Prelude to war? The repatriation of Koreans from the Chinese PLA, 1949–50

Abstract

In 1949 and 1950, three ethnic Korean divisions of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) returned to North Korea. While some historians have cited their return in terms of Chinese and Soviet encouragement for Kim Il Sung's invasion of South Korea, this article argues that this was simply an attempt to enhance North Korea's self-defence capabilities, rather than to invade South Korea. The rationales behind the Soviet and Chinese decisions are analysed here. The Soviet Union's viewpoint will be explained, taking into account the high degree of tension on the Peninsula in early 1949. The Chinese perspective will be examined vis-à-vis the close Sino-Korean relationship, China's domestic economic pressures, and requests by the Korean soldiers themselves. Furthermore, this paper argues that at no time did North Korea dispatch troops to Northeast China in order to help Chinese communists in the Chinese Civil War, showing the limits of both reciprocity and fraternal socialism in the Sino-North Korean relationship.

Notes

Donggil Kim is Associate Professor in Department of History, Peking University in Beijing, and co-author of History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1931–1945) (Beijing: CCP History Publishing House, 2009). He has published articles in Cold War History Lishi yanjiu [Historical Research], Dangde Wenxian [Literature of Chinese Communist Party], Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies] and Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu [The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War against Japan] on Sino-Soviet Relations and Sino-North Korea relations, and is presently working on the Sino-Korea Cold War project.

 [1] There was no fixed name for the Koreans in China during the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. The Koreans in China were variously called Gaoliren, Hanguoren, or Chaoxianren. On 3 September 1952, the ethnic Korean (Chaoxianren) became the formal name after the establishment of the Ethnic Korean's Autonomous Area in Yanbian. This article uses the term ethnic Korean (Chaoxianren) to refer to Chinese of Korean descent. See Go Youngil, Jungguk hangil jeonjaeng gua chosun minjeok, 465–7; Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 15 May 1949, Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, hereafter APRF), APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 9, Listy 54.

 [2] Headquarters of the Northeast Military District Command, PLA, Dongbei sannian jiefang zhanzheng junshi ziliao, 76–7.

 [3] Kim Jung-Saeng, Chosun uiyonggun milipbuk gwa yukio jenjaeng, 151–2.

 [4] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 22 June 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 73.

 [5] A group of scholars has argued that the launch of the Korean War was planned in close cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang, commonly known as the three states conspiracy theory. In the Cold War period, this theory was accepted widely in the Western countries, based on the following speculations: (1) from December 1949 to February 1950, Mao Zedong visited Moscow and reached an agreement on the unification of the Korean Peninsula by force; (2) the return of the ethnic Korean divisions in the PLA to North Korea was designed to enhance the military capability of the KPA so as to unify the Korean Peninsula by force; (3) China and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the work between them, i.e., the Soviet Union provided the weapons while China sent troops; (4) in order to ensure North Korea's security and provide military aid to North Korea when necessary, China and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty prior to the Korean War. See O'Balance, Korea: 1950–1953, 59–60; Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, 90; Whiting, China Crosses Yalu, 44; Nagajima, ‘The Sino-Soviet Confrontation’; So Jincheol, Hanguk jeonjaeng ui giwon: gukje gongsanjuui ui eummo; Donggil Kim, ‘“Sanguo tongmoulun” fenxi’.

 [6] Cumings, The Roaring of the Cataract, 445–8, 619; Cumings, Place in the Sun, 243.

 [7] Cumings, Place in the Sun, 239–41.

 [8] US intelligence summary, 5–12 May 1947, stated that as of 21 April, the number of Soviet trained and equipped Koreans under the command of Kim Cha'ek moving to Jiamushi in northern China will reach 150,000, ISNK, no. 36 (1947.5.16) incl. no. 4, p. 8; ISNK, no. 39 (1947.6.30) incl. no. 1, p. 15: Baek Haksun, ‘Jungguk naejeon sigi bukhan ui jungguk gongsandang e daehan gunsa wonjo’, 274.

 [9] Shi Yuanhua, ‘Lun guiguo qianhou de dahanminguo linshizhengfu ji zhuhuajigou’.

[10] Choe Gang, Chosun Uiyongjunsa, 105–92.

[11] Even after the Chosun doknip dongmaeng, the political arm of the KVA, moved into CCP headquarters at Yen'an, the main body of the KVA in the Taihang Mountains still maintained its independence from the CCP. See Mu Jeong, Huabei Chaoxian Duli Tongmeng, 354–6.

[12] Shi Yuanhua, Zhongguo gongchandang yuanzhu chaoxian duli yundong jishi, 299.

[13] Special Interview Group of Joong Ang Ilbo, Birok, vol. II, 140–41.

[14] Choe Gang, Chosun Uiyongjunsa, 138–46.

[15] Central Archives of China, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, vol. 15, 223.

[16] Shi Yuanhua, Zhongguo gongchandang yuanzhu chaoxian duli yundong jishi, 389–90.

