‘A practical test in the détente’: International support for the Socialist Party in the Portuguese Revolution (1974–1975)

Abstract

In this article we will seek to analyse the development of international ties that enabled the channelling of international support to the Portuguese Socialist Party led by Mário Soares. The support directed to Portuguese socialists assumed particular relevance in the summer of 1975, during which the revolutionary dynamic questioned and challenged the democratic legitimacy. Coincidentally, during these months there were ongoing negotiations for the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the situation in Portugal was presented by several actors as a test of the climate of détente.

Notes

¹ Geoffrey Pridham underlined the importance of ‘international environment’ and drew attention to the establishment of transnational links between internal political forces and international organisations, which result in various forms of support to the defenders of democratisation. In this line, the same author emphasised the importance of contacts between European political parties and elements of opposition to the dictatorships in Southern Europe. Such contacts would reveal its importance in structuring groups that would later play an important role in transitions to democracy. Geoffrey Pridham, ed. Encouraging democracy: the international context of regime transition in Southern Europe (London: Leicester University Press, 1991); Geoffrey Pridham, The Dynamics of democratisation, a comparative approach, London, Continuum, 2000. See also the studies collected in Laurence Whitehead, ed. The International Dimensions of Democratization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

² Tiago Moreira de Sá analysed U.S. involvement in the Portuguese democratic transition, Os Estados Unidos e a democracia portuguesa (Lisboa: Instituto Diplomático, 2009). Mario Del Pero analysed the U.S. reaction to the Portuguese revolution and its impact on the relations between the United States and its Western European allies, “‘Which Chile, Allende?’ Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese revolution”, Cold War History 11 (2011): 625–627. Ana Mónica Fonseca studied the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in this process, “The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976)”, Journal of European Integration History 1 (2009): 35–36. Tilo Wagner researched the role of the German Democratic Republic during the transitional period, “Portugal and the German Democratic Republic during the Carnation Revolution”, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 7, no.1 (2008): 37–47.

³ Based on diplomatic documentation, Portuguese archives and press.

⁴ On the role of non-state actors, see Geoffrey Pridham, “The Politics of European Community, Transnational networks and democratic transition in Southern Europe” in Pridham Encouraging democracy, 212–245. Pridham underlines the importance of such contacts in training and providing support to opposition parties before the fall of authoritarian regimes (ibid., 218).

⁵ Maria João Avillez, Soares, ditadura e revolução (Lisboa: Público, 1996), 266.

⁶ “Ambassador's initial call on foreign minister”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon for the State Department, 21-05-1974, 02027 Lisbon, State Department Cables.

⁷ For example, in Brussels he was received at the headquarters of the Belgian Socialist Party and met with the general secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Otto Kersten, who promised to Soares financial and technical assistance for the creation of democratic unions in Portugal. Diário de Notícias, 4-5-1974, p. 2. “FCGT gensec says Portuguese socialist unions need support now”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Brussels to the State Department, 6-5-1974, 02776, Brusse, State Department Cables.

⁸ “Report on the Lisbon meeting with a leader of the SPD”, 6-10-1974, Mário Soares Foundation, Historical Archives of the PS, pt. 4385.085. The António Sérgio association would be the organisation responsible for the management of such initiatives, thus confirming the importance of foreign aid to the PS shortly after the fall of the Estado Novo, as appointed by Juliet Sablosky in his work on the PS and the transition to democracy. Juliet Antunes Sablosky, O PS e a transição para a democracia (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2000), 46–57.

⁹Diário de Notícias, 3-7-1974, p. 1; Diário de Lisboa, 3-7-1974, p. 1.

¹⁰Diário de Lisboa, 21-10-1974, p. 12 and 15.

¹¹ Joint Communiqué PS/SPD, Diário de Notícias, 21-10-1974, p. 4.

¹²Diário de Notícias, 22-10-1974, p. 9

¹³ “Willy Brandt's views on situation in Portugal”, telegram from the US embassy in Bonn to the State Department, 25-10-1974, Bonn 16825, State Department Cables.

¹⁴Diário de Lisboa, 28-10-1974, p. 19.

¹⁵ “Swedish prime minister Olof Palme leads Scandinavian socialist delegation to Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 31-10-1974, Lisbon 04701, State Department Cables.

¹⁶ “Visit of Leonard Woodcock and Herman Rebhan to Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 31-10-1974, Lisbon 04701, State Department Cables.

