The Hungarian revolution and the origins of China's Great Leap policies, 1956–57

Abstract

The 1956 crisis in Hungary had a profound impact on China's domestic politics. It played a formative role in the evolution of Chinese policy as top officials critically reviewed the Stalinist experience of governance. Intellectuals and students began to doubt the efficiency of the party's rule, while Mao Zedong rejected meaningful reforms of institutional socialism in favour of ‘soft’ means of conscripting the intellectuals and ‘remoulding’ popular thought. Having opened up the party to criticism from outside, Mao cited the risk of domestic opponents fomenting a Hungarian-style crisis in China in terminating the Hundred Flowers campaign and moving to a programme of ideological purges in the summer of 1957, which paved the way for a massive economic campaign in 1958.1

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Professor Odd Arne Westad for his direction on research and comments on writing, Professor Shen Zhihua for his assistance with resources in the preparation of this article.

Notes

Dandan Zhu, Lecturer, Department of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs Management, China Foreign Affairs University.

 [1] To make the main argument stand out, this article focuses on the political and ideological effects from Hungary on Mao's policies towards the intelligentsia in the period from November 1956 to the end of 1957. Economic issues and Mao's efforts for power consolidation by making reference to the Hungarian events in late 1957 to the summer of 1958 are not covered due to size limit.

 [2] See Wu, Shinian lunzhan, 6. Mao repeated the same claim later on several occasions. Also see Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, 64.

 [3] See Bo, huigu, vol. 2, 597–599.

 [4] Up to the 1990s, the books and articles on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 either written by Hungarian scholars or western researchers rarely touch upon Chinese diplomatic and political involvement in the process of the events, let alone seeking to assess the impact of the October Revolution on the Chinese domestic scene throughout late 1956 to late 1957. Fortunately, several Chinese and foreign scholars have applied themselves to this topic, gradually unveiling some of the interconnections between China and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 after the 1990s; see Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, 145–162. Shen Zhihua has published several essays discussing China's role in the Polish and Hungarian events in 1956 and the October Crises’ impacts on China's domestic politics up to 1957: ‘1956 nian shiyue weiji‘; ‘Zhongguo dui shiyueweiji de fanying he sikao’; ‘1957 nian Zhengfeng yundong ‘. Also see his book Sikao yu xuanze, 369–608. For Shen's publications on this topic in English, see ‘China's Role and Influence’, ‘Mao and the 1956 Soviet military intervention in Hungary’. Péter Vámos discussed at length the impact of the Hungarian events on Mao's domestic and foreign policy in his paper ‘Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution’ and dedicated a whole book to the same topic in Hungarian. See Vámos, Kína mellettünk? [Is China with us?]. Both of Vámos’s two publications made extensive use of the newly declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archival documents. Lorenz M. Lüthi concludes that regardless of the actual influence the Chinese side had on the Soviet decision making process in late October 1956, the CCP leadership's self-confidence was enhanced after Polish and Hungarian events. More meaningfully, Lüthi explores Chairman Mao's rejection of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation and peaceful coexistence policies in the wake of the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution. Lüthi further examines the Eastern bloc crises’ impact on Chinese domestic politics up to the summer of 1957. See Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 57–74.

 [5] Schwartz, ‘Thought on the Late Mao’, 19–38.

 [6] For an analysis of the CCP's contradictory policy toward the intellectuals had been present since the Yan'an Rectification Campaign in the early 1940s, see Gao Hua, Hongtaiyang, 313–427. On analysis of the Party's contradictory approach to the intellectuals, see Merle Goldman, ‘The Party and the Intellectuals’, 218–258.

 [7] The Renmin ribao[People's Daily] (RMRB) initially dubbed the Hungarian case as a ‘riot’, changing this to an ‘incident’, and later re-designated as ‘counterrevolutionary’ in early November. For people's debates on Hungary see Neibu cankao (Neican), (2 Nov. 1956): 61; (5 Nov. 1956): 127; (6 Nov. 1956):167–168. Neican, whose publication was started in 1949 and ended in 1964, is an inner circle journal on both domestic and foreign events edited by the Xinhua News Agency for reference purposes among the high-ranking CCP cadres only. For nationwide strikes and demonstrations inspired by the Hungarian Revolution, see ‘Report made by the Party Organisation of the Chinese National General Labourers’ Union on the situation of the strikes of workers’, Hunan Provincial Archives (HPA), Vol. 141, Catalogue 1, No. 840, 16–39.

 [8] Neican, (5 Nov. 1956):122–123, 129; (1 Nov. 1956):5.

 [9] Neican, (10 Nov. 1956):295–298

[10] Neican, (6 Nov. 1956):167–68.

[11] For an in-depth analysis of the mass line in Chinese politics, see Young, ‘On the Mass Line’, 225–240.