[17] Choe Gang, Chosun Uiyongjunsa, 187.

[18] In this period following the Japanese surrender, deep rifts emerged between the ethnic Koreans and Chinese in rural area of the Northeast China. Many Koreans fled from rural Chinese antagonism to big cities such as Shenyang, and many outlaws took advantage of the situation by forming bandit gangs and attacking ethnic Korean people and property. Zhu Dehai memoir's editing team, Zhu Dehai yisheng, 74.

[19] Author recently obtained KVA Vanguard Column Leader Han Cheong's unpublished memoir, Han Cheong, Han Cheng Hoegorok , 1955–73.

[20] On 24 October 1945, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Zhen of the CCP Northeast Bureau, saying that ‘it is highly vital to establish our presence in the pivotal cities of Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces, especially the former’. CCP Archive Study Office and Military Science Academy, Mao Zedong Junshi wenji, vol. 3, 45–60.

[21] Shi Yuanhua, Zhongguo gongchandang zhiyuan chaoxian duliyundong jishi, 394; Special interview team of Joong Ang Ilbo, Birok, vol. I, 155.

[22] Special interview team of Joong Ang Ilbo, Birok, vol. I, 155.

[23] Zhudehai yisheng editing Team, Zhudehai yisheng, 74–5.

[24] Headquarters of the Northeast Military District Command, PLA, Dongbei sannian jiefang zhanzheng junshi ziliao, 76–7.

[25] For more details about development of the 164 and 166th divisions, See, Headquarters of the Northeast Military District Command, PLA, Dongbei sannian jiefang zhanzheng junshi ziliao, 76–7.

[26] Wen Zhengyi and Chi Kuanrong, ‘Kangri zhanzheng zhong de chaoxian yiyongjun’, 20–25; Shi Yuanhua, Zhongguo gongchandang yuanzhu chaoxian duli yundong jishi, 396–7; The Political Department of the 4th Field Army, Chaoxian shi zhongguo qinmi de linbang gonghuannan de zhanyou, 12–16.

[27] Headquarters of the Northeast Military District Command, PLA, Dongbei sannian jiefang zhanzheng junshi ziliao, 76–7; Chaoxian shi zhongguo qinmi de linbang gonghuannan de zhanyou, 12–16.

[28] Cumings, Place in the Sun, 240; Cumings, Roaring of the Cataract, 357–64.

[29] Telegram from Shtykov to Molotov, 27 January 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 3.

[30] Telegram from Shtykov to Molotov, 3 February 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 6.

[31] Telegram from Shtykov to Molotov, 27 January 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 3.

[32] Telegram from Shtykov to Molotov, 3 February 1949, Cited in Bajanov and Bajanova, ‘The Korean Conflict, 1950–1953’.

[33] Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 17 April 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, List 25: Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, hereafter AVPRF) AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 80.

[34] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 20 April 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 839, Listy 13–14.

[35] Memorandum of the USSR Ministers of Armed Forces and the Chief of the General Staff to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, 20 April 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 1, Delo 839, Listy 13–14.

[36] Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 17 April 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 25; AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 80.

[37] Decision of the CPSU Politburo on the Soviet Naval Detachment's temporary station in Korea, 18 March, 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 775, Listy 74–6.

[38] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 22 June 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 73–5.

[39] On 15 May 1949, Shtykov wrote a report to Vyshinsky saying, ‘In the last meeting between Kim Il, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai, Zhu De asked Kim Il whether the Soviet comrades knew about North Korea's request to send several divisions, and what their opinion was. Kim Il answered that he was entrusted by the KWP CC to do so and that the KWP CC had discussed about this issue with the Soviet Union’. See telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 15 May 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 9, List 54.

[40] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 15 May 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 9, List 54; Telegram from Kovalev to Stalin, 18 May 1949, APRF, Fond 4, Opis 01, Delo 333, Listy 59–61.

[41] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 22 June 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 73–5.

[42] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 13 July 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 5, Listy 26–7.

[43] Kim Jung-Saeng, Chosun uiyonggun milipbuk gwa yukio jenjaeng, 98; Wadaharuki, Kim Il Sung gwa manju hangil jeonjaeng, 38.

[44] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 3 September 1949, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 136–38; Telegram from Tunkin to Vyshinsky (in reply to telegram of 11 September), 14 September 1949, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 46–53.

[45] On 12 and 14 August of 1949, Kim Il-Sung and Pak Hen-yong raised the issue of attacking South Korea, asserting that there was no choice but to solve the Korean problem through this method [attacking the South], Record of conversation between Shtykov and Kim Il-Sung, 12 August 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 775, Listy 102–6; record of conversation between Shtykov and Park Heonyeong, 14 August 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 775, Listy 108–11; Torkunov, The War in Korea, 27–30.

[46] Politburo decision to confirm the following directive to the Soviet ambassador in Korea, 24 September 1949, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 75–7.

