Sino-American negotiations on Korea and Kissinger's UN diplomacy

Abstract

During a three-year period between 1972 and 1975, Henry Kissinger, first as national security adviser and subsequently as secretary of state, played a leading role not generally recognised as the principal architect of a new US security policy toward Korea based on Sino-American rapprochement, providing for the termination of the US-led UN Command contingent on ‘alternative armistice arrangements’. Although not implemented at the time, Kissinger's new diplomacy helped paved the way for subsequent breakthroughs in the decades ahead, including UN membership for the two Koreas, the Seoul-Pyongyang Basic Agreement of 1991, the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea, and multiparty talks on nuclear and security issues.

Notes

¹ See South Korean scholar Paik Nak-chung's seminal collection of essays on this issue, The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

² Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Huang Hua, PRC Mission to the UN, New York, 26 July 1972, KT 00531, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archives, 5

³ See for example Steven Lee, ‘The Korean Armistice and the End of Peace: The US-UN Coalition and the Dynamic of War-Making in Korea, 1953–1976’, Journal of Korean Studies 18, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 183–224.

⁴ UNCURK's original mandate was Korean unification, as the political component of the UN military advance into North Korea in October 1950.

⁵ Kissinger proposed cross-recognition to Chinese UN envoy Huang Hua in May 1973, stating ‘We are prepared, under conditions where the PRC and Soviet Union recognize South Korea, to recognize North Korea.’ See Memorandum of Conversation, 27 May 1973, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archives online, 8. The Chinese as well as the Soviet calculus would change two decades later when Seoul had become a major economic player and model to emulate, facilitated in the case of China by the advent of Deng Xiaoping's new policy of reform and opening.

⁶ See Leland Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956).

⁷ In ‘Korea Policy Reconsideration: A Two Korea Approach’, S/S 7309848, 29 May 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, 7–8, Richard Sneider sketched out a negotiating scenario which envisaged four-power security guarantees ultimately replacing the US-South Korean bilateral security treaty.

⁸ See Memorandum of Conversation, 22 June 1972, Peking, near Villa # 5, KT00518, Digital National Security Archive online, 23

⁹ 18 June 1973, K000149, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archive online, 11–12.

¹⁰ John F. Harris and R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘US Backs Talks on Korean Peace’, Washington Post, 16 April 1996.

¹¹ This approach found favour with ambassador William Porter, who sought Kissinger's approval for Chinese and Soviet guarantees for ‘a new border arrangement between the North and South guaranteed by outside powers’ in the DMZ in exchange for terminating the UN Command. See 15 June 1973 Meeting, White House Situation Room, KT00758, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archives, 2–3. Sneider also pointed out that the dissolution of the UN Command provided the basis for new border arrangements.

¹² See text of 1991 North-South Basic Agreement at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31012.htm. Accessed 29 August 2014.

¹³ Morton I. Abramowitz, Moving the Glacier: Two Koreas and the Powers, Adelphi Paper vol. 11, no. 80 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971), 4.

¹⁴ Algeria was the first non-communist Third World country to normalise relations with the DPRK, and North Korea's stature in the Third World grew rapidly in the late 1960s and 1970s. See Charles Armstrong, ‘Juche and North Korean Global Aspirations’, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, North Korea International Documentation Project Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, DC, 2009).

¹⁵ Holdridge memorandum, for Kissinger, SRG Meeting on the Korean Item in the 27^th UN General Assembly, 7 August 1972, K00131, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archive online, 2.

¹⁶ NSC Document, 14 August 1972, KT00012, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archive online, 1–2.

¹⁷ Memorandum of Conversation with Huang Hua, August 4, 1972, K00538, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archives, 1–2.

¹⁸ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹ Senior Review Group Meeting, Summary of Conclusions, The White House, 15 June 1973, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969–1976, Vol. E-12, Chapter VI, The Korean Peninsula, Document 249 and KT00758, 7.

²⁰ See Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, Beijing, Guest House near Villa # 5, 22 June 1972, 26.

²¹ See footnote 17.

²² Memorandum of Conversation, 19 June 1973, The White House, Washington, DC, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archives online, 3.

²³ Samuel S. Kim, China the United Nations and World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 135–6.

²⁴ US Policy toward the Korean Peninsula, Interim Guidance, 18 July 1973, United States and Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archive online.

²⁵ See John A. Froebe, NSC Memorandum, Consultation on the Korean Issue at the UN, 4 August 1972, K00538; Brent Scowcroft, NSC Memorandum, Consultation on the Korean Question, 7 August 1973, K00131; The Senior Review Group (SRG) Meeting on the Korean Item at the 27th General Assembly, 7 August 1973, K00132, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archive online.

²⁶ Telegram 7992, Foreign Policy Changes, American embassy, Seoul to Secretary of State, 25 May 1973, United States and Korea Collection, Digital National Security Archive online and Memorandum of Conversation, with Huang Hua, PRC Mission to the UN, New York, 27 May 1973, 8.

²⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Strategy on the Korean Question in the UN General Assembly, XR7313854, 24 August 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives College Park, Maryland, 1–2.

²⁸ Ibid. and Donald Ranard, Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, Proposed Discussion with PRC and USSR Concerning Korea, 12 July 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, 4.

²⁹ National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 251, 29 March 1974, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969–1976, Vol. E-12, Chapter VI, The Korean Peninsula, Document 253.

³⁰ National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 190, 30 December 1973, Nixon Library, Loma Linda, California. This document is the subject of a pending declassification request.

