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Abstract
With regard to the analysis of the history of the Cold War and the blocs' confrontation, the GDR is both a typical representative of the Eastern bloc alliance and an exception. In addition to processes intended by the Soviets to enforce political conformity, which were similar throughout the Eastern bloc, there were other formative influences, such as the GDR being part of a divided nation, the GDR being at the centre of the Cold War and the lack of legitimacy for SED rule under international law. The Warsaw Pact served the Soviet Union as an instrument for exerting political and military influence on the allied states. The military doctrine of attack as the decisive moment of warfare required extensive preparations for war in times of peace. For the Pact, the GDR was the area of operations for the military clash of systems in the western theatre of war. This function determined the demands on the armed forces, defence industry and security forces and also resulted in a bizarre way of thinking with regard to domestic security after the People's Uprising of 1953. In the 1950s, a co-ordinated domestic security system was established and on that basis a superordinate system of national defence which in its particular form made the GDR one of the most militarised states in the world.
Notes
Dr. Torsten Diedrich is a Scientific Associate at the Military History Research Institute, Potsdam.
[1] CitationGießmann, Das unliebsame Erbe, 75.
[2] , ‘Die bewaffneten Organe der DDR’.
[3] CitationSeubert, Zum Legitimitätsverfall des militarisierten Sozialismus in der DDR, 101–37.
[4] CitationHonecker, ‘Der Schutz des sozialistischen Vaterlandes liegt in guten Händen’, 109.
[5] CitationLenin, ‘Das Militärprogramm der proletarischen Revolution’.
[6] CitationMeuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft, 96.
[7] CitationHockerts, ‘Soziale Errungenschaften?’, 790.
[8] In the Eastern bloc, military doctrine was understood as ‘the official and obligatory principle views of a state (within a military coalition) on the character, preparation and waging of possible wars…. The military doctrine establishes the main directions for the preparation of the armed forces, the population and the whole country for a possible war.’ Cited in Militärlexikon, Citation232. In the course of the international process of détente and political opening in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact was reviewed in 1987.
[9] CitationHoffmann, ‘Grundfragen der Militärpolitik’, 133–8.
[10] CitationWagner, Walter Ulbricht.
[11] In 1952, the following units were stationed in the GDR: 3rd Army in the State of Saxony/Anhalt, 8th Guard Army in the State of Thuringia, 1st Guard Army in the State of Saxony, 3rd Mechanised Guard Army in the State of Mecklenburg, 4th Mechanised Guard Army in the State of Brandenburg and 16th Air Army with HQ at Wünsdorf.
[12] The author sides with Seubert's definition of the term militarisation. See Seubert, Zum Legitimitätsverfall, 89. The debate concerning militarism and/or militarisation of society in the GDR cannot be repeated in this article. See in detail In 1952, the following units were stationed in the GDR: 3rd Army in the State of Saxony/Anhalt, 8th Guard Army in the State of Thuringia, 1st Guard Army in the State of Saxony, 3rd Mechanised Guard Army in the State of Mecklenburg, 4th Mechanised Guard Army in the State of Brandenburg and 16th Air Army with HQ at Wünsdorf, 79–101.
[13] CitationSapir, The Soviet Military System, 20.
[14] Cf. CitationWenzel, ‘Der Tag X. Wie West-Berlin erobert wurde’.
[15] CitationSeubert, ‘Die Entmilitarisierung’, 58.
[16] Sapir, The Soviet Military System, 267.
[17] CitationRitter, ‘Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland’, 206.
[18] Cf. also CitationWeber, DDR: Grundriß der Geschichte 1945–1990, 12.
[19] Cf. CitationLuhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft.
[20] CitationStalin, Rede im Kreml-Palast; CitationStalin, Fragen des Leninismus, 595.
[21] This topic is dealt with more comprehensively in CitationHagemann, Parteiherrschaft in der NVA as well as in CitationGiese, Die SED und ihre Armee.
[22] Cf. Glaser, Citation‘Reorganisation der Polizei oder getarnte Bewaffnung der SBZ im Kalten Krieg?’
[23] Cf. CitationDiedrich, ‘Die Grenzpolizei der SBZ/DDR’; CitationEhlert, ‘Die Hauptverwaltung für Ausbildung’.
