‘Which Chile, Allende?’ Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese revolution

Abstract

This article discusses the US reaction to the Portuguese revolution and its impact on the relationship between Washington and its main Western European allies. It analyses the international repercussions of the chaotic Portuguese transition and their impact on Soviet–American détente. Finally, it highlights the different responses to the Portuguese crisis given by the United States, and by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger overall, and by Western European Socialist governments.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the John W. Kluge Center of the Library of Congress in Washington DC, which generously financed the research, and Marilyn Young, Mark Gilbert, Leopoldo Nuti, Fernando Pimenta, Federico Romero, Anders Stephanson, Antonio Varsori, Irwin Wall, the 2007–2008 fellows of the Kluge Center and the anonymous reviewers of Cold War History for their very useful comments and suggestions.

Notes

Mario Del Pero is Associate Professor of US History at the University of Bologna.

 [1] Meeting Palme-Kissinger, 30 June 1975, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereinafter NARA), General Record of the Department of State, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger (RHK), Box 11.

 [2] Spínola, Portugal e O Futuro.

 [3] On the contacts between Soares and several US policymakers see Mario Soares Papers (hereinafter MSP), Fundação Mario Soares, Lisbon (hereinafter FMS), Antes de 25 Abril, Correspondeça, Internacional, Pasta 00662.003. On the relationship with Western European Socialists see Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, ‘La Socialdemocrazia alemana y el Estad Novo (1961–1974)’, Portuguese Studies Review, 1–2, 2005, 477–503; Ana Maria Fonseca, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976)’, Journal of European Integration History, 1, 2009, 35–56 and Mário Soares, Mémoire Vivante. Entretien avec Dominique Pouchin, Flammarion, Paris, 2002, 69–84. On the role of the SPD in the Spanish context see now Antonio Muňoz Sánchez, ‘La Fundación Ebert y el socialismo espaňol de la dictatura a la democracia’, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 29, 2007, 257–278 and Idem, ‘A European Answer to the Spanish Question’, Journal of European Integration History, 1, 2009, 77–94.F.

 [4] Maxwell, Making of the Portuguese Democracy, 66; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 629; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 141; Melo Antunes . O Sonhador Pragmático, 83–86.

 [5] Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 18 October, 23 October and 26 November 1973, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443 (Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–77), Box 1. Del Pero, ‘Limiti della distensione’; Antunes, Portugal na guerra do petróleo.

 [6] The schemes for providing military hardware to Portugal are discussed in Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 7 January and 28 January 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 2. On the economic situation see Corkill, ‘Portugal's Changing Integration’.

 [7] Memorandum of Conversation Kissinger/Ford/Reza Pahlavi, 15 May 1975, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor Michigan (hereinafter GRFL), National Security Adviser (hereinafter NSA), Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–77 (hereinafter MOC).

 [8] The new executive included two Communist members: the leader of the party, Alvaro Cunhal, as minister without portfolio and Avelino Pacheco Goncalves, who was appointed Minister of Labour. The positive reaction of the Europeans was often accompanied by the persistence of a very stereotyped and paternalistic attitude toward matters Portuguese. Writing a few weeks after the revolution, British Ambassador Nigel Trench maintained that the Portuguese were ‘by and large, a docile people, not unduly addicted to intellectual activity, and a paternalistic regime, such as that of Salazar in his early years, is not by nature unwelcome to many of them’. See Trench to Wiggin, 5 June 1974, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew Garden, London (hereinafter NAUK), Foreign & Commonwealth Office (hereinafter FCO) 9/2046 (also in (hereinafter DBPO), Series III, Volume V, 363.

 [9] Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 26 April 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 4.

[10] Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 631.

[11] Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, June 10, 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 3. Already in early May, Soares was urging American and British help in order to resist ‘the Communists who he believes have the full backing of the Soviet Union’. Callaghan to UK Embassy in Washington, 3 May 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2045; Trench to Callaghan, 17 June 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2046; Record of Conversation between Harold Wilson and Mario Soares, 2 May, 1974, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 357–60.

