‘Wean them away from French tutelage’: Franco-Indian nuclear relations and Anglo-American anxieties during the early Cold War, 1948–1952

Abstract

The 1951 Franco-Indian bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement was the first such cooperation outside the Manhattan Project, and preceded President Eisenhower's 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal. This cooperation on one hand upset the United Kingdom, which regretted losing leverage over its former colony to its colonial rival, and on the other, enhanced the United States' interest in playing a key role in the region. Based on multi-archival research, this paper explores the significance of Franco-Indian nuclear relations against the backdrop of Anglo-American endeavours to censor information related to atomic energy and to secure control of strategic minerals during the early Cold War.

Notes

¹ Although India lacks uranium reserves, its monazite sands in Travancore are rich in radioactive thorium, and therefore a significant component of its reserve of strategic minerals.

² Confidential letter from Homi J. Bhabha to Frédéric Jolio-Curie, 11 February 1949, Carton F-86, CEA: Relations avec l'Inde (1948–50), Joliot-Curie Papers, Bibliothèque National de France, Paris (hereafter BnF).

³ According to Itty Abraham, the nuclear programmes of both these countries involved much more than the mere acquisition of nuclear weapons – they were about restoring national pride through the acquisition of technological prowess. Atomic energy involved technology that only a few countries in the world had access to, thus making it the desirable symbol for national progress and uniqueness. See Itty Abraham, “Contra-proliferation: Interpreting the Meanings of India's Nuclear Tests in 1974 and 1998”, in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott Sagan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 120–2. See also Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

⁴ France signed the NPT in August 1992, while India continues to be a non-signatory to the NPT to this day.

⁵ For French nuclear historiography see Maurice Vaïsse, “L'historiographie française relative au nucléaire” Revue historique des armées 262 (2011): 3–8. Published scholarly works on the history of India's nuclear programme include George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Limbo: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), and Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London and New York: Zed Books, 1998). For scholarly works on the French nuclear programme in English, see Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). See also Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 85–113.

⁶ Jean-Luc Racine, Sanjay Gupta and Constance Roger explore the Indo-French defence relationship in contemporary times. Manpreet Sethi in her occasional paper for the Centre de Sciences Humaines in New Delhi, calls upon the Indian atomic energy establishment to derive lessons from the French nuclear energy experience. None of these studies are historical. Nor do they underline the strategic dialogue: bilateralism and world perceptions', Journal of Strategic Studies 25 (Dec. 2002): 157–191, Sanjay Gupta, “The changing patterns of Indo-French relations: From Cold War Estrangement to Strategic Partnership in the Twenty-first century”, French Politics 7 (Sep.-Dec.2009): 243–262, Constance Roger, “Indo-French Defence Cooperation: Friends in Need or Friends Indeed?” IPCS Research Paper no.7, March 2007, and Manpreet Sethi, “The French Nuclear Energy Experience: Lessons for India”, CSH Occasional Paper no.28, Dec. 2010.

⁷ These five établissements français were Pondicherry, Karikal and Yanaon on the Coromandel coast, Chandernagore in Bengal, and Mahé on the Malabar coast. The Resolution of the Indian National Congress of December 1948 noted that all foreign possessions on the Indian subcontinent were an anomaly and that the independent Indian state should establish its authority over all such territory, as no other solution was conceivable. While Chandernagore voted in favour of joining the Indian Union, the referendum in Pondicherry resulted in the contrary, leading to a severe dispute between Paris and New Delhi. It was not until October 1954 that an accord was finalised between the two countries confirming the de facto transfer of the French possessions to the Indian Republic, and the final treaty of de jure cession was signed in 1956. See Baldev Arora, “Les établissements français de l'Inde”, Revue française de science politique 18 (1968): 362–375.

⁸ It seemed that the negotiations on the French colonial possessions operated parallel to the negotiations for the nuclear cooperation agreement, such that when talks were stalled between the two foreign ministries on the former issue, bilateral discussions continued between the atomic energy commissions on the latter. This was owing to the organisational structure of the two atomic energy commissions. Both the CEA and the AECI operated fairly independently of political control. The CEA was overseen by a French civil servant, who reported back to the French government, whereas the AECI was directly answerable only to the Indian prime minister. This enabled the two atomic energy commissions to continue their negotiations on atomic energy-related matters, even when the Quai d'Orsay and the South Block were engaged in disputes.

⁹ Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, 52.

