Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone, 1970–1975

Abstract

Brazil is traditionally regarded as having been distant from its Latin American neighbours. However, new documents show that it was actually very involved in the Cold War struggles that engulfed the Southern Cone during the early 1970s. In Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, Brazil's military regime intervened to prevent or overturn left-wing gains. It also did its best to encourage the United States to play a greater role in fighting the region's Cold War. Finally, it served as the model that military leaders in the Southern Cone looked to as they plotted to seize power. Examining these direct and indirect forms of influence, with particular reference to the relationship between Brazil and Chile, this article argues that Brazil's experience after 1964 was a game changer when it came to the way in which the inter-American Cold War unfolded.

Notes

 1 Oficio, Stein, EmbaChile Brasilia to Señor Ministro, 13 September 1973 and Oficio, Stein to Señor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Confidenciales, Embajada de Chile en Brasil, 1973, Archivo General Histórico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, Chile [Hereafter: Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE].

 2 Anthony W. Pereira, Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 92, 94; Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Comapanhia das Letras, 2003), 357–58; J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 57; and John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The New Press, 2004), 264. For details regarding Brazilian credits and support for Pinochet, see below.

 3 Electronic Telegram, Scali to SecState, 10 October 1973, Electronic Telegrams, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, NARA, online at: Access to Archival Databases (AAD) http://.aad.archives.gov/add/ [Hereafter: DOS/CFP].

 4 Record of Conversation, Gibson Barbosa and Hernán Cubillos, 7 December 1973, in Oficio, Hernán Cubillos, Embachile Brasila to Señor Ministro, 7 December 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.

 5 Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup’, 15 September 1973, Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter: CREST].

 6 For full details of Brazil's intervention in Latin America and the US-Brazilian relationship, see Tanya Harmer, Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). For other references to Brazil's role in Chile, see also Peter Kornbluh, ed., ‘Brazil Conspired with US to Overthrow Allende,’ August 2009, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB282/index.htm; Carlos Osorio, ed., ‘Nixon: “Brazil Helped Rig the Uruguayan Elections” 1971,’ June 2002, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/; Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 92–93; and Gaspari, A Ditadura Derrotada, 357–58. This article contributes to the emerging story of Brazil's Cold War and adds to it by using new Chilean archival documents and recently declassified US sources.

 7 Leslie Bethell, ‘Brazil and “Latin America”’, Journal of Latin American Studies 42 (2010): 463, 468, 473–74.

 8 Leslie Bethell, ‘Brazil and “Latin America”’, Journal of Latin American Studies 42 (2010). 474, 481.

 9 Pio Penna Filho, ‘O Itamaraty nos anos de chumbo – O Centro de Inforações do Exterior (CIEX) e a rap ressão no Cone Sul (1966–1979)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 52, no. 2 (2009): 55–56.

10 On the idea of a ‘killing zone’ albeit from a predominantly US perspective, see Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

11 Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup’, 15 September 1973.

12 Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 16.

13 Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Latin America: The Aftermath of the Chilean Coup’, 15 September 1973, CREST.

14 Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 1985), 331–32 and Gary MacEoin, Chile, The Struggle For Dignity (London: Conventure, 1975), 194–99. See also Marlise Simons, ‘The Brazilian Connection’, Washington Post, 6 January 1974.

15 For reference to Brazil distancing itself from Operation Condor, see Penna Filho, ‘O Itamaraty nos anos de Chumbo’, 48. On Operation Condor, see Dinges, Condor Years and McSherry, Predatory States.

16 At the time of writing, there is reason to optimistic that the Brazilian Senate's approval of new Freedom of Information Law on 25 October 2011 will change this. President Dilma Rousseff's emphasis on establishing Truth Commissions to examine and deal with Brazil's authoritarian past is also encouraging. However, all indications suggest that secret and top secret material held by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and the Army and Navy Archives will still remain classified for minimum of 50 years.

17 Matias Spektor, ‘Brazilian Assessments of the End of the Cold War’, in The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict, eds. Sergey Radchenko and Artemy Kalinovsky (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2011), 234.

18 See El Mercurio, 7 September 1970.

19 Oficios, Raul Rettig, EmbaChile Brasilia to Señor Ministro, 23 and 30 March 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE.

20 Oficio, Rettig to Señor Ministro, 23 March 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE. The prisoners were released in exchange for the Swiss Ambassador.

