New insights into Mao’s initial strategic consideration towards the Korean War intervention

Abstract

The argument that the US army’s crossing of the 38th parallel compelled China’s intervention has been widely accepted in the West. However, as the US manoeuvre posed a major threat to the political and ideological foundations of the CCP regime in the early period of the Korean War, Mao Zedong wanted to send troops to assist North Korean’s quick victory. However, this was not realised because of Stalin’s negative position. Mao’s stance shows that his overriding criteria for intervention was not whether US forces would cross the 38th parallel, but whether their dispatch helped to solidify the CCP regime and if the preconditions for victory existed.

Notes

¹ From the 1960s, Allen S. Whiting and others asserted that the US decision to cross the 38th parallel triggered China’s intervention, arguing that Beijing’s entry could have been averted, and that the war could have been concluded in the autumn of 1950 if US forces had refrained from crossing that line: Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 2–13, 159; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University,1980), 16–19; Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 92–9; Rosemary Foot, “Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,” Diplomatic History 15, no. 3 (1991): 418–19; Qing Simei, “The U.S.-China Confrontation in Korea Assessment of Intentions in Time of Crisis,” in Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the two Koreas, ed. James I. Matray (Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2012), 93–118.

² Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian (From the Yalu River to Panmunjom) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1985), 12, 21–2; However, Qing Simei insists that Mao, expecting America’s Incheon Landing Operation, began to war preparations from July 1950. Qing, “The U.S.-China Confrontation in Korea,” 104.

³ Hao and Zhai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly 121 (1990): 106, 108, 115; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 216.

⁴ Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 3, 154, 158–9.

⁵ Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng (Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2013), 321–2.

⁶ Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 156; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, 163; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 65; Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, 262–3.

⁷ Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin, 3 July 1950, Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of the President of the Russian Federation](hereafter APRF), fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 331, listy. 75–7; Anatoly Torkunov, The War in Korea 1950–1953: Its Origin, Bloodshed and Conclusion (Tokyo: ICF, 2000), 92–3.

⁸ Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 20 July 1950, Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Russian Federation Ministry of Defence Central Archive] (hereafter TsAMO), fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 352–5; Torkunov, The War in Korea 1950–1953, 94–5.

⁹ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan (Collection of Zhou Enlai’s Military Manuscripts) Vol. 4 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 44–5.

¹⁰ Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin, 18 September 1950, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 331, listy. 123–6.

¹¹ Mao’s verbal message to Stalin via Roshchin, 3 October 1950, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii [Russian State Archives on Social-Political History] (hereafter RGASPI), fond. 558, opis. 11, delo. 334, listy. 105–6; On October 3 1950, Mao received Kim Il-sung’s envoy Pak Il-u, and informed him that ‘we will do whatever we can, but we can’t send troops’, reaffirming China’s non-intervention position: telegram from a representative of the Soviet Army in Pyongyang to Stalin, 7 October 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 121, listy. 705–6.

¹² Record of Conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong, 16 December 1949, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 329, listy. 9–17.

¹³ Jin Chongji, Mao Zedong zhuan: 1949–1976 [Biography of Mao Zedong: 1949–1976] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2003), 545.

¹⁴ On March 7 1949, Stalin turned down Kim’s request to attack South Korea on the ground that, first, ‘the KPA does not have an overwhelming superiority over the troops of the South.’ Second, ‘there are still American troops in the South that will interfere in case of hostilities.’ Third, ‘the agreement on the 38th parallel is in effect between the USSR and the United States.’ Stalin permitted a counterattack only in the case of South Korea attacking: see Evgenii P. Bajanov, Aktual’nye Problemy: Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy [Present Problems: International Relations] Vol. 3 (Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2002), 37; Politburo decision to confirm the following directive to the Soviet ambassador in Korea, 24 September 1949, APRF, fond. 3, opis. 65, delo. 771, listy. 30–2; Donggil Kim, “Stalin’s Korean U-Turn: The USSR’s Evolving Security Strategy and the Origins of the Korean War,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 24, no. 1 (2011): 89–114.

¹⁵ Telegram from Kovalev to Stalin, 18 May 1949, APRF, fond. 4, opis. 01, delo. 333, listy. 59–61; Donggil Kim, ‘Prelude to War? The repatriation of Koreans from the Chinese PLA, 1949–50,” Cold War History 12, no. 1 (2012): 227–44.

¹⁶ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianjuan weiyuanhui, Liu shaoqi Xuanji [Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 426–31; Zhonggong zhonhyang wenxian yanjiushi, Liu Shaoqi nianpu: 1898–1949 [A Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi: 1898–1949] Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1996), 215–17.

¹⁷ Summary of conversation between Stalin and delegation of CC CCP, headed by Liu Shaoqi, 27 June 1949, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 01, delo. 329, listy. 1–7; On 30 July 1949, Liu Shaoqi and Georgy Malenkov signed a loan agreement. The Soviet Union agreed to offer a 300 million dollar loan, at a low interest rate of 1%, to the CCP: see Zhonggong zhonhyang wenxian yanjiushi, Liu Shaoqi nianpu Vol. 2, 219–20.

