Overstepping the Balkan boundaries: The lesser known history of Yugoslavia's early relations with Asian countries (new evidence from Yugoslav/Serbian archives)

Abstract

New discovery of some previously unknown documents from the major Yugoslav/Serbian archives has brought forward some of the long forgotten facts about Yugoslavia's early engagements with certain Asian countries. The leading event among all these was the clandestine recognition of the Republic of China in June 1947 (with the full backing of the USSR), in the light of which special ties with Chinese, Indian, and some Burmese communists were established.

Notes

Jovan Čavoški is a PhD candidate at Peking University and an associate researcher at the Institute for Recent History of Serbia.

 [1] See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 33.

 [2] In his report to Stalin in December 1949 Kovalev indicated that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were hesitant to reject Yugoslavia's overtures for diplomatic recognition, since this could have endangered China's future relations with the US, especially since ‘America was Yugoslavia's boss’. Since US–Yugoslav relations were still strained at that time, the effect of Stalinist propaganda was more than obvious in this statement. See et al., V: 2, 243.

 [3] On the origins of the CCP foreign policy during this period see Niu Jun, Cong Yan'an zouxiang shijie. This is the second edition of this book.

 [4] In September–October 1955 Liu Ningyi visited Yugoslavia again as the head of a big trade-union delegation. However, he never mentioned his previous visit to Yugoslavia in 1947. Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia (hereafter DASMIP), Political Archives (hereafter PA), year 1955, folder (hereafter f) 50, document 18815.

 [5] Kovalev's letter was most probably written at the time when he was desperately trying to indict Mao Zedong as an ‘Asian Tito’, reveal his duplicity and secret ties with the imperialist powers, while this mentioning of Liu Ningyi's earlier visit to Yugoslavia perfectly fitted into this picture the Tito–Stalin split had already occurred. Because of this kind of meddling, Kovalev would be eventually sacrificed for the benefit of the newly formed Sino-Soviet alliance and sacked from his post. Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 156–58. On Kovalev's secret report to Stalin on Mao Zedong see et al., V: 2, 234–43.

 [6] In the official and authoritative history of PRC's foreign relations none of the early contacts between Yugoslavia and CCP are mentioned, even though similar events are indicated for other socialist countries, for example Romania. See Pei Jianzhang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 74–7.

 [7] In Chinese books and documents we can see that the date of recognition is 6 October 1949 and this date is also present on the telegram in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives. However, we should know that the telegram had been sent from Belgrade via the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow on 5 October and it arrived in Beijing the next day. Therefore, Yugoslavia recognised the PRC on 5 October and not the following day. DASMIP, PA, 1949, f-99, 419956, ‘Annual bulletin of the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow’; Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter CFMA), 109-00414-03(1), ‘Yugoslav Foreign Ministry telegram on the recognition of the People's Republic of China’, 6 October 1949; Pei Jianzhang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 74–5; Xie Yixian, Zhongguo waijiao shi, 13.

 [8] et al., V: 2, 193.

 [9] Mates, Međunarodni odnosi, 211. Before and during the initial phase of World War II, Yugoslav interests in China and Japan were protected, first by France, and then by Great Britain. Archives of Yugoslavia (hereafter AJ), 371, confidential 669.

[10] As we shall see, the correspondence on this issue was kept firmly inside the circle of Marshal Tito, Foreign Minister Stanoje Simić, and ambassador in the USSR Vladimir Popović. Perhaps Mates did not know anything about this deal, even though his own comments do arouse suspicion (author's comment).

[11] DASMIP, PA, 1946, f-89, 9734, ‘Avšič's telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Berlin’, 12 August 1946.

[12] According to some documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, a certain number of these Yugoslav nationals were in China for almost 20 years, mostly residing in Harbin, Tianjin and Guangzhou areas. One of them had even been in Yan'an during 1944–45 and after the war he went back to Beiping (from 1949 Beijing) and then Tianjin. As Chinese documents indicate, this man came to Yan'an to assist the CCP and meet with Mao Zedong. We still do not know who this person was. 118-00377-01(1), ‘Telegram on the situation concerning Yugoslav nationals in Tianjin’, 19 May 1950; CFMA, 118-00377-02(1), ‘Telegram on the situation concerning Yugoslav nationals residing in Harbin’, 19 May 1950; CFMA, 118-00377-03(1), ‘Telegram on the situation concerning Yugoslav nationals in Guangzhou’, 18 May 1950.