21 Joquin Fermandois, Mundo y fin de mundo: Chile en la política mundial, 1900–2004 (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 2005), 365.

22 Oficio, Rettig to Señor Ministro, 14 May 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE.

23 O Estado de São Paulo, 10 November 1970 as quoted in Oficio, EmbaChile Rio to Señor Ministro, 23 November 1970. See also Oficio, EmbaChile Rio, 13 November 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.

24 Oficio, Embachile Rio to Señor Ministro, 26 October 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.

25 Speech, General Canaverro Pereira on the occasion of Argentine General Alcides Lópes Aufranc's visit to Brazil, October 1970, as quoted in Oficio, Embachile Rio to Señor Ministro, 26 October 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.

26 This possibility and the decision not to break relations were later conveyed to US Secretary of the Treasury John Connally during conversations with President Médici on 8 June 1972 in Brasilia. See Telegram, AmEmbassy Wellington to SecState, 23 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958–1976, Lot 720373, box 135, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter RG59/NARA].

27 See Telegram, Brazilian Embassy, Washington to Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, 14 August 1971, Rolo 423, Telegramas recebidos da Embaixada em Washingon, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Arquivo Histórico, Brasilia and Record of Conversation, William Rountree, AmEmbassy Brasilia, and Gibson Barbosa, 22 December 1970, Telegram, Rountree, to SecState, 23 December 1970, box 2199/RG59/NARA.

28 ‘Paises Latinoamericanos no han contestado consulta de EE.UU para bloqear a Chile; Departamento de Estado inició contactos en noveimbre. Norteamérica y Brasil observan Gobierno de Allende’, El Diario and La Prensa, 13 March 1971, enclosures, Telex, Pedro Vuskovic Bravo and Daniel Vergara Bustos to Orlando Letelier, 13 March 1971, Telex E.: 1-367, Embajada de Chile en los Estados Unidos, 1971, AMRE [Hereafter EEUU/1971/AMRE].

29 Oficio, EmbaChile Rio to Señor Ministro, 29 April 1970, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1970/AMRE.

30 On Brazil's diplomatic offensive see Oficios, Rettig to Señor Ministro, 2 June 1971 and MRE to Señor Embajador de Chile en Brasil-Brasilia, 11 June 1971, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1971/AMRE. On Brazil's diplomatic outreach to Peru, see Oficio, Raul Rettig to Señor Ministro, 27 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE. On responses to Chilean Foreign Ministry consultations on Brazil, see Oficio, Ramon Huidobro, EmbaChile Buenos Aires to Señor Ministro, 16 July 1971 and Oficio, Rettig to Señor Ministro, 26 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf./EEUU/1971/AMRE.

31 Almeyda as quoted in Urgent Note, ‘Summary of Visit of the Chilean Delegation’, 2 June 1971, wiazka 3, 40/75, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, Warsaw, Poland. I am grateful to Anita Prazmowska for sharing this document with me and translating it.

32 See Matias Spektor, ‘Equivocal Engagement: Kissinger, Silveira and the Politics of US–Brazil Relations (1969–1983)’. Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 2006, 57–69 and Harmer, Allende's Chile, 99–100.

33 Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), 30 November 1970, enclosure, Airgram, Ambassador William Rountree to Department of State, 19 January 1971, box 2136/RG59/NARA.

34 Handwritten Note, Kissinger, on Memorandum, Nachmanoff and Kennedy to Kissinger, 5 December 1970, box H050, National Security Council Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [Hereafter: NSCIF/NPMP]. Although Médici was invited in early 1971, Médici finally visited in December.

35 White House Tape, Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman, 11 June 1971, doc.139, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. E-10: Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972 [Hereafter: FRUS, 1969–1976: E–10].

36 Record of Conversation, Rountree and Gibson Barbosa, 12 November 1970, Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 12 November 1970, doc.129/FRUS, 1969–1976: E–10.

37 Memorandum of Conversation, William Rogers, Charles Meyer, Robert W. Dean, Gibson Barbosa and Celso Diniz, 1 February 1971, box 2134/RG59/NARA.

38 Record of Conversation, Rountree and Admiral Figueiredo, c.14 January, Sao Paulo, Telegram, Rountree to SecState, 14 January 1971, box 1697/RG59/NARA.

39 It is still unclear how far the United States was involved in supporting the Bolivian coup. A recently declassified document at the Nixon Presidential Library suggests that Washington had information coup plotting was underway three weeks before it was launched. See Memorandum from Dell Bragan, 3 August 1971, folder 1, Situation Room Cable Summary, 8/1/71–9/30/71, box 387, NSC Files, Subject Files, http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/jul11.php. On possible involvement, see also Harmer, Allende's Chile, 125.

40 All quotations relating to Nixon-Médici meetings in Washington are taken from Memorandums of Conversation, Médici, Nixon, and Vernon Walters, 11.30a.m, the President's Office, 7 December 1971 and Médici, Nixon and Walters, 10am the President's Office, 9 December 1971, docs.141 and 143/FRUS, 1969–1976: E-10.

41 It is interesting to note that Brazilian delegates had long since argued that the communist threat in Latin America was primarily an internal, regional issue. See Joseph Smith, Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2010), 137, 187.

42 Memorandum, Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to Kissinger, 29 December 1971, doc.145/FRUS, 1969–1976: E–10.

43 Memorandum of Conversation, Médici, Nixon and Walters, 9 December 1971.

44 Memorandum of Conversation, Médici, Nixon and Walters, 9 December 1971 On the Nixon Doctrine, see Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

45 Telephone Conversations, Nixon and William Rogers, 7 December 1971, Conversation 16:36, and Telephone Conversation, Nixon and John Connally, 8 December 1971, Conversation 16:44, White House Tapes, NPMP

46 Letter, Médici to Nixon, 27 April 1972 as quoted in Spektor, ‘Equivocal Engagement’, 101.

47 Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1972, doc.147/FRUS, 1969–1976: E-10.

48 Telex, Letelier to MRE, 8 June 1972, Telex R./EEUU/1972/AMRE. On lack of evidence, see Options Paper, Department of State, ‘Next Steps Options on Chile’, 4 April 1972, enclosure, Memorandum, William Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, box H064/NSCIF/NPMP.

49 Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Médici, et al., 8 June 1972, Telegram, Amembassy Brasilia to SecState, 17 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958–1976, lot 720373, box 135/RG59/NARA.

50 Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Banzer, et al., 13 June 1972, Telegram, AmEmbassy La Paz to SecState, 23 June 1972, Executive Secretariat, Briefing Books, 1958–1976, lot 720373, box 135/RG59/NARA.

51 Kenneth Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1999), 165–66.

52 Memorandum of Conversation, Connally, Médici et al., 8 June 1972.

53 Memorandum of Conversation, Rogers and Barbosa, 29 September 1972, Waldorf Hotel, Telegram, USMission, UN to SecState, 6 October 1972, box 2130/RG59/NARA and Gaspari, Ditadura Derrotada, 349–51. On serious Brazilian concerns regarding the Tupamaro threat and the security situation in Uruguay, see Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1972, doc.147/FRUS, 1969–1976: Vol.E-10.

54 By September 1973, Brazil had offered $30 million in credits and bilateral trade between Chile and Brazil had increased. This is puzzling given what we know about Brazilian efforts to encourage a coup against him. However, it must be viewed in terms of Brazil's interests in expanding economic influence in Latin America during the same period and should be contrasted with the much higher offers that were provided to Chile after the coup (not to mention Brazil's active support for Banzer in Bolivia during the same period). See Fermandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, 365 and Joaquín Fermandois, Chile y El Mundo 1970–1973: La Política Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el Sistema Internacional (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985).

55 O Estado de São Paulo, 9 September 1973 as quoted in Oficio, Stein to Señor Ministro, 13 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.

56 For the ambassador's general observations about Chile's crisis in 1973, see Carlos F. Domínguez Avila, ‘A batalha pero Chile revisitada: um estudo com fontes brasileiras’. Unpublished paper.

57 Davis, Last Two Years, 331–32. See also Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 92–93 and Harmer, Allende's Chile, 228.

58 ‘Chile Contingency Paper: Possible Military Action’, Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, enclosure, Memorandum, Pickering to Scowcroft, 8 September 1973, box 2196/RG59/NARA.

59 Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence, 2 November 1972, ‘Chile Declassification Project’, Freedom Of Information Act Reading Room, Department of State, CIA Documents, online at: http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CIA.asp

60 Patricia Arancibia Claval, ed., Conversando con Roberto Kelly V.: Recuerdos de una Vida (Santiago: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2005), 144–47.

61 Pereira, Political In(Justice), 93.

62 Frei as recalled by Lincoln Gorden. Author's interview with Lincoln Gordon, 2 May 2005, Washington D.C.

63 On parallels, see Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil 1961–1969, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1990) and Pereira, Political In(Justice), 93–94.

64 Oficio Stein to Señor Ministro, 13 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.

65 Oficio, Stein to Señor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.

66 On the Camara Canto's role, see Pereira, Political In(Justice), 92, 94. On Brazilian assistance, see Oficio, Stein to Señor Ministro, 27 September 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE.

67 Oficio, Stein to Señor Ministro, “Visita de Misón Económica”, 29 October 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. In July 1974, Chile also successfully renegotiated its debt payments with Brazil for 1973 and 1974. See Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministro, 29 July 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE.

68 Briefing Paper, ‘The Current State of Chile's Economy’, attachment, Memorandum, Chief, South America Branch, OER, to Chief, OCI/WH/SAW, 21 November 1973, CREST.

69 Oficio, Embajador Cubillos, EmbaChile Brasilia to Señor Ministro, 22 March 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE. See also Fermandois, Mundo y fin de mundo, 408.

70 Oficio, Cubillos, EmbaChile Brasilia to Señor Ministro, 1 August 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE.

71 Enrique Montero Marx, Subsecretario del Interior, Chile, to Don João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, Jefe de Serviço Nacional de Informações, Brasil, ‘Unificación de las actividades de Inteligencia en la Peninsula Ibérica. Establece a continuación, commando territorial unificado, entre Chile y Brasil’, 21 August 1975, as cited in McSherry, Predatory States, 90–92, 93–94.

72 Marie-Monique Robin, Escuadrones de la Muerte: La Escuela Francesa, documentary film, (2003).

73 Oficios, Cubillos to Señor Ministro (DINEX), 7 November 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE.

74 Record of Conversation, Gibson Barboza and Hernán Cubillos, 7 December 1973, in Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministro, 7 December 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. On the importance that the ‘highest authorities’ in Brazil were paying to the Chilean vote on this question, see also Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministry, 30 November 1973, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1973/AMRE. As Cubillos wrote home, Brazil's position was quite clearly a minority one (37 African countries and the majority of Asian countries were voting against it) but only Chile and Peru fully supported Argentina's position within Latin America and 41 countries (including Uruguay) had previously abstained.

75 Spektor, ‘Equivocal Engagement’, 134, 135–36, 158.

76 Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministro, 24 September 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE.

77 Memorandum Confidencial de la Cancilleria Chilena [Distributed by Centro de Informaciones – Comité Chileno de Solidaridad con la Resistencia Antifascista], 9 December 1974, Document 5, Folder 3, Box 2, Fondo Orlando Letelier, Archivo Nacional, Santiago, Chile.

78 Oficio, Cubillos, to Señor Ministro, 1 August 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE

79 Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministro, 31 October 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE.

80 Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministro, 5 April 1974, Oficios Conf./Brasil/1974/AMRE.

81 Oficio, Stein to Señor Ministro, 27 December 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE.

82 Spektor, ‘Equivocal Engagement’, 235–36.

83 Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to AmEmbassy Santiago, 11 April 1975, DOS/CFP.

84 Electronic Telegrams, AmEmbassy Santiago to SecState, 27 March and 17 April 1975, DOS/CFP.

85 MacEoin, Struggle For Dignity, 194–99. See also Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 92.

86 Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 94, 92.

87 Silveira as quoted in Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 19 August 1975, DOS/CFP. To date, there are no details of who exactly attended the first Condor meeting.

88 Oficio, Cubillos to Señor Ministro, 29 October 1974, Oficios Secretos y Reservados/Brasil/1974/AMRE.

89 Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState, 7 March 1975, DOS/CFP

90 See for example Tricontinental Bulletin, No.69, December 1971.

91 See for example author's interviews with Ulises Estrada, 19 April 2011, Havana, Cuba; Andres Pascal Allende, 7 April 2010, Santiago, Chile; and Luis Fernández Oña and Felix Huerta, 23 March 2010, Santiago, Chile.

92 Matias Spektor, ‘Brazilian Assessments of the End of the Cold War’, 231.