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Abstract
This study examines what has been overlooked by most studies of Islamist activism in the early years of the multi-party politics (1945–60) in Turkey. By examining the formal and informal political institutions, power relations and practices, it reveals that the early Islamists did not remain content with only socio-cultural activities. They effectively and creatively engaged with and within the political field, enjoyed an impact disproportionate to their actual numbers and power, and set the parameters for future Islamist activism. In so doing, they reproduced the Republican orthodoxy while advancing their heterodox claims.
Notes
For instance, see Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey and Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Earlier studies give more information on the action and interaction of Islamist actors within the political field, though they juxtapose Islamist activism with religious activity in general and religiousness with Islamism. See, for example, Lewis, “Islamic Revival in Turkey,” 38–48.
The entire set of cognitive and evaluative presuppositions of a given sociological field, in this case, the political field. Bourdieu, Méditations Pascaliennes, 145.
Islamist actors include the activists and elites of the Risale-i Nur Talebeleri (Risale-i Nur Students or the Students of Epistles of Light, 1926–present) and the Milli Görüş Hareketi (the National Outlook Movement (NOM), 1967–present). Non-Islamists are local and national elites and activists of the former DP and its successor, the Justice Party (1961–80). The interviews were conducted for Gencel Sezgin's larger PhD project on Islamist political engagement in the 1960s and 1970s. Interviewee names are not disclosed to preserve anonymity.
For instance, the RPP introduced elective religious classes in the primary schools, established PLP annual courses, opened the tombs and shrines of the saints and sultans to the public and allocated funds for pilgrimages to Mecca in the immediate aftermath of the transition to multi-party regime.
Tarrow, Power in Movement, 32–3.
As sets of interpersonal relations networks provide “structural connection” and “socialization functions.” They interconnect individuals, help information flow and, through prior socialization, render their members predisposed to sympathize with certain ideas and frames. Passy and Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perceptions: Explaining Differential Participation in Social Movements,” 127–8.
The RNS was organized around the persona and writings of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1878–1960).
The Süleymancı Movement was established around the persona and teachings of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959) and specialized in the establishment of underground Kur'anic courses.
To establish the DP, its leader (Celal Bayar) had agreed (with President of the Republic, and the RPP, İsmet İnönü) to uphold the Kemalist secularism principle. In fact, the DP founders had been socialized into politics within the RPP and were no less secular than the Kemalists. The DP, therefore, not only maintained the existing formal constraints, but also expanded, or helped to expand, their scope. In 1949, with the cooperation of the DP, Article 163, prohibiting religious propaganda and activities against the secular character of the state, was expanded to target associations with similar aims. Articles 241, 242 and 529 of the Penal Code, inherited from the single party era and stipulating punishments for those who “bring the administration, laws, or executive actions of the government into disrepute, or incite disobedience” and “conduct religious celebrations and processions outside recognized places of worship” were also maintained after 1950. The DP also enacted the “Atatürk Protection Law” (Atatürk’ü Koruma Kanunu) in 1951 to outlaw open disrespect towards Atatürk and thus made it more difficult to criticize secular reforms. See respectively, Osman, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session VIII, 680–97; Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 412; Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975, 367.
For smaller parties established in alliance with the conservative nationalists see Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 75 and Akkerman, Demokrasi ve Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler Hakkında Kısa Notlar, 44–64.
A “religious-nationalist” press flourished in all Anatolian provinces. See Brockett, How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk.
Islamist circles and publications refer to these editors by their first names, except for Osman Yüksel, who came to unofficially acquire the name of his publication as a second last name.
Interviews with a local elder of Maraş and Antep RNS branches, İstanbul, November 26, 2007, and May 15, 2008, and a Kayseri local leader and founder of the National Order and National Salvation Parties, Kayseri, September 6, 2006.
These sister magazines were published from the mid-1940s through the mid-1950s.
Interview with an ultranationalist founder and leader of the NAT's Kayseri branch, Kayseri, August 24, 2006. It should be re-emphasized that not all members of local right-wing networks, including the NAT, subscribed to the Islamist movement.
In three brief unsuccessful attempts in the 1950s, Büyük Doğu tried to appear as a daily as well. Uğur, Türk Basın Tarihi (1919–1989), 199. The present study focuses only on the magazines.
It should be added that the future activists of the Islamist NOM and the Justice and Nationalist Action Parties were reported to have read Büyük Doğu in the 1950s.
Karabatak, “İslâm Demokrat Partisi,” 197.
These were the National Resurgence Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi), the first party established following the liberalization, and the Turkish Conservative Party (Türk Muhafazakar Partisi), to which he would return following the abolition of the IDP. Karabatak, 197, 205.
Ibid., 199–200.
Among them, Kenan Öner, Osman Nuri Köni, Osman Bölükbaşı, and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (the army's Commander in Chief during Atatürk's and İnönü's presidencies and a beloved conservative-nationalist leader). Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 432.
For the DP congresses, see Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık, 41, and Cahiers de L'Orient Contemporain, 114. For the NP congresses see for example, Ahmad and Ahmad, Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945–1971), 97.
Except for Sebilürreşad, which had connections with Islamists in the NP, such as M. Raif Ogan, who frequently contributed to the magazine.
These two attempts were the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası-November 1924–June 25) and the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası- August–November 1930).
Lewis, “Islamic Revival in Turkey,” 43.
