The United Kingdom's last hot war of the Cold War: Oman, 1963–75

Abstract

Between 1963 and 1975, the United Kingdom fought its last ‘hot war’ that can be classified as part of the Cold War. Attracting little media attention at the time, the war the United Kingdom waged in Oman's Dhofar province halted the spread of communism in the Persian Gulf at a period of acute vulnerability. Contrary to existing studies, which treat the conflict as a textbook British counter-insurgency conducted in a remote province of Oman, the purpose of this article is to highlight the complex regional and international dynamics that arguably proved more critical to the conflict's resolution. Within this context, the key elements contributing to the Anglo-Omani victory were the ability of British policymakers to forge an alliance of the Middle East's conservative monarchies, their successful mobilization of conservative Islam against secular Marxism and their persistent efforts to destabilize the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

Notes

Marc DeVore, PhD (MIT) is a Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the University of St. Gallen.

  [1] At present, the Dhofar War has yet to be the principal subject of a scholarly monograph. However, a number of excellent military memoirs examine the campaign, including Akehurst, We Won a War; Arkless, The Secret War; de la Billière, Looking for Trouble; Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread; Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan; Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman; Perkins, A Fortunate Soldier; Purdon, List the Bugle; Ray, Dangerous Frontiers and Thwaites, Muscat Command. A contemporary journalistic account of the war is Halliday, Arabia without Sultans. Secondary works treating the Dhofar War include: Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era; Geraghty, Who Dares Wins; and Hughes, ‘A “Model Campaign” Reappraised’. To enhance the vision offered by these sources, this article relies heavily on documents and personal papers from The National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom, the Middle Eastern Centre (MEC) at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, and the Liddell Hart Archive (LHA) of Private Military Papers, located at King's College London.

  [2] Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17 March 1970, FCO 46/609, and AD Parsons to Mr. Renwick, 17 January 1972, FCO 8/1856.

  [3] Jeapes set the stage by referring to the Dhofar campaign as a ‘model counterinsurgency.’ Most subsequent writers have follow in this vein. Mockaitis referred to it as a ‘textbook counterinsurgency’. See Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 1; Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, 72–95; and Hughes, ‘A “Model Campaign” Reappraised’.

  [4] Owtram, A Modern History of Oman, 116–21; and Allen and Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos, 23–6.

  [5] Owtram, A Modern History of Oman, 108–9.

  [6] After being militarily defeated in 1958, the Imam continued to be considered the main subversive threat to the Sultan until the late 1960s. Allen and Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos, 26–27; and See ‘Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk’, Washington, 25 January 1968, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, 262.

  [7] TNA FCO 51/41 Memorandum on the Dhofar Liberation Front, 30 January 1968.

  [8] Allen and Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos, 27; Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 10; and Thwaites, Muscat Command, 19–20.

  [9] According to some reports, the DLF did not receive any new supplies between early 1966 and mid-1967. TNA FCO 51/41 Memorandum on the Dhofar Liberation Front, 30 January 1968; TNA FO 1016/782 Arms Smuggling in the Persian Gulf, 4 February 1965; and MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, n.d.

 [10] Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 69.

 [11] TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35.

 [12] MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, ‘The Story of the Sultans Armed Forces 1964/67’, n.d..

 [13] Naumkin, Red Wolves of Yemen; and Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, 209–66.

 [14] Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, 142–3.

 [15] TNA DEFE 11/658 ‘Record of a Conversation between the Sultan of Oman and the Prime Minister at 12:30 PM on Friday 1 Nov at 10 Downing Street’, 1 November 1974; Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 26; and TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35.

 [16] Akehurst reports that Chinese operations inside Oman ceased after an advisor was killed in January 1968. Within China, Dhofari rebels were trained in a six-month course at Beijing's Anti-Imperialist School See Akehurst, We Won a War, 26; Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 30–5; and MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, c.1972.

 [17] For an analysis of Soviet needs of naval bases and their shift from the Mediterranean emphasis (1960s) to one on the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf (1970s), see Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 12–16.

 [18] TNA CAB 130/495 ‘Interdepartmental Study on Defence in the Indian Ocean’, 11 December 1970; Huan, la Marine soviétique, 23–68; and Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 7.

 [19] Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, 182; and Woodward, The Horn of Africa, 136–8.

