Europeanization of the Aegean Dispute: An Analysis of Turkish Political Elite Discourse

Abstract

This paper examines how the Aegean dispute which has been one of the contentious issues between Turkey and Greece for more than three decades has been Europeanized on the Turkish side. This Europeanization process started, in particular, with Turkey's candidacy to the European Union granted at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. In this article, the extent of the Europeanization of the Aegean dispute is measured by making references to the security and foreign policy discourses in Turkey. The change in the Turkish elite's discourses, or more concretely, the shift from the confrontational to cooperative discourses, is identified in the speeches delivered by the political leaders from the Turkish side.

Notes

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10. European Council in Copenhagen, “Conclusions of the Presidency,” June, 21–22, 2003 see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/default_en.htm

11. Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East,” 303–27.

12. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations,” 253–74.

13. Tonra and Christiansen, The Study of EU Foreign Policy, 134–75.

14. This is the way in which the EU approaches to the dispute resolution is via cooperation and integration. So, the logic is that there is universal principle for achieving a peaceful resolution of disputes over the military engagement. Western values depicted in “the development of a peace community” embrace reconciliation between the former enemies just like in the French–German conflicts over the Alsace-Lorraine.

15. Diez, Agnantopoulas, and Kaliber, “Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society,” 1–15.

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23. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 65.

24. Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 32.

25. Ibid., 204.

26. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” 66.

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28. Wagner, “Analyzing the European Politics of Internal Security,” 1033–9.

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30. Howarth and Stavrakakis, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, 243.

31. Van Dyke, “An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes Under International Law,” 63–117.

32. Heraclides, “Imagined Enemies,” 231.

33. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict.

34. Larrabee and Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy, 74.

35. Van Dyke, “An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes Under International Law,” 83.

36. Ibid., Kramer, A Changing Turkey, 167. It is about the

state's exclusive right to economic exploitation of resources on and under the sea-bed (fishery, oil exploration) that adjacent to its territorial water. Turkey insists that its unique geography and the nature of the Aegean (as a semi-enclosed sea) does present “special circumstances” that would provide an equal right for Turkey to reaching the High Seas without passing through the Greek waters.

37. Gross, “Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf,” 31–59.

38. International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Greece”. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Article 57: “The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

39. Alexis Papachelas, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/ENFORMASYON/Turkish%20FM%20sets%20out%20terms%20for%20Aegean.pdf. Ahmet Davutoğlu also emphasizes that a solution can be reached in the Aegean. Davutoğlu is also known with his thoughts articulated in his book Strategic Depth on Turkish foreign policy priorities one of which would be the improvement of the relations with its neighboring countries. In addition, Davutoğlu's insistence on the EEZ stems from the fact that he claims that any Greek action towards the extension of the continental shelf would hinder Turkey's navigational freedoms and rights in the Aegean. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik/Strategic Depth, 148–72.

40. Moustakis, The Greek–Turkish Relationship and NATO, 39.

41. Nachmani, “What Says the Neighbor to the West,” 76.

42. Kramer, A Changing Turkey, 167.

43. Halikiopoulou, Patterns of Secularization.

44. Blum, Islands of Agreement, 143.

45. Haramlambos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea.

46. Van Dyke, “An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes Under International Law.”

47. Heraclides, Yunanistan ve ‘Doğu'dan Gelen Tehlike.

48. Van Dyke, “An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes Under International Law.”

49. International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Greece.”

50. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict.

51. Bilgin, “Turkey's Changing Security Discourses,” 175–201.

52. Heraclides, “The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry.”

53. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy.

54. Bölükbaşı, Turkey and Greece, 65.

55. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society, 213.

56. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri 1821–1993.

57. Sönmezoğlu and Ayman, “The Roots of Conflict and the Dynamics,” 39.

58. Heraclides, The Greek–Turkish Conflict in the Aegean; Özkırımlı and Sofos, Tormented by History, 2.

59. Cumhuriyet, July 19, 1976.

60. Cumhuriyet, July 15, 1976.

61. Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation, 24.