[12] An edited version see Zhongyang Danganguan, Gongheguo, vol. 1, 515–518.

[13] An edited version see Zhongyang Danganguan, Gongheguo, vol.1, 515-518; Jin Chongji. et al. Liu Shaoqi zhuan, 807–808; Bo, huigu, vol. 2, 590.

[14] Dittmer, ‘The Past Recaptured’, 129.

[15] Dittmer, ‘The Past Recaptured’ 134.

[16] Mao's concluding speech made on 15 Nov., 1956 in Mao Zedong xuanji (MXJ) , vol. 5, 323–326.

[17] Shen, Sikao yu xuanze,430. Land reform in Vietnam was modelled on Chinese practices, in which any better-off peasant could be labelled a ‘landlord,’ sent to ‘people's court,’ and publicly executed without any legal process, with sympathisers facing severe punishment. See Yinghong Cheng ‘Beyond Moscow-Centric Interpretation’.

[18] MXJ, 317.

[19] MXJ, 323.

[20] Lin, Lin Ke riji, 15; Li, Fengyu, 105.

[21] Li, op.cit., 105–117.

[22] Li, op.cit; Exact location of the quotation see Li, ‘gongan’, 49.

[23] MXJ, 323.

[24] After the Second Plenum, Lin Ke went to see Li Shenzhi to make sure that he had conveyed Li's messages to Mao correctly. Li explained that by his term ‘big democracy’ he did not mean ‘taking to the streets’ but rather the instigation of democratic reforms against the background of the triumph of the revolution. Mao responded to Li's assertion that in his eyes ‘congress democracy and free press advocated by them [Li and Wang] are in no sense different from taking to the streets.’ See Li, ‘gongan’, 49.

[25] Pang and Jineds., Mao zhuan, 611.

[26] For Mao's session talk, see Pang and Jin, op.cit., 605, 612–613. After the Plenum, the chairman told Wu Lengxi ‘not to criticise them (Wang and Li), they are good comrades.’ Li Shenzhi, ‘Mao Zhuxi shi shenme shihou’, 124–125.

[27] Gansu, Provincial Party Committee's report on cadres’ responses to HF policy, Jilin Provincial Archives (JPA), 1-13/1-1957.72, 3–5; on reports from Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Zhejiang, see JPA, 1-13/1-1957.72, 19–21, 10–12, 18–21.

[28] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, Secret Speeches, 7, 10–12, 49–53, 44–45.

[29] RMRB, 7 January 1957. Summary of this article quoted from Teiwes, Politics and Purges, 183.

[30] ‘The Beijing Party Committee's response, submitted to the Central Committee of the CCP (7 May 1957)’, ‘Transmitting a version of the reports on the correct handling of contradictions among the people, Hubei Provincial Party Committee (8 May 1957), Sichuan, Guangdong, Gansu Provincial Party Committee (15 May 1957)’, HPA, 141-1-850, 72–76, 77–83, 84–99.

[31] RMRB, 24 March, 1957, Fei's article was written before Mao had delivered his famous February 27 ‘On Correctly Handling Contradictions’ speech. See Pang and Jin, op.cit., 616.

[32] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 617; MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 113–128.

[33] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 116.

[34] As commented by cadres from Shanxi province, ‘80% of the college students are from families of exploitation, they would become cadres after graduation. How can Chairman Mao not learn lessons from the Hungarian crisis [and let the party outsiders to criticise us]?’ JPA, 1-13/1-1957.72, 19–21.

[35] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 117

[36] Wang, Zhihui, 319–327; MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 210.

[37] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 618–627.

[38] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 191–274; Pang and Jin, op.cit., 629–639.

[39] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 633–639.

[40] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 338.

[41] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit, 299–300, 329, 336; Pang and Jin, op.cit., 638, 635; Zhongyang wenxian ed., MWJ, vol. 7, 190.

[42] Fu, Fu Lei jiashu, 158. Schwartz's comment on the style of Mao's speech, Schwartz, op.cit., 20–21. Other intellectuals’ positive reactions to Mao's speech, see RMRB 24 March, 16, 25 April; Zhang, Wangshi, 37; Xu, Xu Zhucheng, 265 and his Qinli 1957 , 17–18 (Xu was chief editor of non-Communist Party Wenhuibao in 1957).

[43] For Mao's clarification of the connection and difference between Yan'an and 1957 Rectification, see ‘Kang Sheng's Speech Made in the National Propaganda Conference’, Yunnan Provincial Archives (YPA), 7-1-867, 28–33.

[44] MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 193, 213, 217, 249; MWJ, vol. 7, 186, 204, 245, 249, 260, 267; Pang and Jin, op.cit., 650–661.

[45] ‘The Central Directive on Rectification Campaign, 30 April and 1 May (a slightly revised version)’, Shanxi Provincial Archives (SPA), 123–43–1, 11–16, 17–19.; RMRB 1 May, 1957.