 [20] Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 229.

 [21] Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 214–5.

 [22] Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, 182; and TNA DEFE 25/312 Confidential Annex to COS 25th Meeting/73, 27 November 1973.

 [23] Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy, 184; and TNA DEFE 25/312 Annex A to DP 20/73 Future UK Defence Activity in Oman.

 [24] In terms of infantry firepower, the DLF received large numbers of modern AK-47 assault rifles at a time when government forces still employed the World War II vintage Mk.4 Lee-Enfield rifle. Purdon, List the Bugle, 199; and Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 186.

 [25] McKeown, Britain and Oman, 42–3.

 [26] Thwaites, Muscat Command, 157.

 [27] TNA DEFE 11/656 Annex A to COS 1329/797, GSM: Award of Clasp for Service in Dhofar, n.d.

 [28] Akehurst, We Won a War, 15; Thwaites, Muscat Command, 157.

 [29] Thwaites, Muscat Command, 158.

 [30] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, c.1972.

 [31] Akehurst, We Won a War, 30; and TNA FCO 46/609 The Employment of an SAS Squadron in Dhofar, 26 February 1970.

 [32] Akehurst, We Won a War, 30; and TNA FCO 46/609 The Employment of an SAS Squadron in Dhofar, 26 February 1970

 [33] TNA FCO 46/609 ‘Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8/70’, 17 March 1970.

 [34] Withdrawal from the Gulf, like previous retreats from empire it, was a response to economic difficulties. TNA PREM 13/2688 Burke Trend to Prime Minister, 13 March 1967.

 [35] TNA DEFE 25/186 Presentation to Sir William Luce on the Gulf by the D of DOP, 4 August 1970.

 [36] ‘Intelligence Report: Security and Subversion in the Persian Gulf’, Washington, 1 March 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, 284 (139).

 [37] Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf, 156–9.

 [38] Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf, 159–71; and Walker, Aden Insurgency, 21–40.

 [39] Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf, 183–4.

 [40] MAN was founded in Lebanon after the Arab defeat of 1948. By 1967, its right- and left-wing factions could no longer coexist in a single movement, and MAN dissolved, giving rise to distinct Marxist organisations operating in different states. See Naumkin, Red Wolves of Yemen, 65–74; and Abu Khalil, ‘George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists’.

 [41] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, A Branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement, 3 March 1971.

 [42] Halliday, Arabia without Sultans, 320–1.

 [43] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, A Branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement, 3 March 1971.

 [44] The actual communiqué cited in the British intelligence document took place in 1970. MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, Notes on Current State of Subversive Organisations in Northern Oman, 31 October 1971.

 [45] The JIC analysis (1968) pre-dates PFLOAG's exposition of its aims (1970). TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35.

 [46] ‘Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara’, Washington, 12 June 1968, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXI, 297 (146); and Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf, 171–80.

 [47] Purdon, List the Bugle, 265–6; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

 [48] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, A Branch of the People's Revolutionary Movement, 3 March 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

 [49] TNA DEFE 24/575, Report on Operation INTRADON, 16 April 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

 [50] TNA DEFE 25/186 Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State for Defence, 27 November 1970; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

 [51] TNA DEFE 25/186 Major-General R.C. Gibbs to Chief of Defence Staff, Operation Intradon, 2 February 1971; and de la Billière, 263.

 [52] Khalaf, ‘Labor Movements in Bahrain’.

 [53] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, Notes on Current State of Subversive Organisations in Northern Oman, 31 October 1971.

 [54] Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 1.

 [55] On the development of post-war British counterinsurgency practices, see Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS. British post-war counterinsurgency practices were first set forth in manuals such as, TNA WO 279/241 The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 3rd Edition, 1958; and TNA WO 276/545 A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations, n.d. In the mid-1960s, a series of books by British counterinsurgency experts set forth the theoretical reasoning behind British practices. See Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations; and Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning. Mockaitis provides a useful analysis on how British counterinsurgency doctrine was formulated and transmitted, see Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, 133–41.