¹⁷ “Foreign Secretary Callaghan visits Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 10-2-1974, Lisbon 00795, State Department Cables.

¹⁸Diário de Lisboa, 7-2-1975, p. 24.

¹⁹ The PPD, led by Sá Carneiro, sought to counter this reality and asked to join to the Socialist International. However, given the opposition of the PS never managed to achieve that objective. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, A Revolução e o Nascimento do PSD (Lisboa: Bertrand Editora, 2000), 1° vol. p. 521–522.

²⁰ Rui Mateus, Contos Proibidos: Memórias de um PS desconhecido (Lisboa: Publicações D. Quixote, 1996), 61–62; 89–90; 108–109.

²¹ “Continuing Norwegian contacts with Portuguese socialists”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Oslo to the State Department, 17-5-1974, Oslo 01968, State Department Cables.

²² “Dutch trade union leader on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in The Hague to the State Department, 15-11-1974, The Ha 05580, State Department Cables.

²³ “Belgian socialist party support for Portuguese socialists”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Brussels to the State Department, 5-12-1974, Brusse 09590, State Department Cables.

²⁴ David Castaño, Mário Soares e a Revolução (Lisboa: Publicações D. Quixote, 2013), 248–260. There are several studies on the Portuguese trade unions. The first one was published in 1991: José Barreto, A Formação das centrais sindicais e do sindicalismo contemporâneo em Portugal (1968–1990) (Lisboa: ICS, 1991). The last one was published in 2013: José Maria Brandão de Brito and Cristina Rodrigues, A UGT na história do movimento sindical português 1970–1990 (Lisboa: Tinta-da-China, 2013). However they both contain very few references to the external supports, which in our opinion were fundamental in the implementation of trade unions in Portugal.

²⁵ “Portuguese socialists get financial boost from Dutch”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in The Hague to the State Department, 29-1-1975, The Ha 00475, State Department Cables

²⁶ “Swedish social democrats appeal for aid for Portuguese socialists”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Stockholm to the State Department, 28-2-1974, Stockh 00957, State Department Cables.

²⁷ “Current political situation”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 1-3-1975, 01150 Lisbon, State Department Cables. Are still poorly known the supports that were given the PCP by Eastern Bloc. However, a study on the role of the German Democratic Republic in the Portuguese revolution reveals that PCP received financial and technical support from GDR, having been detected the sending of considerable sums of money to the unions controlled by the communists. Tilo Wagner, “Portugal and the German Democratic Republic”, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 7, no. 1 (2008): 39.

²⁸ Two days after the March 11, Soares met with the U.S. ambassador, Frank Carlucci, and argued that the powers to be granted to the Council of Revolution would lead to the marginalisation of political parties and that they would have to determine whether it would be worth to continue to participate in the process “Conversation with foreign minister Mario Soares”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 13-3-1975, 01397 Lisbon, State Department Cables.

²⁹ Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos e a democracia portuguesa, 246.

³⁰ Record of meeting of executive committee of the PS, Mário Soares Foundation, Historical Archives of the PS, pt. 2128.001.

³¹ Followed by PPD (centre-right) with 26%, PCP 12% and CDS (right) with 7%.

³² Record of meeting of executive committee of the PS, Mário Soares Foundation, Historical Archives of the PS, pt. 2128.002.

³³ “Documento dos Nove”, www1.uc.pt/cd25a/wikka.php?wakka = poderpol26.

³⁴ “Minutes of the Revolutionary Council, 23-5-1975, FMS, pt. 02975.13.

³⁵Diário de Lisboa, 5-6-1975, p. 4.

³⁶Expresso, 7-6-1975, p.2.

³⁷ Carlos Gaspar, “International dimensions of Portuguese transition”, p. 10. Paper presented at the conference The Transition to Democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece: Thirty Yeares After, Konstatinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Athens, May 2005. www.ipri. pt/investigadores/artigo.php?ida = 130&idi = 3; Mario del Pero, The International implications of Portugal's Revolution”, Journal of European Integration History 1 (2009): 28.

³⁸ Mario del Pero, “A European Solution for a European Crisis. The International implications of Portugal's Revolution”, Journal of European Integration History 1 (2009): 23; Giovanni Bernardini, “Stability and socialist autonomy: The SPD, the PSI and the Italian political crisis of the 1970s”, Journal of European Integration History 1 (2009): 104–105.