62. Turkey also perceives the Greek intentions on the demilitarization of islands that must be articulated referring the “Greek islands” by the Greek side whereas Turkey emphasizes the situation referring to the “Eastern Aegean islands.”

63. Cumhuriyet, July 15, 1976.

64. Heraclides, “Imagined Enemies,” 226.

65. Aksu, “Ege Sorunlarının Geleceği ve Türkiye; AB Üyelik Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Seçenekleri,” 261–86, see http://www.turkishgreek.org/makaleler/egesorunTr.htm. Turkey kept its announcement on the casus belli cases, with the adoption of a resolution by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1995.

66. Cumhuriyet, July 19, 1976.

67. Aksu, “Ege Sorunlarının Geleceği ve Türkiye; AB Üyelik Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Seçenekleri,” 261–86, see http://www.turkishgreek.org/makaleler/egesorunTr.htm

68. Hürriyet, March 26, 1987.

69. Hürriyet, March 28, 1987.

70. Cumhuriyet, March 27, 1987.

71. Hürriyet, March 27, 1987.

72. Elekdağ, “2 ½ War Strategy,” 33–57.

73. In Turkish daily newspaper Hürriyet published on March 29, 1987, Turkish attitude was displayed as “firm, decisive and self-confident” while the Greeks were described in “urgency, panic and extremely concerned.”

74. Rumelili, “The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict,” 7.

75. Spyropoulos, “AHMP Letter to the New York Times, February 5, 1996,” 1996, see http://www.hri.org/ahmp/nytimes10.html.

76. Rumelili, “The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict.”

77. The EU has served as a significant actor which urges Turkey committed to settle their disputes in the Aegean peacefully in accordance with the international law and to submit their differences before the International Court of Justice by the end of 2004.

78. Since its formal relations were established in 1959, Europeanization for Turkey meant “Westernization and Modernization” in Turkish domestic policy. It has been the main objective to raise Turkey to the “level of contemporary civilization.”

79. Rumelili, “Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders,” 105–26.

80. Heraclides, The Greek–Turkish Conflict in the Aegean.

81. Both parties did not attempt to bring the issues to the Court. However, even if Turkey was the unwilling side, it also softened its firm stance towards Greece. Çelik and Rumelili, “Necessary but not Sufficient,” 217.

82. Commission of the European Communities, Turkey: 1999 Progress Report, Brussels, October 13, 1999, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf.

83. Çelik and Rumelili, “Necessary but not Sufficient,” 219.

84. Commission of the European Communities, Turkey: 2000 Progress Report, Brussels, November 8, 2000, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key_documents_en.htm.

85. Commission of the European Communities, Turkey: 2004 Progress Report, Brussels, October 6, 2004, SEC (2004) 1201, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key_documents_en.htm.

86. Commission of the European Communities, Turkey: 2010 Progress Report, Brussels, November 9, 2010, SEC (2010) 1327, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keyocuments/reports_nov_2010_en.htm. Commission of the European Communities, Turkey: 2011 Progress Report, Brussels, October 12, 2011, SEC (2011) 1201, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_oct_2011_en.htm

87. Milliyet, May 24, 2006.

88. Sabah, October 19, 2003.

89. Athensnews, 2003, see http://www.athensnews.gr/old_issue/13037/10472, 23 October.

90. Yetkin, “Casus belli yapıcı bir çıkış,” Radikal, April 9, 2005. As a fact, the statement has not been voiced publicly, in the media or elsewhere for so long. This issue is not discussed very often. In addition, the main discourses are being shaped at the political elite level and it would not be wrong to say that no word concerning the “casus belli” was not very often mentioned politically during the 2000s. Therefore, (in line with the article's theoretical ground) the target audiences (Turkish people) are not mobilized in military terms by the statements made by the Turkish politicians.

91. Milliyet, May 14, 2010.

Additional information

Gökcen Yavas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Kocaeli University, Kocaeli. She holds a PhD in European Union Politics and International Relations and an MA in International Relations from Marmara University, İstanbul. Her research focuses on international and European security and Turkish foreign and security policy.