Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light?

Abstract

Since the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, numerous observers and scholars have alleged that the United States ‘green-lighted’ Saddam Hussein's decision to go to war. This article scrutinises the green light thesis by examining US and Iraqi documents that have recently become available to scholars. These records reveal that the green light thesis has more basis in myth than in reality. Preoccupied with issues such as the Iran hostage crisis and the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter administration officials neither expected nor welcomed Saddam's attack on Iran. The Iraqi dictator, for his part, believed that Washington would oppose rather than support his war.

Notes

  [1] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), FBIS-SOV-80-195, ‘Lebedeva Denies U.S. Desires to End Iran-Iraq Conflict’, 6 October 1980; Sajjadpour, ‘Neutral Statements, Committed Practice’, 31.

  [2] Takeyh, ‘The Iran–Iraq War’, 367.

  [3] Tirman, ‘Diplomacy, Terrorism’, 538.

  [4] Hiro, The Longest War, 71. See also Hiro, Iraq, 237.

  [5] Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 187–9.

  [6] Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, 16.

  [7] See, for instance, Adib-Moghaddam, ‘Inventions of the Iran–Iraq War’, 72, 80; Hitchens, ‘Realpolitik in the Gulf’, 51; Tarock, The Superpowers' Involvement in the Iran–Iraq War, x; Sigler, ‘The Iran–Iraq Conflict’, 433; Yazdani and Hussein, ‘United States’ Policy', 271; Bando, Web of Deceit, chapter 3; Timmerman, The Death Lobby, esp. 76–7.

  [8] The US government has recently begun to make these records available to interested scholars through the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University. In this essay, captured Iraqi records are cited by CRRC number, title, and date.

  [9] The apt comparison is probably to the first tranches of Soviet and Eastern bloc records to become available following the end of the Cold War. While these first releases provided only glimpses into Kremlin and Soviet bloc decision-making, they nonetheless allowed scholars who combined these materials with other available sources to break new empirical and analytical ground in assessing a variety of subjects.

 [10] Yazdani and Hussain, ‘United States’ Policy', 271. See also Hitchens, ‘Realpolitik in the Gulf’, 51.

 [11] Hiro, Iraq, 237; Tarock, Superpowers' Involvement, x, 62, 66; Sigler, ‘The Iran–Iraq Conflict’; Hiro, Longest War, 71; Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, 18–22.

 [12] Hitchens, ‘Realpolitik in the Gulf’, 51.

 [13] Timmerman, The French Betrayal of America, chapter 3; Timmerman, Death Lobby, 76–7; Scott, The Road to 9/11, 89.

 [14] Aburish, Saddam Hussein, 187–8.

 [15] Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, 22.

 [16] Quoted in Brzezinski to Carter, 21 December 1979, in Woodrow Wilson Center, The Origins; also Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 477–96.

 [17] See Gasiorowski, ‘The Nuzhih Plot and Iranian Politics’, esp. 649–52; also Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, 16–22.

 [18] On these early overtures, see Carter's marginalia on Vance to Carter, 14 February 1977, NLC-25-61-1-2-4, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCL). For the Iraqi stance, see CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-553, ‘Revolutionary Command Council Meeting’, 27 March 1979; State to Various Posts, 30 January 1979, NLC-16-115-2-19-5, JCL.

 [19] Brzezinski to Carter, 3 January 1980, Geographic File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Materials (ZBDM), JCL; Brzezinski to Carter, 22 June 1979, Subject File, ZBDM, JCL; Njolstad, ‘Shifting Priorities’, 30–38.

 [20] Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy, chapters 2–3; SCC Meeting, 17 January 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM, JCL; SCC Meeting, 26 January 1980, Subject File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [21] ‘Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf,’ 18 June 1979, NLC-20-24-2-1-0, JCL; also Brzezinski to Carter, 25 January 1980, NLC-43-124-6-2-9, JCL; CIA, ‘U.S. Relations with the Radical Arabs’, 7 December 1979, NLC-15-123-8-7-4, JCL. See also Seliktar, The Politics of Intelligence, 27–33.

