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Abstract
When NATO took its so-called dual-track decision on Theatre Nuclear Weapons in December 1979, the Dutch government, while joining the decision, declared that it would not decide on the deployment of the Dutch share of the new weapons for another two years. With the help of new documents from Dutch archival collections, this essay examines the reasons behind this decision by the centre-right Van Agt government. It shows that there was great reluctance in parliament, but also in the cabinet, to contemplate the coming modernisation. In order to survive politically and keep the Netherlands within the NATO fold, the Van Agt government tried to align NATO's decision as closely with Dutch policy as possible while seeking majority support in parliament for its proposed compromise solution. The essay provides new detail on both efforts, including the response of allied governments to the Dutch reservations.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank the Dutch foreign and defense ministries, the staffs at the Dutch National Archives and the Catholic Documentation Center, Radboud University Nijmegen, and especially former prime-minister A.A.M. van Agt, for their cooperation in making their respective collections available for this research. Thanks also to Maarten Brands, Ronald Havenaar, Dick van Rietschoten, Bert Steinmetz, and the two anonymous reviewers for this journal for many helpful comments.
Notes
[1] For NATO's decision making process see CitationLeopoldo Nuti, ‘The origins of the 1979 dual track decision – a survey.’ The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 Leopoldo Nuti, ed. London: Routledge, 2009. Also, more generally, CitationHavenaar, Eb en Vloed, and CitationWiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis.
[2] CitationLaqueur, ‘Hollanditis.’
[3] The various statements connected with this policy are reproduced in CitationVan Eenennaam, 48 Kruisraketten, 302–309. An account that assigns a special role in the discussions about the December 12 communiqué to NATO Secretary-General, Joseph Luns is: CitationKersten, Luns, 593–594. In most documents used here, the envisioned new NATO missiles–Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles with a range of, respectively, 2500 and 1800 kilometers–are referred to as Theatre Nuclear Forces, TNF, but at times the term Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces, LRTNF appears. Gradually, the term Intermediate Nuclear Forces, INF, began to be used to describe these weapons.
[4] CitationSpohr Readman, ‘Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’; CitationGarthoff, Détente and Confrontation, chapter 25; CitationHaftendorn, ‘Das doppelte Mißverständnis’; CitationHaslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1969–87; CitationHaslam, Russia's Cold War, chapter 10.
[5] For a recent account of developments in Dutch society in connection with the NATO plans see, CitationVan Diepen, Hollanditis; for the domestic side of Dutch foreign policy: CitationEverts, ed. Controversies at Home; specifically with regard to nuclear weapons: Everts, ‘Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands.’ In The Public and Atlantic Defense, CitationGregory Flynn and Hans Rattiger, eds., Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985; the Dutch role in NATO: A. van Staden, ‘De rol van Nederland in het Atlantisch bondgenootschap. Wat veranderde en wat uiteindelijk bleef.’ In De kracht van Nederland: Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid, CitationN.C.F. van Sas, ed., Haarlem: Becht, 1991; for Dutch foreign policy since the Second World War: CitationHellema, Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland.
[6] A number of these documents now appear in English translation. See CitationVan Dijk, ‘A mass psychotic movement washing over the country like a wave.’
[7] See for example CitationVan Merriënboer et al., Van Agt, chapter 11.
[8] CitationKennedy, Nieuw-Babylon, 184–190.
[9] CitationDe Graaf details how the campaign was coordinated between the CPN, Moscow, and East Berlin, Over de Muur, chapter 4; the Dutch domestic security agency (BVD) tracked the campaign, and its East European ties, carefully: Report ‘Communistische campagne tegen kernwapenvernieuwing,’ head BVD, P. de Haan, to Dutch Defense minister, February 6 1980, Nationaal Archief (Dutch National Archive: NA), The Hague, Defense Ministry 5.050.114/1954–1979/647.
[10] See the cabinet meetings of 17 February 1978: NA 2.02.05.02, 2397; and 23 February, 28 February, and 3 March: Papers of H. Wiegel, NA 2.21.303, 366 and NA 2.02.05.02, 2665.
[11] CitationNederlandse Atlantische Commissie, Nederland en de Kernwapens, 122–127.
[12] Van Eenennaam, 48 Kruisraketten, 30–31.
[13] Cabinet meeting, 8 December 1978, NA 2.02.05.02, 2407.
[14] Memorandum CitationVan der Klaauw, 5 January 1995. Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Dutch foreign ministry archive: ArchBuZa), 9/1975-1984/6958. For a later episode, see the Reagan administration's decisions of August 1981 and Dutch reactions: ArchBuZa, DPV/1983-1990/00735.
[15] NA, 2.02.05.02, 2927.
[16] NA, 2.02.05.02, 2927
[17] Van Diepen covers the domestic debate in considerable detail. See Hollanditis, chapter 2.
[18] Cabinet prime-minister. NA, 2.03.01, 9464. (TNF speaking notes originally in English).