[46] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 651.

[47] Schwartz, ‘Thoughts on the Late Mao’, 25–26.

[48] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 617; In MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit. 123–124, Mao's words in the same conference were recorded as: ‘We do not meet an enemy attack in a hurry; we do not write articles in a hurry.’

[49] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 683.

[50] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 683

[51] In a meeting with Polish delegation held on 8 April 1957, Mao told the Polish leaders that the Hungarian 1956 October incidents were in nature different from the Polish events. The Hungarian crises were orchestrated by the Petofi Club while the Polish ones were largely under control of the Party. ‘Summary of Chairman Mao's Meeting with the Polish Government Delegation’, Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA), 204-00040-03, 1–14. In referring to some intellectuals’ worries that the Hundred Flowers ‘blooming’ was aimed [by the centre] to ‘fish’ or uncover [wrong thinking], Mao stated that ‘it depends on how to understand [the HF]: is ‘blooming’ a means or an end? In order to know the truth, it [HF policy] can be interpreted as a way of ‘fishing’, but [we are] uncovering two type of fishes, one is Marxist, the other is un-Marxist.’ Record of Mao's talks, 6 May 1957 in Lin Ke, op.cit., 36.

[52] Mao's judgments on the progress of HF can be reflected by his revising drafts of the ‘On Contradictions’ speech from 24 April to 7 May, Pang and Jin, op.cit., 674–683.

[53] Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun ed., op.cit., vol. 22, 18–19; Pang and Jin, op.cit., 688–691.

[54] The intellectuals’ charges against the purge movement and their doubts about the legal reliability of mass campaigns in general see ‘Selected Files of the Blooming and Contending’, SPA, 123–40–47, 31–33, 35–43. Parts of these non-Party leading figures’ speeches were published by the RMRB throughout May 1957, RMRB, 9–12, 14, 16, 17 May, 1957; Guangming Ribao, 8, 11 May, 1957; Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun ed., op.cit., vol. 22, 21–92; Neican, 9 May, 1957, 19–20.

[55] It is known that Chairman Mao read through newspapers such as GMRB and Wenhui, which had been run by non-Communist intellectuals in the short period from early 1957 to the summer of the same year, viewing the content and style of articles on these papers as key indicators of the party outsiders’ political development, Pang and Jin, op.cit., 664–666, 684, 687–688, 692–693.

[56] Teiwes, Politics and Purges, 210–213, 217–219; Pang and Jin, op.cit., 689–690.

[57] ‘Materials on Rectification in Colleges’, SPA, 123–43–38, 10–17; ‘Collected Materials on Political and Ideological Problems of the College Students Participating in Rectification’, 123–43–472, 1–11. Also see Neican (20 May 1957): 3–10, (23 May 1957), 3–16, (25 May 1957), 3–5, (27 May 1957), 14–18, (29 May 1957): 14–17, (31 May 1957): 7–10.

[58] Neican, (23 May 1957), 19–21.

[59] Lin, op.cit., 44–45.

[60] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 694.

[61] General Office of the CCP CC ed., ‘Situation Briefing, On Rectification, Part 1’, SPA, 123–43–466, 1–60.

[62] ‘Things are beginning to change’, 15 May 1957, see Zhongyang wenxian, JMW, vol. 6, 469. Mao had revised this article throughout the period from mid May to 12 June with his judgments on domestic politics changed dramatically by late May.

[63] Zhongyang wenxian ed., Jianguo zhongyao wenxian, 285–286; Pang and Jin, op.cit., 703.

[64] Mao told Kadar that Qian Weichang, the vice president of Qinghua University, was ‘Nagy’, whose nature was ‘anti-Party and anti-Communism’; ‘there exist rightists among the intellectuals’ in almost every school or factory of bigger size, and these ‘rightists’ ‘are people follow Nagy, are small Nagys’. Meeting records of Mao's meeting with Kadar, 27 Sep. 1957, CFMA, 204-00054-04, 2–7.

[65] Zhongyang wenxian, JMW, 316–358; MWJ, 204–244. For a detailed description of how did Mao revise this article from 24 April to 17 June, Pang and Jin, op.cit., 674–704. English version of his speaking notes, see MacFarquhar, Timothy and Wu, op.cit., 131–185.

[66] ‘CCP CC Directives on Attacking and Isolating the Capitalist Rightists’, 26 June 1957, YPA, 2-1-2736, 60–62. For the CCP's counterattacking articles to the so-called ‘rightist’ deviations, see RMRB, 1–7, June 1957.

[67] Pang and Jin, op.cit., 709.

[68] Bo, huigu, 646–53; Also see Xiong Huayuan, ‘Jingji jianshe’, 1154.

[69] Zhongyang wenxian ed., Jianguo zhongyao wenxian, 484–494.