 [22] Odom to Brzezinski, 13 March 1980, Declassified Documents Reference Service (DDRS).

 [23] Quoted in ‘The National Security Issue’, Wall Street Journal, 16 October 1980. On these initiatives, see Memorandum for Brzezinski, 14 January 1980, NLC-43-214-6-2-6, JCL; SCC Meeting on Persian Gulf Security Framework, 5 September 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM, JCL; Odom to Brzezinski, 13 March 1980, DDRS; Warren Christopher to Jimmy Carter, 16 May 1980, DDRS; Vance to Carter, 15 February 1980, NLC-128-15-2-11-9, JCL.

 [24] Gary Sick, email to the author, 24 August 2010.

 [25] Moses, Freeing the Hostages, 261–2.

 [26] Brzezinski to Carter, 3 October 1980, Subject File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [27] Author's telephone interview with Sick, 26 August 2010; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 504.

 [28] Christopher Hitchens, ‘Realpolitik in the Gulf’, 51; also Fayazmanesh, United States and Iran, 22.

 [29] ‘Top Secret/Sensitive’ Cable, undated (April 1981), in Woodrow Wilson Center, The Origins.

 [30] Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad, 67.

 [31] Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak, esp. 13, 70–71, 94; also Hiro, Longest War, 71–72; Fayazmanesh, United States and Iran, 16–17.

 [32] L. Bruce Laingen, ‘Foreword’, in Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak, ix–xi; ‘Bani-Sadr, in U.S., Renews Charges of 1980 Deal’, New York Times, 7 May 1991.

 [33] Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, chapters 11–12; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, chapters 18–19.

 [34] Email from Sick to author, 24 August 2010.

 [35] See FBIS-SAS-80-139, ‘Criticism of Husayn Government,’ 16 July 1980.

 [36] Gause, The International Relations, 57–64.

 [37] Intelligence Information Report, 9 April 1980, NSA; Carter, Keeping Faith, 516; Sick, All Fall Down, 289.

 [38] See, for instance, SCC Meetings of 2 and 5 September 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM, JCL; NSC Meeting, 12 September 1980, Plains File, JCL.

 [39] See ‘Summary of the President's First Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan’, 17 June 1980, Subject File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [40] Author's telephone interview with Gary Sick, 26 August 2010; Sick email to the author, 24 August 2010.

 [41] These documents are primarily available through the CIA's FOIA Electronic Reading Room and the Digital National Security Archive (NSA).

 [42] Intelligence Information Report, 9 April 1980, NSA.

 [43] See, for instance, CIA Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Iran: Unrest in the Military’, September 1980; ‘Strategic Intelligence Monthly Review’, September 1980; National Intelligence Daily, 12 August 1980, National Intelligence Daily, 11 August 1980; National Intelligence Daily, 28 June 1980; National Intelligence Daily, 30 April 1980; National Intelligence Daily, 21 April 1980; National Intelligence Daily, 10 April 1980, and others. These documents were found in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room.

 [44] Teicher and Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm, 68–71.

 [45] Author's telephone interview with Wayne White, 7 June 2010.

 [46] Notes of NSC Meeting, 12 September 1980, Plains File, JCL.

 [47] Carter, Keeping Faith, 516.

 [48] On this point, see Moses, Freeing the Hostages, 266–9.

 [49] PRC Meeting, 21-22 June 1979, NLC-132-76-3-2-6, JCL.

 [50] Brzezinski to Carter, 3 January 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [51] SCC Meeting, 2 September 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM. See also Njolstad, ‘Shifting Priorities’.

 [52] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 485.

 [53] State to Madrid, 10 February 1980, NLC-16-105-3-9-6, JCL.

 [54] ‘Summary of the President's First Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan’, 17 June 1980, Subject File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [55] SCC Meeting, 2 September 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [56] SCC Meeting, 5 September 1980, Geographic File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [57] NSC Meeting, 24 September 1980, NLC-128-12-3-8-6, JCL; CIA Assessment, 22 September 1980, NLC-12-46-1-27-8, JCL.

