Comrades at enmity: Pyongyang-Hanoi split after the fall of Saigon

ABSTRACT

This paper unveils the accumulated tensions and conflicts in North Korean-Vietnamese relations in the late 1970s. From diplomatic competition to ideological gap, the once comrades-in-arms found themselves gradually drifting apart. But it was not until Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia that the traditional friendship was severely damaged. Economic cooperation deteriorated due to the North’s criticism of Vietnam and Kim Il Sung’s support for Democratic Kampuchea. Still, this paper emphasizes that a key source of the Pyongyang-Hanoi discord lay in their mutual perceptions and evaluations of each other’s accomplishments in nation-building and achieving reunification.

KEYWORDS:

• North Korea
• Vietnam
• Kim Il Sung
• non-aligned movement
• Vietnam-North Korea relations

Acknowledgments

This paper was written during a Visiting Fellowship at the Harvard-Yenching Institute in 2019-20 and outlined during doctoral studies at Seoul National University. I am grateful to Tae-Gyun Park (SNU) and Jong-Dae Shin (UNKS) for flaming the interest on and urging the investigation of North Korea-Vietnam relations. I remain indebted to Gregg Brazinsky (GWU) and Nam-Hee Lee (UCLA) for their immense support throughout the years, regardless of the fact that I am not one of their “official” students. My deep appreciation also extends to Julia Cai (Harvard) for her painstaking editing of drafts of this paper, and the anonymous reviewers of Cold War History for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. I dedicate this work to my late Father Đỗ Tiến Thắng.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

¹ Mike Ives, ‘Kim Jong-un Arrives in Vietnam, for a Visit About More Than Trump’, The New York Times, February 25, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/north-korea-kim-vietnam.html.

² Kook-Chin Kim, ‘An Overview of North Korean-Southeast Asian Relations’, in The Foreign Policy of North Korea: New Perspectives, ed. Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh and Tae-Hwan Park (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1987), 365.

³ The most complete account of Pyongyang-Hanoi contact between 1950–1975 is Do Thanh Thao Mien, 『베트남전쟁기 한반도와 베트남 관계 연구』 서울: 이화여자대학교 박사학위 논문, 2019. Other scholars emphasised the North’s participation in the Vietnam War and its calculations, including Merle Pribbenow, North Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP), E-Dossier #2, 2011); Balàzs Szalontai, ‘In the Shadow of Vietnam: A New Look at North Korea’s Militant Strategy, 1962–1970’, Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 4 (2012): 122–66; Lee Sin Jae, ‘Battle between the Two Koreas in Vietnam: An Analysis of Participation in the Vietnam War by the North Korean Psychological Warfare Unit and Propaganda Leaflets’, S/N Korean Humanities 4, no. 1 (2018): 75–97; James F. Durand, ‘Partisans, Pilots, PSYOPS, and Prisoners: North Korea’s Vietnam Odyssey’, International Journal of Korean Studies 23, no. 1 (2019): 43–70; and Benjamin R. Young, ‘The Origins of North Korea-Vietnam Solidarity: The Vietnam War and the DPRK’, Working Paper #7, Washington, DC: NKIDP, 2019.

⁴ Balàzs Szalontai, ‘How the North Korean-Vietnamese Friendship Turned Sour’, NK News, October 31, 2017. https://www.nknews.org/2017/10/how-the-north-korean-vietnamese-friendship-turned-sour/

⁵ None of the published works on Pyongyang-Hanoi relations written in Vietnamese, including Nguyễn Hữu Cát and Mai Hoài Anh, ‘Quan hệ Việt Nam-Triều Tiên trong tình hình mới (Vietnam-North Korea Relations in the New Context)’, Lý luận chính trị (Political Theory) 5 (2008): 59–64; Dương Chính Thức, ‘Quan hệ Việt Nam-Triều Tiên trong bối cảnh mới (Vietnam-North Korea Relations in the New Context)’, Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Bắc Á (Journal of Northeast Asian Studies) 11, no. 129 (2011): 3–10, mention the two countries’ hostility in the 1970s-1980s. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and subsequent normalisation of diplomatic ties between Vietnam and South Korea in 1992 are cited as the turning points when Pyongyang and Hanoi ‘embraced their own paths of development’, resulting in the ‘cooling of ties’ in Trần Quang Minh, ‘Quan hệ Việt Nam-Triều Tiên: 65 năm nhìn lại và triển vọng (Vietnam-North Korea Relations: Looking Back 65 Years and Future Prospects)’, Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Đông Bắc Á 10, no. 176 (2015): 3–12.

⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, ‘3 May Editorial Hails Vietnamese Peoples Victory’, Pyongyang KCNA in English 1001 GMT May 3, 1975 OW.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Comparative studies of the ‘three Confucian-Leninist cultures’ of North Korea, Vietnam, and China are found in the chapters of Robert A. Scalapino and Dalchoong Kim, eds., Asian Communism: Continuity and Transition (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988).

⁹ Report from the GDR Embassy in the DPRK, ‘Note About a Conversation with the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Comrade Le Quang Khai, on 5 May 1976’, May 6, 1976, Document 114286, translated by Bernd Schaefer, Wilson Center Digital Archive (WCDA), https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114286.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam created a single central government and renamed the country the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) on July 2, 1976. The Vietnamese Workers’ Party was also renamed the Vietnamese Communist Party at the end of the year.

¹² Document 114286.

¹³ Samuel S. Kim, ‘Pyongyang, the Third World, and Global Politics’, in The Two Koreas in World Politics, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Patterson and Edward A Olsen (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1983), 75–80.

¹⁴ Kim Il Sung, The Non-Alignment Movement is a Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975), 1–2.

¹⁵ SRV, Phong trào Không Liên kết (The Non-Aligned Movement), Hà Nội: Sự Thật (Hanoi: Truth Publisher, 1979), 36.

¹⁶ The three revolutionary tidal waves, according to Vietnamese rhetoric, were: ‘Thanks to the socialist force (1) as the main anchor and the international workers movement (2) that further weakened imperialism right at its metropolis (chính quốc), the national liberation movement in developing countries (3) gained better conditions to achieve more victories all over the world’. Ibid. Underlines and numbers added.

¹⁷ Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984), 220–1; Dae-sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 265–6; and Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 99–100.

¹⁸ Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, 221.

¹⁹ ‘Minutes of Conversation at the Official Meeting between the Romanian Delegation and the Korean Delegation’, May 20, 1978, Document 114456, obtained and translated by Eliza Gheorghe, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114456.

²⁰ Szalontai, ‘How the North Korean-Vietnamese Friendship Turned Sour’.

²¹ Document 114456.

²² Untitled Report from Brun, Polish Intelligence Station in Tokyo, ‘Concerning Hua Guofeng’s Visit to Pyongyang’, May 12, 1978, Document 208554, obtained by Marek Hańderek and translated by Jerzy Giebułtowski, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208554.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Dự thảo hiệp định hợp tác văn hoá năm 1977 với CHDCND Triều Tiên (Draft Agreement on Cultural Cooperation with the DPRK in 1977), September 24, 1977, Hồ sơ (Folder) 10457, Phông Phủ Thủ tướng (Collection of the Prime Minister’s Office), Trung tâm Lưu trữ Quốc gia III (National Archives III), 3. Hereafter ‘CPMO’. Underlines added.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid. Underlines added.

²⁷ The mastermind behind this political ideology was Kim Jong Il, son of Kim Il Sung and future leader of North Korea. Promulgating it alongside the ‘Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System’, he stated that Kimilsungism was ‘an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind’, and ‘a perfect revolutionary theory of Communism’. See Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 89–91.

²⁸ Folder 10457.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Following the special visit to Hanoi by a US Presidential Commission headed by Leonard Woodcock, the Carter administration conducted five rounds of talks with top Vietnamese diplomats throughout 1977–1978 in Paris and New York. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War, A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 136–68; Steven Hurst, The Carter Administration and Vietnam (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 32–45; and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau, American- Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War: Diplomacy after the Capture of Saigon, 1975–1979 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2006), 108–47.