 [56] Corran Purdon, who commanded the Sultan's Armed Forces (1967–69), previously served in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus and Borneo. His successor, John Graham (1969–72), served in Palestine and Cyprus. John Akehurst, commander of Dhofar Brigade (1974–76), served in Malaya. Peter Thwaites, who commanded Muscat Regiment (1967–70), served in Malaya. Bryan Ray, commander of a regiment (1972–74), served in British Somaliland, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Malaya is the allusion mentioned most frequently in the writings of British commanders in Oman. See Purdon, List the Bugle; MEC John Graham Collection 5/6–7; Akehurst, Generally Speaking; Thwaites, Muscat Command, v–vi; Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 38–40.

 [57] Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 111–20.

 [58] Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 176–9; and Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 50–62.

 [59] Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 49.

 [60] Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs; and Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 69, 102.

 [61] Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 136, 193.

 [62] Most studies of the Dhofar War argue that in 1970 SAS Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Watts developed the counterinsurgency strategy that was implemented thereafter. However, all of the constitutive elements of this strategy had already been evoked by British commanders. During the years 1967-69, the leadership of Oman's armed forces (Purdon, Thwaites, and Harvey) developed a similar operational concept and requested the resources from the Sultan (development aid and military equipment), and London (the SAS) needed to implement it. See MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, Peter Thwaites, Lecture: Dhofar 1967–70, n.d.; and Purdon, List the Bugle, 207, 243.

 [63] LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 Teddy (CO the Desert Regiment) to Peter Thwaites, January 18, 1970; and LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 The Sultan's Armed Forces Association Newsletter, No. 4, December 1969.

 [64] Prior to 1931, Omani finances were managed by British officials, who were perceived as serving British, rather than Omani, interests. After he took over the finances of the kingdom in 1931, Said maintained a balanced budget so as not to provide the British with a pretext for (re-)assuming more authority. Allen and Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos, 2–4.

 [65] Contrary to certain accounts, Said was neither opposed to development nor disconnected from the realities of Oman's military situation. As soon as oil revenues became available in 1966, Said sponsored some development projects and nurtured plans for many more. He also satisfied as many military requests as his budget allowed. In response to the Dhofar War, Said expanded the armed forces from two to three battalions (1965), and purchased FN FAL rifles to replace old Lee-Enfields (1965), Skyvan aircraft (1969), and, finally, modern field artillery, helicopters and a fourth battalion. Allen and Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos, 23–6; Purdon, List the Bugle, 199, 242–3; 292–3; and MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Outline notes for lecture, History of SAF, August 1970.

 [66] The British commander of the Omani armed forces requested the SAS in 1967. The commanders of 22 SAS, Lieutenant-Colonel John Slim, travelled to Dhofar in 1969 and lobbied for deploying the SAS. See Thwaites, Muscat Command, 77–8; and Purdon, List the Bugle, 207, 220–21.

 [67] MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, The Story of the Sultans Armed Forces 1964/67, n.d.; Thwaites, Muscat Command, 76–7; and Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 63.

 [68] TNA FCO 46/609 ‘Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential Annex to COS 8th Meeting/70’, 17 March 1970.

 [69] Fiennes altered Landon's name to Tom Greening. Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 25, 86–7, 240–41; and Connor and Hebditch, How to Stage a Military Coup, 164.

 [70] Thwaites, Muscat Command, 151–2; and Purdon, List the Bugle, 243–4.

 [71] At the post of Military Secretary to the Sultan (i.e. Minister of Defense), Hugh Oldman replaced Pat Waterton at the post of Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, John Graham succeeded Corran Purdon in 1970. See MEC John Graham Collection 3/5, The Coup d'Etat in Oman, n.d. (the document is written by UK civil servant, but includes Graham's handwritten annotations).

 [72] TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35 Likely Developments in the Persian Gulf and their Probable Effects for British Interests, 7 June 1968.

 [73] TNA FCO 46/609 The Employment of an SAS Squadron in Dhofar, 26 February 1970.

 [74] TNA FCO 46/609 Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential Annex to COS 8th Meeting/70, 17 March 1970.

 [75] TNA FCO 46/609 P.J. Bayne, Commodore, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to CDS, 4 June 1970; TNA Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Operational Planning Staff, The Situation in Muscat and Oman, 7 July 1970; and TNA FCO 46/609 A.A. Acland to P. Hayman, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Possibility of a Coup, n.d. (between 8 and 22 July).

 [76] TNA FCO 46/609 Major-General Gibbs, Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Confidential Annex to COS 21st Meeting/70, 15 July 1970.