[13] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 7644, ‘Foreign Ministry's Head of the Political Department Jože Brilej to the Embassy in Moscow on the issue of representation of Yugoslav interests in the Far East’, 5 July 1946.

[14] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 15015, ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Moscow on the decision of the Soviet Government to protect Yugoslav interests in the Far East’, 12 December 1946; DASMIP, PA, f-106, 45824, ‘Chinese Embassy in Moscow acknowledges the fact that the Soviet Government has decided to protect Yugoslav interests in the Republic of China’, 7 March 1947; DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 48418, ‘Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry concerning the reply from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of China sent on 17 March’, 15 April 1947.

[15] et al., V: 1, 228–32, 268–70, 283–6, 305–6, 321–7, 347–8.

[16] Vladimir Popović (1914–72) was one of the leading political figures in the CC CPY before and during World War II. After the war he was the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR (1945–48), and during 1950s he was sent as the ambassador to the US (1950–54) and the PRC (1955–58). Petković, Subjektivna istorija, 141–2.

[17] DASMIP, 1947, top secret no. 66, USSR, 24 May 1947.

[18] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 410722, ‘Ambassador Popović's telegram concerning the previous telegram to Marshal Tito no. 66’, 5 June 1947.

[19] Stanoje Simić (1893–1970) was a career diplomat in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, during World War II he was ambassador of the Royal Government in the USSR (1942–45), then ambassador of the FPRY in the US, and finally Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (1946–48). Petković, Subjektivna istorija, 26–8.

[20] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 410722, ‘Decision of the Yugoslav Government to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of China’, 16 June 1947.

[21] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 411669, ‘Ambassador Popović's telegram concerning the decision of the Chinese Ambassador’, 21 June 1947.

[22] AJ, f-34, ‘Embassy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Turkey’, 8 January 1940.

[23] In the available publications of the US diplomatic documents in the series Foreign Relations of the United States there is no mention of any kind of connection existing between China and Yugoslavia during the period 1946–47 (author's comment).

[24] Countries like Romania, Poland or Czechoslovakia which prior to World War II had had diplomatic relations with the Republic of China were denied that right after 1945 with the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Even Yugoslavia did not re-establish the pre-war honorary consulate in Shanghai immediately after the war. Relations with China were the exclusive privilege of the Soviet Union, which raises many questions about Yugoslavia's recognition.

[25] Ma Xipu, Baergan renmin fanfaxisi zhanzheng shi, 270–97.

[26] et al., V: 2, 336–7. Stalin advised against this strategy, indicating that the CCP should form a broad political front to counter the GMD and imperialist influence.

[27] Niu Jun, ‘The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance’, 62.

[28] More on Liu Ningyi's (1907–94) biography in Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dacidian, 190. In 1948 Liu Ningyi became the Secretary of the CC CCP section responsible for relations with European communist parties. This fact might be closely associated with the results of his visit to Yugoslavia, since he was one of the few CCP representatives that visited other communist countries at that time (besides the USSR).

[29] In early 1947 the trade union situation in China was continuously getting worse, with many of the official organisations in total disorder, which had enabled CCP-controlled trade unions to take the lead in this struggle. Therefore, Liu Ningyi's position was very important during the Civil War. et al., V: 1, 238–9.

[30] In 1946 Shripad Dange planned to send a group of 200 Indian students studying in Britain to Yugoslavia to take part in the construction of the Šamac–Sarajevo railroad. AJ, Central Committee of the LCY (hereafter CK SKJ), 507/IX, 42/I-1.

[31] Liu Ningyi, ‘Tito and New Yugoslavia’. Liu Ningyi travelled extensively around Yugoslavia, visiting some of the famous historical sites in Bosnia, Serbia etc. As we can see from his own article, he was intensively discussing with his hosts some of the wartime issues, sometimes drawing parallels with the events in China. What is even more paradoxical is that he once made a toast in which he said: ‘Let us drink a toast to comrade Mao Zedong, who expelled American imperialists and defeated Jiang Jieshi’, even though two weeks before his hosts had recognised the same regime that he was criticisingt. However, as we shall see, this was not a secret to him.

[32] et al., V: 1, 289–90.