³¹ Full message to Comrades Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, The Pyongyang Times, October 1, 1977, 1.

³² ‘Mừng nước ta vào Liên hợp quốc (Celebrating Vietnam’s Entry to the United Nations)’, Nhân Dân, September 26, 1977, 4.

³³ The three South Korean detainees were Lee Dae Yong (이대용), an official from the Ministry of the Interior who had consulate status in Saigon; Ahn Hee Wan (안희완) and So Byeong Ho (서병호), both were sent to Saigon by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). 차지현, 조동준, ‘권위주의 체제의 비용을 통한 신호 전달: 1970년대 주월남 한국 공관원 억류 사건 중심으로’, 『전남대학교 세계한상문화연구단 국내학술회의』 서울: 전남대학교 세계한상문화연구단, 2008, 1671–2.

³⁴ Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ambassador in Finland, ‘Report on Dialogue with Vainiomaki, Ex-Commercial Attaché in Pyongyang’, June 28, 1978, Document 118387, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118387.

³⁵ Hồ sơ xét duyệt đoàn ra, đoàn vào cho Bộ Ngoại giao năm 1978 (Immigration Approval Records for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978), June 27, 1978. Folder 10486, 25, CPMO.

³⁶ 조동준, 차지현, ‘베트남 한국 공관원 송환을 위한 신호게임, 1975–1980’,『국제정치논총』, 54 (1), 2014, 50. When the Seoul delegation firmly adhered to the ‘one to one’ principle, Pyongyang conceded to a ‘one to seven’ exchange rate. Details about the strained inter-Korean negotiations, including the list of the 28 names that the North requested for repatriation (including highly prominent figures such as Hwang Tae Seong, Shin Young Bok, and Lee Jae Hak) as well as the journey home of the three detainees can be found in several South Korean news articles and historians’ blog posts, such as 오동룡, ‘베트남 억류 외교관 석방 위해 북한과 ‘간첩관의 맞교환’협상’, 월간조선 (2015), http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=E&nNewsNumb=201501100025; 안치용, ‘월남 억류외교관 석방협상, 북한인도명단최초 입수’, 선데이저널, Vol. 1033 (2016), https://sundayjournalusa.com/2016/07/14/안치용-특별발굴비화-2-월남억류외교관-석방협상-북/; 안치용, ‘38년만에 밝혀진 월남억류 한국외교관 충격적 “북한전향서” 진실과 사실’, NewsMedia (2016), http://www.newsm.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=6407; 조갑제, ‘북한 정권의 이대용-신영복 교환 공작은 이래서 좌절되었다!’, 조갑제닷컴 (2018), http://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=77869&C_CC=AZ.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Chanda, Brother Enemy, 46–73; and Stephen J. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 47–68.

³⁹ Michael Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot, And the United States: The Faustian Pact (New York: Praeger, 1991), 13–4.

⁴⁰ Szalontai, ‘In the Shadow of Vietnam’, 162.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² More information about the special friendship between Kim and Sihanouk throughout the Cold War can be found in Kin Phea, ‘Cambodia-North Korea Relations Since 1964: A Historical Review’, 『동아연구』 제35권 2호 (통권 71집, 2016), 381–406. As regards the anti-Vietnam coalition, apart from Pol Pot’s army (the Khmer Rouge), there were forces of the former Lon Nol regime, which eventually formed the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and a small army loyal to Prince Sihanouk. The KPNLF and Sihanoukists were known as the non-Communist resistance (NCR); their armies were later called the Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) and the Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS). In 1982, the three political factions signed an agreement to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

⁴³ David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 138.

⁴⁴ ‘Party and Government Delegation of Democratic Kampuchea Concludes Its Visit to the DPRK’, The Pyongyang Times, October 15, 1977, 3.

⁴⁵ ‘We Most Warmly Congratulate Korean People on All Their Great Successes Made in Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction in the Spirit of Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Reliance, Speech of Comrade Pol Pot at Mass Rally’, Ibid., 4.