 [77] TNA FCO 46/609 A.A. Acland to P. Hayman, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Possibility of a Coup, n.d. (between 13 and 22 July).

 [78] TNA FCO 46/609 Bahrain Residency to FCO, Telegram 340, 13 July 1970; TNA FCO 46/609 A.A. Acland to P. Hayman, Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Possibility of a Coup, n.d.; and TNA FCO 46/609 FCO to Bahrain Residency and Muscat, n.d.

 [79] Sheikh Braik bin Hamud was the son of the Wali of Dhofar. Immediately after the coup, he took over from his father. Ray Kane's story originally appeared in the Mail on Sunday published on 7 July 2002. See Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 23–4; and Connor and Hebditch, How to Stage a Military Coup, 164.

 [80] In 1970, SAS Brigadier Fergie Semple sent an intelligence cell of 20 personnel, bodyguards for the Sultan and an SAS squadron that could be used to train the new Omani battalion being formed in Northern Oman. The decision was later taken to send squadrons to fight in Dhofar. TNA DEFE 25/186 Department of Military Operations to Vice-Chairman of the General Staff, Assistance to SAF, 13 August 1970.

 [81] TNA FCO 46/609 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Operational Planning Staff, the Situation in Muscat and Oman, 30 July 1970; and TNA DEFE 25/186 Department of Military Operations to Vice-Chairman of the General Staff, Assistance to SAF, 13 August 1970.

 [82] SAS officers have attributed the idea of the firqas to John Watts. On the other hand, General Graham stated that the plan to create firqas was ‘conceived in Muscat [Oman] and courageously supported in London and Hereford [SAS Headquarters]’. De la Billière, 267; Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 32–41; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

 [83] MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, CSAF (Graham) to Colonel M.G. Harvey, Directive to Commander, Dhofar for 1971, 12 February 1971.

 [84] TNA DEFE 25/186 Visit of the Military Secretary to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman – Colonel H.R.D. Oldman, 14 October 1970; MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (23 November 1971); and Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 85, 101, 111, 133–5.

 [85] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (4 October 1971).

 [86] MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, CSAF (Graham) to Colonel M.G. Harvey, Directive to Commander, Dhofar for 1971, 12 February 1971.

 [87] TNA FCO 8/1856 Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces' Assessment, 1972.

 [88] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, 1972.

 [89] Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 135–44.

 [90] MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, CSAF's assessment of the situation in Dhofar as at 14 February 1972.

 [91] TNA FCO 8/1856 Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces' Assessment, 1972.

 [92] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (6 February 1971).

 [93] In January 1972, a foreign office official referred to Dhofar as ‘a kind of micro-Vietnam in the Arabian peninsula’. In November 1972, a member of the British Central Policy Staff pessimistically warned that ‘Small beginnings [in Dhofar] can be deceptive, as Vietnam shows. And British public opinion might not take kindly to another Aden in a year or two's time.’ TNA FCO 8/1856 From A.D. Parsons to Mr. Renwick, Private Secretary, 17 January 1972; and TNA CAB 148/122/49, 21 November 1972.

 [94] TNA FCO 8/1856 Defence Department (FCO) to Arab Department, 21 December 1971; and Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 144.

 [95] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, 1972.

 [96] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.; and TNA DEFE 25/186 SAS Assistance to the Sultanate of Oman, Annex to D/DS, 17 August 1970.

 [97] MEC John Graham Collection 2/2, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in Dhofar, 1972; and MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

 [98] Thwaites, Muscat Command, 76; and Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread, 167′75.

 [99] Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 29′30.

[100] McKeown, Britain and Oman, 46.

[101] Musallim had feelers out attempting to negotiate a truce with the government since at least 1968. TNA FO 51/41 FO/CO Joint Research Department Memorandum, The Dhofar Liberation Front, 30 January 1968; and Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 29–57.

[102] Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 39.

[103] Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 60.

[104] Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 135.

[105] MEC John Graham Collection 3/1, Translation Leaflet S13, n.d. and Translation of Mk. 10 Leaflet, December 1970.

[106] MEC John Graham Collection 3/1, Translation of Message from Mussalim bin Nufl to the Dhofari Rebels (note: drop anytime after 10 January 1971).

