![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
This paper examines the role of Cold War military systems science in the emergence of a nonlinear view of war within the US military. It argues that US military ambivalence towards systems science and seeds of a nonlinear worldview within the systems sciences help to explain the enlistment of nonlinear sciences like chaos and complexity theories. The turn to nonlinear science represents not a radical break with, but rather the evolution of a worldview whose roots can be traced to US military responses to Cold War exigencies.
Notes
Sean Lawson, PhD is Assistant Professor, Department of Communication, University of Utah, USA.
[1] CitationEglash, ‘A Cybernetics of Chaos’; CitationEglash, ‘Chaos, Utopia, and Apocalypse’; CitationOsinga, Science, Strategy, and War; CitationBousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare.
[2] Historians of science have used a number of terms to identify these new sciences, including ‘cybersciences’ (see CitationKeller, Refiguring Life), ‘cyborg sciences’ (see CitationMirowski, ‘Cyborg Agonistes’), and ‘systems sciences’ (see CitationHughes, Rescuing Prometheus; CitationMindell, Between Human and Machine). Because the latter term is more widely used and conveys better the importance of the ‘systems’ concept for these new sciences, it will be used throughout this study.
[3] CitationEdwards, The Closed World; CitationGray, Postmodern War; CitationGray, Peace, War, and Computers; CitationHammond, The Mind of War; Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War; CitationBousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare.
[4] CitationFortun and Schweber, ‘Scientists and the Legacy of World War II’, 601–2.
[5] CitationRau, ‘The Adoption of Operations Research in the United States During World War II’, 66–7.
[6] CitationThomas and Sheldon, ‘Military Operations Research’.
[7] Fortun and Schweber, ‘Scientists and the Legacy of World War II’, 601–2.
[8] CitationBrothers, ‘Operations Analysis in the United States Air Force’.
[9] Thomas and Sheldon, ‘Military Operations Research’.
[10] Fortun and Schweber, ‘Scientists and the Legacy of World War II’, 606–7, 609–10; CitationHughes and Hughes, ‘Introduction’, 8; CitationJohnson, ‘Why Operations Research?’, 103–4; CitationParkhurst, ‘A Challenge to Operations Research’, 376.
[11] Holley, ‘The Evolution of Operations Research and Its Impact on the Military Establishment’, 93.
[12] Thomas and Sheldon, ‘Military Operations Research’, 2; Brothers, ‘Operations Analysis in the United States Air Force’, 9–10; CitationSolandt, ‘Observation, Experiment, and Measurement in Operations Research’, 4, 13; CitationMeals, ‘Trends in Military Operations Research’, 253–4; Holley, ‘The Evolution of Operations Research and Its Impact on the Military Establishment: The Air Force Experience’, 93; Fortun and Schweber, ‘Scientists and the Legacy of World War II’, 602.
[13] CitationPerry, ‘Commentary’, 116.
[14] Keller, Refiguring Life, 84–5; Mindell, Between Human and Machine, 316.
[15] CitationHounshell, ‘The Medium is the Message’, 255.
[16] CitationGhamari-Tabrizi, ‘Simulating the Unthinkable’, 192.
[17] CitationHitch, ‘An Appreciation of Systems Analysis’, 466–7.
[18] CitationLeslie, The Cold War and American Science.
[19] CitationBush, Science, the Endless Frontier, 6, 17.
[20] CitationOffice of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 21.
[21] CitationThomas and Sheldon, ‘Air Force Operations Analysis’; Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers.
[22] CitationJohnson, ‘The Long-Range Future of Operational Research’, 3–4.
[23] Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 36.
[24] Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 21, 32.
[25] CitationLeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, xii–xiii.
[26] CitationWhite, ‘Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals’, 10.
[27] CitationBonder, ‘A Purely Intellectual Activity’, 14.
[28] CitationBonder, ‘A Purely Intellectual Activity’, 18.
[29] CitationBonder, ‘A Purely Intellectual Activity’, 22.
[30] In 1980, Kent won the Vance R. Wanner Memorial Award of the Military Operations Research Society.
[31] The ‘Damage Limiting Study’ sought to determine the feasibility of a strategy to limit damage to the United States in the event of a determined attack by the Soviets using both ICBMs and manned bombers. The results of the study indicated that an attempt to limit damage, either through air defense or civil defense, was not feasible. As a result, the strategy was abandoned. See CitationKent, ‘Looking Back: Four Decades of Analysis’.
[32] The ‘Damage Limiting Study’ sought to determine the feasibility of a strategy to limit damage to the United States in the event of a determined attack by the Soviets using both ICBMs and manned bombers. The results of the study indicated that an attempt to limit damage, either through air defense or civil defense, was not feasible. As a result, the strategy was abandoned. See CitationKent, ‘Looking Back: Four Decades of Analysis’, 122.
[33] The ‘Damage Limiting Study’ sought to determine the feasibility of a strategy to limit damage to the United States in the event of a determined attack by the Soviets using both ICBMs and manned bombers. The results of the study indicated that an attempt to limit damage, either through air defense or civil defense, was not feasible. As a result, the strategy was abandoned. See CitationKent, ‘Looking Back: Four Decades of Analysis’, 124.
[34] CitationKent, ‘On Analysis’.
[35] Hitch, ‘An Appreciation of Systems Analysis’, 467.
[36] CitationMindell, ‘Automation's Finest Hour’, 31.
[37] CitationRamsey, ‘Management Or Command’, 33–4.
[38] CitationRamsey, ‘Management Or Command’, 37–8.
