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Original Articles

Abortion and Public Reason in Turkey: A Normative Evaluation of the Discourses of AKP and CHP

Pages 45-61 | Published online: 10 Mar 2014
 

Abstract

During May and June 2012, the question of abortion was hotly debated in Turkish public forums. This paper analyzes the main characteristics of this abortion debate using John Rawls's conception of public reason as a normative framework. In doing so, speeches and declarations on abortion made by legislators are critically evaluated. The arguments in the debate are examined with a view to interpret how the issue should be discussed as far as the demands of public reason are concerned. From a Rawlsian framework, it is observed that the pro-ban position (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) is far from contributing to a reasonable balance of political values on abortion whereas the contra-ban position (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) satisfies the demands of public reason. Moreover, it is argued that, the latest proposed legislation on abortion cannot be viewed as an outcome of a reasonable balance of political values but is rather an outcome of pragmatic compromise.

Notes on contributor

Devrim Kabasakal Badamchi received her PhD in political theory from Luiss Guido Carli University in Italy in 2009. She is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration in İzmir University, Turkey. She is interested in contemporary political theory with a specific focus on political liberalism, multiculturalism and toleration. She is the author of the book, The Tension Between Action and Revolution in Arendt's Political Thought. She published articles on the idea of toleration, John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas.

Notes

1. To be consistent on terminology, throughout the paper, the terms pro-ban and contra-ban are used to define the two positions of the debate on abortion. This terminology seems to be more accurate and neutral as compared to other American originated ones, such as pro-life and pro-choice.

2. According to the draft regulation, only gynecologists in hospitals may practice abortion, rather than also gynecologists in private clinics, as is currently the case.

3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

4. There are varieties of accounts on public reason in the contemporary liberal theory. For some of the main resources, see Habermas, “Reconcilitaion Through the Public Use of Reason;” Habermas, “Reasonable Versus “True”;” Cohen, “Truth and Public Reason;” Gaus, The Order of Public Reason; and Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason.”

5. It might be claimed that abortion is among those controversial problems that are morally unresolvable, but when it is transferred to the legal and political domain, there are situations that force us to decide on its permissibility. In this sense, Gert states that, in the legal political domain, the question is resolved at the practical level but the moral question is not resolved. He says,

Common morality does not provide a unique correct answer to questions about the moral acceptability of abortion. Neither the claim that women almost never ought not to have an abortion nor the claim that women ought to be allowed to have abortions at any time, are in conflict with common morality. Of course, many people on both sides of the abortion issue claim that common morality supports their position. However, most people recognize that some otherwise competent moral agents, i.e., those who know what kinds of actions morality prohibits, requires, discourages, encourages, and allows, hold an opposing view. Unlike the attitudes that people take with regard to most moral judgments, e.g., that it is morally wrong to lie, cheat, or steal, those who make moral judgments concerning abortion realize that they need to provide arguments to support their judgments. Many also believe that they need to show that those who make opposing judgments are mistaken” (Gert, “Moral Disagreement Concerning Abortion,” 34).

6. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 214.

7. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 227.

8. Ibid., 445.

9. Ibid., 215.

10. Ibid., 247.

11. Ibid., 252.

12. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 453.

13. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 243.

14. Ibid.

15. George, a well-known American conservative thinker, argues that this conclusion of Rawls about abortion is arbitrary since he does not explain the reasons behind the decision that the value of the equality of women overrides the value of fetal life. He claims:

The absence of argument for this claim is especially remarkable in view of the fact that opponents of abortion contend that the right to life (which, in their view, the unborn share with all other human beings) is fundamental and inviolable and, as such, cannot be ‘balanced’ against other considerations. (George, “Public Reason and Political Conflict,” 13) Here, we might come up with two possible answers to this critic within Rawls' political liberalism. First, as mentioned in the text, Rawls thinks that only such a decision would satisfy a reasonable balance of political values. That is to say, any decision banning abortion altogether would violate the equality and rights of women. Second, he might have thought that the rights of women (who are undeniably persons) should not be overridden by the supposed rights of the early fetus, whose moral personality is questionable.

16. Freeman, “Public Reason and Political Justifications,” 2054–2055.

17. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 244.

18. Freeman, “Public Reason and Political Justifications,” 2054–2055.

19. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 479.

20. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion, 127. On this point, Torcello claims that Rawls's permissive conclusions regarding abortion stem from his commitment to moral skepticism, especially in his later philosophy. For him, this is evident from the role that “burdens of judgement” plays in his formulation of moral pluralism and the political response to it. Thus, he says: “It follows that while one need not like abortion, or agree that it is morally neutral, one does need to tolerate its availability to others in a free society.” Torcello, “A Precautionary Tale,” 22.

21. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion, 127.

22. Torcello asserts that the Rawlsian position on abortion would even support the woman's right to choose in all stages of pregnancy, from conception to birth. He argues:

As controversial as it is to decide whether or not a fetus or infant is a person in the morally relevant sense of the term, it is just as non-controversial to recognize that the woman who is carrying the fetus, if otherwise healthy, is a full person with self-awareness and the accompanying moral status that such personhood denotes within the bounds of the societal contract. While any argument that can be made from public reason will intrinsically recognize the moral priority of the actual person, only arguments that are rooted in a comprehensive doctrine, whether religious or philosophical, can be appealed to in order to grant moral status to the fetus in a way that can seriously stand against the moral relevance of an actual adult woman. Any argument granting moral status to the fetus will involve a robust comprehensive doctrine concerning the distinction between human and person or the sanctity of human life, and therefore, such arguments must be bracketed out of public debates over abortion. (Torcello, “A Precautionary Tale,” 25)