⁴⁶ While in Peking, Pol Pot denounced ‘the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba [who] are cooperating in order to fight us in the border areas’. ‘Hua Guofeng and Pol Pot’, 29 September 1977, Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg, Seventy-Seven Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars of Indochina, 1964–1977 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War International History Project, 1998), 193. In response, China promised to give remarkable support to DK’s policy ‘in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism’. Chanda, Brother Enemy, 101.


⁴⁷ Document 114456.

⁴⁸ Telegram 066764 From the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pol Pot’s Visit to the DPRK’, October 10, 1977, Document 114866, obtained and translated by Eliza Gheorghe, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114866.

⁴⁹ Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2008), 377–8.

⁵⁰ Memorandum for Brzezinski from East Asia, Weekly Report, ‘North Korea Military Assistance to Cambodia’, June 15, 1978, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration II.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² East Asia Review, ‘North Korea: Chronology (December 1978–January 1979)’, January 23, 1979. CREST, 22.

⁵³ ‘Possible Redraft or Insertion in Worldwide Briefing on the Soviet Union’, January 19, 1978. CREST.

⁵⁴ Parrot’s Beak – Mỏ Vẹt (Svay Rieng Province), one of the terminus points of the Ho Chi Minh/Sihanouk Trail, was also the site of a key operation of US forces during the Cambodian Incursion in 1970. It was seized by Vietnamese troops in December 1977-January 1978 during their retaliatory attack against the Khmer Rouge.

⁵⁵ Document 114456.

⁵⁶ ‘민족적독립과 사회주의와 평화에 대한 도전 (Challenge to National Independence, Socialism and Peace)’, Rodong Sinmun, January 13, 1979, 4; FBIS, ‘Nodong Sinmun Denounces Vietnamese Role in Cambodia’, Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0606 GMT January 12, 1979 SK.

⁵⁷ Ibid. Although leaning towards China in the latter half of the 1970s, North Korea studiously avoided using the term ‘hegemonism’, a well-known Chinese code word for Soviet attempts to project and expand its power in the world. Pyongyang instead coined the phrase ‘dominationism’ (지배주의).

⁵⁸ FBIS, ‘Nodong Sinmun Condemnation of SRV Invasion of Cambodia Cited’, Beijing XINHUA (Peking NCNA) in English, 1612 GMT January 12, 1979 OW.

⁵⁹ Telegram to the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on DPRK’s Foreign Minister Heo Dam’s Visit to Yugoslavia, etc’, April 7, 1979, Document 118391, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118391.

⁶⁰ ‘Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Pyongyang’, The Pyongyang Times, May 26, 1979, 1.

⁶¹ ‘His Excellency Marshal Kim Il Sung Is a Greatest Hero of Revolution, of the War of National Liberation, of the Socialist and Communist Construction, Speech of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk at Banquet’, Ibid., 2–3.

⁶² Ibid., 3.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ ‘Samdech Norodom Sihanouk’s Sojourn in Korea’, The Pyongyang Times, June 9, 1979, 2.

⁶⁵ ‘Great Leader President Kim Il Sung Sees Film Produced by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk’, ‘Great Leader President Kim Il Sung Calls on Samdech Norodom Sihanouk At Guest House’, The Pyongyang Times, September 1, 1979, 1.

⁶⁶ ‘Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Looks Round Some Places in Pyongyang’, The Pyongyang Times, September 15, 1979, 2.

⁶⁷ ‘Visit to DPRK by Government Delegation of Democratic Kampuchea’, The Pyongyang Times, March 15, 1980, 1.

⁶⁸ ‘President Kim Il Sung, Together with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Sees Film “Tale of Chunhyang”’, The Pyongyang Times, April 19, 1980, 1.

⁶⁹ Jarip (자립), together with jaju or chaju (자주 – political independence) and jawi (자위 – self-reliance in defence), are the three fundamental principles of juche (주체 – often translated as ‘self-reliance’), the official ideology of North Korea.

⁷⁰ Szalontai, ‘How the North Korean-Vietnamese Friendship Turned Sour’.

