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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the leftist Salvadoran revolutionary organisation FMLN and the Cuban regime throughout the Salvadoran civil war in the 1980s. In light of interviews conducted by the author in 2007 and 2008 with some of the highest-ranking leaders of the FMLN, it re-evaluates existing primary and secondary sources on the topic. This study demonstrates that despite its autonomous roots, the FMLN's development, growth, and achievements throughout the Salvadoran civil war were indissolubly linked to its relationship with Cuba. By placing Cuba as a nodal point in the Salvadoran civil war, the idea of ‘unilateralist’ US hegemony in the region throughout the Cold War is brought into question, as is the notion that the Soviet Union fashioned Havana's foreign policy. Furthermore, this analytical paradigm begins to shed light on the importance of transnational historical analyses.
Notes
Andrea Oñate was born in 1984 in Mexico City. She has a BA in political science and history from New York University. She is currently a second-year PhD student in Latin American history at Princeton University. Her dissertation will explore the transnational ties that Mexico and Cuba maintained with revolutionary movements in Central America during the 1980s.
[1] Information on Latin America's Communist Parties and their views towards armed insurgency can be found in: CitationCastañeda, ‘In the Beginning’, Utopia Unarmed. Joaquín Villalobos and Eduardo Sancho, both former leaders of the FMLN, conveyed the specifics of the Salvadoran Communist Party to the author. Interviews with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford) and Eduardo Sancho.
[2] FMLN leaders agreed that Cuba embodied the possibility of change and that Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were tangible examples of the ideal ‘revolutionary man.’ Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Salvador Sanchez Cerén, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[3] Facundo Guardado and Joaquin Villalobos both claim that Cuba not only made revolution look possible but also gave the impression that it was easy. Interviews with Facundo Guardado and Joaquin Villalobos (Oxford).
[4] Interview with Facundo Guardado.
[5] Roque Dalton was a communist Salvadoran poet and guerrilla who joined the ERP in 1974. Before joining the ERP, Roque Dalton lived in Cuba, received guerrilla training and developed close relationships with prominent members of the Cuban administration. In May of 1975 he was accused of treason by leaders of the ERP, was tried by an ad hoc military commission and was found guilty. Dalton was executed on 10 May 1975. His death was condemned by Havana which consequently broke relations with the ERP. Eduardo Sancho ‘Fermán Cienfuegos’, provides a first-hand account of Dalton's death. CitationCienfuegos and Sancho, Crónica Entre los Espejos, 100–14.
[6] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martínez.
[7] This was first documented by the United States' Department of State in its ‘White Paper,’ subsequently used by the Reagan administration to justify its support for the Salvadoran armed forces. This document reports that from 5 May to 8 June 1980, Salvadoran guerrillas attended meetings in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua and then went to Cuba and met with Castro and with the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations (DOE) ‘to discuss guerrilla military plans’. In late May 1980 the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was ‘admitted into the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in Havana’. CitationUS Department of State, ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’. In interviews carried out by the author with three Commanders of the FMLN: Ana Guadalupe Martínez (prominent member of the ERP), Eduardo Sancho (leader of the RN and member of the ‘Comandancia General’), and Joaquín Villalobos (supreme leader of the ERP and member of the ‘Comandancia General’), these meetings in Havana to establish unity between the guerrillas were confirmed. All three, as well as FPL Commander Facundo Guardado, agree that Cuba played a pivotal role in bringing about the creation of the FMLN as such. The interviewees also disclosed that meetings between the FPL, CP and RN began in mid-1979, in Cuba. These three groups were the first to unite, forming the ‘revolutionary tripartite’. After Ana Guadalupe Martínez's successful lobbying efforts, the ERP was included and the PRTC was the last to join. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[8] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[9] Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos, who were present at these negotiations, concur that Havana's offer to provide weapons was Cuba's biggest selling point in exchange for unity. Villalobos recalls that in the meetings the Cubans effectively said: ‘unite and we give you arms’. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[10] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[11] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[12] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.
[13] Cuba's decisive role in keeping the FPL united after the death of its leader, Cayetano Carpio, was revealed to the author by Facundo Guardado of the FPL and Eduardo Sancho of the RN. Interviews with Facundo Guardado and Eduardo Sancho.
[14] Interview with Facundo Guardado.