[33] Archives of Josip Broz Tito (hereafter AJBT), Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (hereafter KMJ), I-2-c/2, ‘Marshal Tito received representatives of the Trade Unions of the Liberated Regions of China and All-India Trade Union Congress’; AJ, CK SKJ, 507/IX, 60/II-1. Liu Ningyi's article is in general accordance with the published version of these talks (first six pages), but, at the same time, he also avoided saying anything else on the issue that Tito personally removed from the official publication (last two pages).

[34] Yugoslavia was first among socialist countries that refused to attend the conference in Paris concerning the Marshall Plan. Foreign Minister Stanoje Simić personally handed in the note to the French ambassador in Belgrade that Yugoslavia had decided not to participate in this economic assistance programme. On 5 July the Soviet ambassador notified Tito that the Soviet Union was pleased with the Yugoslav reply, but he suggested that, notwithstanding, Yugoslavia should go to Paris and forge a united anti-imperialist front. However, on 7 July Stalin changed his mind and ordered that every socialist country should abstain from participation in the Marshall Plan. Petranović, Jugoslavija, velike sile, 56–7; Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 28–9; Parish and Narinsky, ‘New Evidence’, 48.

[35] AJBT, KMJ, I-2-c/2, ‘Marshal Tito received representatives…’, 8. Liu Ningyi made a comment that the Chinese press under Jiang Jieshi's control was publishing slanders against Yugoslavia.

[36] More on Lin Biao's biography in Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dacidian, 346.

[37] AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/385, Lin Biao's telegram to Marshal Tito, 11 July 1947.

[38] In July 1947 a big CCP delegation was travelling to Prague to take part in the Youth Festival celebrations. They were logistically and financially supported by the Soviet Government. It is very possible that one of the members of this delegation was chosen to travel to Yugoslavia and work on the opening of this propaganda center. et al., V: 1, 331–5, 339–40.

[39] We should not forget that at this same time Mao Zedong persistently tried to get to Moscow, personally meet with the Soviet leadership, and discuss all outstanding issues concerning the Soviet role in the Chinese Civil War. However, Stalin postponed this visit on the grounds that this could hamper the success of the forthcoming military campaigns. et al., V: 1, 327, 333; Westad, Decisive Encounters, 166–7; Shen Zhihua, Zhong Su guanxi shigang, 89.

[40] AJ, CK SKJ, 507/III, 29, ‘Session of the Politburo of the CPY’, 30 September 1947; Petranović, Zapisnici sa sednica, 213–19; Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 30–33; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 130–33.

[41] Selected Works of Mao Zedong , IV, 172–3.

[42] et al., V: 2, 63. Mao Zedong was also considering joining the Cominform, but the Soviets refused this on the grounds that this was the organisation of European communist parties.

[43] In 1947 Mao Zedong proclaimed his theory of the ‘intermediate zone’ which implied that the decisive battle against the US imperialism would be waged in the area standing between the two superpowers and in that zone China held its paramount position. Forging ties with nations of that ‘intermediate zone’ was one of the CCP's foreign policy priorities in resisting the imperialist onslaught. Perhaps newly established relations with Yugoslavia were also part of that broad political front. Niu Jun, ‘The Origins of Mao Zedong's Thinking’, 16–19.

[44] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-47, 418079, ‘Burmese good-will delegation visited Yugoslavia’, July 1947; Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 25.

[45] DASMIP, PA, 1947, f-124, 425154, ‘Minutes of conversation between comrade Prica and the representative of the Burmese Government Maung Ohn’, 5 December 1947. Also, details of Burma's first constitution were borrowed from the United States, France, and largely from the legislation of the United Kingdom. Donnison, Burma, 141.

[46] Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 26–7.

[47] More on the regional and international importance of the Yugoslav–Burmese strategic partnership and Yugoslavia's decisive role in Burmese internal policies see Čavoški, ‘Arming Nonalignment’.

[48] DASMIP, PA, f-124, 425449, ‘Ciphered telegram from the Foreign Minister Simić to the Embassy in Moscow’, 11 December 1947.

[49] Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka, 11–12. From this conversation we can see that the issue of China was clearly one of the priorities for Yugoslavia at that time, especially after the recognition of the Republic of China and Liu Ningyi's visit.