¹⁸ Shi Zhe, Zai lishi Juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [By the Side of Historical Giants] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1991), 412.

¹⁹ Telegram from Stalin to Mao, drafted by Molotov, 26 October 1949, APRF, fond. 45, opis.1, delo. 332, listy. 47–8.

²⁰ Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation] (hereafter AVPRF), fond. 059a, opis. 5a, delo. 3, papka. 11, list. 92.

²¹ Kim Il-sung visited Moscow from 30 March to 25 April 1950, and met Stalin three times: Torkunov, The War in Korea 1950–1953, 51–2.

²² Telegram from Soviet representative Aleksei Ignatieff in Pyongyang to Vyshinsky, 10 April 1950, AVPRF, fond. 059a, opis. 5a, delo. 3, papka. 11, listy. 98–9.

²³ Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 12 May 1950, AVPRF, fond. 059a, opis. 5a, delo. 3, papka. 11, listy. 100–3.

²⁴ Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong on the issue of Kim Il-sung’s visit to Moscow, 3 May 1950, APRF, fond. 45, opis.1, delo. 331, list. 54.

²⁵ Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin, 13 May 1950, AVPRF, fond. 059a, opis. 5a, delo. 3, papka. 11, listy. 100–3.

²⁶ Record of the second conversation between Mao Zedong and representatives of CPSU, 23 September 1956, author’s personal collection.

²⁷ Ibid; Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, 221–2.

²⁸ Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 May 1950, RGASPI, fond. 558, opis. 11, delo. 334, list. 56.

²⁹ Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, 221–2; Record of the second conversation between Mao Zedong and representatives of CPSU, 23 September 1956, author’s personal collection.

³⁰ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Mao Zedong nianpu: 1949–1976 [A Chronology of Mao Zedong: 1949–1976] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013), 152–3.

³¹ Telegram from Stalin to Mao, drafted by Molotov, 26 October 1949, APRF, fond. 45, opis.1, delo. 332, listy. 47–8.

³² Before the founding of the PRC, the CCP planned to utilise Hong Kong as an import and export channel with capitalist countries. On 6 July 1949, Liu Shaoqi asked Stalin to ‘open a Dalian seaport for facilitating China’s exporting of coal and salt to Hong Kong and Japan’. At the same time, he also requested that ‘when Shanghai and Tianjin port were blockaded, China should be allowed to use the Port of Dalian, and the U.S. and England merchant ships are permitted to access Dalian, as well’: see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongyang dang’anguan, Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao [Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2005), 27.

³³ Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, 221–2; Record of the second conversation between Mao Zedong and representatives of CPSU, 23 September 1956, author’s personal collection.

³⁴ US Department of State, “Resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council, June 25, 1950,” 25 June 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Korea, 1950, 155–6.

³⁵ US Department of State, “Resolution adapted by the United Nations Security Council, June 27, 1950,” FRUS (1950), Korea, 211.

³⁶ US Department of State, “Memorandum of conversation, by the Ambassador at large (Jessup), 26 June 1950,” FRUS, (1950), Korea, 179; US Department of State, “Statement issued by the President, 27 June 1950,” FRUS (1950), Korea, 202–3.

³⁷ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1956) Vol. 2, 333–9; US Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), June 26, 1950,” FRUS, Vol. 7 (1950), Korea, 178–83.

³⁸ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and zhongyang dang’anguan, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao [Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008), 524–6.

³⁹ Yang Kuisong, “Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper 34 (February 2002): 5–10.

⁴⁰ Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao (Internal Reference), 1 July 1950, no. 171, 1–3.

⁴¹ Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin, 2 July 1950, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 331, listy. 75–7; Torkunov, The War in Korea 1950–1953, 92–3.

⁴² Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 5 July 1950, RGASPI, fond. 558, opis. 11, delo. 334, list. 79.

⁴³ Yao, Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian, 21–2; Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, 321–2.

⁴⁴ Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian Tanpan (The Panmunjom Negotiations) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), 36; Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 15 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 303–5.

⁴⁵ Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 20 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 352–5.

⁴⁶ Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 4 July 1950, no. 172, 12; Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 10 July 1950, no. 175, 24–5; Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 11 July 1950, no. 176, 31–2.

⁴⁷ Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 13 July 1950, no. 178, 39–40; Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 15 July 1950, no. 179, 45.

⁴⁸ Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 22 July 1950, no. 184, 79–80.

⁴⁹ Luo Ruiqing tongzhi zai dierci quanguogonganhuiyishang de baogao [Comrade Luo Ruiqing’s Report at the second national public security meeting held on 16 October 1950], cited from Yang Kuisong, ‘Xinzhongguo “zhenya fangeming” yundong yanjiu’ [A Study in the Movement of Suppression of the Anti-Revolutionaries in the Early Period of PRC] Shixue yuekan 1 (2006): 45–61.