[15] Cuba's role in the unification of the Nicaraguan guerrillas was documented by the CitationCentral Intelligence Agency as follows: ‘Castro assumed a similar role in Havana's dealings with the Sandinistas in late 1978 and was instrumental in unifying the three Sandinista factions. In return for the Sandinistas unity agreement, the Cubans sharply increased their assistance in money, arms, and ammunition. The same may also occur in the case of El Salvador’. CIA Memorandum, ‘Cuba: Looking to El Salvador’.
[16] Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer argue that Cuba foresaw that the general offensive would succeed and that the new administration in the CitationUnited States would have no choice but to accept it. Bracamonte and Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 16.
[17] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[18] Interview with Claudio Armijo.
[19] Joaquín Villalobos, Eduardo Sancho, and Claudio Armijo expressed that the Departamento América was the effective mechanism for revolutionary leaders to get to Fidel Castro. Both Joaquín Villalobos and Claudio Armijo explicitly stated that Piñeiro was the bridge to Castro. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Claudio Armijo and Joaquin Villalobos (Oxford).
[20] CitationDominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 120–21
[21] Jorge Castañeda describes the Cuban creation of the America Department as follows: ‘Thus was born the (in)famous America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, or, some might have called it, the Ministry of Revolution. This was, thereafter, where Revolution was exported from…’ Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, 57.
[22] Jorge Castañeda describes the Cuban creation of the America Department as follows: ‘Thus was born the (in)famous America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, or, some might have called it, the Ministry of Revolution. This was, thereafter, where Revolution was exported from…’ Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, 57
[23] Eduardo Sancho and Facundo Guardado told the author that the DOE was extensively involved in setting up a nationwide communication system for the guerrillas; that it taught the FMLN secret codes to communicate clandestinely; and that it kept the organisation up to date with the most modern technology available. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Facundo Guardado.
[24] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[25] A number of health facilities on the island, most notably the ‘26 of July Camp’, were devoted to assisting injured FMLN combatants and FMLN leaders recognise that Cuba promoted the humane treatment of prisoners of war. Interviews with Ana Guadalpe Martínez, Leonel Gonzalez and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford). Jorge Castañeda, one of the few writers on the subject to acknowledge this role, suggests that Cuba's humanitarian functions in El Salvador were symptomatic of its foreign policy throughout Latin America. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, 55.
[26] Eduardo Sancho conveyed that the first cadre of officials was formed in Cuba. FMLN leaders concur that the actual number of combatants trained on the island was small. Based on his visits to these training camps, ERP Commander Claudio Armijo estimates that the number of trainees on the island at any given time was around 100. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Leonel Gonzales, Claudio Armijo, Facundo Guardado, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[27] Joaquín Villalobos, Facundo Guardado and Eduardo Sancho agree that Cuban military training, although crucial in the initial stages of war, quickly came to play a secondary role in the organisation's military capacity. Facundo Guardado gave the specific date of 1983 to the author. Interviews with Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[28] Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Claudio Armijo, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[29] A 1989 secret report by the Department of State claims: ‘to train FMLN guerrillas for the highly successful 1981 attack on Ilopango air base, the Cubans built a facsimile of Ilopango airfield in Cuba’. CitationUS Department of State, ‘Cuban Support for Subversión in Latin América’. ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos and ERP Commander Claudio Armijo confirmed this information to the author and added that the tactic used came from the Vietcong. Villalobos, conveyed the additional details of the ERP's contribution to this operation. Interviews with Claudio Armijo and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[30] Interview with Eduardo Sancho, Facundo Guardado, Ana Guadalupe Martínez, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[31] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[32] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford)
[33] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).
[34] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[35] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).
[36] FMLN members interviewed by the author expressed that the FMLN was the most modern guerrilla army in the region. While their assessment could be attributed to hubris, David E. Spencer and Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte, who are both staunchly critical of the FMLN and whose sympathies clearly lie with the Salvadoran army, make the same judgment. Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 7.
[37] Jorge I. Dominguez asserts that Cuba publicly denied that Cuban advisers ever worked in El Salvador with the guerrillas. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 136. The FMLN leaders interviewed by the author also affirmed that Cuban troops never fought with the FMLN. Even the CitationUnited States Department of State, in a 1985 secret memorandum based on the testimony of a captured FMLN combatant, recognised that ‘to the best of [the combatants’] knowledge, there are no Cuban or Nicaraguan advisors in El Salvador because of ‘political considerations’. US Department of State, ‘Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels’.