¹⁰ Strategic minerals, also called critical minerals, comprise minerals considered to be vital for economic growth and national defence. These also include uranium, thorium and beryllium, which are used in the production of atomic energy. Since many of these minerals were initially assumed to be not abundant in nature, they are also called “rare earths”. The Anglo-American post-war efforts for resource control incorporated strategic minerals like cerium, bauxite, manganese, uranium, thorium and beryllium amongst others. For US efforts to control strategic minerals during the early Cold War see Glenn Herald Snyder, Stockpiling Strategic Materials; Politics and National Defense, (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1966). and Mats Ingulstad, “The Interdependent Hegemon: The United States and the Quest for Strategic Raw Materials During the Early Cold War”, The International History Review (2014). For an analysis of Anglo-American efforts to control uranium see Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943–1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

¹¹ See Itty Abraham, “Rare Earths: The Cold War in the Annals of Travancore”, in Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).

¹² “Cooperation, Competition and Testing,” Cabinet Papers, United Kingdom National Archives (hereafter UKNA) http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/co-operation-competition-testing.htm (last accessed January 25, 2014)

¹³ Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear sharing: NATO and the N+1 country”, Foreign Affairs 39 (April 1961): 357–8.

¹⁴ Note prepared by M.I. Michaels, head of the UK delegation to the United Nations in New York dated July 1957, Carton AB 16/2550, UKNA.

¹⁵ For a detailed account of these pre-war French attempts see Bertrand Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, trans. Georges M. Tanner (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 45–59. See also Bertrand Goldschmidt, L'aventure atomique: Ses aspects politiques et techniques (Paris: Fayard, 1962).

¹⁶ According to British officials, the Indian Atomic Energy Bill, which was introduced by Jawaharlal Nehru to the Constituent Assembly in March 1948, was “almost of a verbatim reproduction” of British act. Letter from D.E.H. Peirson at the Department of Atomic Energy of the Ministry of Supply to J.P. Gibson at the Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 April 1948, AB 16/515, Commonwealth Relations: India Research and Supplies, 1947–1953, UK National Archives, Kew.

¹⁷ Andrew Jon Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000). 98.

¹⁸ Gyan Prakash, Another Reason, 193.

¹⁹ Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial Bomb (London: Zed Books, 1998), 46.

²⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister wrote in The Discovery of India that “the scientific approach and temper are, or should be, a way of life… It is the temper of a free man.” For an overview of Nehru's vision of a science-led modernity as part of the national development project of India see Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1948).

²¹ Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre: L'Appel 1940–1942 (Paris: Plon, 1954),1.

²² “France must be, and must be recognized as a proud, sovereign, and independent great power participating as an equal among the leading world powers – in short, France must live up to de Gaulle's mystical concept of French grandeur.” Secret Intelligence Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 9 December 1960, INR Files, US Department of State. For an overview of “grandeur” see Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère de Général de Gaulle, 1958–69 (Paris: Fayard, 1998) and Frédéric Bozo, La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945 (Paris: Flammarion, 2012).

²³ See Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1998). See also Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan, 1998), 75–178.

²⁴ Quoted in “Le ministre atomique”, Normandie, 22 October 1945, cited in Hecht, The Radiance of France, 1.

²⁵ Frédéric Joliot-Curie remained and continued his research in Paris throughout the Second World War. In 1945, the CEA was created with Joliot as its first Haut-Commissaire.

²⁶ Top secret letter from Jacques Allier to President of the Council of French Ministers, 30 April 1945, Carton F-15, Defence Nationale, Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF, Paris, France.

²⁷ They were Bertrand Goldschmidt, Jules Guéron and Pierre Auger, Hans Halban and Lew Kowarski.

²⁸ French physicist Bertrand Goldschmidt wrote, “Although the total French contribution was important and out of proportion to our tiny number, it could never represent a real political asset for France for we were not grouped in a coherent unit with a recognised leader who could have negotiated with the British on our behalf. Had Joliot-Curie gone to England, he would have naturally assumed this role.” Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, 60.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ He wrote, “S'il faut admirer l'effort gigantesque de recherches et de fabrication réalisé par les Etats-Unis, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que c'est en France que les premiers principes de réalisation ont été trouvés, ils constituent un appoint de première importance à cette nouvelle conquête de l'homme sur la nature.” Frédéric Joliot-Curie, “A propos de la bombe atomique”, L'Humanité, 12 August 1945, Carton F-31(46), Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF.

³¹ Vincent Bugeja, “Joliot-Curie Rips America for Atomic Energy Report”, New York Herald Tribune, European edition, 15 June 1947, Carton F-87, CEA, Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF.

