Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy and the Problems of Democratization in Turkey: Conservatism Without Democrats?

Abstract

This article examines the intellectual efforts in Turkey aiming at hegemonizing conservative democracy by diversifying and deepening its equivocal content vis-à-vis challenging alternatives. While globally acclaimed as an evidence of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, this article will try to show that, the real test is whether the Muslim circles will be able to overcome the limits of conservative democracy for a full-fledged democratization. Only then it is possible to build new discourses internalizing the diversity and hybridity of Turkey that is a sine qua non for the consolidation of democracy.

Acknowledgments

I thank the Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University, for the visiting scholar status and the TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) for the post-doctoral research grant which contributed to the finalization of this article.

Notes

Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,” 13–27 and Hefner, Remaking Muslim Politics.

Yavuz, Emergence of a New Turkey; Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy; and Cizre, Secular and Islamic Politics.

Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi.

Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 5–21.

See Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” 72–87; Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” 21–35; Lewitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 51–65; and Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism.

The program of conservative democracy was mainly developed by Akdoğan, then advisor of Erdoğan. He also produced a book with the same title. In the book, it is asserted that “the party is trying to reproduce conservatism—an ideology that has been tested so far at the world level—under the social and cultural conditions peculiar to Turkey” (Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi, 6). Following words of Erdoğan can also be taken as an effort to justify it: “An important majority of the society is willing to see a modernity not excluding the tradition; universality not excluding the locality, a rationality not refusing the faith, and changes that are not very fundamental” (Erdoğan, “Opening Speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan,” 4). However, Akdoğan's book is too general to address the most critical issues that could be experienced in trying to combine both conservative and democratic outlook. Yavuz criticizes it as “incoherent and has no clearly articulated ideas … a close reading of the book demonstrates that neither the party nor its intellectuals are clear about the concept or history of intellectual thought in Turkey” (88).

Names that can be referred as Muslim liberals can be found especially in daily Star while there are also names with similar standing in the Zaman and Yeni Şafak.

Among those circles that defend an authentic Islam and Islamism, Daily Yeni Akit and Milli Gazete can be named. The latter is the mouthpiece of the remaining National Outlook movement organized around the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party).

A recent and novel development was the formation of the HAS Party (People's Voice Party) by a group split from the SP in 2010 under the leadership of Numan Kurtulmuş. The party recruited such names as Mehmet Bekaroğlu and some socialist figures.

Demirel, Adalet Partisi, İdeoloji ve Politika.

The Zaman is the most influential conservative newspaper of Turkey. It can sell and distribute about 800,000 copies on daily basis.

The Gülen community attributes enormous significance to form links with the political and religious elites of the USA and Europe around a discourse of inte-faith diologue. Fethullah Gülen visited leaders of the various Christian and Jewish communities in Turkey and abroad. He even visited the Pope John Paul II in Vatican in 1998. The Gülen community is trying to promote a moderate Muslimhood based on civil society activism that denounces the use of violence.

Demir, Türkiye'de Medya Siyaset İlişkisi, 260.

Can Paker, an outspoken liberal member of the TÜSİAD, anticipated that “the two branches within the middle class will merge due to economic considerations” (Başaran (Interview with Can Paker), (Radikal, April 18, 2011)).

Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSAD) is the most influential business association of Turkey with 600 members. Its members realize about 80 percent of all exports of Turkey.

MÜSİAD is the acronym for The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association which represents pro-AKP conservative business people. It has more than 3000 members representing 15,000 companies. The TUSKON, Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey, is operating as the top organization of 160 associations of businessmen representing about 33,000 entrepreneurs. Its members are known for their affinity to the Gülen Community.

Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey.

Özkan (Interview with Erol Yarar), (Star, July 20, 2009).

For an article on the importance of the local goverments and the state controlled by the AKP in creating and empowering the Islamic capital, see Buğra and Savaşkan, “Yerel sanayi ve bugünün Türkiyesi'nde iş dünyası,” 92–123.

Dirlik, The Post-Colonial Aura, 71.

Öztürk (Zaman, April 26, 2010).

Öztürk (Zaman, December 28, 2009).

For a critical account of the AKP and conservative business groups' approach to the labor issue, see Yıldırım, “Labor Pains or Achilles’ Hell,” 235–58.

The official statistics claim that the unionized workers 3,232,679 which corresponds to 30 percent of all! “Sendikalı işçilerin sayısı bir milyonun altında,” (The number of the unionized workers are below one million), Yeni Şafak, July 30, 2011.

The other confederations are nationalist Kamu-Sen with 394,497 and socialist KESK with 232,083 members.

Quoted by Casanova, “Civil Society and Religion,” 1064; quoted from Şahin's dissertation, The Alevi Movement.

Erdoğan even recommended this form of secularism to the Arab countries which are on the way of constitutional changes after the Arab spring. İdiz (Hürriyet Daily News, September 15, 2011).