[12] Peck to Foreign Office, 20 May 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2066; Scott to Kissinger, 31 May 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials (hereinafter NPM), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereinafter NARA), National Security Council Files – Country Files: Europe (hereinafter NSC-CFE), Box 701; Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 10 July, 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 4; Ramsbotham to Foreign Office, 13 May 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2045.

[13] Scott to Kissinger, 11 June 1974, NPM, NARA, NSC-CFE, Box 701; Philip Shabecoff, ‘Nixon, Home, Sees Mideast Changed’, The New York Times, 20 June 1974; Spínola, País Sem Rumo, 157–62; ‘Nixon Lauds Spinola at Meeting in Azores’, Washington Post, 20 June 1974; Soares, Mémoire Vivante, 127–28; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 147–8.

[14] Scott to Kissinger, 16 July, NPM, NARA, NSC-CFE, Box 701; Briefing Paper on Portugal, 12 August 1974, NARA, Lot file 77D112 (Policy Planning Staff, Policy Planning Group, Director's Files) (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Box 349; Beaumont to Tickell, 7 August 1974 and Peck to MacLaren, 5 September 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2066. The British diplomat was B.J. Everett, at the time First Secretary at the Southern European Department of the Foreign Office. See J.A.N. Graham to Goodison, 22 May 1974, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 362. Story, ‘Portugal's Revolution of Carnations’; Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 91; ‘Portugal Arranges 5-year, $150 Million Standby Credit’, The Wall Street Journal, 20 August 1974 mentioned request of Portuguese bankers and industrialists.

[15] Antunes, Sonhador Pragmático, 124–6; Spínola's reconstruction of the events is in Spínola, País Sem Rumo, 211–44.

[16] Kissinger to Ford, 30 September 1974; Hyland to Kissinger, 30 September 1974 GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10. Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 79–80; Szulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington’. The Foreign Office offered instead a different and much less pessimistic appraisal. See Thomas to Killick, 24 October 1974, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 376–82.

[17] Kissinger to Ford, 18 October 1974, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11.

[18] Ingersoll to Scott, 9 October 1974, GLF, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Kissinger to Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of State, Director Central Intelligence, 12 October 1974; GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11. Miguel Acoca, ‘U.S. is Said to Fear Lisbon's Shift to Left’, Washington Post, 27 October 1974; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 154–5; Bernardino Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger. OS EVA e a Revolução Portuguesa, Lisbon, Dom Quixote, 2008, 85–90.

[19] Lord to Kissinger, 17 October 1974, NARA, RG59, Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff, Policy Planning Group, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Box 348; Rivero (US Ambassador to Spain) to Kissinger, 14 October 1974; Kissinger to Ford, 18 October 1974; Kissinger to Scott, 23 October 1974, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Kissinger to Ford, 23 October 1974, GFL, White House Central Files, Subject Files (hereinafter WHCF-SF0, Box 42; Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 95; Szulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington’, 3; Príncipe, Cartas e Confidências de Mario Soares, 204. Maria João Avillez, Soares: Ditadura e Revolução, Lisboa, Público, 1996, 353–354.

[20] Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 22 October, 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 5; Kissinger to American Embassy in Moscow, 23 October 1974; Kissinger to American Embassy in Lisbon, 28 October 1974 and Scott to Department of State, 2 November 1974 in GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11 and 20; Thomas to Tickell, 24 October 1974 and Rasmbotham to Foreign Office, 7 November 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2066; Thomas to Killick, 24 October 1974, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 382; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ‘Unpredictable Politics in Portugal’, Washington Post, 26 October 1974; ‘Lisbon May Quit Atom NATO Panel’, The New York Times, 14 November 1974. Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger, 101–7.

[21] Memorandum of Conversation Henry Kissinger–Pedro Cortina Mauri, 9 October 1974, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 5.

[22] Interview with Frank Carlucci, 30 December 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereinafter FAOC-LOC), 3–4; ‘Lisbon Aide Sees Threat From CIA’, The New York Times, 12 October 1974; Miguel Acoca, ‘U.S. is Said to Fear Lisbon's Shift to Left’, Washington Post, 27 October 1974; Maxwell, Making of the Portuguese Democracy, 94–5.