[50] Mao Zedong sent Dong Biwu and Chen Jiakang to be part of the Chinese delegation on the founding conference of the UN in San Francisco. Their assignment was to win over the American public opinion for the CCP. While staying in the US Dong Biwu published the ‘Memorandum on the Liberated Regions of China’. This was the document he also gave to Dedijer. Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dacidian , 471; Hunt, The Genesis, 155.

[51] Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka, 14–20.

[52] AJ, CK SKJ, 507/IX, 42/I-7, ‘Letter from the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India Joshi inviting Yugoslav representatives to attend the Second Congress of the CPI 22–28 February 1948’.

[53] Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka, 20–21, 39. Dedijer personally discussed this issue with the general secretary of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) Thakin Than Tun and the answer was negative. The Chinese–Burmese border was too heavily guarded for anybody to cross into China.

[54] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, 271–2; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 29; Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy, 32.

[55] Pavel Yudin, editor-in-chief of the Cominform's main journal ‘For Permanent Peace, For People's Democracy’ that was being published in Belgrade at that time, refused to print Dedijer's article on his visit to India and contacts made with major Asian communist parties. Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka, 44–6. By the way, Khrushchev considered Yudin as the chief culprit for the Soviet–Yugoslav split. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev , 3, 529–31.

[56] At that time, January–February 1948, Djilas and Kardelj were in Moscow holding strenuous negotiations with Soviet officials and ultimately with Stalin himself. These meetings were just the beginning of an open Soviet–Yugoslav break-up later that same year. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, 133–86.

[57] As is well known from recent historiography and declassified documents from East European archives, during early post-war years Yugoslavia had a dominant position in the Balkans, often directly challenging Western powers in Italy and Austria, also held effective control over Albania, directly supported Greek communist insurgency, attempted to create the Balkan Federation with Bulgaria, which would eventually, as Georgi Dimitrov proclaimed, encompass other communist countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia), all to Stalin's open or silent discontent. On these issues see Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat, 1–46; Nešović, Bledski sporazumi; Banac, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 419–44; Shrader, The Withered Wine, 165–86 etc.

[58] 15–16.

[59] McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 45–6. Nehru was infuriated with the Soviet Union regarding these actions of the CPI, thus he said to Krishna Menon: ‘We want friendship and cooperation with Russia in many fields but we are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being cursed at and run down’.

[60] Richelson, The Soviet Estimate, SE 00081, ‘The Communist Influence in Burma’, 7–11. In March 1948 the Burmese Communist Party (‘White Flag’) was outlawed by the Burmese Government and they had initiated a large scale rebellion in the countryside, sometimes even attacking the capital Rangoon. The smaller and more radical faction of the BCP (‘Red Flag’) had been outlawed ever since 1946.

[61] Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, 274.

[62] As we can see from some newly available documents of the Malayan Communist Party, there is no direct link between the Malayan rebellion and the conference in Calcutta, but the influence this gathering had on the political thinking of Asian communist parties, including the Malayan, as these documents suggest, was not at all discernible or insignificant. See Chen Jian (C.C. Chin), ‘Leng zhan yu dongnan Ya gongyun de xingshuai’, 349–79.

[63] Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka, 41–2.

[64] AJ, CK SKJ, 507/IX, 42/I-24, ‘Minutes of Conversation with the Former General Secretary of the CPI Joshi’, 25 March 1956.

[65] DASMIP, PA, 1948, f-159, 430981, ‘Minutes of Conversation with India's High Commissioner in London’, 13 November 1948. Yugoslav Foreign Ministry demanded from the Embassy in London to immediately convey all the details concerning Menon's remarks on the visit of Yugoslav representatives to the CPI's Congress. DASMIP, PA, 1948, f-159, 430968, 17 December 1948.

[66] On the evolution of Indo-Yugoslav relations see my forthcoming article ‘Trustworthy Allies: The Origins of the Indo-Yugoslav Strategic Partnership and the Formation of the Nonaligned Movement’.

[67] AJBT, KMJ, I-2-c/2, ‘Marshal Tito received representatives…’, 7–8.

[68] On Yugoslavia's subsequent relations with China and India during 1950s and early 1960s see Čavoški, Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959–1962.

[69] The same logic would suggest that the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1945, signed between Stalin and Jiang Jieshi, was totally irrelevant for history since it was annulled by the Stalin–Mao treaty in 1950. However, in that moment and under particular circumstances of those years the treaty of 1945 was of the highest importance to help us decipher Soviet and Chinese behaviour. (author's comment)