Despite its recognition of the Alevi question and undertaking some efforts to introduce solutions, AKP has so far failed to produce a significant policy change over the issue. Moreover, the AKP tries to proceed by making a distinction between “good and bad Alevis.” It insists to exclude socialist-oriented Alevis from the table due to their alleged marginality.

A recent example of using the card of religion came from Erdoğan who asked the Kurdish people, “How would you support an organization (PKK) that bombs your mosques?” Milliyet, September 28, 2011.

Before 2005 Erdoğan had frequently embraced an all-inclusive identity of Turkiyelilik pointing to a geographical–historical notion like the American identity: “Like different ethnic groups who feel and define themselves as Americans, we must reach a Turkiyelilik consciousness” (Quoted from Fatih Altaylı's interview with Erdoğan on the ATV channel) Hürriyet, September 3, 2003. However, he has been increasingly referring to the uncompromising slogan of “one nation, one flag, one fatherland, one state” (Erdoğan, Star, May 8, 2008).

For an article that observes a paradigmatic shift in the top military echelons away from the the option of a military intervention, see Aydınlı, “A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish General and the End of Coup Era in Turkey,” 581–96.

Recently Erdoğan has insulted a prominent women academic and journalist, Nuray Mert, in a party meeting by calling her Namert (despicable). His anger was due to Mert's criticisms towards the harsh methods employed in the Kurdish question. “Erdoğan'dan Nuray Mert'e cok sert sözler,” (Very harsh words from Erdoğan against Mert) Milliyet, June 3, 2011

The arrests of journalists Nedim Şener ve Ahmet Şık have created a fury in the public opinion. Many believe that they were arrested because they were researching the organized activities of the pro-Gülen group within different state units. Şık's unfinished draft on these groups was destroyed by the police—a rare measure that the people are familiar from the days of military intervention.

The Ergenekon investigation officially began in June 2007. According to the prosecutors, Ergenekon is an underground terrorist organization which was established to control the country, a “deep state” that has infiltrated nearly all levels of government, especially the military. Its aim is to incite public chaos and a military coup with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Emre (Yeni Şafak, September 20, 2011).

Ibid.

Some media circles in the US tend to honor Ahmet Davutoglu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Kissinger of Turkey. Keating, “The List.” Soroush was once considered to be the ideologue of the Islamic revolution. However, his increasing disappointment from the ideologization of religion led him to develop a pluralist understanding of religious democracy that rejected the monolithic understanding and imposition of Islam on the masses. Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Post-revolutionary Iran, 196.

Özal (Tercüman, December 27, 1987).

Famous novelist Elif Şafak, Etyen Mahçupyan from the Armenian minority, Şahin Alpay with a socialist past, poet Bejan Matur known with her Alevi-Kurdish origins and İhsan Dağı with his radical liberalism are among those columnists who had contributed for a certain period or are still contributing to Zaman. Similarly, Bayramoğlu, Bumin and Düzgören are contributing to Yeni Safak.

Taraf, with a circulation of 50,000, is the most militant voice of secular-minded radical liberals.

Beyond the influence of the liberal intellectuals from Star, Yeni Şafak, Zaman and Taraf, we can also mention the impact of the youth organization known as Genç Siviller (Young Civilians) and Liberal Düşünce Derneği (Association of Liberal Thought).

Ünal (Zaman, April 12, 2010).

Albayrak (Yeni Şafak, July 29, August 9, August 19, 2011).

Akyol (Star, August 3, 17, 22, 2011).

What follows is a summary of the ideas that Akyol put forward in his three articles.

Toprak, “Being Different in Turkey.”

Ibid.

Aktay (Yeni Şafak, December 27, 2008); Bulaç (Zaman, December 22, 2008); and Dumanlı (Zaman, December 22, 2008).

Two studies that Toprak and Çarkoğlu conducted were extensively quoted by the conservative circles to present a moderate face of Islam Çarkoğlu and Toprak, Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset: Çarkoğlu and Toprak, Değişen Turkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset.

For the influential role that Karaman has played in the Islamization efforts via the education see Özgür, “Social and Political Reform Through Education,” 569–85.

Karaman (Yeni Safak, Augustus 7, 2011).

Ibid.

Kaya, “Individualization and Institutionalization,” 47–63.

Göle, İslam in Public.

Akyol (Star, August 16, 2011).

Ibid.

Akyol (Star, August 3, 2011).

The group formed The Initiative for Demanding Veiled Deputies (Başörtülü Milletvekili İstiyoruz İnisiyatifi) and started a campaign with the slogan, “If there is no veiled candidate, no vote!”.

Bulaç (Zaman, April 2, 2011). There were some conservative journalists who supported this effort such as Koru, (Zaman, April 6, 2011).

Ongun, Başörtülü Kadınlar Anlattı.

Mahçupyan (Zaman, April 7, 2011).

Ibid.