[39] CitationMiksche, ‘The Soldier and Technical Warfare’, 72.
[40] CitationMiksche, ‘The Soldier and Technical Warfare’, 73–4.
[41] CitationMiksche, ‘The Soldier and Technical Warfare’, 78.
[42] Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 32.
[43] Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 32; Perry, ‘Commentary’, 119–21.
[44] Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 77.
[45] Office of Technology Assessment, A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 32–3.
[46] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, xv.
[47] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, x.
[48] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, i.
[49] White, ‘Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals’, 10.
[50] White, ‘Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals’, 11.
[51] CitationBesley, ‘The Need for Military Officers as Strategic Thinkers’.
[52] CitationAkera, ‘Engineers or Managers?’, 213–5.
[53] For example, see CitationBrown, ‘The Effect of Automation on Organization’.
[54] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, 16.
[55] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, 11–8.
[56] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, 14.
[57] LeMay and Smith, America is in Danger, 16–7.
[58] CitationVought, ‘Insurgency (Review)’, 110.
[59] CitationGray, ‘What Rand Hath Wrought’, 30.
[60] CitationPowe, ‘The U.S. Army After the Fall of Vietnam’, 14.
[61] CitationPowe, ‘The U.S. Army After the Fall of Vietnam’, 14–5.
[62] Representative examples include, CitationCohen, ‘Systems Paralysis’; CitationFallows, National Defense; CitationVan Creveld, Command in War; CitationHart and Lind, America Can Win.
[63] Eglash, ‘A Cybernetics of Chaos’, 73–4. He specifically mentions the work of Paul Edwards (The Closed World). The work of Steve Heims (1980) and, most recently Antoine Bousquet (The Scientific Way of Warfare), are also exemplary in this regard.
[64] See for example, CitationBeyerchen, ‘Nonlinear Science and the Unfolding of a New Intellectual Vision’; CitationBeyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War’; CitationSchmitt, Chaos, Complexity, and War; CitationSaperstein, ‘Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy’; CitationSchmitt, ‘Command and (Out of) Control’; CitationRinaldi, ‘Complexity Theory and Airpower’; Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare, 181.
[65] CitationRichardson and Midgley, ‘Systems Theory and Complexity’, Part 1–4.
[66] For example, conference presenter Major John Schmitt was the principal author of several Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Steven Mann went on to server as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs in the Bush Administration. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski was the architect of the theory of Network Centric Warfare that was at the heart of the Bush Administration's attempts at ‘military transformation’.
[67] CitationStiehm, The U.S. Army War College.
[68] ‘Foreword’ by Ervin J. Rokke, USAF, in CitationAlberts and Czerwinski, Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, ii.
[69] CitationMaxfield, ‘Complexity and Organization Management’; Schmitt, ‘Command and (Out of) Control’; Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare, 182.
[70] CitationBeyerchen is most noted for arguing this position. But it was articulated by most other presenters at the conference, as well as many others since. Beyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery’.
[71] Fortun and Schweber, ‘Scientists and the Legacy of World War II’, 624, 626.
[72] Mindell, ‘Automation's Finest Hour’, 50–1.
[73] Hughes and Hughes, ‘Introduction’, 22–3. See also CitationGalison, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy’.
[74] Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 166–7.
[75] Mirowski, ‘Cyborg Agonistes’, 704; CitationWeaver, ‘Science and Complexity’, 539.
[76] Mirowski, ‘Cyborg Agonistes’, 704; CitationWeaver, ‘Science and Complexity’, 539
[77] Mirowski, ‘Cyborg Agonistes’, 704; CitationWeaver, ‘Science and Complexity’, 539, 540.
[78] Mirowski, ‘Cyborg Agonistes’, 704; CitationWeaver, ‘Science and Complexity’, 539, 540–1.
[79] Ghamari-Tabrizi, ‘Simulating the Unthinkable’, 179-80.
[80] CitationHitch, ‘Uncertainties in Operations Research’, 437–8.
[81] Hitch, ‘An Appreciation of Systems Analysis’, 475–6.
[82] Hitch, ‘Uncertainties in Operations Research’, 445.
[83] Hitch, ‘Uncertainties in Operations Research’, 444.
[84] Keller, Refiguring Life, 112.
[85] Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 148.
[86] Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 21.
[87] Ghamari-Tabrizi, ‘Simulating the Unthinkable’, 184.
[88] Ghamari-Tabrizi, ‘Simulating the Unthinkable’, 170.
[89] Hitch, ‘An Appreciation of Systems Analysis’, 474–5. See also CitationHitch, On the Choice of Objectives in Systems Studies.
[90] Hitch, ‘Plans, Programs, and Budgets in the Department of Defense’, 1.
[91] Brothers, ‘Operations Analysis in the United States Air Force’, 14–6.
[92] CitationHitch, ‘Plans, Programs, and Budgets in the Department of Defense’, 37. Enthoven made the same point. See CitationEnthoven, ‘Systems Analysis and Decision Making’.
[93] Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 195.
[94] Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 303–4.
[95] For more on military reform in the 1980s and the reformers' critique of systems science and computing, see CitationFallows, ‘Muscle-Bound Superpower’; Cohen, ‘Systems Paralysis’; Fallows, National Defense; Hart and Lind, America Can Win; Hammond, The Mind of War; Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War.
[96] Hammond, The Mind of War; Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War; Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare.
[97] Edwards, The Closed World, 137, 144–5; Bousquet, ‘Cyberneticizing the American War Machine’, 98–9.
[98] Hammond, The Mind of War; CitationCoram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War; Osinga, Science, Strategy, and War; Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare.