Analyzing the Determinants of Group Identity Among Alevis in Turkey: A National Survey Study

Abstract

This study systematically explores the factors that affect collective identity associations within the Alevi community in Turkey by employing the social identity approach and examining survey data collected through fieldwork. The results show that Kurdish Alevis express lower levels of attachment to their religious identity as compared to Turkish Alevis. The results also indicate that personal experiences of discrimination tend to increase one's prioritization of Alevi identity. Last, no significant differences are observed regarding group identity between Alevis who reside in urban areas and those who live in rural areas.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Arif and Gül Şirin for their invaluable support throughout her field research in Turkey. The author would also like to thank Leonie Huddy, Kathy Staudt, José D. Villalobos, Cengiz Erişen, Başak Yavcan, Gizem Arıkan, and the anonymous reviewers for their instructive comments and suggestions, as well as Anna Haro for her research assistance.

Notes

See, for example, van Zomeren et al., “Exploring Psychological,” 353–72.

Coy and Woehrle, Social Conflicts, 41–63.

Koçan and Öncü, “Citizen Alevi in Turkey,” 464–89 and Ocak, Türk Süfiliğine Bakışlar. Some of the differences that distinguish Alevis from Sunnis include the fact that Alevis (1) use wine and music for religious ceremonial functions, (2) do not observe the five daily prayers, Ramadan, and the Haj, (3) do not segregate women and men during worship, and (4) use cemevis instead of mosques as their place of worship. See Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia,” 76.

Kosnick, “Speaking in One's Own Voice,” 979–94; Özalay, “Minorities in Turkey;” and Şener, Yaşayan Alevilik.

Kosnick, “Speaking in One's Own Voice;” Vorhoff, “Let's Reclaim,” 220–52; and Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia.” Generally, non-Alevis are not easily admitted to the Alevi community and intermarriage is not widely tolerated.

Kosnick, “Speaking in One's Own Voice.”

Çelik, “Alevis, Kurds, Hemsehris,” 141–57; Güzeldere, “Turkey: Regional Elections,” 291–306; and van Bruinessen, “Shifting National,” 39–52. As the largest ethnic minority group in Turkey, Kurds constitute approximately 20 percent of the total population in Turkey.

Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey,” 517–41.

Erman and Göker, “Alevi Politics,” 99–118.

See http://www.turkstat.gov.tr. See also Vorhoff, “Let's Reclaim;” Özalay, “Minorities in Turkey;” and Shindeldecker, Turkish Alevis Today.

Vorhoff, “Let's Reclaim.” See also Canbakal, “An Exercise,” 253–71.

Ortaylı, “Alevilik, Nusayrilik,” 35–47; Vorhoff, “Let's Reclaim;” and Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia.”

Koçan and Öncü, “Citizen Alevi in Turkey.”

Kosnick, “Speaking in One's Own Voice.”

Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia.”

Vorhoff, “Let's Reclaim.”

Koçan and Öncü, “Citizen Alevi in Turkey;” see also Erman and Göker, “Alevi Politics” and Ocak, Türk Süfiliğine Bakışlar.

Çelik, “Alevis, Kurds, Hemsehris.”

Erman and Göker, “Alevi Politics” and van Bruinessen, “Kurds, Turks and the Alevi,” 7–10.

Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia.”

Vorhoff, “Let's Reclaim.”

Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia.”

Ibid.

Godziñska, “Rituals of Alevi,” 57.

Soner and Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism,” 419–34.

“Turkish Police Fire Teargas After Controversial Court Ruling,” Reuters, March 13, 2012.

Huddy, “From Social to Political,” 127–56; Hogg, “Intragroup Processes,” 65–93; and Hornsey, “Social Identity Theory,” 204–22.

Huddy, “From Social to Political.”

Hornsey, “Social Identity Theory.”

Tajfel, Human Groups and Tajfel and Turner, “An Integrative Theory,” 33–47.

Turner, “Social Categorization,” 77–122; Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group; Oakes, “The Salience of Social Categories,” 117–41; and Oakes et al., Stereotyping and Social Reality.

Ibid.

Gürbey, “Peaceful Settlement,” 57–90; Eriten and Romine, “Instrumental and Symbolic Sources;” and Barkey and Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question.

Parenti, “Ethnic Politics,” 723.

Finke and Harris, “Wars and Rumors;” Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict; and Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel,” 161–201.

Sanchez, “The Political Role,” 435–46.

Ibid.

Barreto and Pedraza, “The Renewal and Persistence,” 595–605.

Dion and Earn, “The Phenomenology,” 944–50 and Dion et al., “Personality-Based Hardiness,” 517–36.

Barreto and Pedraza, “The Renewal and Persistence.”

Peffley and Hurwitz, Justice in America.

Davey, “Ethnic Identification” and Kaspar and Noh, “Discrimination and Identity,” 1–70. Alternatively, as Kaspar and Noh, “Discrimination and Identity,” note, experience or anticipation of discrimination may prompt people to distance themselves from their in-group and develop negative perceptions of their own community.  Thus, some individuals may choose to minimize the salience of their ethnic and/or religious identity to escape discriminatory treatment, gain acceptance by the dominant majority, and improve their socioeconomic status.  However, individuals who choose this option may face double rejection by the dominant out-group that they seek to acculturate into as well as by their own in-group members who no longer perceive them as part of the community.

Zeidan, “The Alevi of Anatolia,” p. 77.

Turner, “Social Categorization” and Haslam et al., “Social Identity Salience,” 810.

Mainly due to a number of missing observations within the 580 completed surveys, the final sample sizes dropped to some extent in the statistical analyses. One of the key reasons for such missing observations and the subsequent drop in sample size is that although the participants were informed that their responses would be completely anonymous, some of them were still hesitant to answer certain survey questions (especially questions concerning discrimination as well as questions inquiring about one's socio-demographic information). This is understandable given the fact that the survey was conducted with members of a hidden minority population.

Andrews, Türkiye'de Etnik Gruplar and Koç et al., “Demographic Differentials,” 447–57.

Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey,” 517–41.

Çarkoğlu, “Political Preferences,” 273–92.

Ibid.

Cohen and Arieli, “Field Research,” 423.

Ibid.

The reason that a regional dummy was included as a control is because Western Turkey is generally less conservative, more urbanized, more industrialized, and demographically diverse (due to the high levels of immigration that this region attracts) as compared to other parts of the country, which may lead to cross-regional differences in collective identity associations among the Alevi community.  The Western Turkey regional dummy variable consisted of surveys conducted in Bursa, İstanbul, Eskişehir, İzmit, and Yalova.

The author would like to thank İnan Keser, a sociologist from Dicle University, Turkey, for his insightful suggestions regarding this point.

See, for example, Rodney, “The Economics of Piety,” 483–503 and Schieman, “Socioeconomic Status,” 25–51.

Çelik, “Alevis, Kurds, Hemsehris” and Stewart, “Modernity and the Alevis,” 50–60.

See, for example, Çelik, “Alevis, Kurds, Hemsehris;” Erman and Göker, “Alevi Politics;” Stewart, “Modernity and the Alevis;” van Bruinessen, “Kurds, Turks and the Alevi;” and van Bruinessen, “Aslını İnkar Eden,” 1–24.

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for this important insight.

See Özyürek, “The Light of the Alevi,” 233–53.