[19] Memorandum of conversation, Van der Klaauw to Van Agt, 23 April 1979. ArchBuZa, apa/gs/1975-1984/1121.
[20] Briefing paper, 2 May 1979. Cabinet prime-minister. NA, 2.03.01, 8700.
[21] NA, 2.03.01, 8701.
[22] There is significant evidence for this point in German diplomatic papers also: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Citation1979, for example document numbers 113, 303, 312, 313, 316, 321, 323.
[23] Telegram permanent representative to NATO (Barkman) to the minister of foreign affairs, 7 May 1979, on the meeting of the DPC. In AVR files, NA, 2.02.05.02, 2928.
[24] AVR meeting, 11 May 1979. NA, 2.02.05.02, 2924.
[25] NA, 2.02.05.02, 2664.
[26] Ambassador to NATO, Barkman, did so to Van Agt at the time. See Van Merriënboer et al., Van Agt, 397. Early December 1979, British prime-minister Margaret Thatcher also raised the issue with Van Agt: Archief A.A.M. van Agt, box 41: TNF file (Papers of A.A.M. van Agt: Van Agt, TNF), Catholic Documentation Center, University Nijmegen.
[27] Cabinet meeting 2 July 1979. NA 2.02.05.02, 2665.
[28] CitationKoster, De eenzame fietser, 177.
[29] See for example, Van Merriënboer, et al., Van Agt, 398–401; CitationSteinmetz, Ruud Lubbers, 124–126. Also Van der Klaauw, Een diplomatenleven.
[30] Carter to Van Agt, 12 July 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[31] Lubbers to Van Agt, 13 August 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[32] Scholten to Van Agt, 16 August; paper to Steenkamp dated 15 August. Van Agt, TNF.
[33] Van Diepen, Hollanditis, 121–123, Lubbers quote, 122.
[34] Lubbers to Scholten, 18 September 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[35] Scholten to Lubbers, 19 September 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[36] Lubbers to Scholten, 24 September 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[37] Scholten to Lubbers, 25 September 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[38] Nederlandse Atlantische Commissie, Nederland en de Kernwapens, 134–136; Van Merriënboer, et al., Van Agt, 398–400; Van Eenennaam, 48 Kruisraketten, 72–73.
[39] Scholten's meeting with Brown was on 5 October this position paper has a date and time, handwritten at the end: 2 October 1979, 11:10 hours. Van Agt, TNF.
[40] Later, Lubbers claimed not to have known of Scholten's initiatives. Van Eenenaam, 48 Kruisraketten, 72–73, especially note 37; and Steinmetz, Ruud Lubbers, 126.
[41] Lubbers to Scholten, n.d. Van Agt, TNF. On 4 October, Lubbers also sent Scholten his draft remarks on nuclear questions prepared for the debate in parliament on the government's program for the 1980 fiscal year. Ibid.
[42] Van Merriënboer, et al., Van Agt, 400.
[43] Summary Dutch position TNF modernisation for Brown-Scholten meeting. 2 October 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[44] Memorandum of conversation, Van der Klaauw and Van Agt with Cossiga and his foreign minister Franco Malfatti, 15 October 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[45] Memorandum of conversation, Scholten-Aaron meeting, 22 October 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[46] Carter to Van Agt, 31 October 1979. Cabinet prime-minister. NA 2.03.01, 8699. Van Agt would take until 29 November to send a reply, in which he agreed not to press the 50% demand, but in which he did argue, following the CDA parliamentarians' Vertrekpunten, for just a production decision now, and a postponement of the decision to deploy. Memorandum of conversation, Scholten-Aaron meeting, October 22, 1979. Van Agt, TNF
[47] Cabinet meetings 14 and 16 November 1979. NA 2.02.05.02, 2669.
[48] Scholten to his NATO colleagues, 23 November 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[49] Message Secretary of State for Defence to the Netherlands Minister of Defence. Accompanied by a separate paper on a possible reduction of Dutch nuclear tasks. Forwarded to the office of prime-minister Van Agt on 5 December 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[50] Handwritten memorandum of conversation, 6 December 1979, meeting Van Agt-Martens, Brussels, 4 December 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[51] Handwritten memorandum of conversation, 9 December 1979, meeting Van Agt-Cossiga, Rome, 6 December 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[52] Handwritten memorandum of conversation, 9 December 1979, meeting Van Agt-Thatcher, London, 6 December 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[53] Handwritten memorandum of conversation, 9 December 1979, meeting Van Agt-Carter (and others), Washington, 7 December 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[54] Handwritten memorandum of conversation, 9 December 1979, meeting Van Agt, Van der Klaauw-Brzezinski, Vance (and others), Washington, 7 December 1979. Van Agt, TNF.
[55] Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors von Staden, Bundeskanzleramt, 11. Dezember 1979, AAP 1979, 1884–1887. Handwritten summary of main points, conversations Brussels, Rome, London, Washington, Bonn, n.d. Van Agt, TNF.