[23] Trench to Morgan, 12 November 1974; Callaghan to UK Embassy in Washington, 13 November 1974; NAUK, FCO 9/2068; Ure to Thomas, 23 October 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2059; Scott to Department of State, 2 December 1974, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10; Henry Giniger, ‘Lisbon is Pressing US on Aid Effort’, New York Times, 21 November 1974. Avillez, Soares, 403–4.

[24] Kissinger to Ford, 10 December 1974; Kissinger to US Embassy in Lisbon, 10 December 1974; Clift to Scowcroft, 11 December 1974; Scowcroft to Ford, 23 December 1974, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 156–7; ‘U.S., in a Major Policy Switch, Offers Portugal Economic Aid’, New York Times, 14 December 1974.

[25] Cornish to Chatterjie, 20 December 1974 and Barret to Morgan, 3 January 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2068 and FCO 9/2291; ‘Support for Portugal’, New York Times, 17 December 1974. The change of late 1974 is instead considered almost inexplicable by Szulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington’.

[26] NSC Briefing Paper on Portugal, undated (ca. December 1974), GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10; Meetings of Secretary of State's Staff, 9 December, 1974 and 6 January 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 5. Oldberg, ‘The Portuguese Revolution’, 17–18.

[27] Henry Giniger, ‘Labor Dispute Shakes Lisbon Coalition’, New York Times, 20 January 1975; Maxwell, Making of the Portuguese Democracy, 108–9.

[28] Ray Vicker, ‘Comrade Cunhal. Communist Leader in Portugal's Cabinet Preaches Moderation’, Wall Street Journal, 20 February 1975; George W. Grayson, ‘Communists Play it Cool in Portugal’, Washington Post, 26 January 1975.

[29] Meetings of Secretary of State's Staff, 12, 20 and 27 January 1975, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 6. Meeting Kissinger/Schlesinger/Scowcroft/Wickam, 22 January 1975, GFL, NSA, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–77 (hereinafter MC), Box 8.

[30] Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 29 January 1975, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 6; Carlucci to Kissinger, 27 January 1975; Carlucci to Kissinger, 28 January 1975; Kissinger to US Embassy in Lisbon, 28 January 1975; Carlucci to Kissinger, 28 January 1975; GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 107; Interview with Frank Carlucci, FAOC-LOC. On the clash between Kissinger and the Embassy see also the Interview with Richard Melton, at the time in the political section of the Embassy, 27 January 1997, FAOC-LOC, 18–21 and more generally, the detailed reconstruction of Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger.

[31] Carlucci to Kissinger, 4 February, 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Memorandum of conversation Kissinger/Callaghan, 17 February 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2291.

[32] Idem; Miguel Acoca, ‘Soares Hits NATO Exercises Off Portugal as “Not Opportune”’, Washington Post, 2 February 1975; Meeting of Portuguese Council of Ministers, Mario Soares Papers, Fundaçao Mario Soares, Lisbon, (hereinafter MSP, FMS), 3 February 1975, Pasta 00953.010.

[33] ‘A Communist-style takeover moving Portugal into the Third World or eventually the Communist camp would well infect Spain across the border’, Evans and Novak claimed. ‘Would Western Europe perceive a neutralist pro-Communist Portugal as another example of America's decline?’ Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ‘A Portuguese Tragedy’, Washington Post, 3 February 1975; ‘Soviet Asks Access to Portuguese Port’, Washington Post, 1 February 1975; Drew Middleton, ‘Soviet Site in Portugal Would Peril Sea Links’, New York Times, 1 February 1975; Henry Giniger, ‘Soviet Said to Ask Lisbon for a Port’, New York Times, 1 February 1975; Matlock (US Deputy Chief of Mission to the Soviet Union) to Kissinger, 4 February 1975; Carlucci to Kissinger, 4 February 1975; Carlucci to Kissinger, 7 February 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11, 20.

[34] Szulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington’, 31–3; Meeting of the Revolutionary Council (Conselho da Revolução), 31 March 1975, MSP, FMS, Pasta 02975.002; Garvey to Callaghan, 3 April 1974, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 431. The impact of Portugal on bipolar détente is discussed, albeit briefly, in Zubok, Failed Empire, 250–53. On the relationship between the PCP and East Germany see also Wagner, ‘Portugal and the German Democratic Republic’.