 [58] NSC Meeting, 24 September 1980, NLC-128-12-3-8-6, JCL.

 [59] SCC Meeting, 27 September 1980, NLC-25-45-9-5-8, JCL.

 [60] Brzezinski to Carter, 3 October 1980, ZBDM Subject File, JCL.

 [61] Undated draft letter from Carter to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, ZBDM Geographic File, JCL; SCC Meeting, 27 September 1980, NLC-25-45-9-5-8, JCL; Nicholas Veliotes Oral History, 29 January 1990, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Library of Congress.

 [62] Nicholas Veliotes Oral History, 29 January 1990, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Library of Congress; Sick, October Surprise, 106–7.

 [63] State to Various Posts, 8 November 1980, NLC-16-121-1-20-7, JCL.

 [64] State to Amman, 25 September 1980, NLC-6-42-4-24-9, JCL.

 [65] Rome to State, 30 September 1980, NSA.

 [66] Brzezinski to Carter, 3 October 1980, Subject File, ZBDM, JCL.

 [67] Sick email to author, 24 August 2010.

 [68] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 504. On Israeli support for Iran, see Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 102–16; also SNIE 36.2–83, ‘Prospects for Iraq’, 19 July 1983, Electronic Briefing Book 167, NSA.

 [69] CRRC SH-SPPC-D-000-705, Letters from Bakr to Brezhnev and Saddam, undated (1976); Smolanksy and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 12–28; Styan, France and Iraq, 98–125.

 [70] Parker, Persian Dreams, 6–10.

 [71] The letter is recalled in CRRC SH-SPPC-D-000-452, ‘Meeting with an Indian Government Delegation’, July 2002.

 [72] Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 189–90.

 [73] Memorandum for Carter, 18 June 1980, NLC-2-28-6-1-2, JCL; Memorandum for Brzezinski, 29 May 1980, NLC 1-15-5-17-1, JCL; FBIS-MEA-80-144, ‘President Saddam Husayn's 20 July Press Conference’, 24 July 1980.

 [74] FBIS-MEA-80-144, ‘President Saddam Husayn's 20 July Press Conference’, 24 July 1980; FBIS-MEA-80-122, ‘Foreign Minister Interviewed on Dangers to Gulf Region’, 23 June 1980; FBIS-MEA-80-023, ‘President Husayn Comments on U.S., USSR in Interview’, 1 February 1980.

 [75] ‘Meeting of Congressman Solarz with Saddam Husayn’, August 1982, CIA FOIA Reading Room.

 [76] Oral History Interview with Arthur Lowrie, 23 December 1989, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Library of Congress (LC).

 [77] CRRC SH-RVCC-D-000-805, ‘Two Speeches for Saddam Hussein’, 1977.

 [78] Hussein Kamil to Saddam Hussein, February 1996, quoted in Woods et al., A Survey of Saddam's Audio Files, 25.

 [79] Bengio, Saddam's Word, 125–31.

 [80] CRRC SH-SPPC-D-000-879, ‘Meeting of the National Front and the National Progressive Committee’, 7 June 1975.

 [81] CRRC SH-MISC-D-000-508, ‘Seminar Attended by President Saddam Hussein to Study the Kurdish Case’, June 1975; Brands, ‘Making the Conspiracy Theorist a Prophet’.

 [82] Woods, The Mother of All Battles, 50.

 [83] CRRC SH-SHTP-D-000-559, ‘President Saddam Hussein Meets with Iraqi Officials to Discuss Political Issues’, November 1979. The best available translation of this document, and the one cited here, is in Woods et al., A Survey of Saddam's Audio Files, 30–31.

 [84] CRRC SH-SHTP-D-000-559, ‘President Saddam Hussein Meets with Iraqi Officials to Discuss Political Issues’, November 1979; translation taken from Woods et al., A Survey of Saddam's Audio Files, 30–31.

 [85] FBIS-MEA-80-023, ‘President Husayn Comments on U.S., USSR in Interview’, 1 February 1980.

 [86] ‘Soviet Briefing on the Need to Counter-Balance Yugoslav Endeavors Concerning the Afghan Question in the Non-Aligned Countries’, undated (1980), Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Virtual Archive.