³⁹ Namely Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen of Denmark, Dutch Prime Minister Joop den Uyl, Trygyve Bratteli of Norway, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

⁴⁰ Adenauer's government had already taken steps in this direction. In this regard, see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage, 1994).

⁴¹ Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal Republic's relationship with the West” in The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975, ed. Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (New York: Routledge, 2008), 119.

⁴² Jussi M. Hanhimaki, “Détente in Europe, 1962–1975”, in The Cambridge History of The Cold War, volume II, Crises and Détente, ed. Melvin Leffler and Odd ArneWestad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 211.

⁴³ Giovanni Bernardini, “Forced to cooperate. The Brandt Government and the Nixon Administration in the road to Helsinki”, in Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985, ed. Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2010), 94. Other authors tend to emphasise that within the U.S. government there were divisions between the White House and the State Department's policy towards Europe and the CSCE. See, for example, Stephan Kieninger, “Transformation versus status quo: The Survival of the Transformation Strategy during the Nixon Years”, in Perforating the Iron Curtain, 102.

⁴⁴ Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal Republic's relationship with the West”, 119.

⁴⁵ Jussi M. Hanhimaki, “Détente in Europe, 1962–1975”, 211.

⁴⁶ Hanhimaki argues that ‘by improving relations with a number of East European governments as well as the Soviet Union, Brandt and his Ostpolitik set in motion the process of increased exchanges and contacts across the Iron Curtain that paved the way to the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a key event in the era of détente’. Ibid., 212.

⁴⁷ On the positioning of Great Britain, see, for example, Keith Hamilton, “Cold War by other means. British diplomacy and the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975”, in The Making of Détente, 168–182.

⁴⁸ “Norwegian labor visit Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Oslo to the State Department, 3-7-1975, Oslo 02776, State Department Cables.

⁴⁹ “Soares suggestions for US assistance”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 12-7-1975, Lisbon 03936, State Department Cables.

⁵⁰ “Views of British and German ambassadors on current crisis”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 12-7-1975, Lisbon 03936, State Department Cables.

⁵¹ “Miscellany of Swedish views on Mozambique, Angola and Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Stockholm to the State Department, 18-7-1975, Stockh 03480, State Department Cables; Views of British and German ambassadors on current crisis”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 12-7-1975, Lisbon 03936, State Department Cables.

⁵² Castaño, Mário Soares e a Revolução, 201–205.

⁵³ “Socialist meeting on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in The Hague to the State Department, 4-9-1975, The Ha 04481, State Department Cables; “Labor party conference”.

⁵⁴ “Soviets public support's Portugal's AMF”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Moscow to the State Department, 17-7-1975, Moscow 10029, State Department Cables; “Costa Gomes and current political situation”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 18-7-1975, Lisbon 04071, State Department Cables. Mário Del Pero argues that the reluctance shown by Kissinger to follow the pact advocated by Carlucci was due to the fact that the Secretary of State was more concerned about a possible emancipation of Europe that with the deployment of a communist regime in Portugal. Mario Del Pero, “‘Which Chile, Allende?’…”, 648.

⁵⁵ “Memorandum of Conversation”, April 30, 1975, NA, SDR, Entry 5339, box 11, quoted in Tiago Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos da América e a Democracia Portuguesa. As relações luso-americanas na transição democrática em Portugal (1974–1976) (Lisboa: ISCTE), 251.

⁵⁶ See Bernardino Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger.‐ Os EUA e a revolução portuguesa (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2008). An English version was published later: Bernardino Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sá, Carlucci versus Kissinger, The US and the Portuguese Revolution (Washington D.C.: Lexington Books, 2011).

⁵⁷ Mario Del Pero, “‘Which Chile, Allende?’ …”, 646.

⁵⁸ Kissinger's Telecons, July 17, 1975. www.foia.state.gov/searchcolls/collsseracha.asp. Quoted in Tiago Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos da América e a Democracia Portuguesa, 309.

⁵⁹ “Memorandum of conversation”, quoted in Ibid., 309.

⁶⁰ About the meeting of Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich with Ford and Kissinger see: “Memorandum of conversation”, 28.07.1975, Akten der Aussenpoltik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1975, doc. 225, p. 1045–1049, quoted in Ana Mónica Fonseca, “É Preciso regar os cravos!” A social-democracia alemã e a transição para a Democracia em Portugal (1974–1976) (Lisboa: ISCTE, 2011), 275; About the meeting of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan with Ford and Kissinger see: “Memorandum of conversation”, July 27, 1975, GFL, NSA, box 11, Quoted in Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos da América e a Democracia Portuguesa, 312; About the meeting of Olof Palme with Kissinger see: “Memorandum of conversation”, July 30, 1975, GFL, NSA, box 12, Quoted in Ibid., 313.

⁶¹ “Social democratic reaction to emergence of Portuguese triumvirate”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to the State Department, 29-7-1975, Copenh 02143, State Department Cables.

⁶² Luís Nuno Rodrigues, Marechal Costa Gomes (Lisboa: Esfera dos Livros, 2008), 266–271; Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger, 264.

⁶³ Nuno Rodrigues, Marechal Costa Gomes, 272–273.

⁶⁴ Telegram from the British embassy in Lisbon to the Foreign Office, 23-7-1975, 23170Z, The National Archives, FCO 9/2293.

⁶⁵ Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger, 270.

⁶⁶ Helsinki 012355Z, 1-8-1976, The National Archives, PREM 16/603; Harold Wilon, Final Term. The Labour Government 1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 172–173.

⁶⁷ Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carluccy vs Kissinger 272.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Tilo Wagner, “Portugal and the German Democratic Republic”, Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 7, no. 1 (2008): 43.

⁶⁹Diário de Lisboa, 24-7-1975, p. 4.

⁷⁰ “Socialists leaders to meet in Stockolm to discuss Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Stockholm to the State Department, 22-7-1974, Stockh 03528, State Department Cables.

⁷¹ Telegram from the British embassy in Lisbon to the Foreign Office, 22-7-1975, 222250Z, The National Archives, FCO 9/2293; Telegram from the British embassy in Lisbon to the Foreign Office, 23-7-1975, 23170Z, The National Archives, FCO 9/2293.

⁷² Those present at the meeting were Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's Labor Party, Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen of Denmark, Kalevi Sorsa of Finland, François Mitterrand, Joop den Uyl, Dutch Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, Trygve Bratteli, Prime Minister of Norway, Reiulf Steenm Norwegian Labour Party leader, Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, British Prime Minister and British minister of Foreign Affairs, Helmut Schmidt, German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, SPD leader, Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden, and Bruno Kreisky, Austrian Chancellor.

⁷³ “Meeting of socialist party leaders and heads of government”, 2-8-1975, PREM 16/603, The National Archives.

⁷⁴ “Meeting of socialist party leaders and heads of government”, 2-8-1975, PREM 16/603, The National Archives.

⁷⁵ “Stockholm meeting of socialist leaders in Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Paris to the State Department, 14-8-1975, Paris 21017, State Department Cables.

⁷⁶ “Social democratic meeting in Stockholm”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Oslo to the State Department, 12-8-1975, Oslo 03351, State Department Cables.

⁷⁷Diário de Notícias, 4-8-1975, p. 11.

⁷⁸ “Meeting of socialist leaders on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S.embassy in Stockholm to the State Department, 12-8-1975, Stockh 03962, State Department Cables.

⁷⁹ “Socialist meeting on Portugal”, 3-9-1975, Stockh 04348, State Department Cables.

⁸⁰ “Danish Prime Minister visit to Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to the State Department, 7-8-1975, Copenh 02244, State Department Cables; “Comments on Danish Prime Minister visit to Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to the State Department, 15-8-1975, Copenh 02345, State Department Cables; “Tour d'horizon with Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to the State Department, 19-8-1975, Copenh 02368, State Department Cables.

⁸¹ Speech by Álvaro Cunhal at the PCP rally in 14-8-1975. Álvaro Cunhal, A crise politico-militar (Lisboa: Editorial Avante!, 1975), 181–182.

⁸² “Polish editorial blasts west European social democrats on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Warsaw to the State Department, 12-8-1975, Warsaw 05233, State Department Cables.

⁸³ “GDR stand on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Berlin to the State Department, 15-8-1975, Berlin 06168, State Department Cables.

⁸⁴Diário de Notícias 1-9-1975, p. 7.

⁸⁵ “Socialist meeting on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Stockholm to the State Department, 3-9-1975, Stockh 04353, State Department Cables; “Socialist meeting on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in The Hague to the State Department, 4-9-1975, The HA 04481, State Department Cables.

⁸⁶ All this information was transmitted to the U.S. ambassador in London by the Secretary-General of the British Labour Party, who took the opportunity to ask if the Americans would be available to fund the Portuguese democratic forces “Socialist meeting on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in London to the State Department, 8-9-1975, London 13814, State Department Cables.

