Turkey and the European Union: Europeanization Without Membership

Abstract

This article analyzes Turkey's relationship with the European Union (EU) against the background of the latest Turkish parliamentary elections in June 2011. The main argument is that Turkey's European transformation at home and abroad will continue under the third term of the Justice and Development Party rule, yet Turkish rulers will increasingly find it difficult to put EU membership issue at the center of this process. At present, it appears that neither is the EU eager and flexible as to offer Turkey credible membership prospects nor is Turkey's ruling party maintaining the same degree of commitment to the EU as it had during its first term in government. Rather than the dynamics of the accession process, the growing need to find a solution to the decade-long Kurdish dispute in a liberal-democratic fashion as well as Turkey's ability to deal with the rising foreign and security policy challenges in the context of the Arab Spring will shape Turkey's European transformation in years ahead.

Notes

Sinan Ülgen, How to Operationalize the Foreign Policy Dialogue Between Ankara and Brussels? German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, April 5, 2011.

Europeanization is defined here as Turkey's adoption of EU's norms in the areas of domestic and foreign policy areas. This article defines Europeanization as a dependent variable or, outcome, rather than Turkey's socialization to the EU norms alongside the EU accession process. Europeanization as an outcome might be informed by non-EU membership related factors as well.

This paper can be reached at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/2010_2011_eylem_plani.pdf.

See, for example, Diba Nigar Göksel, Europe and Turkey: Back to the Future? German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, March 15, 2011.

For example, see the Progress Report on Turkey, Issued by the European Commission on November 2010.

On the ratio of Turkish people who supported EU membership in 2004 and the following years, one can consult on the Transatlantic Trends surveys of the German Marshall Fund Center. The figures used within this were first mentioned on these surveys.

For example, the latest Transatlantic Trends survey issued in 2011 reveals that 20 percent of Turkish people value cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries, whereas 19 percent with the EU and 8 percent with the USA.

For example, see Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans, “Why Not Turkey? Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European countries,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2011), pp. 741–766. They say that 34.4 percent of Europeans in 27 members support Turkey's membership.

For example, see Ziya Öniş, “Contesting for Turley's Political ‘Center’: Domestic Politics, Identity Conflicts and the Controversy over EU Membership,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 18. No. 3 (September 2010), pp. 361–376, at p. 368.

See Gamze Avci, “The Justice and Devlepment Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 409–421.

Ödul Celep, “The Republican People's Party and Turkey's EU Membership,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 423–434, and Gamze Avci, “The Nationalist Movement Party's Euroskepticism: Party Ideology meets strategy,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 435–447.

Seckin Bariş Gülmez, “The EU Policy of the Republican People's Party: An Inquiry on the Opposition Party and Euro-Skepticism in Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 423–436.

This document can be found at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=46229&l=1.

Gerhard and Hans (2011), p. 746. Only five percent of Austrian people support Turkey's membership in the EU.

Gerhard and Hans (2011), p. 746. Only 24 percent of French people support Turkey's membership in the EU.

Catherine Macmillan, “Privileged Partnership, Open Ended Accession Negotiations and the Securitization of Turkey's EU Accession Process,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 447–463, at pp. 454–457.

“Turkey rebuffs Sarkozy over Armenia ‘genocide’,” October 7, 2011, available at http://www.france24.com/en/20111007-turkey-rebuffs-sarkozy-over-armenia-genocide.

Gerhard and Hans (2011), p. 751.

Ali Aslan, New Approaches to Muslim Engagement: A View from Germany, German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, Policy Brief, February 2011.

For example, rightist parties performed well in the latest European Parliament elections held in 2009 as well as joined the coalition governments in their countries, such as Finland and Austria.

Rachid Azrout, Joos van Spanje and Claes de Vreese, “Talking Turkey: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Their Effect on Support for Turkish Membership for the EU,” European Union Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), pp. 3–19.

Macmillan (2010), pp. 452–454.

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Relations and Public Opinion, The German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, September 8, 2011.

Katinka Barysch, Turkey and the EU: Can the Stalemate be Avoided?, Center for European Reform Policy Brief, December 2010.

See the Progress Report of EU Commission Turkey issued on November 9, 2010, in which the Commission pointed out to the dangers of decreasing press freedom and lack of impartiality on the part of Turkish judiciary. This report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf.

For example, see Emiliano Alessandri, Beyond Enlargement? European Skepticism, Turkish Cynicism, and the Uncertain future of EU–Turkey Relations, German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, February 24, 2011.

See Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Elections of June 12, 2011: Now What? German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, June 16, 2011.

On the details the latest round of negotiations on the island, see Vincent Morelli, Cyprus: Reunification proving elusive, Congressional Research Service, July 26, 2011.

Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk, “The Restructuring of Turkey's Policy Towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party's Struggle for power,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2007), pp. 349–363.

“Turkish Prime Minister Criticized debt ridden Eurozone”, available at http://easymovetoturkey.wordpress.com/2011/11/16/turkish-prime-minister-criticises-debt-ridden-eurozone/.

See İlter Turan, Critical Elections Behind, Critical Problems Ahead, German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, June 16, 2011.

See Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 125, No. 4 (2010–11), pp. 657–683.

Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey's ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2011), pp. 33–55.

Nathalie Tocci, Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: A European Perspective, German Marshall Fund Center, Analysis, April 5, 2011.

“Turkey will not Stand by the Wrongdoing in Syria,” June 19, 2011, Today's Zaman , available at http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=247815&link=247815.

TBMM Yeni Yaşam Yılı Başladı, October 1, 2011, available at http://www.trt.net.tr/Haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=70654a5a-99d1-40fb-b5d9-3079fbb5f35a.

Turkey's approach toward the Arab Spring in general has not been that much different from the positions adopted by the Western powers. In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey did not find it difficult to adopt a pro-demonstrators approach from the very beginning. In contrast, Turkey initially adopted a prudent “wait and see” approach when the uprisings spread to Libya and Syria. Because Turkey had strong economic and strategic interests vested in such countries, Turkish leaders found it challenging to immediately coerce their leaders to step aside. For example in Libya, Turkey first reacted against the calls for international military operations. However, once it became clear that Qaddafi had no intention to power and that he increased his effort to subdue the opposition forces through military instruments, Turkish leaders changed their mind and decided to support the deployment of NATO force in Libya, provided that this mission would mainly perform humanitarian tasks and oversee the economic and military embargo from the air and sea. In both Libya and Syria, Turkey's adoption of a pro-democracy and pro-demonstrators approach became possible after Turkish leaders lost their hope that the incumbent regimes would initiate liberal-democratic reforms and shun forceful measured against protestors.

TESEV, a think-tank based in Istanbul, conducted a survey in key Middle Eastern countries which asked the people on the street how they view Turkey's EU membership as well as how think Turkey's EU membership process affects Turkey's role and image in the Middle East. The responses given two both questions reveal that more than half of the respondents have positive feelings with respect to Turkey. The report can be accessed at http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/Ortadogu_arastirma_2010.pdf.