³² Jean-François Leguil-Bayart suggested to me that one could perhaps draw parallels between the Manhattan Complex, and the “Fashoda complex” or “Fashoda syndrome,” often used to characterise French foreign policy in Africa, i.e. Paris's tendency to assert its influence in territories that might be vulnerable to London's control. The Fashoda complex is said to have emerged from feelings of hurt national interests and battered pride for the French when in September 1898 at Fashoda, in present-day South Sudan, French forces had to withdraw from the White Nile, thus leaving much of that region to the British. Apprehensions of losing out to Anglophone encroachment is often said to have influenced French intervention in Africa. See for instance Jean-François Leguil-Bayart, “Fin de partie au sud du Sahara ? La politique africaine de la France”, in S. Michaïlof (dir.), La France et l'Afrique. Vade-mecum pour un nouveau voyage, Paris, Karthala, 1993, 112–129 and “Bis repetita: la politique africaine de François Mitterrand de 1989 à 1995”, in S. Cohen (dir.), Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide, Paris, PUF, 1998, 251–286. (Coll. “Politique d'aujourd'hui”).

³³ Bertrand Goldschmidt, himself participant in the Manhattan Project, and later on the head of International Relations Division of the CEA, noted lamentingly that without the research undertaken by Hans Halban and Lew Kowarski on heavy water in Montréal, Canadian predominance in pressurised heavy water reactors would have never materialised. Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, 65.

³⁴ Press Communiqué of CEA signed by Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Raoul Dautry, 15 December 1948, Carton F-76(300), Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF.

³⁵ Hecht, The Radiance of France, 2.

³⁶ Note prepared by Francis Perrin titled, “La pile atomique de Chatillon,” 1949, Carton F-76 (300), Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF, Paris, France.

³⁷ Hecht, The Radiance of France, 2.

³⁸ Letter from J.P. Gibson to D.E.H. Peirson, 7 April 1948, AB 16/515, Commonwealth Relations: India Research and Supplies 1947–1953, UKNA.

³⁹ Monazite is an ore which can be used to produce thorium, lanthanum and cerium. Cerium is a rare earth metal with atomic number 58,used in projector lights and studio lighting, common in the cinema industry. Rare Earth Elements: Cerium. http://londoncommoditymarkets.com/rare-earth-elements.php (last accessed 12 December 2012)

⁴⁰ For a historical overview of the monazite question with regard to Travancore in the years following Indian independence see Itty Abraham, “Rare Earths: The Cold War in the annals of Travancore”, in Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 101–124.

⁴¹ Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 98–9.

⁴² Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores, 168.

⁴³ Ibid, 169.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 168.

⁴⁵ Confidential letter from Homi J. Bhabha to Frédéric Joliot-Curie, 11 February 1949, Carton F-86, CEA: Relations avec l'Inde (1948–50), Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF.

⁴⁶ Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office's Trade and Transport Department to the UK High Commissioner in India, 17 May 1949, AB 16/515, Commonwealth Relations, India: Research and Supplies, 1947–53, UKNA.

⁴⁷ Press release by the Indian Home Ministry in New Delhi, 1 June 1950, AB 16/515, Commonwealth Relations, India: Research and Supplies, 1947–53, UKNA.

⁴⁸ Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in India, 30 November 1949, AB 16/515, Commonwealth Relations, India: Research and Supplies, 1947–53, UKNA.

⁴⁹ Secret letter from Roger Makins at the UK Foreign Office to M.W. Perrin at the Ministry of Supply, 5 June 1951, AB16/565, Technical cooperation with India, 1947–54, UKNA.

⁵⁰ Minutes of a Secret Special Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission held on 17 January 1950 3pm, in the House of S.S. Bhatnagar, 4 York Place, New Delhi, Carton F-86, Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF.

⁵¹ The purification of uranium was to be to the degree necessary for use in a reactor, with complete designs and blueprints of the plant, and all technical information about its operation. Ibid.

⁵² Although the visit of Frédéric Joliot-Curie and his wife Irène Joliot-Curie to India precipitated the nuclear cooperation agreement in 1954, it is hard to ascertain if he was specifically authorised to do so by the French government. However, it is possible to say that he enjoyed a good rapport with Raoul d'Autry, the French civil servant or administrateur general, who was responsible for overseeing the activities of the French atomic energy commission. During the negotiations for the Franco-Indian agreement, Raoul D'Autry played an important role. Furthermore, the fact that the agreement did not fall through despite the removal of Joliot-Curie from the CEA probably indicates that the interest for the agreement was rather pervasive.

⁵³ Letter from Raoul Dautry, Administrator-General of the CEA to René Lescop, Secretary-General of the CEA, 14 September 1950, 307 AP 203, June-December 1950, Papers of Raoul Dautry, French National Archives, Paris (hereafter FNA).

⁵⁴ Secret envelope from Jules Guéron to Raoul Dautry containing resumé of discussions with Homi J. Bhabha in London, 2 July 1950, 307 AP 225, 1950–1, Papers of Raoul Dautry, FNA.

⁵⁵ Letter from Oliver Harvey, British Embassy in Paris to the British Government, 30 October 1951, AB16/565, Technical cooperation with India, 1947–54, UKNA.