[38] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[39] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford)
[40] In 1982, ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos personally received 12 weapons from Fidel Castro. This was utterly atypical, however. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford)
[41] US Department of State, ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’, 4.
[42] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[43] Joaquín Villalobos, Ana Guadalupe Martinez and Eduardo Sancho all judge that Cuba's diplomatic efforts on the FMLN's behalf were the deciding factor that secured the support of socialist countries in providing weapons to the FMLN. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[44] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[45] Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[46] Because Havana had legitimate trade relations with these countries, the boats used to transport the weapons were predominantly Cuban commercial carriers. ‘Although there was regulation of these carriers, it was impossible to know which ones were carrying arms, and the arms were generally hidden within the vessels.’ Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[47] Interview with Eduardo Sancho; Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 177; and US Department of State, ‘Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels’.
[48] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[49] Interviews with Joaquín Villalobos.
[50] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).
[51] Joaquín Villalobos, who personally managed a large amount of Cuba's financial assistance, related that Cuba gave the money freely but that they closely monitored how it was spent. For example, Joaquín Villalobos affirms that his logistics coordinator, whom he trusted entirely, was constantly informing the Cuban administration of the ERP's spending. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).
[52] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[53] Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho, and Leonel González.
[54] Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 3.
[55] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.
[56] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez
[57] Joaquín Villalobos recounts that this is what President Mitterrand told Guillermo Ungo when they first met and Ungo asked for financial backing. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[58] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[59] Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford and Mexico City).
[60] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).
[61] Interview with Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).
[62] Many FMLN leaders retrospectively judge Cayetano Carpio as somewhat of a tyrant. A leader who believed the FMLN should be a hierarchical organisation that he would preside. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho, Facundo Guardado, and Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford and Mexico City).
[63] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford).
[64] Interview with Joaquín Villalobos (Oxford)
[65] This was the official position of the United States during the Salvadoran civil war. Speeches by ex-Secretary of State Alexander Haig, US Ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick, and President Ronald Reagan, presented events in Central America as reflecting Soviet expansionism channelled through Cuba. CitationWhitehead, ‘Explaining Washington's Central American Policies’. In the ‘White Paper’ the US Department of State affirms: ‘it is clear that over the past year the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into another case of indirect armed aggression against a small Third World country by Communist powers acting through Cuba.’ US Department of State, ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’. After over a decade of stressing Soviet and communist involvement in El Salvador, the United States' Defense Intelligence Agency eventually recognised the absence of direct Soviet support for the FMLN. In a secret position paper written in 1990, the Agency states: ‘The Soviet Union does not appear to have provided direct military training or equipment to the FMLN since the early 1980s. However, the Soviet Union has not indicated that it disproves of such aid by the Cubans, who depend economically and militarily on the Soviets.’ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Soviet and Cuban support for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front’.
[66] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
[67] Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 4.
[68] CitationGrandin, Empire's Workshop, 71. In a secret memorandum from Salvadoran President Cristiani to the US Department of State, Cristiani affirms: ‘The US has supported the Salvadoran Government throughout the ten year insurgency with economic and military assistance totaling more than $3billion.’ CitationUS Department of State, ‘Proposed Call on the President by Salvadoran President Cristiani’.
[69] Grandin, Empire's Workshop, 71.
[70] This position is argued by Greg Grandin in Empire's Workshop, chapter 2: ‘The Most Important Place in the World: Toward a New Imperialism’. It is also presented by CitationLeoGrande in ‘A Splendid Little War’.
[71] Interviews with Salvador Sánchez Cerén and Ana Guadalupe Martínez.
[72] Interviews with Facundo Guardado and Joaquín Villalobos.
[73] Even those countries proclaiming to have a foreign policy of non-intervention supported groups that adhered to either Cuba or the United States. Perhaps the best example of this is Mexico which proclaimed neutrality in the region and had close relations with both Cuba and the United States but provided widespread support to the FMLN through its diplomatic efforts. See Salvador Samayoa's, El Salvador: la reforma pactada.
[74] Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos agree that Cuba stayed out of this final stage of the conflict. Villalobos recalls failed attempts to get the Cubans more involved with the process. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos (Mexico City).