[35] Carlucci to Kissinger, 4 January 1975.

[36] Clift to Scowcroft, 28 February 1975; Scowcroft to Carlucci, undated (ca. February/March 1975), GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10.

[37] US Embassy in Lisbon to Department of State, 11 March 1975; Clift to Scowcroft, 11 March 1975; Carlucci to Kissinger, 14 March 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10. Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 166–7; Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 110–11; Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger, 150–69.

[38] ‘Golpe Infantil e Muito Mal Preparado’, Diário de Notícias, 12 March 1974; ‘Incerteza nas relaçoes luso-americanas apos o malogro da intentona reaccionaria’, Diário de Notícias, 14 March 1974; ‘O governo provisorio deixara ha muito de corresponder ao avanço do processo revolutionario’, Diário de Notícias, 17 March 1974; ‘Coincidencias com o golpe chileno’, Diário de Lisboa, 11 March 1974; ‘Senators Issued Warning’, New York Times, 22 March 1974; ‘Sen. Buckley Urges Action on Portugal’, Washington Post, 22 March 1974; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, ‘Portugal: a Soviet Testing Ground’, Washington Post, 22 March 1974; ‘Portugal and Détente’, New York Times, 19 March 1974; ‘Rockefeller is Gloomy’, New York Times, 10 April 1974.

[39] Volpe to Kissinger, 22 March 1974, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 15; Kissinger to Ford, 25 March 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10; Memorandum of Conversation Ford/Scowcroft/Volpe (US Ambassador to Italy), 25 March 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 10; Jonathan Randal, ‘European Liberals Uneasy About Direction Portugal Taking’, Washington Post, 26 March 1975 Claire Sterling, ‘Italian Communists: a Portuguese Connection’, Washington Post, 28 March 1975; Rubbi, mondo di Berlinguer, 73–5 and Pons, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo, 60–66.

[40] Stoessel to Kissinger, 26 March, 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 21; Memorandum of Conversation, Brandt/Kissinger/Scowcroft, 27 March 1975, 25 March 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 12; Garvey to Foreign Office, 3 April 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2269; Garvey to Killick, 9 April 1975, in DBPO, Series III, Volume III, 385. A different interpretation is in Gaspar, ‘International Dimension of the Portuguese Transition’. Paper presented at the conference, The Transition to Democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece: Thirty Years After, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Athens, 22 May 2005. http://www.ipri.pt/investigadores/artigo.php?idi = 3&ida = 130 (accessed 26 February 2010).

[41] Ingersoll to Carlucci, 21 March 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 21; Hartman to Kissinger, 24 March 1975, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 14; Lowenstein to Kissinger, 21 February 1975, NARA, RG 59, Lot File 77D112, Box 352; Memorandum of Conversation Ford/Haig/Scowcroft/Rumsfeld, 27 March 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 10; Callaghan to Trench, 21 March 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 403–4. Fonseca, Federal Republic of Germany and Portuguese Transition.

[42] Kissinger to Callaghan, 24 April 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2291; Tompkins to Foreign Office, 26 March 1975; Henderson to Foreign Office, 27 March 1975; Hibbert to Foreign Office, 28 March 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2269.

[43] Memorandum of Conversation Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, 27 March 1975; Memorandum of Conversation Ford/Haig/Scowcroft/Rumsfeld, 27 March 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 10.

[44] Kissinger to Schmidt, 12 April 1975, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 2.

[45] Carlucci to Secretary of State, 22 March 1975; Interview with Frank Carlucci, FAOC-LOC; Kissinger to Carlucci, 3 April 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11. Miguel Acoca, ‘Envoy Reported in Disfavor’, Washington Post, 10 April 1974; Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, ‘Lisbon Envoys, Kissinger Disagrees’, Washington Post, 11 April 1974. Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger, 186–94.

[46] David Binder, ‘Kissinger Weighs Effect of a Communist Portugal’, New York Times, 18 April 1975; Memoranda of Conversation Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, 17 and 21 April 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 11.

[47] Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 111–14; Avillez, Soares, 406–8; Costa Pinto and Teixeira, Southern Europe.

