Dragon in the Golden Triangle: military operations of the people’s liberation army in Northern Burma, 1960–1961

ABSTRACT

Towards the end of the Chinese Civil War, contingents of Chinese Nationalist Party/Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers escaped to an area of Burma that would later be known as the Golden Triangle. They expanded into a significant armed presence. Burma, the Republic of China, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States were subsequently embroiled in this decade-long KMT Issue. A joint Sino-Burmese military campaign between late 1960 and early 1961 finally ended the KMT Issue. This article, primarily based on PRC sources, reconstructs how the PRC understood, conceived, organised and evaluated this campaign.

KEYWORDS:

• Golden Triangle
• Tatmadaw
• China-Burma Relations
• Kuomintang Issue
• People's Liberation Army

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Richard M. Gibson (with Wenhua Chen), The Secret Army: Chiang Kai-shek and the Drug Warlords of the Golden Triangle (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 64.

² Yunnan shengzhi: Junshizhi (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2007), 384.

³ Robert H. Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the Kuomintang Intervention in Burma (Ithaca: Southeast Asian Studies Program, Cornell University, 1973); Kenneth Young, Chinese Nationalist Troops in Burma: Obstacles in Burma’s Foreign Relations (PhD Thesis, New York University, 1975); Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 32–9; Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 101–30; and Mary Callahan, War and State Building in Burma (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), 154–9.

⁴ Yunnan shengzhi: Junshizhi, 385.

⁵ Gibson, The Secret Army, 184–5; and Chin Yee-hua, Jinsanjiao Guojun xueleishi, 1950–1981 (Taipei: Zhonyang yanjiyuan, Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2009), 242–4.

⁶ Victor Kaufman, ‘Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division’, The China Quarterly 166 (2001): 440–2; Kenton Clymer, A Delicate Relationship: The United States and Burma/Myanmar since 1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 87–91; John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 149–52; and Jovan Cavoski, ‘Arming Nonalignment: Yugoslavia’s Relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia (1950–1955)’, Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series No. 61 (April 2010), 17–18.

⁷ Clymer, A Delicate Relationship, 124–5.

⁸ The United States was also embarrassed by an incident that took place on 15 February 1961. An aircraft of the ROC Air Force, carrying US-made weapons and supplies for the Burma-based KMT forces, was shot down. All these US-made weapons were presented as further proof of the United States’ covert support for the KMT.

⁹ Foreign defence attachés invited to inspect the battle scene picked up shell casings from weapons used neither by the KMT forces nor by the Tatmadaw, raising suspicion of the PLA’s involvement. See Gibson, The Secret Army, 200.

¹⁰ Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 235.

¹¹ John Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 175.

¹² Alfred McCoy (with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II), The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 134.

¹³ Young, Chinese Nationalist Troops in Burma, 147–50.

¹⁴ Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences, 55, 59.

¹⁵ Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 160–1.

¹⁶ Clymer, A Delicate Relationship, 186; and Kaufman, ‘Trouble in the Golden Triangle’, 451. Kaufman, however, still could not be certain ‘whether the PRC sent any soldiers into Burma to join this assault and, if so, how many’.

¹⁷ Gibson, The Secret Army, 191–203.

¹⁸ Chin, Jinsanjiao Guojun xueleishi, 244–63.

¹⁹ Liu Yuan-lin, DianMian bianqu fengyunlu (Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyiju, 1996).

²⁰ Kuomintang Agression Against Burma (Rangoon: Information and Broadcasting Department of Burma, 1953).

²¹ Qiyiyejiniu (Chitkyiye Kyi Nyunt), Sige shiqi de Zhongmian guanxi (Dehong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1995), 70–9. This is a Chinese translation from the 1973 Burmese book.

²² Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw, 39.

²³ Liu Kaizheng and Zhu Dangkui, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zuimimi zhanzheng (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1994).

²⁴ As was common among PRC’s publications then, the book was written in a reportage literature style, meaning that facts were mixed with fiction for the sake of literary appeal, and henceforth would require readers to carefully discern what was reliable from what was less so.

²⁵ Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun Kunming junqu, Zhandou zai YunGui gaoyuan de guanghui licheng (Kunming: Kunming junqu, 1985), 113–20.

²⁶ Dangdai Zhongguo congsu bianjibu, Dangdai Zhongguo de junshi gongzuo (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989), 376–8.

²⁷ Cai Huilin, ‘Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo’, Kunming wenshi zilao xuanji 11 (1990): 227–71.

²⁸ Sha Li and Min Li, Zhongguo 9 ci dafabing (Chengdu: Sichuan wenyi chubanshe, 1992); Wang Zhongxin and Liu Liqin, Guofang lishi (xia) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2003); Xue Guoan, Tieliu: Gongheguo luzhan jishi (Beijing: Xiyuan chubanshe, 2009). Garver (note 15) cited the book by Sha and Min.

²⁹ Zhang Bing and Zhao Hongmin, ZhongMian jiaofei miwen lu: Liuling zhi liuyi jinsanjiao zuozhan jishi (Jinan: Huanghe chubanshe, 1992). Interestingly, this book was never used by scholars outside of the PRC despite having been available earlier than China’s Most Secretive War.

³⁰ Yunnan shengzhi: Junshizhi, 396–401.

³¹ Zong zhengzhibu lianluobu, Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo (Beijing: Zongzheng lianluobu, 2007).

³² Liu Kaizheng and Zhu Dangkui, Xuan Jian (Chengdu: Chengdu junqu, 2008).

³³ Fan Hongwei, Heping gongchu yu zhongli zhuyi: Lengzhan shiqi Zhongguo yu Miandian heping gongchu de chengjiu yu jingyan (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2012), 78–117; and Chen Hongyun, Miandian Guomindang canbu wenti de yuanqi yu Meiguo de duice, 1949–1954 (PhD Thesis, East China Normal University, 2018).

³⁴ Jiaofei douzheng: Xinan diqu (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2002).

³⁵ Zhonggong Yunnan shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, ed., Yunnan jiaofei douzheng (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2011), 364.

³⁶ Qiu Yuguo, ed., Qin Jiwei junshi shijian he sixianag yanjiu (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2014), 169; Qin Jiwei, Qin Jiwei huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2007), 365.

³⁷ Zong zhengzbibu lianluobu, Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo, 64.

³⁸ Zhonggong Yunnan shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, ed., Yunnan jiaofei douzheng, 349.

³⁹ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Mao Zedongzhuan, 1949–1976 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanse, 2003), 576–7.

⁴⁰ Kunming budui zhengzhibu xuanchuanbu, ed., Biancui shinian: Yunnan bianfang douzheng tongxun baogao xuan (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1959), 39–40.

⁴¹ Kunming junqu zhengzhizbu, ed., Kunming junqu qunzhong gongzuoshi (Kunming: Kunming qunju, 1985), 283; and Yunnansheng junqu, ed., Yunnan minbing, diyice (Kunming: Yunnan junqu, 1986), 110.

⁴² The height of the exodus happened during the Great Leap Forward, where at one point more than 140,000 people reportedly fled to neighbouring countries, although most of them returned afterwards. See: Yunnansheng junqu, ed., Yunnan minbing, 111.

⁴³ Jiaofei douzheng: Xinan diqu, 45; Zong zhengshibu lianluobu, Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo, 80; and Dehong junshi shiliao xuanbian, 1950–1986 (Dehong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1990), 63.

⁴⁴ Kunming junqu zhengzhizbu, ed., Kunming junqu qunzhong gongzuoshi, 291.

⁴⁵ Zhonggong Yunnan shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, ed., Yunnan jiaofei douzheng, 377.

⁴⁶ Shubian wushinian bianjizhu, ed., Shubian wushinian: jinian Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun disi bingtuan jinjun Yunnan ji jiefang Yunnan wushi zhounian (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2000), 127–32.

⁴⁷ Zongzhengzhibu lianluobu, Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo, 91.

⁴⁸ ‘Record of the First Meeting between Premier Zhou and Prime Minister U Nu’, 28 June 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, the Wilson Center, PRC FMA 203–00007-03. Translated by Jeffrey Wang. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112438 (accessed August 22, 2021).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949–1975 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 96.

⁵¹ Chin, Jinsanjiao Guojun xueleishi, 199–204.

⁵² Gibson, The Secret Army, 172–3.

⁵³ Cai, ‘Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo’, 252;. Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yicang zuimimi zhanzheng, 175; Zong zhengshibu lianluobu, Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo, 80.

⁵⁴ Fan, Heping gongchu yu zhongli zhuyi, 111.

⁵⁵ Gen Huo, ‘Zoujin fumie de yingsuhua: waijiao jiemi dangan zhong jishu de taoMian Jiangjieshi canjun kuisan shimo’, in Dangnian naxieshi, ed. Dangan chunqiu zazhishe (Beijing: Huawen chubanse, 2009), 12.

⁵⁶ Zhang Qin, ZhongMian kanjie jishi (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 2016), 181, 216–17.

⁵⁷ Fan, Heping gongchu yu zhongli zhuyi, 72.

⁵⁸ Yao Zhongmin, Shen Weiliang and Zuo Junfeng, ‘Zhou Enlai zongli jiejue ZhongMian bianjie wenti de guanghui yeji’, in Yanjiu Zhou Enlai: waijiao sixiang yu shijian, ed. Fei Jianzhang (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989), 94–110. For the texts of these two documents, see: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu tiaoyue falüsi, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo bianjie shiwu tiaoyueji: ZhongMian juan (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2004), 7–13, 39–63. On top of these documents, a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression between the PRC and Burma was signed in January 1960.

⁵⁹ Cavoski, ‘Arming Nonalignment’, 20–1.

⁶⁰ Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yicang zuimimi zhanzheng, 168–9; Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 59–60; Dehong junshi shiliao xuanbian, 15, 169, 214–15; and Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwen lu, 69–70.

⁶¹ Yunnan shengzhi: Junshizhi, 535; for detailed descriptions of some of these activities, see Dehong junshi shiliao xuanbian, 169–82.

⁶² Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 62–3.

⁶³ Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 186; Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 70; Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwenlu, 60–1.

⁶⁴ Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwenlu, 61.

⁶⁵ Gen, ‘Zoujin fumie de yingsuhua’, 11.

⁶⁶ Zhang, ZhongMian kanjie jishi, 278.

⁶⁷ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 80.

⁶⁸ Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 188; Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 80–1. An interesting fact disclosed in a PRC publication was that the Tatmadaw officer who coordinated with the PLA for this small operation was a Colonel Than Shwe, the Myanmar junta chief that ruled the country from 1992 until 2013. See Meng Lixing, Liu Zhihe, eds., Shubian weiguo: Yunnansheng junqu bianfang diertuan tuanshi (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2003), 30.

⁶⁹ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 118–19; and Wang Jian and Xiao Qian, Shouwei zai Zuguo Diannan bianjiang: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun di39shi shubian jishi (Hohhot: Yuanfang chubanshe, 2004), 250–3.

⁷⁰ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 86.

⁷¹ Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwenlu, 62.

⁷² Zong zhengzhibu lianluobu, Yunnan jingwai Guomindang canjun shimo, 86; Dangdai Zhongguo junshi gongzuo, 374.

⁷³ Zhang Zishen, Mao Zedong he Yang Chengwu (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 2014), 292; Yang Chengwu nianpu bianxiezu, ed., Yang Chengwu nianpu (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2014), 332.

⁷⁴ In this sense, this campaign was consistent with the new strategic thinking of the PRC that emphasised proactive defence outside of its border. See Xiaobing Li, The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 5–6.

⁷⁵ Chin, Jinsanjiao Guojun xueleishi, 244.

⁷⁶ Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi, 1918–1975, xia ce (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 521–2.

⁷⁷ Wang Fan, Zhiqingzheshuo 2: Yu lishi guanxian renwu de duihua (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanse, 1998), 83; and Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 187–8. Zhu, a co-author of Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, was one of the local PLA officers summoned to brief Zhou.

⁷⁸ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 80.

⁷⁹ Decades later San Yu served as Burma’s President from 1981–8. Among the delegation of San Yu was, again, Than Shwe. See Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 91.

⁸⁰ Gibson, The Secret Army, 192.

⁸¹ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 168.

⁸² Li Junlong and Yao Changhao, Zongheng zhengzhan: lujun di14jun zhandou fengyunlu (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2000), 408; and Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwenlu, 84–5.

⁸³ Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwen, 65.

⁸⁴ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 92–3.

⁸⁵ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 122–3.

⁸⁶ Wang and Liu, Guofang lishi (xia), 122. These units were: 117th Regiment (of the 39th Division of the 13th Army), 118th Regiment (of the 40th Division of the 14th Army), and 8th, 9th, 10th Regiments of the YMR, plus a battalion from the 116th Regiment.

⁸⁷ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 123.

⁸⁸ Wang and Liu, Guofang lishi (xia), 123.

⁸⁹ Yunnan shengzhi: Junshizhi, 397.

⁹⁰ Li and Yao, Zongheng zhengzhan, 408.

⁹¹ Liu, DianMian bianqu fengyunlu, 110–13. Liu ironically made the estimation based on the PRC’s publication China’s Most Secretive War, where it mentioned three divisions of the 13th and 14th Armies were being briefed about the upcoming campaign (Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 193). However, China’s Most Secretive War never stated that three divisions were eventually committed to the campaign.

