The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil–Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections

Abstract

After providing a brief overview of civil–military relations in Turkey prior to the June 12, 2011, general elections, this article focuses on the way in which the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the opposition Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), and the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi treated this issue in their election campaigns. It argues that the AKP had a dual discourse on civil–military relations and the CHP occasionally showed signs of defending the role of the military in Turkish politics. However, both the victorious AKP and the main opposition CHP adopted policies that accentuated the reduction of the military's role in politics. An analysis of the election campaigns and results suggests that until the next elections, civilian control over the military will further increase.

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Ömer Turan for exchanging ideas and his valuable comments on a previous version of this article.

Notes

This is the interval between the start of a new wave of arrests in the coup plot investigations and the date that the CHP took the pledge in the new assembly (see below for more on these developments). Even though the article covers the policies of the top three parties that got into the parliament, it does not examine the independent candidates of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) that won 36 of the 550 seats in the general assembly. The BDP mainly represents the Kurdish minority in Turkey and, therefore, its main policy agenda is focused on this issue. The party is antagonistic toward the military partially because the armed forces have been the principal actors who fought against Kurdish seperatist movements in the eastern regions since the 1980s.

For an extensive analysis of the reforms between 1999 and 2010, see Yaprak Gürsoy, “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 293–308.

Metin Heper, “The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 33–44.

See Table 2 in Gürsoy (2011, p. 305).

For an overview of the investigations, see Ersel Aydınlı, “Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish ‘Inner State’,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 227–239. For more information on the reasons for the coup investigations and their consequences for Turkish democracy, see Yaprak Gürsoy, “The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization through Coup Plots?” Democratization (forthcoming), doi: 10.1080/13510347.2011.623352.

The name of the alleged organization is derived from the Ergenekon epic in Turkish mythology, which tells the story of the rebirth of the Turks. The epic has been an important symbol of Turkish nationalism since the 1930s.

Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt, “The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF),” Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2010), pp. 397–398.

“Press Freedom in Turkey: A Dangerous Place to be a Journalist,” The Economist, March 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18333123 (accessed June 5, 2011).

“Haber Yapma Demişler, Niye Yapıyorsunuz” [They Said Do Not Make News, Why Are You Making It?], Hürriyet, February 18, 2011.

“Odatv Dalgası Gazetecileri Vurdu” [The Odatv Wave Struck the Journalists], Hürriyet, March 4, 2011, p. 20.

“Gözaltıları Anlamakta Zorluk Çekiyoruz” [We Are Having Difficulties Understanding the Takings into Custody], Hürriyet, Feburary 16, 2011, p. 23; “ABD: Kaygılıyız, AB: Endişeliyiz” [The US: We Are Anxious, The EU: We Are Concerned], Akşam, March 4, 2011, p. 13.

“Şener ve Şık'tan Notlar …” [Notes from Şener and Şık], Radikal, March 6, 2011.

“Özgürlük Yürüyüşü” [The Walk of Liberty], Hürriyet, March 14, 2011, p. 24.

Pelin Turgut, “Why is Turkey Arresting Journalists?” TimeWorld, March 6, 2011, http://www.time.com (accessed July 18, 2011).

“Balyoz Şoku” [The Balyoz Shock], Hürriyet, February 12, 2011, p. 22.

“Orgeneral Balanlı Cezaevinde” [General Balanlı is in Prison], Milliyet, May 3, 2011, p. 14.

“Hasdal Ordusu” [The Hasdal Army], Milliyet, June 1, 2011, p. 16.

“Harbiye'den Dolmabahçe'ye” [From Harbiye to Dolmabahçe], Hürriyet, February 13, 2011, p. 20.

“Balyoz Tutuklularına 4 Yıldızlı Ziyaret” [A 4-Star Visit to Balyoz Prisoners], Milliyet, February 19, 2011.

Press release dated April 6, 2011, number BA-05/11. Available on the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff website http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2011/BA_05.htm (accessed July 23, 2011).

Ruşen Çakır, “CHP Sahiden Değişiyor Mu? CHP Sahiden Değişebilir Mi?” [Is the CHP Really Changing? Can the CHP Really Change?], Vatan, May 29, 2011.

Oral Çalışlar, “Ordu Eksenli CHP Muhalefetinin Sonu Mu?” [An End to the Military Centered CHP Opposition?], Radikal, March 16, 2011.

A Land of Freedom and Hope: Everyone's Turkey, CHP 2011 Election Manifesto (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2011), p. 7.

The current duration of military service ranges from 6 to 15 months, depending on the education level of the conscript and the needs of the armed forces.

Demokrasi: Eşit Yurttaş Özgür Toplum [Democracy: Equal Citizens, Free Society] (Ankara: CHP Bilim, Yönetim ve Kültür Platformu, 2011), pp. 6–10.

Ibid., p. 10.

“Kim Muhtıra Verirse Doğru Yargı Önüne” [Whoever Gives a Memorandum Immediately Faces the Judiciary], Akşam, March 3, 2011, p. 12.

Murat Yetkin, “Bedelli Askerlik ve CHP'de Değişim” [Paid Conscription and Change in the CHP], March 17, 2011. The trial of the 1980 coup-makers was also mentioned in the democracy report.

According to the CHP's scheme, male citizens who had not yet been conscripted despite their age and who earned incomes above a given bracket would pay pre-determined fees to serve in the military for 21 days, and those who are below a certain income level would get only basic training. “Yaş Sınırı 28, Fakire Bedelsiz” [The Age Limit is 28, Free of Charge to the Poor], Hürriyet, March 17, 2011, p. 24.

For instance, when the vice-president of the party, Süheyl Batum, likened the armed forces to a “paper tiger,” he implied that the military should have intervened in politics against the AKP and implicitly criticized the fact that the military stood idly by as the government introduced reforms in civil–military relations and retired and active officers were arrested. However, it is important to note that Kılıçdaroğlu publicly warned his vice-president, implicitly threatened to fire him, advised against conducting politics over the military, and claimed that no one other than the chair of the party could direct criticisms against the armed forces. “Kılıçdaroğlu, Batum'u uyardı: Ordu Üzerinden Siyaset Yapma” [Kılıçdaroğlu Warned Batum: Do Not Play Politics over the Military] Radikal, February 9, 2011, p. 13; “Kılıçdaroğlu, Batum ve Güneş'i Görevden Alabilir” [Kılıçdaroğlu Can Dismiss Batum and Güneş], Milliyet, February 9, 2011, p. 17.

Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2011 Seçim Beyannamesi: 2023'e Doğru Yükselen Ülke Türkiye Sözleşmesi, Ses Ver Türkiye [MHP 2011 Election Statement: The Agreement of the Nation Rising towards 2023, Respond Turkey] (Ankara: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 2011), pp. 180–181.

Ibid., p. 182.

“Baskılar Halkı Patlatır” [Pressures Could Make the People Explode], Hürriyet, Feburary 15, 2011, p. 24. It is important to note that during the interrogation of some journalists, the public prosecutor asked questions about the CHP leadership, which led to implications of an illicit deal in the sale of a TV channel and a sexual harassment scandal. The attorney general did not pursue these issues; however, because the information was leaked to the press, the CHP leadership argued that the purpose of the interrogation was to tarnish the image of the party. “Taciz İddiası Savcılıkta” [The Harrasment Charge Is In the Hands of the Public Prosecutor] Hürriyet, March 7, 2011, p. 21; Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “Hem Bana Hem Kemal Bey'e Komplo” [A Conspiracy Both Against Me and Against Mr. Kemal], Milliyet, March 9, 2011.

“Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan Savcılara: Hesap Vereceksiniz” [From Kılıçdaroğlu to the Attorneys: You Will Be Called to Account], Radikal, March 11, 2011.

“Nerede Bu Örgüt Üye Olayım” [Where is this Organization, Let Me Register], Hürriyet, February 16, 2011, p. 23.

“Ülkenin Çivisi Çıktı” [This Country is Perturbed], Hürriyet, February 15, 2011, p. 24.

“Ordumuz İncitilmesin Darbeci Ayıklansın” [Do Not Let Our Military Be Hurt, Clean Out the Putschists], Hürriyet, February 13, 2011, p. 21.

Emphasis added, “Bahçeli'den Erdoğan'a Balyoz Eleştirisi” [A Balyoz Critique from Bahçeli to Erdoğan], Radikal, February 15, 2011.

“Yargıyı Çift Vardiya Çalıştır” [Make the Judiciary Work Double Shifts], Hürriyet, March 14, 2011, p. 24.

“Üstünlerin Hukuku” [The Law of the Rulers], Hürriyet, Feburary 13, 2011, p. 21. See also a similar statement of CHP Secretary General Bihlun Tamaylıgil, “Biletini Halkımız Sandıkta Kessin Hesabını da Yargıçlar Sorsun” [Let Our People Dismiss Them at the Ballot Box and the Judges Call Them to Account], Hürriyet, Şubat 15, 2011, p. 24.

“Kılıçdaroğlu: Yarın Savaş Olsa Ne Olacak?” [Kılıçdaroğlu: What Would Happen If There Was A War Tomorrow?] Milliyet, May 28, 2011, p. 26.

“Balyoz'a 14 Vekil” [14 Deputies to Balyoz], Hürriyet, March 15, 2011, p. 25. The CHP also followed the arrests of the journalists in the Ergenkon case by visiting their homes, see “Kılıçdaroğlu Soner Yalçın İçin Görevlendirdi” [Kılıçdaroğlu Assigned for Soner Yalçın], Hürriyet, February 15, 2011, p. 24.

“Balbay ve Haberal'a da Parlemento Yolu Kapalı” [The Road to Parliament Is Closed to Balbay and Haberal], Radikal, June 24, 2011.

The MHP decided to take an approach different from that taken by the CHP and took the oath in the parliament. However, the MHP leadership criticized the government for not taking on more responsibility, describing the crisis as regrettable, and defining the court's decision as a judicial scandal. “MHP Liderinden Başbakan'a Çağrı” [An Appeal from the MHP Leader to the Prime Minister], Radikal, June 24, 2011; “‘Hukuk Skandalı’ Dedi Ama Yemin Edecek” [He Said “Judicial Scandal” But He Will Take the Oath], Radikal, June 26, 2011.

“A Democracy Manifesto from the CHP Leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu,” dated July 7, 2011, available on the CHP website at http://www.chp.org.tr/en/?manset=a-democracy-manifesto-from-chp-leader-kemal-kilicdaroglu (accessed July 30, 2011).

“Yemin Krizi Çözüldü” [The Oath Crisis Is Solved], Radikal, July 11, 2011.

Murat Yetkin, “Asker Üzerinden Seçim Kampanyası” [Election Campaign over the Military] Radikal, May 29, 2011. See also Devlet Bahçeli's declaration in February, “Komutanlardan İntikam Alınıyor” [Revenge Is Being Taken on the Commanders], Hürriyet, February 16, 2011, p. 22.

“Eşler Değil Aydınlar Üstlensin” [Let the Intellectuals Take Over, Not the Wives], Hürriyet, February 20, 2011, p. 23.

“Askere Çağrı. Sakın Ola Tepki Vermeyin” [An Appeal to the Military: Avoid Reacting], Hürriyet, May 31, 2011, p. 18.

For an item-by-item comparison of the AKP, CHP, and MHP election manifestos, see Deniz Zeyrek, “Bu Vaatleri Bir Kenara Yazın” [Take Note of These Promises], Radikal, April 24, 2011, pp. 16–17.

“Gazeteci Kılıklı Kişiler İçin Ayağa Kalktılar” [They Are Revolting for People Who Appear To Be Journalists], Hürriyet, March 14, 2011, p. 24; “Sistematik Karalama Kampanyası” [Systematic Slander Campaign], Hürriyet, March 15, 2011, p. 24.

See the declarations of the Minister of State Faruk Çelik and the vice-chairman of the party Hüseyin Çelik, “TSK Çürükleri Ayıklasın” [Let the Turkish Armed Forces Sort out.the Rotten Ones] and “Yargıya Başbakan Bile Telkinde Bulunmamalı” [Even the Prime Minister Should Not Inculcate the Judiciary], Hürriyet, February 17, 2011, p. 22. Also see Erdoğan's speech on March 4, “Yargının Tasarrufu Bize Çamur Atmayın” [Judiciary's Authority, Do Not Slander Us], Akşam, March 5, 2011, p. 12.

“‘Nerede Bu Örgüt Üye Olacağım’ Sözü Yargıya Müdahale” [The Expression “Where is this Organization, I Will Register” Is An Intervention in the Judicary], Hürriyet, February 17, 2011, p. 22.

“Yeni CHP İçi Boş Proje” [The New CHP is An Empty Project], Milliyet, May 30, 2011.

“Ergenekon Ofisi Açacaklar” [They Will Open An Ergenekon Office], Hürriyet, April 19, 2011, p. 24.

“Ayağa Kalkmayan Korgeneral Yerini Buldu” [The Lieutenant General Who Did Not Stand up Found His Place] Akşam, May 19, 2011, p. 13.

“Erdoğan: Muhalefet İster Meclis'e Gelsin İster Gelmesin” [Erdoğan: Let the Opposition Either Come to the Parliament or Not], Radikal, June 30, 2011; “Laf Ebeleri Değil Hukuçular Konuşsun” [Let the Lawyers Speak, Not the Yappers], Radikal, June 30, 2011.

Sedat Ergin, “Erdoğan'ın Ergenekon Söyleminin Evrimi” [The Evolution of Erdoğan's Ergenekon Discourse], Hürriyet, April 2, 2011, p. 22.

Quoted in ibid.

“Arınç: Belli Görevlerde İnsanları Tutuklarken Çok İnce Düşünülmeli” [Arınç: When Arresting People in Certain Positions it is Necessary to be Very Considerate], Milliyet, June 1, 2011, p. 17.

See, for instance, the comment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu on the perfect harmony that the government and the military had during the evacuation of Turkish citizens from Libya. “TSK ile Tıkır Tıkır Çalıştık” [We Worked with the Turkish Armed Forces Like Clockwork], Akşam, April 12, 2011, p. 15.

See Erdoğan's press conference in March, “Başbakan'dan Bedelli Askerlik Açıklaması” [Paid Conscription Declaration from the Prime Minister] Radikal, March 17, 2011, and Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan's announcement, “Peki Kim Koruyacak Bu Memleketi?” [Well Then, Who Is Going To Protect This Motherland?] Vatan, March 13, 2011. It should be mentioned that the AKP government passed a new law in November 2011 allowing people over 30 years old to pay a certain fee instead of serving in the military.

“Başbakan'dan ‘Bedelli'ye’ Yeşil Işık” [Green Light From the Prime Minister To “Paid Conscription”], Radikal, June 9, 2011.

“Bedelli Gündemde Değil” [Paid Conscription is not on the Agenda], Hürriyet, February 18, 2011, p. 21.

“TSK'nın Balyoz Açıklaması Yanlış” [The Balyoz Declaration of the Turkish Armed Forces Is Wrong], Akşam, April 14, 2011, p. 13. Also see similar comments of other government officials in “Hem İktidardan Hem Muhalefetten Tepki” [Reactions from Both the Government and the Opposition], Akşam, April 8, 2011, p. 10.

“Asker Artık Kısa Cevap Veriyor” [The Military Now Gives Short Replies], Milliyet, May 30, 2011, p. 14.

“Ordu Durması Gereken Yerde” [The Military Is Where Is Should Stand], Hürriyet, May 13, 2011, p. 24.

“Asker Artık Topuk Selamı Veriyor” [The Military Now Gives the Heel Salute], Akşam, May 14, 2011, p. 18; “TSK'ya Saygısızlık Aklımdan Geçmez” [I Would Not Think of Disrespecting the Turkish Armed Forces], Hürriyet, May 17, 2011, p. 27.

In a public opinion survey conducted in 2006, it was revealed that a significant portion of the Turkish public is conservative, religious, xenophobic, and intolerant. See Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 27–63. Thus, a political party that can successfully appeal to the nationalist and religious sentiments of the voters can win the elections with a wide margin.

The argument that nationalist and religiously conservative voters have different stances toward the military does not necessarily mean that they have dissimilar attitudes toward other issues. In fact, on other policy matters, such as foreign policy, the two groups might have complementary and overlapping perspectives.

For a summary of the events that led to the resignations, see “Soğuk Savaş,” [Cold War] Posta, July 30, 2011, p. 1, and “Emekliliğe Götüren Süreç,” [The Process Leading to Retirement] HaberTürk, July 30, 2011, p. 14.

“TSK'yı Suç Örgütü Gibi Gösteriyorlar,” [They Are Making the Armed Forces look like Organized Crime], Milliyet, July 30, 2011, p. 18.

“Top Generals Quit in Group, Stunning Turks,” The New York Times, July 30, 2011, A1.

There was one exceptional instance after the 1980 coup when Prime Minister Turgut Özal refused to promote Necdet Öztorun to the position of Chief of Staff in 1987. Since this incident, however, all the Council's nominees have been promoted by the government.

“Muhalefet Ne Dedi?” [What Did the Opposition Say?], Milliyet, July 30, 2011, p. 20.

“Kurumlar Arasındaki Kopukluğun Göstergesi,” [An Indicator of the Rupture between Institutions], Milliyet, July 31, 2011, p. 20.

“İktidar Ne Dedi?” [What Did the Government Say?], Milliyet, July 30, 2011, p. 20.

Derya Sazak, “Şura'dan Sonra” [After the Council], Milliyet, August 5, 2011, p. 20.