23. Radikal. 2012. “Erdoğan: Sezeryana karşıyım, kürtaj cinayettir.” May 25. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1089120&CategoryID=78

24. Warren challenges the argument founded on the idea that the fetus is a person. For her, it is difficult to argue that fetuses are persons since the capacity for reason, self-awareness and social and moral reciprocity seems to develop only after birth. She develops her argument on the basis of the rights of women by claiming that

since women are persons and fetuses are not, we should come down on the side of respecting women's rights in cases of apparent conflict … The extension of equal moral status to fetuses threatens women's most basic rights … That is why abortion should not be prohibited and why birth, rather than some earlier point, marks the beginning of full moral status. (“Abortion,” 312–313)

25. Thomson discusses the possible meanings of “the right to life” argument in her well-known article, “A Defense of Abortion,” where she develops an argument in favor of abortion. She argues that “having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body—even if one needs it for life itself” (10). For further discussion on the right to life and abortion, see Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion.”

26. Yeni Şafak. 2012. “Akdağ: Kurtaj bir cinayettir.” May 29. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://beta.yenisafak.com.tr/saglik-haber/akdag-kurtaj-bir-cinayet-29.05.2012-385966

27. Radikal. 2012. “Bakan Akdağ: Tecavüz Bebeğine Devlet Bakar.” May 31. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1089651&CategoryID=77

28. Radikal. 2012. “Ayhan Sefer Üstün, Tecavüze Uğrayan da Kürtaj Yaptırmamalı.” June 1. Accessed September 14, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1089772&CategoryID=78

29. The Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs also argued similarly against abortion. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in 1924 as an institution affiliated with the Prime Ministry. It is officially and legally responsible for the regulation of Islamic worshipping activities and also the enlightenment of citizens regarding religious matters. The head of the institution, Mehmet Görmez, has argued that the human body is given to us as a trust; therefore, we are not the owners of our body. He says,

It is our duty to carry the body well and provide it with the conditions of living well … The fetus in the body of the mother has a right to life. Neither the father nor mother has a right of ownership on the life of the fetus, they do not have the authority to end the life of the fetus or renunciation on the life of the fetus. For this reason, the mother does not have the right and authority to claim that it is her body and she can use it in the manner she wants; she can have a baby and get rid of it when she wants. (Yeni Safak. 2012. “Ceninde Annenin Mülkiyeti Yoktur.” June 5. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/Default.aspx?i=387170)

Here, Görmez declares Islam's point of view on the issue of abortion. His argument is founded on the Islamic belief that the bodies of all human beings, including that of a fetus, belong to God. That is why abortion is considered as acting against the will of God. This is a religious argument opposing abortion but not a political value that can be part of a reasonable balance on the abortion issue. In order to be part of a reasonable balance, proper public reasons must be offered in due course.

30. Radikal. 2012. “Üstün: Kürtaj Yasaklanmalı.” May 28. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1089350&CategoryID=78

31. We might claim that it is important to develop an argument on the basis of the moral rights of women to have an abortion to oppose those who believe abortion is inherently and morally wrong. Consequentialist arguments such as the argument about the health of women may not be convincing enough to counter the anti-abortion position. Moreover, the political actors who favor banning abortion in Turkey develop consequentialist arguments related to the health of women too, claiming that for health reasons abortion should be banned. One may say that this is a weak argument since today abortions can be carried out very safely due to medical developments. However, this does not rule out the necessity to come up with non-consequentialist arguments to convince those who believe that abortion is morally wrong.

32. Milliyet. 2012. “Diyanet'e Kurtaj Tepkisi.” June 6, 2012. Accessed September 13. http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/diyanet-e-kurtajtepkisi/gundem/gundemdetay/06.06.2012/1549849/default.htm

33. Milliyet. 2012. “Basbakan Vajina Bekciligini Bıraksın.” May 26. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-basbakan-vajina-bekciligini-biraksin/siyaset/siyasetdetay/26.05.2012/1545483/default.htm

34. Ibid.

35. Radikal. 2012. “Gürsel Tekin: Gündemi Değiştirmeye Çalışıyorlar.” June 1. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1089871&CategoryID=78

36. Radikal. 2012. “AKP'de Kurtaj Konusunda Aykırı Açıklama.” June 8, 2012. Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1090521&CategoryID=78&Rdkref=1

37. Torcello, “A Precautionary Tale,” 24.

38. According to Rawls's revised statements on abortion in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” abortion might be allowed earlier or later than the first trimester depending on the reasonable balance of political values that is reached.

39. Here, the duration in which abortion is allowed might change according to the balance of political values that is reached, whether earlier or later in pregnancy.

40. Torcello, “A Precautionary Tale,” 25.

41. It might be possible to add a further point to support this claim that the AKP took a pragmatic rather than principled stance regarding the whole abortion debate. The entire debate was initiated by the government right in the middle of discussions about the Uludere bombings. In this event, at the end of 2011, 35 Kurdish smugglers in eastern Turkey were mistaken for terrorists and bombed, turning into a widely debated scandal during May 2012. Therefore, in the media, there were comments arguing that the government had initiated the abortion debate in order to distract public attention from the bombings. Although there may be some truth in this banal dimension to the debate, it does not rule out the need to evaluate the speeches on abortion made by legislators from a normatively demanding point of view since these speeches fall into the realm of public reason, which is essential for a democratic culture. That is, these declarations made by parliamentarians are public in character and so, in a democratic society, they should satisfy the demands of public reason.

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