[48] Memorandum of conversation Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, 1 May 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 11; Meeting of Secretary of State's Staff, 25 and 28 April, 1 May, 1974, NARA, R5 59, Lot File 78D443, Box 7; Ramsbotham to Foreign Office, 9 May 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2291; Trench to Foreign Office, 6 May 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 439. Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger, 202–8.

[49] Henry Giniger, ‘Lisbon Communists Warn Socialists Against Opposing the Military Rulers’, The New York Times, 28 April 1975; Foreign Office, Background Brief on Portugal, May 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2291; Melo Antunes. Sonhador Pragmatico, 207–10; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 172–5; Szulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington’, 39–43.

[50] Memorandum of Conversation Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft, 5 May 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 11; Morgan to Wilberforce, 30 May 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 447.

[51] Memorandum of Conversation Kissinger/Ford/Reza Pahlavi, 15 May 1975; Kissinger to Embassy in Brazilia, 17 May 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77 (hereinafter PSCF-LA); Memorandum of Conversation Richardson–Callaghan, 19 May 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2291; Memorandum of Conversation Kissinger–Cortina, 28 May 1975, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 11.

[52] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Gerald Ford, 1975, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1977, 712–13; James M. Naughton, ‘President to Ask NATO if Portugal Should Be Kept In’, New York Times, 24 May 1975; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 178–9; Szulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington’, 42–3.

[53] Memorandum of Conversation, 20 May 1975, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 11.

[54] Scowcroft to Ford, 21 May 1975, NARA, RG 59, RHK, Box 11.

[55] Memorandum of Conversation Gonçalves/Ford/Kissinger, 29 May 1975 Kissinger to Ford, 29 May 1975, NARA, RG 59 RHK, Box 11. Speaking with British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Roy Hattersley, Sonnenfeldt made the point that ‘a dictatorship of the left of the kind that was coming about in Portugal and was impregnated with neutralist ideas while still paying lip-service to NATO membership was more incompatible with the essential defence purposes of NATO than dictatorships of the right had been’. DBPO, 18 June 1975, Series III, Volume V, 449.

[56] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., ‘Portugal: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?’, Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1975; ‘Schmidt Complains’, Washington Post, 4 June 1975; Memorandum of Conversation Kissinger/Ford/Pope Paul VI, 3 June 1975, GFL, NSA, MC, Box 12.

[57] Clift to Kissinger, 3 April 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Thurmond to Ford, 7 April 1974 and Wolthuis to Scowcroft, 24 April 1975, GFL, White House Central File (hereinafter WHCF), Box 42; Carlucci to Kissinger, 21 April 1975; Colby to Kissinger, 31 May 1975 and Heckler to Ford, 25 July 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 1 and 20. In a later interview, Carlucci recognised that Spínola's plans were supported by some of the military attachés of the US Embassy in Lisbon. Interview with Frank Carlucci, FAOC-LOC, 5.

[58] Ingersoll to Scowcroft, 5 June 1975, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft: Files, (1972) 1974–77; Temporary Parallel File (hereinafter HK&BS, TPF), Box A1; Killick to Goodison, 9 June 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 450. That the Azorean independentists did not meet outright hostility in the State department is underlined by Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 169–70; Garthoff, Journey Through the Cold War, 299; Schmidt, Men and Powers, 168–9. The most detailed reconstruction is now in Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger, 195–202.

[59] Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 148–9. Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger, 212–20.

[60] Meeting Conselho da Revolução, 23 May 1975, MSP, FMS, Pasta 02975.002.

[61] Rubbi, Mondo di Berlinguer, 75–9.

[62] Memorandum of Conversation Soares-Trench, 12 July 1975; Trench to Foreign Office, 15 July; 16 July; 22 July and 23 July 1975; NAUK, FCO9/2270. Kissinger to Carlucci, 19 July 1975 and Carlucci to Kissinger, 22 July 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11.

[63] Memorandum of Conversation Soares-Trench, 30 May 1975; Trench to Goodison, 10 June and 18 June 1975; Cornish to Baker, 16 July 1975, NAUK, FCO9/2270; Weston to Wright, 23 July 1975 and Baker to Killick, 28 July 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2285; Sutherland to Callaghan, 18 July 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 465.