⁸⁷ “Meeting with Willy Brandt”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Bonn to the State Department, 17-9-1975, Bonn 15265, State Department Cables.

⁸⁸ “Socialist meeting on Portugal”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in London to the State Department, 5-9-1975, London 13759, State Department Cables.

⁸⁹ “Humphrey-Soares meeting”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in London to the State Department, 6-9-1975, London 13770, State Department Cables.

⁹⁰ “PS views in sixth government”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 9-9-1975, Lisbon 05289, State Department Cables.

⁹¹ “Message to Callaghan on Portugal”, telegram from the State Department to the U.S. embassy in London, 9-9-1975, State 214379, State Department Cables.

⁹² “Coalition politics”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 10-9-1975, Lisbon 05303, State Department Cables.

⁹³ “Mario Soares views on current negotiations for sixth provisional gop”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, Lisbon 05398, State Department Cables.

⁹⁴ “Message to Soares”, telegram from the State Department to the U.S. embassy in Lisbon, 19-9-1975, State 223754, State Department Cables.

⁹⁵ Kenneth Maxwell, The making of Portuguese democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 152–153.

⁹⁶ Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger, 314–315.

⁹⁷ José Freire Antunes, O segredo do 25 de Novembro (Lisboa: Publicações Europa-América), 197–198.

⁹⁸ Memorandum, 4-11-1975 Mário Soares Foundation, Historical Archives of the PS, pt. 00110.000.

⁹⁹ About the demobilisation of the Communists, see the report of a former communist activist in her memoirs, Zita Seabra, Foi Assim (Lisboa: Alêtheia Editores, 2007), 301–302. Carlos Gaspar argues that the Communists only retreated when found that the correlation of forces was unfavourable to them, Carlos Gaspar, “O Partido Comunista e a revolução portuguesa” in O Longo Curso. Estudos em homenagem a José Medeiros Ferreira, ed. Pedro Aires Oliveira and Maria Inácia Rezola (Lisboa: Tinta-da-China, 2010), 569–570. This is the thesis that in our opinion best explains the intentions of PCP during the revolutionary process. Raquel Varela, on the other hand, rejects the thesis of retreat, since in her opinion the PCP was never sincerely engaged in the revolutionary way. Raquel Varela, A história do PCP na revolução dos cravos (Lisboa: Bertrand Editora, 2011), 341–350.

¹⁰⁰ Soares reported the existence of these plans to Sánchez Cervelló, A revolução portuguesa e a sua influência na transição espanhola (Lisboa: Assírio e Alvim, 1993), 250. Callaghan refers in his memoir this episode and said that in line with Mário Soares plans had been drawn up to respond to a communist coup. James Callaghan, Time and Chance (Glasgow: William Collins Son & Co., 1987), 360–362.

¹⁰¹ “Memorandum of conversation”, 16-9-1975, quoted in Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger, 314–316; 329–334.

¹⁰² “Meeting of European Socialists in Denmark”, message from the Secretary to Willy Brandt, 14-1-1976, Foia, n. F-2011-01527, www.foia.state.gov.

¹⁰³ “Soares about Helsingor conference”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to the State Department, 19-1-1976, Copenhagen 00193, State Department Cables; “The socialist summit in Elsinore”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Rome to the State Department, 21-1-1976, Rome 01037, State Department Cables. Revealing their opposition to Mitterrand's project, Soares was not present at the meeting of the socialist parties of southern Europe promoted by the French leader. “Socialist party participation in upcoming international meetings”, telegram from the U.S. embassy in Lisbon to the State Department, 15-1-1976, Lisbon 00316, State Department Cables.

¹⁰⁴ Harold Wilson, Final Term. The Labour Government 1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 214; “Morning summary”, telegram from the State Department, 20-1-1976, State 013827, State Department Cables.

¹⁰⁵Diário de Lisboa, 9-2-1976, p. 11.

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David Castaño

David Castaño holds a PhD in Modern and Contemporary History, an MA in History of International Relations and a BA in Modern and Contemporary History from ISCTE-IUL. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow in IPRI-UNL, where he is developing a research project on democratic consolidation in Portugal. He has several articles and book chapters published; he was one of the coordinators of Portugal e o Atlântico, 60 anos dos Acordos dos Açores and he is the author of Paternalismo e Cumplicidade: As Relações Luso-Britânicas 1943–1949. In 2005 he received the Teixeira de Sampayo Award. His latest book, Mário Soares e a Revolução, was published in 2013.