Reading Turkey's Foreign Policy on Syria: The AKP's Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of Grandeur

Abstract

This study examines the ways in which Turkey's regional role, power and self-image are constructed by the Turkish official discourse on Syria. Focusing on the speeches of the AKP government on the conflict, as reported in a major mainstream Turkish daily, Milliyet, between March 2011 and November 2012, the article explores the major building blocks of the AKP government's representation of Turkey's capability, responsibility and threat perceptions with regard to the ongoing crisis. The analysis shows that the AKP government's demonization of the Assad regime and depiction of Turkey's moral responsibility toward the Syrian people served to constitute Turkey's great power role and assert Turkey's moral superiority vis-à-vis the other actors in the conflict. Turkey's policy of grandeur has been an integral element of the country's moralist, as well as national security discourse on Syria.

Notes on contributor

Özlem Demirtas-Bagdonas received her PhD in Political Science from Central European University in 2008. She is currently an assistant professor of international relations at Fatih University. Her research interests include Turkish foreign policy, politics of identity, critical security studies and Kemalism.

Notes

1. Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision,” 80.

2. Yılmaz and Bilgin, “Constructing Turkey's ‘Western’ Identity.”

3. On Turkey's cautious policy of non-intervention in the Middle East during the Cold war era, see Aras and Köni, “Turkish-Syrian Relations Revisited”; Jung, “Turkey and the Arab World”. On the daring and interventionist policies of Turkey toward Syria in the late 1950s, see Mufti, “From Swamp to Backyard,” 83.

4. Kirişçi, “Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times,” 12.

5. Sayari, “Turkish Foreign Policy.” See also, Öniş, “Turkey and the Middle East” and Jung, “Turkey and the Arab World.”

6. For a detailed analysis of the 1998 crisis, see Aras, “Similar Strategies, Dissimilar Outcomes.”

7. Ibid., 43.

8. Altunışık and Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 571; Oğuzlu, “Soft Power,” 87 and Kirişçi, “Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times.”

9. Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey's Search” and Aras, “Turkey's Rise,” 35.

10. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik and Aras, “Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill,” 44.

11. Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision,” 80

12. Cebeci and Üstün, “The Syrian Quagmire,” 15.

13. Walker, “Turkey's Time in Syria,” 2.

14. Aras, “Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill,” 50.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.; Hokayem, “Syria and its Neighbors,” 10.

17. Aras, “Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill,” 48.

18. Ibid., 49; Hokayem, “Syria and its Neighbors,” 10 and Phillips, “Turkey's Syrian Problem.”

19. Karaveli, “Why Does Turkey Want a Regime Change in Syria?”

20. See for instance, Karaveli, “Why Does Turkey Want a Regime Change in Syria?” and Karaveli, “Turkey Is No Partner for Peace.” For a criticism of this view, see Akyol, “Is Turkey's Foreign Policy Really Sunni?”

21. Taşpınar, “Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria,” 128.

22. Ibid., 138.

23. Ibid.

24. ‘Ideationalist’ perspectives seek to explain relationships between different phenomena in terms of ideas, identities and ideologies, rather than interests.

25. On the multiple uses of Kemalism in the Turkish foreign policy discourse, see Demirtaş Bagdonas, “A Post-structuralist Approach” and Demirtaş Bagdonas, “The Clash of Kemalisms?”

26. Hansen, Security as Practice, 1.

27. Campbell, Writing Security; Campbell, Politics Without Principle; Dillon, Politics of Security; Shapiro, Violent Cartographies; Connoly, Identity and Difference and Behnke, NATO's Security Discourse.

28. Campbell, Writing Security, 9 and Connoly, Identity and Difference, 201.

29. Campbell, Writing Security, 9.

30. Ibid., 11.

31. Ibid.

32. Wæver, “Identity, Communities, and Foreign Policy,” 24.

33. “Ankara'dan Suriye'ye en sert tepki,” Milliyet, May 6, 2011. http://goo.gl/R9mXK.

34. “Erdoğan: Kanla iktidar olanlar kanla giderler,” Milliyet, September 9, 2011. http://goo.gl/3n8Qj.