[64] ‘Communist Portugal?’, New York Times, 17 July 1975; David Fouquet, ‘Aid Depends on Fate of Democracy’, Washington Post, 18 July 1975; Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 178–9; Callaghan to Trench, 25 July 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 467–70.

[65] Callaghan had given similar warnings to Brezhnev and Gromiko during a short meeting in Helsinki. Moreton to Foreign Office, 15 August 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2292; Callaghan to Garvey, 2 August 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume II: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–75, 461; Murrey Marder, ‘Kissinger Warns Soviet on Portugal’, Washington Post, 15 August 1975.

[66] Williams, ‘Tourism in Portugal’; Corkill, ‘Portugal's Changing Integration’; Lains, ‘Portuguese Economy in the Twentieth Century’; ‘ITT Halts Investing in Portugal Affiliates’, Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1975.

[67] Trench to Foreign Office, 11 August 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2272; Kissinger to Carlucci and Carlucci to Kissinger, 18 August 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 150–51; Antunes, Sonhador Pragmático, 152–7, 234–43; Callaghan, Time and Chance, 362–4.

[68] Ingersoll to Carlucci, 22 and 27 August 1975; Carlucci to Kissinger, 27 August 1975; US Embassy in Paris to Kissinger, 28 August 1975 and Kissinger to Carlucci, 29 August 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Walters to Kissinger, 29 August 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10; Memorandum of conversation Callaghan/Sauvagnargues/Genscher/Kissinger, 24 September 1975, NARA, RG 49, RHK, Box 12.

[69] Callaghan to Trench, 22 July 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2285; Working Paper Committee on Portugal, 27 August 1975; NAUK, FCO 9/2286; Ramsbotham to Foreign Office, 28 August 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2272; Carlucci to Kissinger, 22 August and 27 August 1975; GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11; Callaghan to Trench, 26 August 1975, DBPO, Series III, Volume V, 482–3; Schmidt, Die Deutschen und Ihre Nachbarn, 433–5.

[70] Scowcroft, 22 August 1975, GLF, NSA, Presidential Name File, 1973–77 (hereinafter PNF), Box 2; Morgan to Callaghan, 10 September 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2292.

[71] Kissinger to Carlucci, 9 September 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11. Carlucci, again, took a different approach and minimised the dangers caused by the Communists’ inclusion in the new government. See Carlucci to Kissinger, 10 September 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11.

[72] Meeting Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal, London, 5 September 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2285; Brandt, Erinnerungen, 348–9.

[73] Trench to Callaghan, 15 September 1975, NAUK, FCO 9//2272; GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 11. Washington did not modify its hand-off approach to the Azorean issue, but did not either cut off its contacts with the Azorean separatists. Kissinger to Ford, 9 September 1975, GFL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, Box 10.

[74] Memorandum of conversation Callaghan/Sauvagnargues/Genscher/Kissinger, 24 September 1975; Trench to Callaghan, 17, 18 and 20 September 1975, NAUK, FCO 9//2272; Briefing Memorandum Meeting Kissinger/Ford/Antunes, 10 October 1975, NAUK, FCO 9//2272; Maxwell, Making of Portuguese Democracy, 163–5.

[75] Palme quoted in Bernard D. Nossiter, ‘Socialists Plan Portugal Aid’, Washington Post, 6 September 1975. On the role of Western European socialists see also Avillez, Soares, 475–8.

[76] On the inner conservatism of détente see Suri, Power and Protest; Allin, Cold War Illusions; Kaldor, The Imaginary War, and, more recently, Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest, who presents détente as a conservative reaction to the social discontent of the 1960s.

[77] At the time of the revolution, and thanks to a trade agreement ratified in 1972, almost 50% of Portugal's imports and exports (respectively 44.9 and 48.6) were with the EEC.

[78] On the role played by Europe and the myth of the European model in facilitating the end of the Cold War see the useful reflections in Cox, Another Transatlantic Split?, and Federico Romero, Storia della guerra fredda. L'ultimo conflitto per L'Europa. Torino: Einaudi, 2009.