[107] MEC John Graham Collection 3/1, Leaflets S1, A3, MS1, S15, S18 and S22.

[108] TNA DEFE 25/186 unnamed leaflet (italics added).

[109] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.; MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, Annex B to Op. Instr 1, Dhofar Int Sum, 20 November 1970; and Jeapes, SAS Operation Oman, 40–41.

[110] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

[111] LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 H.H. (handwritten notes from meeting), n.d. (1969).

[112] The Sultan of Mahra was the last of South Yemen's traditional rulers overthrown. Naumkin, Red Wolves of Yemen, 231, 256.

[113] Thwaites' handwritten notes concerning the initiation of the Mahra uprising state that the ultimate goal was to evict the PDRY and PFLOAG from all of the forts, but especially Ghada. The ultimate objective was a Mahra buffer state. Writing in 1972, the SAF's intelligence chief, Major Hezeldine, still states that a Mahra buffer state is the objective, but recognises that it is probably politically infeasible. LHC Peter Thwaites Collection, 1/2 H.H. (handwritten notes from meeting), n.d. (1969); and MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, Major Awa Hazeldine, The Future of Dhofar, 27 June 1972.

[114] MEC Edward Ashley Collection 2/1, Edward Ashley, Notes for Captain Insall, n.d. (1972).

[115] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (6 June 1971); and MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, Intelligence Summary 441, Sultanate of Oman, 20 May to 3 June 1971.

[116] Before this raid, the MI6 agent in Saudi Arabia told Karama that he could obtain supplies from the British-officered Omani armed forces. Karama offered his services to Oman once he entered Dhofar, but was instead resupplied and encouraged to depart. However, instead of leaving Dhofar immediately, he attacked Habrut, re-entered Dhofar and was then evacuated by sea back to Saudi Arabia. MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (entries from 22 May to 21 June).

[117] Not surprisingly this unit, Firqat Al Badiya, is not mentioned in Jeapes' history of the SAS in Oman. MEC John Graham Collection 2/3, Intelligence Summary 452, Sultanate of Oman, 13 November to 1 December 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 2/1, Major Awa Hazeldine, ‘The Future of Dhofar’, 27 June 1972.

[118] The use of ex-SAS personnel to officer the Mahra firqat is explained by Geraghty and indirectly confirmed by Arkless (who mentions a firqat being led by ex-SAS). Geraghty, Who Dares Wins, 135; and Arkless, The Secret War, 92.

[119] TNA DEFE 11/736 D.W. Napper, Commodore, Dir Def Op Plans to CGS, 12 October 1972; and TNA DEFE 11/736 Ambassador Hawley, Muscat, to FCO, 10 October 1972.

[120] TNA DEFE 11/762 CSAF to H.M., The Direction of the War, 19 June 1973; and TNA DEFE 11/762 COS Committee, DOPS, The Progress of Operations in Oman, 26 June 1973.

[121] MEC John Graham Collection 3/8, Notes on Current State of Subversive Organisations in Northern Oman, 31 October 1971.

[122] MEC John Graham Collection 3/7, Report on the Development and Activities of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 20 July 1973.

[123] In Aden, the NLF crippled the British counterinsurgency by liquidating most of Aden's Police Special Branch. Naumkin, Red Wolves of Yemen, 110–11.

[124] MEC John Graham Collection 3/7, Report on the Development and Activities of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 20 July 1973.

[125] TNA DEFE 11/759 CGS to Minister of State, January 10, 1973; TNA DEFE 11/759 Directive from Major R.D. Willingale R. Sigs for Operation Jason, 17 January 1973; and MEC John Graham Collection 3/7, Report on the Development and Activities of PFLOAG in Northern Oman, 20 July 1973.

[126] Kechichian, Oman and the World, 47–8.

[127] The Buraimi Oasis produced conflict with Saudi Arabia in the mid-1950s while clashes occurred with Ras al Khaymah in 1971. See TNA CAB 158/70 JIC (68) 35 Likely Developments in the Persian Gulf and their Probable Effects for British Interests, June 7, 1968; MEC John Graham Collection 1/2, Lecture by Tony Lewis, n.d.; and MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (23 November 1971).

[128] Kechichian, Oman and the World, 44–6.