⁷¹ For example, in the Five-Year Agreement, North Korea was to provide 100 kilograms of fresh ginseng and 5 tons of menthol to Vietnam. During negotiations, however, the North Korean delegation only promised 24 kilograms of fresh ginseng (and included them into the medicine exchange together with 315 kilograms of flour ginseng), and refused to provide menthol. They also initially agreed to provide just 200 tons of lead, though the Five-Year Agreement stipulated the amount of 250 tons. Therefore, the final results of negotiations, according to Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nguyễn Văn Đào, was just ‘average’. Báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại thương về kết quả đàm phán mậu dịch năm 1979 với Triều Tiên (Report by the Ministry of Foreign Trade on the Results of Trade Negotiations with North Korea for 1979), January 11, 1979, Folder 11318. CPMO.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Trade emphasised in the report key items such as tires, rubber, and peanut oil where Vietnam might have difficulties in meeting the demands of the DPRK. Hanoi, however, tried its best to secure the rest of the items listed in the Five-Year Agreement, especially apatite which Pyongyang needed urgently. On their end, North Korea decided to agree to the 250 tons of lead following strong persuasion from the Vietnamese side. Ibid.

⁷⁴ With a narrow worldview that stemmed from its long history of constant wars and isolation, Hanoi categorised the players in the international system throughout the Cold War into three concrete groups: ‘friend’ (bạn), ‘enemy’ (địch), and ‘we’ (ta). Starting from mid-1977, China and the DK were no longer being called ‘friends’ in Vietnam’s diplomatic reports. One example is Báo cáo tình hình công tác sáu tháng đầu năm 1977 của Bộ Ngoại giao (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Report on the Foreign Affairs of the First Six Months of 1977), July 1977, Folder 10160, 10–12, CPMO.

⁷⁵ Công văn của Ủy ban Khoa hc và Ky~ thuật Nhà nước về giúp một số hạng mục khoa học ky~ thuật cho Triều Tiên năm 1979 (Official Dispatch from State Committee for Science and Technology on Assisting North Korea in Several Scientific-Technical Items), September 13, 1978, Folder 11319. CPMO.

⁷⁶ The two sides set up an Inter-Governmental Committee of Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation in 1989. After three years, the Committee’s activities were halted again due to Pyongyang’s protest against 1992 Hanoi-Seoul diplomatic normalisation.

⁷⁷ Hồ sơ xét duyệt đoàn ra, đoàn vào cho Bộ Ngoại thương năm 1980 (Immigration Approval Records for the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1980), ‘Về việc đàm phán mậu dịch 1980 với Triều Tiên’ (On Trade Negotiations with North Korea for 1980), January 29, 1980. Folder 11369, 17, CPMO.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Bổ sung tình hình quan hệ giữa ta với Triều Tiên từ 1973 đến 12/1979 (Additional Information on Our Relations with North Korea from 1973 to December 1979), document undated, Folder 9235, 11, CPMO. The additional handwritten paper was attached at the end of the typed report, indicating a later add-on in December 1979. Square brackets, emphasis added.

⁸⁰ Folder 11369.

⁸¹ The iron shipyard was planned to be built in Nghệ Tĩnh province (now divided into Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh), central Vietnam. As of 1979, the two countries were undecided about this project. Meanwhile, the porcelain factory (mostly for manufacturing porcelain for electrical insulation products, which were crucial for electricity supply and connection in Vietnam back then) was scheduled to be constructed in Thanh Hóa province, northern Vietnam. In 1977, Vietnam sent a delegation to Pyongyang to negotiate this project and on June 26 the same year signed a contract on its design, materials, equipment, and expertise, all provided by North Korea. It was expected that the North would hand over the design in 1978 and then send the materials in 1980. However, as the North Korean side ‘passed over’ and ‘said nothing’ about the project due to mutual ‘bad relations’, Vietnam could not help but remain silent about the issue. Folder 9235.