 [87] Memorandum for Brzezinski, 21 March 1980, NLC-1-14-6-1-8, JCL. See also FBIS-MEA-80-050, ‘KDNA Report on Talks’, 9 March 1980.

 [88] ‘President Saddam Husayn's 20 July Press Conference’, 24 July 1980, FBIS-MEA-80-144; also Brzezinski to Carter, 23 June 1980, NLC-1-16-1-3-9, JCL; ‘Probable Reaction to the Use of Diego Garcia by B-52s’, undated, Brzezinski Geographic File, JCL.

 [89] Saddam's motives are discussed in Gause, ‘Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990’, 63–9; Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, chapter 2.

 [90] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-851, ‘Meeting to Discuss the Problem of Iran’, 20 February 1979.

 [91] GMID Memorandum, 26 April 1979, included in CRRC SH-GMID-D-000-845, GMID Documents on Various Subjects, various dates (1978–79).

 [92] CRRC SH-GMID-D-000-620, GMID Memos on Arab Areas in Iran, various dates (1979); CRRC SH-SHTP-D-000-559, ‘President Saddam Hussein Meets with Iraqi Officials to Discuss Political Issues’, November 1979.

 [93] CRRC SH-GMID-D-000-842, ‘GMID Intelligence Report about Iran’, 1 July 1980.

 [94] CRRC-SH-SHTP-A-000-835, ‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and High-Ranking Officials’, 16 September 1980.

 [95] This sense that Iran was unprepared to offer serious resistance was central to the underdeveloped Iraqi war plan, which simply assumed that a broad, largely uncoordinated advance would lead to Khomeini's overthrow by a more moderate government that would make peace on Baghdad's terms. See Pollack, Arabs at War, 182–4.

 [96] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-626, ‘Saddam Hussein Discusses Neighbouring Countries and Their Regimes’, undated (1980–81).

 [97] CRRC-SH-SHTP-A-000-835, ‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and High-Ranking Officials’, 16 September 1980. The best translation of this passage can be found in Woods et al., A Survey of Saddam's Audio Files, 159.

 [98] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-553, ‘Revolutionary Command Council Meeting’, 27 March 1979. The best available translation of this passage is in Woods et al., A Survey of Saddam's Audio Files, 262–3. For a similar statement, see also CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-341, ‘Speech at al-Bakr University’, 3 June 1978.

 [99] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-553, ‘Revolutionary Command Council Meeting’, 27 March 1979.

[100] CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-566, ‘Meeting with Armed Forces General Command’, 2 November 1980.

[101] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-635, ‘Meeting to Discuss the 1982 Budget’, undated.

[102] CRRC-SH-SHTP-A-000-835, ‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and High-Ranking Officials’, 16 September 1980.

[103] FBIS-MEA-81-121, ‘Text of Saddam Husayn 23 June Cabinet Statement’, 24 June 1981.

[104] CRRC SH-SHTP-D-000-846, ‘Transcription of Recording of Tapes Concerning Meetings of the Armed Forces General Command’, 17 October 1980.

[105] CRRC SH-SHTP-D-000-826, ‘Meetings between Saddam Hussein and High-Ranking Officers’, 31 October 1980.

[106] FBIS-MEA-80-220, ‘Text of President Husayn's 10 Nov Press Conference’, 12 November 1980.

[107] CRRC SH-SHTP-D-000-846, ‘Transcription of Recording of Tapes Concerning Meetings of the Armed Forces General Command’, 17 October 1980.

[108] CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-566, ‘Meeting of the Armed Forces General Command’, 28 October 1980.

[109] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-626, ‘Discussion of Neighboring Countries and Their Regimes’, undated.

[110] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-835, ‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and High-Ranking Officials’, 16 September 1980. See also Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 230–32; Parker, Persian Dreams, 12–13.

[111] Jentleson, With Friends Like These; Brands, ‘A Look Inside the Iraqi State Records’.

[112] See Little, ‘Mission Impossible’, 663–701; also Pipes, The Hidden Hands.