[129] The first Omani delegation did not visit Saudi Arabia until January 1971 and only Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan had visited Oman. Kechichian, Oman and the World, 70–78. On Britain's opposition to Qaboos' act, see: TNA FCO 8/1676 From Bahrain Residency to Cairo Embassy, 9 March 1971.

[130] TNA FCO 8/1676 FCO Cairo Embassy to FCO, Telegram 367, 23 March 1971.

[131] TNA FCO 8/1676 Cairo Embassy to Muscat Embassy, 16 March 1971; and TNA FCO 8/1676 Extract from ‘14 October’ Issue No. 992, 31 March 1971.

[132] TNA FCO 8/1676 From D.G. Allen, Arabian Department to D.F. Hawley, United Kingdom Ambassador, Muscat, 8 July 1971.

[133] FCO 8/1676 FCO Cairo Embassy to FCO, Telegram 367, 23 March 1971.

[134] Khalifa sought advice from the British Residency and freely communicated his frustrations with Qaboos' negotiating position. TNA FCO 8/1676 D.G. Allen to British Embassy Muscat, 8 July 1971; and TNA FCO 8/1676 Doha to British Permanent Residency for the Persian Gulf, 27 September 1971.

[135] The suggestion that the title of Mufti could be accorded Ghalib seems to have originated with a Saudi ambassador. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry also backed the idea. TNA FCO 8/1676 D.G. Allen to British Embassy Muscat, 8 July 1971; and TNA FCO 8/1676 Beirut Embassy to FCO, Telegram 263, 6 July 1971.

[136] The Saudi decision came as a surprise to some because of the lack of a breakthrough with Ghalib. TNA FCO 8/1676 From Cairo; FCO Telegraph No. 1255, 30 September 1971; TNA FCO 8/1676 Cairo Embassy to D.G. Allen, 13 October 1971; and MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (8 October 1971).

[137] TNA FCO 8/1676 Sunday Telegraph, 31 October 1971. A note written in the margin of the Telegraph article remarked laconically, ‘Odd this has taken so long to reach Sunday Telegraph from Beirut!’

[138] MEC John Graham Collection 5/2, John Graham, Thirty Months, n.d.

[139] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (17 February and 10 September 1972).

[140] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (17 May 1972).

[141] Kechichian, Oman and the World, 99–100.

[142] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (31 October 1971).

[143] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (22 August 1971).

[144] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (2 October 1972); and Kechichian, Oman and the World, 72.

[145] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (3 August 1972).

[146] TNA DEFE 24/575 Commander Sultan's Armed Forces Assessment, 14 February 1972.

[147] Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 63–4.

[148] TNA DEFE 11/759 FM BRITDEFAT MUSCAT TO MODUK, 3 February 1973.

[149] TNA DEFE 11/759 FM BRITDEFAT MUSCAT TO MODUK, 9 February 1973.

[150] TNA DEFE 11/759 BRITDEFAT MUSCAT to MODUK, 15 February 1973; TNA DEFE 11/759 Brief for Meeting of Ministers, Gilmour/Balniel, Oman, 15 February 1973; and TNA DEFE 11/762 Review of the Military Situation, June 1973.

[151] TNA DEFE 25/312 Military Operations in Oman, June–October 1973.

[152] TNA DEFE 25/312 Record of Talks, 28 April 1974; and TNA DEFE 11/658 FCO Note, 2 December 1974.

[153] TNA DEFE 25/312 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, December 1973–May 1974; TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974; and TNA DEFE 11/658 Report on CSAF's visit to Jordan, 4 December 1974.

[154] TNA DEFE 25/315 HQ SAF D-OPS/5, Operational Review, 11 April 1974; TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974; and TNA DEFE 11/656 COS Committee, Defence Operational Planning Staff, Report on the Provision of British Service Assistance to Oman, 7 August 1974.

[155] Akehurst, Generally Speaking, 154; and TNA DEFE 11/656 Major-General Tim Creasy to Sultan Qaboos, 25 August 1974.

[156] Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 75–94; and Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 102–91.

[157] TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974.

[158] MEC John Graham Collection 4/1, J.D.C. Graham, Oman Diary (23 November 1971).

[159] TNA DEFE 11/658 Review of the Situation by Major General Tim Creasy, Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces, June–December 1974.