⁸² ‘K. Y. Yang’, a South Korean Swede and President of Daniel International’s Sweden branch, visited Hanoi between September 8–16, 1980. He offered to be the mediator for the Vietnamese Government to establish trade relations with Seoul. While remaining cautious about allowing South Korean businessmen to enter the country en masse, Hanoi was eager to diversify its trading partners, especially a potential one like the ROK. Tờ trình, công văn, báo cáo của Phủ Thủ tướng, Bộ Ngoại giao về việc quan hệ buôn bán với Nam Triều Tiên năm 1980 (Statement, Official Dispatch and Report by Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Trading Relations with the Republic of Korea in 1980), September 23–8 November 1980, Folder 11800. CPMO.

⁸³ Hungarian Embassy in Canada, Ciphered Telegram, ‘Vietnamese-DPRK Relations’, 8 June 1979, Document 115837, translated by Balàzs Szalontai, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115837 Square brackets added. After the overthrow of Pol Pot, the pro-Vietnamese People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established in Phnom Penh, marking the beginning of a ten-year occupation by Vietnam.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Between 1976–1978, President of the Vietnam-North Korea Friendship Association Trần Lâm and Chairman of the Vietnamese Committee for Support of Korean Reunification Lê Thiết Hùng hosted noisy meetings, rallies and film festivals in big cities such as Hanoi, Nam Định and Vĩnh Phú every June-July as an act of solidarity with Pyongyang. Nhân Dân and KCNA in English, 1976-78.

⁸⁶ Only a small film show was organised for both events. The former was arranged at the Vietnamese Embassy, the latter at the Chollima House of Culture. KCNA in English, January-February 1980.

⁸⁷ Telegram from the Hungarian Embassy in Pyongyang, ‘KWP’s 6^th Congress’, October 24, 1980, Document 123746, Translated by Imre Màjer, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123746.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Report from Hungarian Embassy in Mongolia, ‘Vietnamese Views about North Korean Policies’, March 2, 1983, Document 115830, translated by Balàzs Szalontai, WCDA, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115830.

⁹⁰ FBIS, ‘Text of Kim Comments to TANJUG on Nonaligned’, Pyongyang KCNA in English, 2225 GMT February 17, 1983.

⁹¹ Ibid. Throughout the 1980s, Kim constantly emphasised chajusong during his meetings with the leaders of NAM nations, such as Pinto da Costa of São Tomé and Príncipe, Zia of Pakistan, Ortega of Nicaragua, Habyarimana of Rwanda, Mengistu of Ethiopia, Khamenei of Iran, etc. It was also the key message of his addresses at several conferences of NAM bodies that were held in Pyongyang. KCNA in English, 1982-89.

⁹² Document 115830.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ironically, Pyongyang once urged the creation of the ‘united front of the five revolutionary Asian countries’ (China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Sihanouk’s Cambodia) in mid-1970 that was opposed by Hanoi. Balázs Szalontai, ‘Political and Economic Relations between Communist States’ in Stephen A. Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 316.

⁹⁹ Telegram from US Embassy in Bangkok to Secretary of State, ‘Possible Thai Request for Purchase of Korea-Produced Arms’, June 22, 1979, The National Archives Access to Archival Databases (AAD).

¹⁰⁰ Telegram from US Embassy in Seoul to Secretary of State, ‘Transfer of M-16 Rifles from Korea to Thailand’, August 2, 1979, AAD.

¹⁰¹ Telegram from US Delegation Secretary in New York to Secretary of State, ‘ROK Foreign Minister’s Meeting with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke’, September 27, 1979, AAD.

¹⁰² Telegram from US Delegation Secretary in Bali to US Embassy in Seoul, ‘Korea Assistance on Refugees’, July 2, 1979, AAD.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Harvard-Yenching Institute [Visiting Fellowship].

Notes on contributors

Khue Dieu Do

Khue Dieu Do is a lecturer at the Faculty of International Relations, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City. She earned her Ph.D. and MA in International Studies from Seoul National University, and Visiting Fellowships from the Harvard-Yenching Institute and The George Washington University. Her research mainly revolves around modern Korean history, U.S. relations with East and Southeast Asia throughout the Cold War, and the dynamics among Asian Socialist states.