35. “Meraklısı değiliz ama savaştan uzak değiliz,” Milliyet, October 6, 2012. http://goo.gl/h7OCC.

36. Fikret Bila, “Davutoğlu: Esad, Miloseviç olmayı tercih etti.”

37. “Esad babasının rekorunun peşinde,” Milliyet, October 11, 2012. http://goo.gl/PvuU5.

38. Ibid.

39. “Türkiye için tehlike, kitle imha silahları,” Milliyet, September 6, 2012. http://goo.gl/xkikB.

40. See also “Press Release Regarding All Diplomatic Members of the Syrian Embassy in Ankara Being Asked to Leave the Country,” No: 151, May 30, 2012, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://goo.gl/Ftphs.

41. “Oldu bittiye göz yumamayız,” Milliyet, August 1, 2012. http://goo.gl/hXTk1.

42. Jeremy Bowen, “Turkey: Risk Worth Taking for Syria Safe Zones.”

43. “Misliyle karşılık veririz,” Milliyet, July 24, 2012. http://goo.gl/svtBH.

44. “Erdoğan’ın hedefinde hem Esad hem de CHP vardı,” Milliyet, March 6, 2012. http://goo.gl/Ujnw9.

45. “Başbakan'dan Batı’ya rest,” Milliyet, October 12, 2012. http://goo.gl/Xv6wQ.

46. “Esad öldürünce suç olmuyor mu?” Milliyet, June 9, 2012. http://goo.gl/1BpRr.

47. “Davutoğlu İran'a sert çıktı,” Milliyet, August 8, 2012. http://goo.gl/f6fO8.

48. “Erdoğan: Kerbela neyse Suriye de odur,” Milliyet, September 8, 2012. http://goo.gl/hC3iy. It must be noted here that the Karbala Battle of 680 AD, which took place between the supporters of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein ibn Ali and the forces of Yazid I of the Ummayad Caliphate, whom Ali did not recognize as a caliph, resulted in the death of all of the supporters of Ali, and gave way to the Shia–Sunni divide.

49. Daniel Domney, “Ahmet Davutoglu: Renewed confidence is on display.”

50. “Ortadoğu'da değişimi yöneteceğiz,” Milliyet, April 27, 2012. http://goo.gl/jdnT0.

51. “Suriye'deki sancılı sürecin çok uzun süreceğini düşünmüyorum,” Milliyet, August 25, 2012. http://goo.gl/xjFLd. [Italics mine].

52. “Dostluğumuz değerli gazabımız şiddetlidir,” Milliyet, June 27, 2012. http://goo.gl/ZNEQa.

53. “Çelik: Bu olaydan sonra başka bir aşamaya geçilmiştir,” Milliyet, June 24, 2012. http://goo.gl/NQ2Io.

54. “Kimse bizi test etmesin,” Milliyet, June 25, 2012. http://goo.gl/lLWh5.

55. “Müdahale hakkımız,” Milliyet, July 26, 2012. http://goo.gl/XQ5HQ.

56. Fikret Bila, “Kuzey Irak-Kuzey Suriye çelişkisi.”

57. “Haklarımızı koruyacağız,” Milliyet, October 4, 2012. http://goo.gl/ZomTM.

58. “Başbakan Erdoğan'dan Suriye açıklaması,” Milliyet, October 4, 2012. http://goo.gl/rJUoe.

59. “Erdoğan: Her an gerekirse savaşa hazır olmak zorundayız,” Milliyet, October 7, 2012. http://goo.gl/ZPjiK.

60. “Biz buradayız dimdik ayaktayız,” Milliyet, October 10, 2012. http://goo.gl/WvGKC.

61. “3 saatte Şam'a varırız,” Milliyet, October 11, 2012. http://goo.gl/sXbjv.

62. “Meraklısı değiliz ama savaştan uzak değiliz,” Milliyet, October 6, 2012. http://goo.gl/QW0Sk.

63. “Bağış: Türkiye Suriye'yi birkaç saatte yok eder,” Milliyet, October 6, 2012. http://goo.gl/vWNBP.

64. “Dostluğumuz değerli gazabımız şiddetlidir,” Milliyet, June 27, 2012. http://goo.gl/90u8n.