[47] Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 30 October 1949, cited in Bajanov and Bajanova, ‘The Korean Conflict, 1950–1953’.

[48] Telegram from Nie Rongzhen to Mao Zedong regarding the question of sending home ethnic Korean officers and soldiers stationed in the Huazhong [Central China] military district China, 29 December 1949, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 8–9.

[49] Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 8 January 1950, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, List 110.

[50] CCP Archive Study Office, Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, 319–20.

[51] Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilv, 748.

[52] CCP Archive Study Office, Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, vol. 1, 319–21; Telegram of Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong, 22 January 1950, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, Listy 22.

[53] Kim Jung-Saeng, Chosun uiyonggun milipbuk gwa yukio jenjaeng, 151–2.

[54] Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 26 October 1949, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 332, Listy 47–8.

[55] Record of Conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong, 16 December 1949, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 329, Listy 9–17.

[56] Telegram from to Stykov, 30 January 1950, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 92.

[57] Political department of the 4th Field Army, Chaoxian shi zhongguo qinmide linbang gonghuannan de zhanyou, 20–24.

[58] Mao Zedong had commented that the two divisions were not regular divisions and were poorly trained. Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 15 May 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 9, Listy 52–54.

[59] CCP Archive Study Office, Chen Yun wenji, 638–49.

[60] Memorandum between Roshchin and Zhou Enlai on China's politics and economy, 15 November 1949, AVPRF, Fond 0100, Opis 42, Delo 19, Papka 288, Listy 81–95.

[61] Chinese Academy of Social Science and Central Archives of China, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dangan xuanbian , 202.

[62] In May 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to organise the demobilisation committee that would be headed by Zhou Enlai, and decided that the total number of the PLA numbers would be cut down from 5.4 to 4 million. CCP Archive Study Office, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 390–6.

[63] About the Chinese policy towards the Korean Peninsula before the outbreak of the Korean War, see Donggil Kim, ‘“Sanguo tongmoulun” fenxi’, 112–21.

[64] Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong, 16 December 1949, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 329, Listy 9–10.

[65] Telegram from Soviet representative Aleksei Ignatiev to Vyshinsky, 10 April 1950, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 98–9.

[66] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 12 May 1950, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 100–103.

[67] APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 13–23, 46; Bajanov, Aktual'nye Problemy, vol. 3, 37; Weathersby, ‘“Should We Fear This”’, 3–4.

[68] Record of conversation between Shtykov and Kim Il-Sung, 12 August 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 775, Listy 102–6; record of conversation between Shtykov and Park Hen-Yong, 14 August 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 775, Listy 108–11; Torkunov, The War in Korea, 27–30.

[69] In a report to Stalin, Shtykov said, ‘Kim Il Sung stressed again that he hoped to listen to comrade Stalin's viewpoint on the question of South Korea, because he always wanted to start an attack on the South’. Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 87–91.

[70] Weathersby, ‘New Findings on the Korean War’, 14.

[71] Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, AVPRF, Fond 59a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, List 92.

[72] Heinzig, ‘Stalin, Mao, Kim and War Origins, 1950’, 240.

[73] Cumings, Place in the Sun, 241.

[74] Headquarters of the Northeast Military District Command, PLA, Dongbei sannian jiefang zhanzheng junshi ziliao, 76–7.

[75] Cumings, Place in the Sun, 241.

[76] Headquarters of the Northeast Military District Command, PLA, Dongbei sannian jiefang zhanzheng junshi ziliao, 77.

[77] Kim Il Sung, ‘Jungguk inmin ui hyeong myeong eul jeokgeuk dowa juneun geosi uriui gukjejuuijeok immuida’, 386–7.

[78] Headquarters, U.S. Military Forces in Korea, Intelligence Summary of Northern Korea (ISNK), no. 36 (1947.5.16) Incl. no. 4, pp. 2–3.

[79] ISNK, no. 36 (1947.5.16) Incl. no. 4, p. 8; ISNK, no. 39 (1947.6.30) Incl. no. 1, p. 15.

[80] ISNK, no. 35, p. 15; ISNK, no. 45, p. 13; Headquarters, U.S. Military Forces in Korea, G-2 Weekly Summary (W/S), no. 125, p. 17.

[81] W/S, no. 142, p. 22.

[82] Orlov and Gavrilov, Tayny Koreyskoy Voyny, 26.

[83] Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 22 June 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 3, Listy 68.

[84] Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 15 September 1949, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 776, Listy 13.

[85] Wu Qun, Li Hongguang zhidui, 203.

[86] In June 1946, the Northeast Bureau of the CCP decided to establish a logistical base for the struggle in southern Manchuria in northern North Korea. Therefore, the Northeast bureau of the CCP delegated a representative to Pyongyang. That is the beginning of the first official contact between the CCP and the KWP. See, Ding Xuesong et al., ‘Huiyi dongbei jiefang zhanzheng qijian dongbei zhu chaoxian banshichu’, vol.1.