⁵⁶ Beryllium is a toxic rare metal, which is extremely lightweight and considered a critical strategic mineral useful for national security purposes, especially since the end of the Second World War, when its usefulness in nuclear applications was discovered. The Indian embargo on exports of strategic minerals instituted in 1946 therefore encompassed beryllium as well, which made India's willingness to make an exception for France all the more noteworthy.

⁵⁷ Bertrand Goldschmidt, “Les problèmes nucléaires indiens”, Politique étrangère 47 (1982): 619

⁵⁸ Secret envelope from Jules Guéron to Raoul Dautry containing resumé of discussions with Homi J. Bhabha in London, 2 July 1950, 307 AP 225, 1950–1, Papers of Raoul Dautry, FNA.

⁵⁹ On 7 January 1948, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada agreed at the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee on a modus vivendi involving the exchange of scientific and technological information on matters related to common concern. Article 7 of this modus vivendi stated, “In the interest of mutual security, classified information in the field of atomic energy will not be disclosed to other governments or authorities or persons in countries in other countries without due prior consultation.” In 1954, Roger Makins of the British Foreign Office tried to convince Lewis Strauss of the US AEC to allow Britain to share information in nuclear matters with members of British Commonwealth – information that had not emanated from any exchange with the United States or Canada. Text of letter from Sir Roger Makins to Lewis L. Strauss, 21 April 1954, AB16/565, Technical cooperation with India, 1947–54, UKNA.

⁶⁰ Report by F.W. Marten in Washington DC to W. Harpham at the Foreign Office in London, on debates at the US Senate and at the House of Representatives on loaning wheat to India, 31 May 1951, AB 16/565, Technical cooperation with India 1947–54, UKNA.

⁶¹ Letter from F.C. How to Roger Makins, 18 August 1951, File AB 16/565, Technical co-operation with India, 1947–54, UKNA.

⁶² Report by F.W. Marten in Washington DC to W. Harpham at the Foreign Office in London, on debates at the US Senate and at the House of Representatives on loaning wheat to India, 31 May 1951, AB 16/565, Technical cooperation with India 1947–54, UKNA.

⁶³ Report prepared by Sir John D. Cockcroft on the French atomic energy project, July 1951, File AB 16/565, Technical co-operation with India, 1947–54, UKNA.

⁶⁴ Bertrand Goldschmidt, who headed the CEA mission to India in December 1951, indicated this potential benefit of beryllium-moderated reactors to Indian scientists. Cited in Rudy Mahut, “Entre atomes et diplomatie: les premiers heures du développement international du CEA”, Revue d'histoire diplomatique, vol. 123, n°1, 2009, p. 59.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ United States Statutes at Large, 82nd Congress First session, Vol. 65, Statute 69, 69–71, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-65/pdf/STATUTE-65-Pg69.pdf, accessed 27 December 2013)

⁶⁷ Memorandum by Undersecretary of State Matthews to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 13 November 1951, General United States Policies with respect to South Asia, FRUS, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part II, 1695–8.

⁶⁸ Report by F.W. Marten in Washington DC to W. Harpham at the Foreign Office in London, on debates at the US Senate and at the House of Representatives on loaning wheat to India, 31 May 1951, AB 16/565, Technical cooperation with India 1947–54, UKNA.

⁶⁹ Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 101.

⁷⁰ For a history of Pawley's life see Anthony R. Carrozzo, William D. Pawley: The Extraordinary Life of the Adventurer, Entrepreneur and Diplomat who Cofounded the Flying Tigers (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012).

⁷¹ Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 101.

⁷² Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 81.

⁷³ Ibid, 81–2.

⁷⁴ Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 102.

⁷⁵ Kux, Estranged Democracies, 82.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 79.

⁷⁷ Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, 15 April 1952, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. II, Part 2, National Security Affairs, Document 14.

⁷⁸ Text of letter from Sir Roger Makins to Lewis L. Strauss, 21 April 1954, AB16/565, Technical cooperation with India, 1947–54, UKNA.

⁷⁹ Decree of 28 April 1950, Carton F-87, CEA, Joliot-Curie Papers, BnF.

⁸⁰ The 1951 Franco-Indian agreement set the stage for the training of Indian scientists at the CEA in Saclay, and the knowledge they acquired in France was instrumental in the construction of Zerlina, India's third research reactor. In the absence of primary sources on this episode, further analysis is not possible. See Sandeep Dikshit, “Saclay: Where Indian nuclear scientists cut their teeth”, The Hindu, 7 March 2010, accessed February 21, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/saclay-where-indian-nuclear-scientists-cut-their-teeth/article724533.ece

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Jayita Sarkar

Jayita Sarkar is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Email: [email protected]