; ‘Mutual Security Objectives Plan FY 1962–1966: Yemen’, 5 November 1959, f. ’MSOP Yemen–FY 1962–1966 [1959]', Lot 61 D 260, Subject Files Relating to the Arabian Peninsula, 1952–60, Box 20, RG 59, NACP.

[112] See editorial note in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 805; OME (59) 4th Meeting, 18 November 1959, CAB 134/2343, TNA:PRO.

[113] ZP 1/35 G, ‘The Future of Anglo-American Relations’, Planning Section, PUSD, 5 January 1960, CAB 21/5552, TNA:PRO.

[114] NSC Staff Study on NSC 5801, 16 January 1958, DDRS, 18.

[115] OCB, Report on the Near East (NSC 5820/1), 3 February 1960, f. ‘NEAR EAST’, Records of the OCB, Box 5, RG 273, NACP; Eisenhower questioned plans to establish covert intelligence cooperation with Egypt and was especially worried by the influence of Egyptian teachers all over the Middle East but was reassured by Allen Dulles that ‘if we can bring [excised] policy to parallel our own, [excised] teachers would then be useful to us’; MemCon, 15 May 1959, f. ‘Meeting with the President – 1959 (2)’, WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Box 4, DDEL (quoted passage declassified through a mandatory review request of this author in January 2008).

[116] MemCon, 23 December 1958; see n.35; editorial note in FRUS 1958–60, XII, 216; MemCon, 9 June 1958, DDRS.

[117] MemCon, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 248f.; OCB Report, 3 February 1960; see n.115; Briefing Note for Planning Board, 1 June 1960, DDRS; NSC 6011: ‘Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the Near East’, enclosed to NSC Report, 19 July 1960, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 262–73.

[118] Compare ibid., 189f. with 266f.; Briefing Note, 14 June 1960; MemCon, 26 July 1960; Briefing Note for Planning Board, 6 July 1960, DDRS.

[119] Ibid.; Meyer Memo to Hart, 20 July 1960, FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 589f.

[120] MemCon, 23 December 1958; see n.35, the remark on Jordan is missing in FRUS 1958–60, XIII, 509ff.; see FRUS 1958–60, XII, 196; Briefing Note for Planning Board, 6 July 1960, DDRS.

[121] Rountree Letter to Hare, 3 March 1959, FRUS 1958–60, XII, 211.

[122] For the long-neglected relationship between covert operations and Third World politics see Prados, ‘CIA and Decolonization’; for the Middle East in this context see Little, ‘Mission Impossible’.

[123] Memo, 28 September 1961; Battle Memo to Bundy, 30 September 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, XVII, 259–61, 268–71; Komer Memo to Bundy/Rostow, 10 October 1961, fol. ‘Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 10/61’, National Security Files, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 322, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts; for an opposite assessment see Barrett, Greater Middle East, 323–7.