⁹² Lu Ruilin, Xinan sanshinian (Beijing: Renmin ribao chubanshe, 1998), 122.

⁹³ Wang Fan, Zhiqingzheshuo 2, 89; and Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 122.

⁹⁴ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 124.

⁹⁵ Zhong Shilu and Guo Huawen, ‘Zha Yusheng yu ZhongMian bianjing kanjie jingwei zuozhan’, in Zha Yusheng jinian wenji, ed. Ma Zilong and Lü Dengming (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2013), 352.

⁹⁶ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 124. Lin was famous for developing and perfecting the ‘annihilation campaign’ doctrine during the 1948 Liao-Shen Campaign in the Chinese Civil War. See Harold M. Tanner, Where Chiang Kai-Shek Lost China: The Liao-Shen Campaign, 1948 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 32–3.

⁹⁷ Zhou Baoliang, Jiandi subian: ZhongMian lianhe daji Guomindang yuejing chuanrao canjun (Beijing: Lantian chubanshe, 2014), 86–7.

⁹⁸ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 125.

⁹⁹ Li and Yao, Zongheng zhengzhan, 410.

¹⁰⁰ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 144–5.

¹⁰¹ Wang and Liu, Guofang lishi (xia), 124.

¹⁰² Zhong and Guo, ‘Zha Yusheng yu ZhongMian bianjing kanjie jingwei zuozhan’, 355; Zhou, Jiandi subian, 93; and Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwen, 130–1.

¹⁰³ Gibson, The Secret Army, 194.

¹⁰⁴ Gibson contended that the Tatmadaw were caught unaware by the PLA’s actions. But the PRC sources suggested that there were Tatmadaw liaison officers embedded in the PLA’s regiments during the first phase of the campaign; the Tatmadaw should be aware of the PLA’s actions. See Gibson, The Standing Army, 193; Shubian wushinian bianjizhu, ed., Shubian wushinian, 108.

¹⁰⁵ Zhang and Zhao, ZhongMian jiaofei miwen, 82–3.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 180–1.

¹⁰⁷ Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 248.

¹⁰⁸ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 175.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 174.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 176; and Wang and Liu, Guofang lishi (xia), 124.

¹¹¹ Liu, DianMian bianqu fengyunlu, 113–14.

¹¹² Chin, Jinsanjiao Guojun xueleishi, 259.

¹¹³ Ibid., 268–71. The relatively intact Third and Fifth Armies, consisting mostly of Yunnanese, chose to remain.

¹¹⁴ Ne Win was said to be extremely unhappy with the decision by U Nu to approve of the joint campaign, see Clymer, A Delicate Relationship (see note 34), 360.

¹¹⁵ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 98, 198.

¹¹⁶ Yi Qihe and Yuan Shifu, ‘Junzhang yaowo da touzheng’, in Zha Yusheng jinian wenji, 288.

¹¹⁷ Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun Kunming junqu, Zhandou zai YunGui gaoyuan de guanghui licheng, 117.

¹¹⁸ The other three generals were deputy chief of the General Political Department Gan Weihan, deputy commander of the KMR Chen Kang, and another deputy commander of the KMR Lu Ruilin.

¹¹⁹ Liu and Zhu, Xuan Jian, 208–9.

¹²⁰ Accounts of the battlefield performance of the KMT forces in PRC publications were actually corroborated by their opponent. Chin described that the KMT soldiers tended to fight determinedly against the Tatmadaw, but quickly lost the will to fight when they encountered the PLA. See Chin, Jinsanjiao Guojun xueleishi, 259.

¹²¹ Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 314–17; Ma Zilong and Lü Dengming, Zha Yusheng zhuan (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanse, 2014), 357–8; Yao Shuanglong, Xuese zhengcheng (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2011), 211; and Zhang Zhixiu, Junlü shengya (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1998), 443.

¹²² Ma Jin’an, YuanYue YuanLao KangMei jianwen (Hong Kong: Zhongguo guojin wenhua chubanshe, 2013), 261; Zhong and Guo, ‘Zha Yusheng yu ZhongMian bianjing kanjie jingwei zuozhan’, 360; Liu and Zhu, Zhongguo ceng canjia yichang zui mimi zhanzheng, 305; and Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 100.

¹²³ Years later after the defeat of the KMT, the BCP would grow in military strength in the same Golden Triangle area. However, the support provided by the PRC to the military struggle of the BCP only began in 1967. The PRC did not have the objective of supporting the BCP when it decided to remove the KMT in the Golden Triangle in 1960–1.