³¹ In fact, Soviet-Korean pilots had flown combat missions over North Korea while Soviet advisers had been heavily involved in launching the North Korean attack in June 1950.

³² Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 338.

³³ Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Park Tong Jin, ROK-US Relations: Korean Question, 9 April 1976, United States and Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archive online, 7.

³⁴ At the same time, the State Department drew up a list of its own criteria, including ‘The assumption of responsible roles by the two Koreas, a reduction in political and military tension accompanied by increased political, economic, social and cultural communication between them.’

³⁵ Section II, US Posture 1972–1975, 7, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park Maryland and Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Zhou En-lai, Peking, Guest House near Villa # 5, 22 June 1972, 22.

³⁶ Memorandum, Donald Ranard to Marshall Green, 2 April 1973, ‘North Korea's New Position toward the South’, Record Group 59, Korea, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, 2.

³⁷ Secretary's Staff Meeting, 25 January 1974, Office of the Historian, Department of State, FRUS, 1973–1976, East and Southeast Asia, online, Volume VI, Document 252, 36–37.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, US Policy toward Korea, 18 July 1973, United States and the Two Koreas Collection, Digital National Security Archives online, 1–2.

⁴⁰ See note 36.

⁴¹ ‘Korea Policy Reconsideration; A Two Korea Approach’, S/S 7309848, 29 May 1973, 2–3 and ‘Summary and Options Paper’, Office of the Historian, Department of State, East and Southeast Asia online, Chapter VI, The Korean Peninsula, Document No., 1.

⁴² Annex A to NSSM 190, Nixon Library, Loma Linda, California.

⁴³ Memorandum of Conversation with Deng Xiao Ping, New York, 14 April 1974, Record Group 59, Winston Lord, Chron. files, Policy Planning Staff, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Richard Solomon, Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, ‘The PRC and the Termination of the UN Command in Korea’, 12 April 1974, Winston Lord, Chron. files, Policy Planning Staff, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, 3.

⁴⁷ Winston Lord, Chron. files, Policy Planning Staff.

⁴⁸ Ibid. In a letter to the UN Security Council on 27 June 1975, the US stated its willingness to dissolve the UN Command effective 1 January 1976, provided the PRC and North Korea accepted the US and ROK as ‘successors in command’. Memorandum from Habib, Lord and Solomon to Kissinger, 3 July 1976, Ford Library, Solomon Subject Files, Box 39, PRCLO (3) May–July 1975 in FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 18, 703. Cited in footnote 110 in Yafeng Xia and Zhihua Shen, ‘China's Last Ally: Beijing's Policy toward North Korea during the US-China Rapprochement, 1970–1975’, Diplomatic History, first published online 9 September 2013, doi: 10.1093/dh/dht120, footnote 110.

⁴⁹ Memorandum of Conversation with Chi'ao Kuan-hua [Qiao Guanhua], New York, 2 October 1974, Winston Lord, Chron. files, 15.

⁵⁰ See Xia and Shen, ‘China's Last Ally’, 20.

⁵¹ ‘Korea Talks, Chinese Position in November 1973’, Winston Lord Chronological files, Policy Planning Staff.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai, 22 June 1972, 21.

⁵⁴ Winston Lord Chron. files, Policy Planning Staff.

⁵⁵ Memorandum for the Chairman, NSC Review Group, Subject NSSM 27, US Policy for Korea, 17 February 1970, United States and Two Koreas Collection, K00089, Digital National Security Archive online, 2. See also Charles K. Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 170, and ‘Excerpts from Interview with North Korean Premier on Policy Towards the US,’ The New York Times, 31 May 1972.

⁵⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Zhou En-lai, Peking, 22 June 1972, 23.

⁵⁷ See Xia and Shen, ‘China's Last Ally’, 15–17.

⁵⁸ Abramowitz, Moving the Glacier, 12.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Xia and Shen, ‘China's Last Ally’, 18.

⁶¹ Memorandum of Conversation with Korean Foreign Minister, Park Tong Jin, 9 April 1976, 4–5.

⁶² Winston Lord Chron. files, Policy Planning Staff.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Memorandum of Conversation with Ch'iao Kuan-hua [Qiao Guanhua], New York, 2 October 1974, 17, and US Note, 28 August 1974, Winston Lord Chron. files, Policy Planning Staff.

⁶⁵ See UN Document A/9973, Agenda Item 104, Report of the First Committee, General Assembly, 29th Session Annexes, 16 December 1974, 4–5.

⁶⁶ UN Document A/10327, Agenda Item 119, 30th Session of the General Assembly Annexes, 908–918, 18 November 1975. The vote was 54 to 43 for the first resolution and 59 to 51 for the second.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁸ In his memorandum, ‘The United Nations in Korea – Belling the Cat’, (16 August 1971), Wesley Kriebel, a State Department official, pointed out that ‘There is no single factor in the Korean situation that is more of an anomaly than for US officers to be in command of Korean Armed Forces.’ Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland,), 8.

⁶⁹ Annex E to NSSM 154.

⁷⁰ Xia and Shen argue that ‘the Chinese were not enthusiastic about direct US-North Korean contact.’ Xia and Shen, ‘China's Last Ally’, 20.

⁷¹ See footnote 56.

This paper was based on research conducted under the auspices of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Charles K. Armstrong

Charles K. Armstrong is Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies in the Social Sciences at Columbia University.

John Barry Kotch

John Barry Kotch (PhD, Columbia) is a political historian specializing in U.S. security policy toward the Korean peninsula. Email: [email protected]