The above-mentioned RNS elder of Maraş and Antep, though an executive of the local NP branch, always supported and voted for the DP. He emphasized that this was a general trend among NP activists. In Kayseri, too, future activists of the NOM stated that they sympathized with, but did not vote for, the NP.
“Nedir Bu Adamların Din ile Zoru?” Sebilürreşad, no. 148 (April 1953), 361.
Çapan, “İnkılabı Bekliyoruz!” 11.
Edip, “Hükümetin Programı ve Ezan Meselesi,” p. 66.
Ömer Bilen, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Sesion IX, 436–7.
Osman Köni, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session VIII, 554.
Edip, “Laik Devletin Laik Meclisinde Din Meseleleri Konuşulamaz,” 116.
Büyük Doğuculardan Bir Grup, “Milletçe Ağlıyoruz!” 3.
DP Meclis Grubu Müzakere Zabıtı, (June 9, 1953), 17.
Reed, “Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics,” 338.
Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, 434.
Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975, 370.
It has been stated that the perpetrators were members of these organizations. Cahiers de L'Orient Contemporain, 206.
Yüksel, “Ayasofya!” 5–7.
When the NP was reestablished a month later, Islamist elites were excluded. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975, 369.
Regarding the expulsions see DP Meclis Grubu Müzakere Zabıtı (December 16, 1952), 1; (March 24, 1953), 1; and (February 3, 1953), 1.
Cited in Ahmad and Ahmad (1977), 106.
The Islamist deputies from Isparta were readmitted shortly before 1954 elections.
For the DP government's measures to silence the press, universities, unions and opposition in general see Eroğul, Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 189–200.
In social movement literature the qualities and functions attributed to collective action frames and collective identity frames greatly converge despite efforts to analytically separate them. See Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” 611–39 and Hunt and Benford, “Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment,” 433–57.
Bourdieu, “Sur le Pouvoir Symbolique,” 206. In this essay, Bourdieu focuses on the relations of power between the classes. However, he applies his conceptualization of symbolic production to any relation of power between groups who play within a given field.
Bourdieu, “Sur le Pouvoir Symbolique,” 206–7.
Bourdieu, Méditations Pascaliennes, 145.
Bourdieu, “Le Champ Scientifique,” 100. Bourdieu's analysis of the scientific field seems much more useful to understand the nature of power relations in a given field. The Turkish political field of these years witnessed the clash of the legitimacy of “the truths” (the positivist truth of the Kemalists and the religious truth of the Islamists), much like the clash of truths in a scientific field.
Binnaz, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 39–40.
Bozarslan, “Islam, Nationalisme ou les Paradoxes Turcs,” 17.
Bozarslan, “Islam, Laicité et la Question d'Autorité de l'Empire Ottoman à la Turquie Kemaliste,” 112.
See also Davison, “Turkey, a “Secular” State? The Challenge of Description,” 333–350.
Bozarslan, “Islam, Laicité et la Question d'Autorité de l'Empire Ottoman à la Turquie Kemaliste,” 112.
Ibid.
Ibid., 111.
See also Brockett, How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk. He argues that the provincial press reflected a nationalism infused with the religious identity of the people and produced at the local level against the secular and secularist nationalism of the state elites.
See, for instance, “23 Nisan ve Kuvayi Milliyeciler,” Serdengeçti, no. 22 (May 1956), 3 and “Tarihi Politikaya Alet Eden Kim?” Serdengeçti, no. 12 (Nov. 1950), 7.
Serdengeçti, “Ey Türk Milleti,” Serdengeçti, no. 25 (Sept. 1957), 1.
Serdengeçti, “İmansızlar Saltanatı,” Serdengeçti, no. 6 (May 1949), 3; Edip, “Hükümetin Programı,” 66–78; Dedektif X Bir, “Kanun,” Büyük Doğu, 3.
Edip, “Kuranın Siyasi ve İctimai Umdeleri,” 275.
Edip, “Partilerin Din Siyaseti,” 3.
See, for instance, Kısakürek, “1001 Çerçeveden: Musaviler,” 2.
Hasan Fehmi Ustaoğlu. Ustaoğlu, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session IX, 449, 487. See also Edip, Kuranın Siyasi ve İctimai Umdeleri, 275.
Tunaya, İslamcılık Akımı, 201.
TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session IX, 362.
Yüksel, “Ayasofya,” 3; the İstanbul branch of the NAT voiced similar demands. See “Ayasofya Camii,” 386.
See, for instance, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session IX, 938–1001, in passim; DP Meclis Grubu Müzakere Zabıtı, (May 3, 1951), 8–48.
TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session IX, 604.
For this paragraph see Ibid., 604–11.
In this essay only the gains that could be considered public and redistributed to members of religious and Islamist networks in the form of new jobs, education opportunities, or a higher standard of living are taken into consideration.
Çakır, Bozan and Talu, İmam Hatip Liseleri, 60. Retrieved from http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/IH%20Efsaneler-Gercekler.pdf.
Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 80.
In 1962, two years after the coup d’état of 1960, the Minister of State responsible for public religious establishments declared that of Turkey's 60,000 religious personnel, 55,000 had no formal education. Çakır, Bozan and Talu, İmam Hatip Liseleri, 96–7. This lack of education among PRA employees supports the view that the increase in the cadres helped previously non-recognized medrese scholars and men of religion gain a certain status through employment by the state.