⁵⁰ Regarding the petition movement developed by the Chinese government to peacefully resolve the issue of the Korean Peninsula, some people said that ‘the petition is a preparation phase of compulsory military service, and if you sign, you will suffer disadvantages when the Kuomintang returns’, showing that many Chinese people believed that reinstatement of the Kuomintang regime was at near: Xinhua News Agency, ed., Neibu cankao, 24 August 1950, no. 205, 69–71.

⁵¹ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian [Selected Important Documents Since the founding] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992), 358–60; From January to October in 1950, 816 armed revolts occurred to overthrow the China’s communist government and the number of people who got arrested for being a spy totaled up to 25,041 by August, and the Chinese government executed 639 of them: Yang, “Xinzhongguo ‘zhenyafangeming’ yundong yanjiu,” 49; Wang, “Liu Shaoqi yu xinzhongguo chenglichuqi de zhenya gangeming yundong” [Liu Shaoqi and the Suppression of the Counterrevolutionary Movement in the Early Period of People’s Republic of China], Shixue yuekan 11 (2013): 42.

⁵² Seoul Sinmunsa, ed., Juhan migun 30 nyeonsa (1945–1978) [A History of American forces in Korea for 30 years (1945–1978)] (Seoul: Haenglim chulpansa, 1979), 155–7.

⁵³ Torkunov, The War in Korea 1950–1953, 94–5.

⁵⁴ CIA Intelligence Report, “Communist China’s Role,” Weekly Summary Excerpt, 14 July 1950. Cited from Kuhns, Assessing the Soviet Threat, 419–21; ‘The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State’, 29 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 821–2.

⁵⁵ US Department of State, “Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950,” FRUS, 1950, Korea, 953.

⁵⁶ Telegram from Shykov to Stalin, 20 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 352–5.

⁵⁷ Telegram from Shykov to Stalin, 15 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 303–5.

⁵⁸ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1987), 454–5.

⁵⁹ Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, kangmei yuanchao zhanzhengshi [A History of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea] Vol. 1 (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2011), 99; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 469.

⁶⁰ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan Vol. 4, 43–50.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Chen Jian and Goncharov insist that Kim Il-sung did not want China’s help. Particularly, Chen Jian argues that in the initial stage of the war, Kim Il-sung believed that ‘direct help from Beijing was neither necessary nor desirable, especially if such help would strengthen the position of the (Yan’an) opposition factions within the North Korean Communist Party’: See Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 134, 156; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, 163.

⁶³ Telegram from Shykov to Stalin, 7 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 168–71.

⁶⁴ Telegram from Shykov to Stalin, 15 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 303–5.

⁶⁵ Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 20 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 122, listy. 352–5; Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko, Date were not given, AVPRF, fond. 0102, opis. 6, delo. 48, papka. 21, listy. 109–69.

⁶⁶ In a telegram to Stalin, Ambassador Shtykov provided his personal view, stating that ‘Kim Il-sung has lost his confidence completely in gaining a victory on his own, continuing to attempt to seek our approval on this issue’: Shykov to Vyshinsky, 28 July 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 127, listy. 666–9.

⁶⁷ Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il-sung via Shtykov, 28 August 1950, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 347, listy. 5–6; Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il-sung via Shtykov, 28 August 1950, AVPRF, fond. 059a, opis. 5a, delo. 4, papka. 11, listy. 155–6.

⁶⁸ Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 6 July 1950, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 140, list. 140.

⁶⁹ William Stueck argued that ‘for the short term, this development (Chinese involvement) would further China’s dependence on the USSR, yet it would also increase the likelihood of global conflict. For the long term, China’s assumption of the major burden in Korea could lead to an erosion of Soviet control over international communism’: see Stueck, The Korean War, 65.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 54.

⁷¹ Telegram from Stalin to Gottwald, 27 August 1950, RGASPI, fond. 558, opis. 11, delo. 62, listy. 71–2.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko, 21 September 1950, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 125, listy. 86–8.

⁷⁴ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Mao Zedong nianpu: 1949–1976 Vol. 1, 195–6.

⁷⁵ Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin, 18 September 1950, APRF, fond. 45, opis. 1, delo. 331, listy.123–6.

⁷⁶ Torkunov, The War in Korea 1950–1953, 101–2.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Jin, Mao Zedong zhuan: 1949–1976 Vol. 1, 111.

⁷⁹ Telegram from Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950, RGASPI, fond. 558, opis. 11, delo. 334, listy. 97–8; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Mao Zedong nianpu: 1949–1976 Vol. 1, 200.

⁸⁰ As the war situation became worse after the Incheon landing, China’s leaders faced with growing domestic opposition for sending troops to Korea. By October, this opposition opinion, initially expressed by minority democratic parties and members of the Chinese army, spread quickly to members of central committee of the CCP: Mao’s verbal message to Stalin via Roshchin, 3 October 1950, RGASPI, fond. 558, opis. 11, delo. 334, listy. 105–6; Telegram to Stalin from a representative of the Soviet Army in Pyongyang, TsAMO, fond. 5, opis. 918795, delo. 121, listy. 705–6.