[24] Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereinafter: BA-MA), VA-P-01/037, 29. Minutes of the Eggersdorf Conference of 12/13 June 1957.
[25] In contrast to the build-up of the Bundeswehr in the second German state, Wehrmacht officers did not play an important role in the build-up of the Garrisoned People's Police and the NVA as far as numbers are concerned. In the build-up phase they accounted for some 4 per cent of the whole officer corps. Among them were a total of only nine generals. Cf. CitationWenzke, ‘Wehrmachtoffiziere in den DDR-Streitkräften’.
[26] CitationWenzke, ‘Die Nationale Volksarmee’, 456.
[27] CitationHaueis, ‘Die führende Rolle der SED in der Nationalen Volksarmee’, 334.
[28] Cf. CitationKleßmann and Stöver, 1953 – Krisenjahr des Kalten.
[29] Cf. the notes of Wilhelm Pieck during the meeting with Stalin from 1 to 7 April 1952 in Moscow. In CitationPieck, Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 382–5.
[30] BA-MA, DVH 3/ 2073, 86 f. Advisor Plan dated 12 June 1952.
[31] BA-MA, DVH 3/ 2070, 32. Bericht über die Entstehung und Entwicklung der KVP (Report on the Origin and Development of the KVP) dated 16 December 1953.
[32] CitationDiedrich, Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR, 364.
[33] On the Soviet Joint-Stock Company (SAG) see CitationKarlsch and Schröter, Strahlende Vergangenheit, 364 as well as CitationHolloway, Stalin and the Bomb.
[34] CitationDiedrich, ‘Aufrüstungsvorbereitungen und -finanzierung’.
[35] Cf. Diedrich et al., ‘Die bewaffneten Organe der DDR’.
[36] Cf. CitationDiedrich and Wenzke, Die getarnte Armee, 225–314.
[37] Cf: CitationDiedrich, Waffen gegen das Volk.
[38] Diedrich, Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR, 381–4.
[39] Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereinafter: BA (B)), DO-1/ 11/304, p. 163-166. Vorschlag zur Erhöhung der Schlagkraft der DVP vom 22 Juni 1953.
[40] Cf. CitationSteike, ‘Von der “Inneren Truppe”’.
[41] Cf. CitationWagner, ‘Die Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse’.
[42] BA-MA, DVH 3/ 2004, 70. und DVH 3/ 2005, 1 seq. Befehl des Ministers des Innern vom 28.1.1954.
[43] Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereinafter: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/ I IV 2/2/334. Minutes of the Politburo meeting of 26 January 1954.
[44] BA-MA DVH 3/ 2007, 27 seq. Order of the Minister of the Interior of 28 January 1954.
[45] SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ I IV 2/2/511, 8–11. Annex 3 dated 6 November 1956 of the Minutes of the Politburo Meeting of 8 November 1956.
[46] For Security System in Warsaw Pact see CitationDiederich and Süß, Militär und Staatssicherheit.
[47] Cf. CitationDiedrich and Wenzke, ‘Mit “Zuckerbrot und Peitsche”’.
[48] BA-MA, DVW 1/39561, 2–22. Resolution of the Security Commission concerning Measures to Enhance the Defence Readiness of the GDR of 9 January 1958.
[49] Die Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (hereinafter: BStU), ZA Archiv, SdM 410, 23–50. Operation Plan for the Armed Forces (1959).
[50] For operation ideas see CitationWenzke, Die Streitkräfte der DDR.
[51] Cf. also Wagner, Walter Ulbricht.
[52] CitationHoffmann, ‘Waffendienst’.
[53] Cf. Wenzke, ‘Die Nationale Volksarmee’, 442–63.
[54] The first protocol agreed between the commands of the Unified Forces and of the NVA that went beyond the scope of arms deliveries dates back to January 1957, subsequent protocols were issued annually, from 1960 for two years, from the mid-60s for three years and from 1970 for five years. These basic obligations provided the basis for other agreements on arms deliveries, technical co-operation.
[55] Cf. in a more detailed way: CitationDiedrich, ‘Gegen Aufrüstung’.
[56] Minutes of the X Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 126 et seq.
[57] Wenzke, ‘Die Nationale Volksarmee’, 476.
[58] CitationHarrison, ‘Ein Superalliierter und eine Supermacht?’
[59] Die Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED, Citation575.
[60] See Diederich et al., Der Warschauer Pakt.